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Chair's comments

Welcome to Issue No. 194 of the *Australian Defence Force Journal*.

The Board again had almost double the number of required articles, which continues to be an encouraging development in enabling the Board to be critically selective in its choices and further enhancing the professional standing of the *Journal*. In this competitive environment, several otherwise very worthwhile articles have been deferred to the next edition or will be published on the Australian Defence College's website as Geddes or Shedden Papers <<http://www.defence.gov.au/adcc/publications/publications.html>>.

I am pleased to announce that the lead article by Jo Woodbury, addressing the promised referendum on the future political status of Bougainville and its implications for Australia, has been judged the 'best article' in this issue. Its author, who is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Australian Defence College, will also receive a certificate personally signed by the CDF and Secretary of Defence, as will all future winners of this award.

We then feature a selection of articles on a range of subjects. Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Beng of the Singapore Armed Forces provides a useful account of submarine developments in Southeast Asia, which is timely as Australia contemplates its future submarine capability. Chris Brookes addresses the very topical issue of Japan's future strategic policy and its implications for Australia. Rachel Mourad then examines the lessons to be drawn from the use of air power in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, NATO's air campaign against Libya in 2011.

Captain Katherine Richards provides a critical assessment of the likely impact on regional security of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, contending that the US presence in the region, and economic interdependence between the key states, are important constraints. Major Nathan Stapleton then argues that past strategic policy can provide useful insight into Australia's contemporary defence policy challenges. And Major Emma Maiden addresses the importance of coercion in counterinsurgency operations, highlighting examples from Malaya and Iraq.

The article by Corporal Gary Jones assesses the potential role of the ADF's Service Police in providing training and mentoring assistance to host nation police forces. I commend Corporal Jones for his contribution and would hope that it provides inspiration for others from the ADF's more junior ranks to contribute to future issues. Wing Commander Pam Bradshaw then examines three post-Cold War UN stability operations to argue that the 'liberal peace thesis' and the Western sensibilities that underpin it are flawed. The final article, by Cate Carter, asserts that there are gaps in the services being provided to veterans, highlighting the need for dedicated services to women, and better plans to reintegrate veterans into the broader community.

The issue concludes with a review essay by Brigadier Chris Field, and a selection of book reviews. As always, we remain keen to hear from readers wishing to join the list of reviewers, who are sent books provided to the Editor by publishers. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and area of interest to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au

The November/December 2014 edition will be a 'general' issue, although we would also welcome articles that may be relevant in informing the next Defence White Paper. For the information of readers, we will be including in each issue a list of forthcoming Defence-related seminars and conferences, covering topics that could also be addressed by contributors (see page 4).

Contributions for the next issue should be submitted to the Editor, at the email address above, by mid September. Submission guidelines are on the *Journal* website (see www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au).

I hope you enjoy this edition and would encourage your contribution to future issues.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'S. Wilkie'.

Simone Wilkie, AM
Major General
Commander, Australian Defence College
Chair of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board

Forthcoming seminars and conferences

12 August 2014

1730-1830 at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra
Professor Eliot Cohen, 'The Strategic Utility of Land Power in an Australian Context'
<<https://www.aspi.org.au/>>

13 August 2014

1745-1900 at the Lowy Institute, Sydney
Professor Eliot Cohen, 'The Changing Utility of Land Power in the 21st Century'
<<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/events/event-changing-utility-land-power-21st-century-eliot-cohen>>

24 September 2014

1730-1930, Royal United Services Institute of Australia, Canberra
Defence White Paper 2015 Panel - Australian Defence Capability Policy Settings
<https://www.rusi.org.au/states/act/whats_on.php>

10 October 2014

Williams Foundation seminar
'Battlespace Awareness: the Joint Edge'
Details expected shortly on Williams Foundation website
<<http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/>>

11 November 2014

Sea Power Centre-Australia in conjunction with ANU Law Faculty
Seminar on 'the implication of the UN Law of the Sea Convention on Navies'
Linked to the 20th anniversary of LOSC
Details to be provided shortly on Sea Power Centre-Australia's website
<<https://www.navy.gov.au/spc/>>

October 2015

To be held in Sydney
Sea Power Conference 2015, with the theme 'The Future of Sea Power'
Details to be provided shortly on Sea Power Centre-Australia's website
<<https://www.navy.gov.au/spc/>>

Ongoing

RAAF's Air Power Development Centre runs regular Air Power Seminars
Russell R1 Theatre
Details at <<http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Home.aspx>>

NOTE

To advertise forthcoming seminars and conferences in future issues of the
Journal, please email details to the Editor
publications@defence.adc.edu.a

Bougainville: the promised referendum and its implications for Australia¹

Jo Woodbury, Australian Defence College



Introduction

The Bougainville crisis of the late 1980s and 1990s was not a conflict resolved, it was a conflict deferred.² Hostilities erupted in November 1988 when a group of landowners launched violent protests against Bougainville Copper Limited and successfully halted operations at Panguna, one of the world's largest copper and gold mines.³ Exacerbated by desires for self-determination, intra-Bougainvillean conflicts and rising resentment against the Papua New Guinean (PNG) Government over inequitable mining revenue distribution, the insurrection sparked what has been described as a 'nine-year destructive secessionist war against PNG',⁴ otherwise known as the Bougainville crisis.

In 1989, the PNG Government announced a state of emergency. Several peace talks and agreements failed during the 1990s, before a truce was signed in 1997 and a ceasefire finalised in January 1998.⁵ By then, Bougainville's major infrastructure had been destroyed, the functions of the PNG state were crippled and the island's economy had regressed into subsistence.⁶ Around 10,000 Bougainvilleans—5 per cent of the population—had died of violence or disease.⁷ At one stage, over 60,000 Bougainvilleans—almost one-third of the population—were internally displaced and living in camps.⁸ The crisis also had spill-over effects in the neighbouring Solomon Islands.⁹ It was 'the deadliest, bloodiest, and most destructive conflict in the South Pacific since World War 2'.¹⁰

The purported resolution to the crisis was the Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed in 2001.¹¹ This was a joint creation of PNG and Bougainvillean leaders, and provided an agreed roadmap to the formation of an Autonomous Bougainville Government, which began in 2005, as well as demilitarisation through a three-

stage, UN-supervised weapons disposal process.¹² Importantly, the Agreement also guaranteed Bougainvilleans a referendum between 2015 and 2020 on the question of Bougainville's future political status—that is, whether to continue as an autonomous region within PNG or to progress as a fully-independent nation.¹³ While the result will not be unanimous, it seems likely that most Bougainvilleans will vote in favour of independence at the referendum.¹⁴

The outcome of Bougainville's referendum, however, is not binding as it remains subject to ratification by PNG's Parliament.¹⁵ Because of pressure from other PNG provinces for autonomy, and the potential loss of future mining revenue from Bougainville, the PNG Government could resist or delay recognising any referendum result which favours independence.¹⁶

The foreseeable mismatch of expectations on the outcomes of the referendum—and how Bougainvilleans and the PNG Government seek to resolve these—could have security implications, including for Australia and the immediate region.¹⁷ While it is not inevitable that Bougainville would return to bloody conflict, recourse to violence cannot be discounted as a product of provocation, miscalculation or habit.¹⁸

Australia's attention to Bougainville sharply diminished once the peace monitors departed in 2003. Since then, the island's prominence has receded as commitments to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands quickly overtook the space in Australia's strategic policy where Bougainville once also stood.¹⁹ This article argues that Australia urgently needs to re-engage on Bougainville issues, in concert with its Pacific regional partners. As the window for the referendum draws nearer, a proverbial 'stitch in time' could help preserve peace on Bougainville and lessen significant and costly problems across the next decade.²⁰

Why will Bougainvilleans vote for independence?

Many Bougainvilleans do not see themselves or their homeland as a natural or inevitable part of PNG. Oliver describes Bougainville as 'the black spot in an island world of brown skins',²¹ and the distinctively 'jet-black' people of Bougainville colloquially refer to mainland Papua New Guineans as 'redskins'.²²

From a cultural, linguistic and geographic perspective, Bougainville forms part of the Solomon Islands' chain. Bougainville's political attachment to PNG is a legacy of 19th century German and British colonial boundaries.²³ This was reinforced by the UN after World War 2, when Australia administered the combined Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

Griffin documents Bougainvillean movements towards secession in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁴ These led to a unilateral declaration of independence by the 'Republic of North Solomons' (and a failed bid for self-determination at the UN) around the time of PNG's independence from Australia in 1975, with similar claims made by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in 1990.²⁵ These declarations lacked international recognition at the time but demonstrate a longstanding desire within Bougainville for independence—a sentiment which has gathered more support in the intervening years.

Crisis-related divisions between the pro-independence Bougainville Revolutionary Army and pro-government Bougainville Resistance Forces began to subside during the peace and autonomy process. As Regan observed in 2002, 'factions that previously opposed one another ... now work together towards establishing a single set of institutions under agreed autonomy arrangements'.²⁶ Very few Bougainvilleans advocate a permanent autonomy model²⁷ and it is now widely expected that the majority of Bougainvilleans will vote for independence at the referendum.²⁸

Augmenting this trend, and arguably working against its own long-term interests, the PNG Government has not sufficiently demonstrated to Bougainvilleans how autonomy could work to full effect. Its budget and development grants to Bougainville are seriously in arrears, the transfer of functions and powers to Bougainville since 2005 has been slow, and the level of post-conflict reconstruction and restoration of services has been inadequate.²⁹ This has entrenched Bougainvillean resentment and distrust of the national government and made the benefits of remaining within the PNG system unclear. As Bougainville President John Momis, one of the few local champions of autonomy, conceded in 2013:

[T]he people of Bougainville deserve to have a real choice between two comparably attractive options, namely full autonomy and independence.... [But] if autonomy is perceived as not comparable to independence, then the people [will] have no choice.³⁰

Admittedly, there have been some positive steps taken recently by PNG's current Prime Minister, Peter O'Neill. In January 2014, he became the first sitting Prime Minister to visit Bougainville since the 1998 ceasefire. His trip formed part of a reconciliation effort and included a visit to Panguna, an apology for past hostilities, and promises to fund major new development projects.³¹ But unfulfilled funding promises have been made before³² and, according to Momis, 'successive national governments [have for decades] failed to treat Bougainville as a special case with its unique needs'.³³ So although O'Neill's visit was welcome, it is unlikely to change the minds of most Bougainvilleans without a concerted, ongoing effort.

Kirschner contends that Bougainville is already well progressed on a path of 'earned sovereignty'—that is, a journey beginning with shared sovereignty (set by the Bougainville Peace Agreement), continuing through institution-building (the formation of the Autonomous Bougainville Government, the gradual transfer of powers, and the creation of a Bougainville public service), which ends with a determination of final status (the referendum).³⁴ Similarly, Wallis argues that through autonomy arrangements, reconciliation processes and its constitution, Bougainville has been engaged in 'state-building' for the past decade.³⁵ She asserts that a sense of common Bougainvillean identity has emerged, which has helped to ameliorate previous social divisions, and that Bougainville is essentially now a 'nation-in-waiting'.³⁶

Will PNG resist or delay recognising a vote for independence?

For the national government, accepting an independence result from Bougainville's referendum carries both political and economic repercussions. The potential for further fragmentation within PNG is a real concern, as the national government already faces problems managing the expectations of other PNG provinces seeking autonomy. It may, therefore, not want to let Bougainville go easily.

Money is also a factor. Although mining remains a contentious issue on Bougainville, and some remain fiercely opposed to reopening Panguna, public opinion has swung around post-autonomy as Bougainville has begun to focus on options for its long-term economic viability.³⁷ President Momis claims 97 per cent of Bougainvilleans now support reopening the mine if acceptable terms for its operation can be negotiated. Talks have already begun with landowners.³⁸

If Bougainville was to become independent, PNG would lose significant revenue if the Panguna mine is eventually reopened. Panguna generated around US\$5 billion between 1972 and 1989, equating to 17 per cent of PNG's internal revenue and around 44 per cent of PNG's foreign currency earnings. Bougainville Copper Limited's 1989 *Annual Report* estimated that 691 million tonnes of mineable ore, comprising 0.40 per cent copper and 0.46 grams per tonne of gold, remained at the site when the crisis erupted.³⁹ Although PNG's lucrative liquefied natural gas reserves mean that Panguna would no longer dominate PNG's economy,⁴⁰ some speculate that the mine's reserves could still be worth around US\$50 billion in today's market.⁴¹

Furthermore, there is no undertaking in the Bougainville Peace Agreement other than to hold a vote. The outcome of the referendum is advisory and requires ratification by the PNG Parliament to take effect.⁴² The national government could therefore legally choose to 'vote it down'.⁴³ The court system could also be utilised to challenge the referendum result by contesting its legitimacy on the grounds that weapons disposal is incomplete, Bougainville is not fiscally self-reliant or that good governance has not yet been established, which are the three pre-conditions of the referendum.⁴⁴

To delay implementing the result, the PNG Government could also opt to stretch out Bougainville's transition to independence. As Regan explains, 'the timetable for moving towards independence would have to be agreed [and] it would not necessarily happen overnight'.⁴⁵

How might Bougainville respond?

If the PNG Government was to frustrate the implementation of the referendum's result, it would likely aggravate many Bougainvilleans, who could argue that they have waited long enough and have legally and democratically expressed their collective voice. While a resumption of hostilities is not inevitable—and most Bougainvilleans would not want to repeat the horrors of what occurred earlier—several reputable commentators agree there is a risk that guns could come out of hiding and that violence could be employed by some groups or individuals looking to redress their grievances. As Regan explains:

There is a danger that a situation rather like that of the 1980s will be repeated, in which much-touted expectations are not met, social tensions rise, and early secession—perhaps again supported by violence—re-emerges as an attractive, albeit simplistic, answer to Bougainville's ills.⁴⁶

Compounding this risk, weapons containment continues to be a major challenge on Bougainville.⁴⁷ While nobody knows exactly how many guns remain, one 2010 estimate claimed there were 14 armed militia groups still openly carrying weapons in southern Bougainville and that 1500-2000 weapons of mixed quality are still in circulation.⁴⁸ Added to this, a 'lost generation' of displaced, unemployed, fighting-age youth has grown up on Bougainville idolising the earlier combatants—some of whom may not need much encouragement to take up arms for the independence cause.⁴⁹

The implications for Australia

If tensions between Bougainville and the PNG Government re-escalated to the point that hostilities resumed, the consequences would be significant and costly. As President Momis has acknowledged, it would cause 'incalculable harm in Bougainville', 'threaten the integrity of PNG', and potentially destabilise other parts of the neighbouring region as well.⁵⁰

Australia's leadership role in addressing social, political, economic and security challenges in the Southwest Pacific is widely acknowledged by politicians, military leaders and academics.⁵¹ As Prime Minister Howard acknowledged in 2004 at the Pacific Islands Forum, it is generally accepted that 'this is our patch. We have a special responsibility in this part of the world'.⁵²

Australia's relationship with PNG also has particular significance. The Australian Government publicly describes PNG as 'a strategically important neighbour'⁵³ and recognises that '[g]eographic proximity and historical links have given PNG a special place in Australia's foreign relations'.⁵⁴ With the high level of government and private investment in PNG—through aid funding, bilateral defence cooperation and business links—Australia has both a strategic and reputational stake in its stability.⁵⁵

This also applies to Bougainville. International intervention was used to 'create the secure space' needed to facilitate peace negotiations and weapons disposal on Bougainville,⁵⁶ and Australia made significant financial, personnel and political investments to help Bougainville achieve peace by peaceful means. This included hosting a series of important meetings⁵⁷ and deploying a large number of unarmed peace monitors⁵⁸ to the regionally-constituted, New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group in 1997-1998, the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group in 1998-2003, and the Australian-led Bougainville Transition Team in late 2003.⁵⁹ Around 3,800 Australian military personnel and 300 Australian civilians served at various times on Bougainville. The Australian Government also committed over A\$250 million in development assistance to support the peace and autonomy process and Bougainville's post-conflict reconstruction.⁶⁰

However, it would not just be stability on Bougainville that would be jeopardised if hostilities resumed on the island; the stability of the immediate region would also be at risk. Bougainville is geographically close to Solomon Islands, which Australia and other regional partners have spent the past decade trying to stabilise. Any resumption of hostilities on Bougainville could destabilise Solomon Islands and other parts of PNG as well. And Australia, whether it wanted to or not, would be drawn into the fray as the regional powerbroker of the Southwest Pacific.⁶¹

In addition, Australia played a key role during the peace agreement negotiations to appease both sides on how the international community was likely to react in their favour to the referendum's outcome. Both sides could turn to Australia 'as the ultimate guarantor of what could ... be diametrically opposed positions following the referendum'.⁶² Australia would 'not have the option to stand aloof' should this occur, particularly if the threat of serious instability emerged.⁶³

What should Australia do?

Australia needs to use its Pacific regional influence to employ 'preventive diplomacy' to head off the prospect of conflict on Bougainville.⁶⁴ This means bringing Bougainville back into focus on Australia's strategic policy agenda and placing Bougainville upfront again in its bilateral dealings with PNG, its regional partners (especially New Zealand), and its whole-of-government strategic priorities.⁶⁵

As Australian responses to situations in Solomon Islands and Timor Leste demonstrate, significant time and money—often more than initially envisaged—can be required to fix regional problems once they escalate.⁶⁶ To that end, intensive pre-referendum action taken now, which concurrently addresses security, political and development issues on Bougainville and is closely coordinated with Australia's Southwest Pacific partners, could forestall the need for a costly and lengthy 'Timor or Solomon Islands-style stabilisation later'.⁶⁷ As a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute recently concluded, 'Bougainville presents potential risks and rewards.... [b]ut the greatest risks are from Canberra's inactivity'.⁶⁸

That same report advocated a 9-point plan for a renewed Australian-led peace initiative for Bougainville which includes increasing development, police and military assistance, mobilising regional support, and fostering dialogue between PNG and Bougainville leaders. While it may not be workable in its entirety, not least because of budgetary and resource reasons, the plan could provide a suitable starting point for further policy consideration.

Conclusion

The Bougainville crisis was not only bitter and divisive, it was long, complex and costly. This article has argued that the key question concerning Bougainville's political status was not resolved as part of the subsequent peace agreement, it was only deferred. Bougainvilleans and the PNG Government seem to have vastly differing expectations about what the outcome of the referendum in 2015-2020 will mean. Accordingly, as Regan observes, there is still 'a long way to go before there can be certainty that the political settlement [in the peace agreement] does in fact provide the basis for sustainable peace'.⁶⁹

Australia needs to be prepared for the likely outcome of the referendum. Almost a decade of demonstrating how autonomy could work for Bougainville has passed. Notwithstanding the significant political and economic repercussions for PNG and its government, any resistance or delay to ratify an independence outcome would not be received well in Bougainville. It would also be difficult for the international community to ignore, given that the will of the Bougainvillean people would have been legitimately and democratically expressed in the referendum.⁷⁰

Australia, as the 'security guarantor' of the Southwest Pacific,⁷¹ needs to re-engage quickly and take measures, closely coordinated with regional friends, to help avoid the prospect of Bougainville's peace process running 'dangerously adrift'.⁷² In the words of the notorious Bougainvillean combatant Chris Uma, whose armed gang still controls the roadblock leading to Panguna, 'we have a fight here and it is not over'.⁷³

Jo Woodbury has worked at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and in the Office of the Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Over the course of her career, she has lived and worked in parts of the Southwest Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and South and Southeast Asia. She holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and Bachelor of Laws (Honours) from the Australian National University. She is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this paper are the author's, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, or the Australian Government more broadly.

NOTES

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- ¹ This is an edited and abridged version of a paper, titled 'The Island We Forgot? Bougainville, the promised referendum, and implications for Australia', submitted by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College in 2014.
 - ² Similar terminology is used by other commentators. See Joanne Wallis, 'Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums: unresolved questions from Bougainville, Papua New Guinea', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2013, p. 311.
 - ³ Anna-Karina Hermkens, 'Like Moses Who Led His People to the Promised Land: nation- and state-building in Bougainville', *Oceania*, Vol. 83, Issue 3, November 2013, p. 192.
 - ⁴ Helga M. Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 'Introduction', in Anthony J. Regan and Helga M. Griffin (eds.), *Bougainville before the Conflict*, Pandanus Press: Canberra, 2005, p. xxvii.
 - ⁵ For a detailed, list-style timeline of the crisis and the peace process up to 2010, see Anthony Regan, *Light Intervention: lessons from Bougainville*, US Institute of Peace: Washington DC, 2010, pp. 167-77. For a shorter timeline of the crisis, including a list of major events and key players, see Alexander Downer, *The Bougainville Crisis: an Australian perspective*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT): Canberra, 2001, pp. v-viii. For a Bougainvillean reflection and summary of the crisis, see John Momis, 'Mediating peace and autonomy through consultation and consensus: the Bougainville experience', keynote address to the 3rd Asia Pacific Mediation Forum Conference on 'Mediating Cultures in the Pacific and Asia', Suva, 28 June 2006, pp. 5-6.
 - ⁶ Mark Turner, 'Autonomous Regions and the Contribution of International Relations to Peace and Development: Mindanao, Bougainville and Aceh', *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, March 2007, p. 92.
 - ⁷ Death estimates range from several thousand to 20,000 people or higher. See Jim Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific way in Bougainville', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2001, p. 43.
 - ⁸ Anthony Regan, 'The Bougainville conflict: political and economic agendas', in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: beyond greed and grievance*, Lynne Rienner: Boulder US, 2003, p. 149.
 - ⁹ Anthony Regan, 'The Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2001-2002: towards order and stability for Bougainville?' in R.J. May (ed.), *Arc of Instability? Melanesia in the early 2000s*, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU: Canberra, 2003, pp. 10-1; Anthony Regan, 'The Bougainville political settlement and the prospects for sustainable peace', *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol.17, Issue 1, 2002, p. 115.
 - ¹⁰ Momis, 'Mediating peace and autonomy through consultation and consensus', p. 5.
 - ¹¹ 'Bougainville Peace Agreement', signed at Arawa, 30 August 2001, *PNG National Gazette*, G146, 16 November 2001.

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- 12 'Bougainville Peace Agreement', Preamble and Part E, Clause 329.
- 13 'Bougainville Peace Agreement', Preamble and Part C, Clauses 309, 310 and 312.
- 14 This assessment is supported by various commentators. See Wallis, 'Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums', p. 326; also Karl Claxton, quoted in 'PNG leader apologises to Bougainville for bloody 1990s civil war: Peter O'Neill and President of Autonomous Region break arrow in peace gesture but tensions remain over its future', *The Guardian*, 29 January 2014.
- 15 'Bougainville Peace Agreement', Preamble and Clause 310(a). Also noted by Regan, 'The Bougainville political settlement and the prospects for sustainable peace', p. 118; and Wallis, 'Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums', p. 328.
- 16 An assessment shared by Peter Jennings and Karl Claxton, 'A stitch in time: preserving peace on Bougainville', Special Report, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI): Canberra, November 2013.
- 17 Peter Jennings, 'ANZAC Cooperation: just do it', ASPI blog, 'The Strategist', 14 February 2013.
- 18 For assessments which concur with this viewpoint, see Regan, 'The Bougainville conflict', p. 152; and John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy and Leah Dunn, *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: sequencing peace in Bougainville*, ANU E Press: Canberra, 2010.
- 19 Australian development assistance has continued but at very reduced levels: see Jennings and Claxton, 'A stitch in time', p. 6 and President Momis interview, 'Bougainville appeals for more Australian aid', *ABC Radio Australia*, 1 March 2011.
- 20 Jennings and Claxton, 'A stitch in time'.
- 21 Douglas Oliver, *Black Islanders: a personal perspective of Bougainville 1937-1991*, Hyland Press: Melbourne, 1991, p. 3.
- 22 'Jet-black' is the terminology used by Jonathan Friedlaender, 'Why do the people of Bougainville look unique? Some conclusions from biological anthropology and genetics', in Regan and Griffin, *Bougainville before the Conflict*, pp. 57-70.
- 23 James Griffin, 'Origins of Bougainville's boundaries', in Regan and Griffin, *Bougainville before the Conflict*, pp. 72-6.
- 24 James Griffin, 'Movements towards secession 1964-1976', in Regan and Griffin, *Bougainville before the Conflict*, pp. 291-9.
- 25 See John Lawrence Momis, 'Shaping leadership through Bougainville indigenous values and Catholic seminary training – a personal journey', in Regan and Griffin, *Bougainville before the Conflict*, pp. 312-6.
- 26 Regan, 'The Bougainville political settlement and the prospects for sustainable peace', p. 115.
- 27 The current President (Momis) is known to be a supporter of 'high autonomy' but he seems to be in the minority and differs from his two predecessors (Tanis and Kabui). See 'Bougainville's new president: halfway to freedom', *The Economist*, 10 June 2010.
- 28 See Wallis, 'Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums', p. 32.
- 29 The PNG Government reportedly owed Bougainville approximately A\$87 million/US\$78 million by August 2013. See 'Bougainville President John Momis accuses PNG of renegeing on referendum funding', *Australia Network News*, 16 September 2013.
- 30 President Momis quoted in Thiago Oppermann and Kylie McKenna, 'Sustainability of Bougainville', *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, In Brief 2013/7*, ANU: Canberra, 2013, p. 1.
- 31 'PNG leader apologises to Bougainville for bloody 1990s civil war', *The Guardian*, 29 January 2014; 'Peter O'Neill becomes first post-war PNG leader to visit Bougainville', *Australia Network News*, 31 January 2014.
- 32 See, for example, a 2011 commitment to invest A\$200 million to the reconstruction of Bougainville, cited in Richard Marles, 'Bougainvillians [sic] deserve the chance to say 'it's mine'', *The Punch* (online), 24 April 2011, available at <www.thepunch.com.au/articles/Bougainvillians-deserve-the-chance-to-say-its-mine> accessed 3 February 2014.

- 33 Momis writing about relations in the mid-1970s when the PNG Government failed to delegate promised powers and functions to Bougainville; the same could equally be said today. See Momis, 'Shaping leadership through Bougainville indigenous values and Catholic seminary training – a personal journey', p. 315.
- 34 Nathan P. Kirschner, 'Making Bread from Broken Eggs: a basic recipe for conflict resolution using earned sovereignty', Bepress Legal Series website, February 2007, available at <<http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1973/>> accessed 12 June 2014.
- 35 See Joanne Wallis, 'Ten Years of Peace: assessing Bougainville's progress and prospects', *The Round Table*, Vol. 101, No. 01, February 2012, pp. 29-40.
- 36 Terminology used by Wallis, 'Nation-Building, Autonomy Arrangements, and Deferred Referendums', p. 313.
- 37 See Volker Boege and Daniel M. Franke, 'Reopening and developing mines in post-conflict settings: the challenge of company-community relations', in P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad (eds.), *High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding*, Earthscan: London, 2012, pp. 98-9 and 101.
- 38 Rowan Callick, 'Battle intensifies over Bougainville copper', *The Australian*, 16 July 2011. Also Jemima Garrett, 'Formal talks begin on reopening Bougainville mine', 'Pacific Beat', *Australia Network News*, 27 May 2013.
- 39 See Hugh L. Davies, 'The Geology of Bougainville', in Regan and Griffin, *Bougainville before the Conflict*, pp. 27-8.
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Submarine Procurement in Southeast Asia: potential for conflict and prospects for cooperation¹

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Introduction

A spate of recent submarine acquisitions in Southeast Asia, together with declarations for future purchases, could result in at least five nations operating submarines by 2020.² As at the end of 2012, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia were already operating submarines, while Vietnam had placed orders and Thailand had made clear its intention to acquire a submarine capability.

Other than submarines, major arms purchases—such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, coastal defence systems and armoured vehicles—have resulted in Southeast Asian defence expenditures rising by 13.5 per cent to nearly US\$24.5 billion between 2010 and 2011.³ While some observers have warned of the potential for an arms race in the region, the majority of analysts have concluded that the conditions for a full-blown arms race have not yet developed.⁴ Instead, the current defence-related spending spree has been characterised as ‘a period of modernisation’ for Southeast Asian militaries,⁵ in which new platforms are not being bought ‘in numbers large enough to seriously affect the regional balance of power’ and where most ‘acquisitions [are] inherently defensive in nature’.⁶

However, the acquisition of submarines by so many Southeast Asian countries represents a sudden proliferation of a new capability in the region. There also seems to be a pattern of tit-for-tat buying of submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Encouragingly though, given the nascent stage of submarine operations within Southeast Asia, there also exists significant potential for cooperation, which could serve as a platform for confidence building and help remedy the mutual suspicion and lack of trust which has undermined the prospect of region-wide stability in Southeast Asia.

Submarine procurements of Southeast Asian nations

Indonesia

The Indonesian Navy (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut* or TNI-AL) has been continuously operating submarines since the 1960s, and is the oldest submarine operator in Southeast Asia. As part of its current fleet, the TNI-AL operates two Type 209 boats, which were commissioned in the early 1980s.

With more than 17,000 islands and vast interconnecting archipelagic waterways, Indonesia’s focus on building up a strong navy is understandable. Although the TNI-AL operates a relatively large number of platforms compared to its Southeast Asian neighbours, its fleet is considered inadequate for patrolling Indonesia’s vast coastline and internal waters. As far back as 2004, former Indonesian Navy chief of staff Admiral Sondakh told his parliament that the navy had 117 ships of all types and readiness status but that effective security of the country’s huge maritime expanse required 762 ships.⁷

While budgetary and financial considerations have previously led to delays and postponement of force renewal projects desired by the TNI-AL leadership, a slate of project acquisitions since 2009 indicates that the seeds of a ‘green-water’ capability are being sown, and that Indonesia is trying to play catch-up in order to secure its maritime territory. This includes three Chang Bogo-class submarines, to be delivered by 2020.⁸ An eventual complement of 10 submarines has been articulated. This is the number of boats deemed necessary to sustain patrols throughout the nation’s waters, with additional boats to be used as back-up and for training.⁹

Developing a conventional surface navy of sufficient size and capability to ensure deterrence over the country’s vast maritime territory will take many years and a large financial investment. However, the stealthy nature of submarines can provide a credible deterrent with a relatively small force. This is because submarines can be discreetly deployed, *en masse* if needed, to various locations within the archipelago. Unlike the surface fleet, which needs to be visible in order to deter, submarines can threaten

a potential adversary by their mere presence. Thus having a small but capable submarine force will allow the TNI-AL to quickly leapfrog its current inadequacies and provide an interim solution to fulfil its mission of protecting territorial integrity while it continues to build-up and modernise its remaining force structure.

Singapore

The uniqueness of Singapore's geostrategic predicament is that despite its miniscule size and small territorial boundaries, the island's area of concern stretches much further across the expanses of water on its east (the South China Sea) and west (the Malacca Strait), where most of its trade and imports flow from. The stated mission of the Singapore Navy is to 'to provide for the seaward defence and ensure the safety and security of Singapore's vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs)'.¹⁰

Of note, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) is the only Southeast Asian naval force to include SLOCs—and not merely its own maritime territory—within the scope of its mission, due to the island's heavy reliance on trade. Some observers have described the RSN's force structure as having undergone a 'golden era' since the beginning of the 21st century.¹¹ Significant acquisitions have included six Formidable-class frigates, with significant anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities, and Seahawk S70B naval helicopters which extend the frigates' ability to conduct stand-off ASW and anti-surface warfare.

However, the most noteworthy acquisition has been two second-hand Swedish submarines of the Vastergotland-class.¹² These boats join Singapore's ex-Swedish Sjoorman-class submarines, which were purchased in the mid 1990s and operationalised in the early 2000s. Beginning with its force modernisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and continuing to its more recent acquisitions, the RSN has continually improved its capability to project presence in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.¹³ The recent acquisition of the ex-Vastergotland submarines to supplement the ex-Sjoorman boats is in line with this development trajectory. Indeed, the primary stated purpose of Singapore's submarines is to 'enable the RSN to better fulfil its mission of protecting Singapore's SLOCs and territorial integrity'.¹⁴

Coupled with deterrence, the second pillar of Singapore's larger defence policy is diplomacy. Unique among the current submarine operators in Southeast Asia, the Singapore Navy's submarines have participated in a number of bilateral exercises with India and the US,¹⁵ as well as multilateral exercises with a number of countries including Malaysia, New Zealand, the UK, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.¹⁶ This indicates that Singapore's submarines, like its other platforms, are not merely viewed as a deterrent capability but also as a means of engaging and increasing interoperability with its friends and partners, and to build confidence with other militaries.¹⁷

Malaysia

The core mission of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is to prepare and deploy naval forces to protect Malaysia's maritime interests in peacetime and in times of conflict.¹⁸ Malaysian maritime territorial claims contested by other nations include the Spratly Islands (with China, Brunei, Vietnam and The Philippines), the Ambalat Island Block (with Indonesia) and the Ko Kra and Ko Losin Islands in the Gulf of Siam (with Thailand).¹⁹ Of note, Malaysia has maintained a military presence on Ardasier Bank, Mariveles Reef and Swallow Reef in the Spratlys, as well as building an air strip and diving resort on Swallow Reef.²⁰ This no doubt signals the importance which Malaysia attaches to its claims in the Spratlys.

The RMN's two French-built Scorpene-class submarines, acquired in 2002, returned to Malaysia between 2009 and 2010.²¹ Even before the introduction of the submarines, the RMN already operated a well-balanced and capable naval force, including frigates, corvettes and next-generation patrol vessels, with a credible capability to project power and enforce its maritime claims. On the submarine acquisitions, then-Malaysian Defence Minister (now Prime Minister) Najib Tun Razak said in 2007:

This is a new capability for the RMN. It will not only allow our navy to have the capability to operate in a sub-surface dimension but more importantly will allow us to play a more significant role in ensuring our national sovereignty and national interests are protected [It] should also be seen as our contribution towards peace, security and stability.²²

The basing of both submarines at Kota Kinabalu Naval Base in Sabah, East Malaysia, indicates that a key mission is to protect Malaysia's sovereignty in the South China Sea. They provide an alternative to more overt means of projecting presence and asserting Malaysia's maritime claims. This makes sense given that many countries lay claim to territory in the South China Sea and that these disputes are unlikely to be resolved soon.

Vietnam

Vietnam is one of two Southeast Asian nations to have engaged in major naval confrontations with China over disputed territory in the South China Sea (the other being The Philippines).²³ Vietnam's worries over incursions into its territory were articulated in its 2009 national defence policy, which states that territorial disputes in the East Sea (the term Vietnam uses for the South China Sea) have been increasing and thus have 'seriously affected many activities and the maritime economic development of Vietnam'.²⁴

However, until recently, the Vietnam People's Navy (VPN) had only a limited capability to protect its territories in the South China Sea, especially compared to the naval strength of China. Underscoring this point in comments made following Vietnam's 13th National Assembly in 2011, Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh said that building up a modern navy was a priority but it would require time and significant amounts of capital.²⁵

In 2009, Vietnam signed a comprehensive defence deal with Russia, which included the acquisition of six Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines to be delivered between 2013 and 2020.²⁶ In addition to torpedoes, it has been reported in the Russian media that these boats will be fitted to operate the Club anti-ship missile.²⁷ This submarine purchase comes on the heels of a slew of recent naval acquisitions by Vietnam, including corvettes, frigates and patrol crafts.²⁸ Similar to Indonesia, Vietnam's acquisition of a significant submarine force has been a rapid way to develop an interim deterrent capability.

Such capability could be used to enforce and, if needed, contest its sovereignty in the South China Sea. However, even with the operationalisation of all its recent surface-platform acquisitions, the VPN will still be significantly inferior to China's naval forces, although the ability to deploy submarines will provide the VPN with a potential sea-denial strategy.

Thailand

The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has responsibility to provide littoral and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) maritime security in relation to Thailand's significant maritime interests, including the protection of offshore oil and gas reserves, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and countering illegal trafficking in its territorial waters.²⁹ The RTN operates a capable maritime force, one of the largest in Southeast Asia in terms of the number of platforms, with assets including an aircraft carrier, frigates and offshore patrol vessels.

To add to its force structure, the RTN has been actively canvassing the purchase of submarines since at least the early 1990s.³⁰ Although budgetary constraints have hampered the RTN's ability to obtain funding approval, its latest acquisition plan is centred on the purchase of two ex-German Navy Type 206A diesel-electric platforms.³¹ To date, the RTN has not been able to obtain funding approval for the acquisition, because of government concerns over the cost of the purchase relative to the strategic requirement.

Interestingly, Thailand's need to acquire submarines is not articulated as a capability requirement to achieve a specific mission. Instead, it has been framed as a response to the submarine acquisitions of Thailand's neighbours, with Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban saying in early 2011 that:

[Submarines are] necessary for the Royal Thai Navy because countries in the immediate region—who could pose a threat—all have submarines. If we don't ... [acquire] submarines it will be difficult to protect our sovereignty and we will be at a disadvantage. We have natural resources and interests at sea that need protecting.³²

The arms dynamic framework

The arms dynamic framework is a useful way to examine the arms purchases of Southeast Asian countries. At one end of the spectrum is an 'arms race', which denotes the 'most extreme manifestations of the arms dynamic when actors are going flat out or almost flat out in major competitive investments in military capability'.³³ At the other end is a 'build down', which occurs when weapon systems are being phased out or replaced by new systems of smaller numbers, or with lower or less capabilities, or with capabilities which are likely to be less destabilising.

At the mid-point is the normal equilibrium, which could be referred to as maintenance of the military status quo. Between maintenance of the status quo but below a full-out arms race is a somewhat grey area which could be viewed as 'arms competition or build-up'. As mentioned earlier, military commentators have generally agreed that the prevailing dynamic in Southeast Asia is somewhere above maintenance of the status quo, and tending towards 'arms competition'.³⁴

From the earlier review of the acquisition plans of individual Southeast Asian nations, it is clear that none is 'going flat out or almost flat out in' in an arms race. When examined in the context of each country's overall naval force structure, submarines are being purchased in relatively modest numbers, often to address an existing capability gap. As such, the prevailing arms dynamic for submarine acquisitions would generally seem to be paralleling the broader arms dynamic.

However, it could also be argued that the acquisition of submarines across the region represents the introduction of a significantly enhanced capability that arguably lies in the grey area of 'arms competition'. This view is supported by Richard Bitzinger, in his general examination of Southeast Asian arms acquisitions, who concluded that the prevailing dynamic is one of 'arms competition', albeit dedicated mainly to the maintenance of the status quo.³⁵

Supporting this assessment is the fact that the expressed purpose (or strategic objective) for most submarine acquisitions appears to be stabilising and non-competitive in nature.³⁶ Submarines are viewed as a means to respond asymmetrically to perceived threats, and provide an alternative to building up a large surface fleet. For Indonesia, for example, the acquisition of new submarines is a means to overcome the inherent limitations of its navy and to protect the country's large maritime territory, while Singapore's submarines add to its capability to guard its SLOCs. One could thus argue that the acquisition of submarines is stabilising, as the purchase of a small number of submarine platforms to overcome a perceived capability gap is less destabilising than the acquisition of a large surface fleet to achieve the same effect.

However, in the Southeast Asian context, it must be understood that the acquisition of submarines has a very different character from the purchase of other weapon systems for two key reasons. First, unlike other defence procurements which serve to upgrade existing military capabilities—such as newer fighter aircraft or more modern armoured vehicles—the purchase of submarines represents the introduction of a new military technology for almost all of the Southeast Asian nations.

From a capability perspective, the acquisition of submarines also provides navies with the means to undertake a sea denial strategy—as opposed to sea control—which is a more cost effective means to secure influence over maritime terrain. While sea control requires the highly-visible presence of ships, flotillas and fleets, sea denial only requires the perception of threat to cause unease in an opponent and deter further hostile actions.³⁷

Second, given their design and capabilities, it is difficult to portray submarines as benign platforms. Their primary purpose is to lurk undetected and strike against surface shipping, both naval and merchant. Diesel-electric submarines, the only variety being considered by Southeast Asian nations, are particularly suited to this mission because they are quiet and stealthy, and are armed with heavy-weight torpedoes and even anti-ship cruise missiles. Compared to nuclear-powered boats, diesel-electric submarines are more suited to operate in the littoral geography of Southeast Asia, which is characterised by shallow and confined waters.³⁸

Viewed against the backdrop of maritime competition in the South China Sea, where a number of maritime boundary claims remain unresolved, a maritime arms dynamic centred around submarines arguably increases the risk of naval confrontation. Because of these reasons, the impact of Southeast Asian nations' submarine purchases must be viewed in a different light from that of other arms acquisitions.

More worrying is the mistrust that has been sown by submarine acquisitions. Thailand has articulated its desire to obtain submarines based on the acquisition of this capability by its neighbours. This is perhaps the clearest indication of the emergence of an unintended consequence—the security dilemma which occurs when an 'arms acquisitions by one state, even if it has no desire to threaten its neighbours, can often lead to anxieties and insecurities being felt by nearby states'.³⁹

These findings, coupled with the recent surge of interest in ASW platforms, suggest that a regional tit-for-tat might be emerging, with countries investing both in submarines and various means of countering their neighbours' submarine capabilities. Singapore operates six S-70B Seahawk naval helicopters, which are configured for ASW missions. Vietnam has reportedly expressed interest in acquiring ASW aircraft, including the Lockheed Martin P-3 and Airbus Military C-295, and Malaysia is seeking to acquire ASW helicopters, specifically the Sikorsky MH-60R and Agusta Westland AW159.⁴⁰

Thus one could conclude that the prevailing arms dynamic for submarines in Southeast Asia is more intense and destabilising than that of more generalised arms acquisitions. An accurate characterisation could be an 'accelerated arms competition', because of the accompanying anxieties and insecurities. While not yet in the realm of an arms race, which is an 'inescapable vicious cycle',⁴¹ there is potential for this dynamic to evolve further unless concerted efforts are made to break or mitigate the cycle.

Prospects for cooperation

Central to preventing the further escalation of the arms dynamic is the building of trust and confidence among regional states to stymie the rise of anxiety and insecurity. Interestingly, the growth in the number of submarines within the region provides opportunities to introduce confidence-building measures through increased cooperation between nations. Water space management and submarine rescue are two areas for potential cooperation.

Water space management

If all, or even most, of the countries listed earlier go through with their submarine procurements, the underwater environment in Southeast Asia has the potential to get very crowded. Coupled with the presence of submarines from extra-regional powers, the risk of an underwater accident increases significantly. This creates the need for a system to manage the underwater environment and minimise the risk of submarine collision. By way of example, NATO created a 'water space management' regime during the Cold War to ensure the safety of NATO and allied submarines.⁴² Through an established set of protocols and procedures, submarine movements were de-conflicted to ensure that only one submarine would be operating in a defined area at any one time.⁴³

A similar system in Southeast Asia could help to ensure the safe operation of submarines during peacetime. It is important to recognise that there could be sensitivities about implementing such a system, as it would require releasing information about a submarine's deployment and location. After all, the keys to effective submarine operations are stealth and secrecy, so there could be strong resistance and reluctance to sharing the intended operating areas of each nation's submarines.

However, there are a number of ways to mitigate these concerns and enact a workable system. One would be to try and create a neutral water space management agency, which could be formed by an extra-regional country or as a multilateral regional entity. Clearly, it would be vital for any such agency to obtain the trust of the participating nations, and to be judicious in the way it discharged its duties. Effective de-conflicting of submarine operating areas does not necessarily require all participating nations to have full knowledge of the location and positions of all submarines. Instead, an effective set of procedures could be implemented so as to achieve effective de-conflicting without requiring the complete disclosure of sensitive information.

Regardless of the intricacies of the structure and procedures of a water space management agency, the creation of an effective regime would help to increase confidence and transparency among the Southeast Asian submarine operators, and reduce concerns about submarine operations and the intentions of other countries. This would go some way to mitigating the anxiety and insecurities fuelling the evolving arms dynamic.

Submarine emergency and rescue

Among the existing and potential Southeast Asian submarine operators, only Singapore has a fully-fledged submarine rescue capability. No other country has yet indicated plans to procure or develop a similar capability,⁴⁴ possibly because of the high associated cost. Cooperation in submarine emergencies and rescue could thus form a second pillar for increased cooperation and confidence building among the Southeast Asian submarine operators.

Pooling submarine rescue expertise and capabilities is common for other submarine-operating nations. For example, the US, which has the world's most advanced submarine rescue capabilities, has entered into submarine rescue agreements with many other countries.⁴⁵ Similarly, there are submarine rescue agreements among NATO countries, and also between NATO and Russia.⁴⁶ As part of these agreements, participating countries agree to render assistance and provide rescue services in the event that a submarine is in distress. Participating countries also work on ensuring that equipment is interoperable and establishing common doctrine.

In order to develop and refine common doctrine, many countries also participate in joint submarine emergency and rescue exercises, such as the multinational 'Pacific Reach' submarine rescue exercises.⁴⁷ The 2010 exercise was hosted by Singapore and attended by Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the US. During the course of the exercise, the participating forces focused on working together in different submarine emergency and rescue scenarios.

A similar exercise could be enacted among Southeast Asian submarine operators to develop common emergency and rescue procedures, allowing nations to pool resources should an emergency occur. The development of common operating processes and procedures could subsequently lead to the establishment of a regional submarine emergency response framework, covering emergency notification procedures, requests for assistance and the conduct of rescue operations.

The dearth of submarine rescue capabilities in Southeast Asia makes a collective response framework an urgent requirement for safe submarine operations. Given the sensitive nature of submarines and their capabilities, submarine rescue is perhaps the best type of tangible cooperation—sufficiently benign, yet still able to attract participation from the various submarine operators. Similar to water space management, such cooperation would also serve as a platform for increased transparency and trust among the Southeast Asian nations.

Conclusion

Having examined the motivations, intended deployment and concerns underlying Southeast Asian nations' submarine procurements, it appears that a somewhat worrying state of affairs is developing. Unlike other military hardware purchases, submarine procurements in Southeast Asia represent the introduction of a capability that is inherently offensive in nature. Southeast Asian countries appear to be caught in a security dilemma where the purchase of submarines by some states, to address legitimate defence concerns, has resulted in increased anxiety among their neighbours.

Although this dynamic is being fuelled by a lack of trust and transparency, this article has argued that significant prospects for cooperation among the submarine operating countries still exist, most tangibly in the areas of water space management, and submarine emergency and rescue. The establishment of cooperative frameworks and mechanisms in either of these areas would go a long way in reducing insecurities and anxieties, and help diminish the potential for further escalation of the arms dynamic in Southeast Asia.

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Japan's 2013 *National Security Strategy*: the strategic implications for Australia¹

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Introduction

In 2013, Prime Minister Abbott described Japan as both Australia's 'best friend in Asia'² and a 'strong ally'.³ The relationship, from the Australian Government's perspective, is built on mutual economic reliance and a 'shared commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as common approaches to international security'.⁴ In the financial year 2012-13, Japan was ranked second in the trade of goods with Australia and its third largest investor.⁵ In April 2014, the two countries entered into an economic partnership agreement.⁶ In addition to the direct relationship, Japan has a large indirect role in Australia's strategic environment through its relationship with both the US—with whom Australia shares its most important security relationship⁷—and China, Australia's key economic trading partner.⁸

Japan considers the US alliance as the cornerstone of Japan's security.⁹ The alliance is built on post-World War 2 military and diplomatic cooperation to provide stability and security in East Asia.¹⁰ Japan's relationship with China, on the other hand, is more complex. Economically, Japan and China are interdependent, with Japan being China's principal import source in 2012 and ranked third as an export destination.¹¹ However, their relationship is marred by history, particularly China's view that Japan has not atoned for its actions in World War 2, and Japan's concern regarding China's military expansion and territorial claims.¹²

It is in this strategic environment that Japan delivered its 2013 *National Security Strategy* (2013 *NSS*) in December 2013.¹³ The 2013 *NSS* uses a relatively broad definition of national security that encompasses a range of challenges, consistent with the strategies of Japan's key strategic ally in the US¹⁴ and even that of Australia.¹⁵ The document is not revolutionary and is largely consistent with Japan's national security efforts under previous Japanese governments.¹⁶ It does, however, identify that Japan's security environment is 'becoming ever more severe'.¹⁷ And while it identifies a number of challenges, it is evident that China clearly dominates current Japanese security thinking.¹⁸

Although the 2013 *NSS* identifies a number of approaches or activities to enhance Japan's national security, this article focuses on three that are likely to have significant direct and indirect strategic impact on Australia in the next ten years, namely 'building a comprehensive defense architecture to firmly defend Japan; strengthen[ing] diplomacy to play a more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity; and defense equipment and technology co-operation'.¹⁹

The article will argue that the 2013 *NSS* represents an overall positive outcome for Australian strategic interests over the next ten years. However, this overall positive effect will need to be balanced against the risk that its tone and assessments may further fracture Japan-China relations and, indirectly, impact Australia-China relations through the Australian Government's public support for Japan.

'Building a comprehensive defense architecture to firmly defend Japan'

The *Defense of Japan 2013* (2013 White Paper) was published in July 2013, some six months before the 2013 *NSS*.²⁰ It articulates a more focused defence plan to directly address Japan's highest perceived threat, identified as China in general, and Chinese incursions in the air and waters surrounding Japanese territory, in particular. While the 2013 White Paper is a short-term annual document, it identifies long-term capability investments that support the strategic guidance provided in the 2013 *NSS*.

One of the key outcomes from both documents is the first increase in Japan's defence-related expenditure in 11 years, with a 0.8 per cent increase in 2013 and a planned 2.6 per cent increase over five years.²¹ This increase, from a trend of shrinking defence budgets since 2002, is significant politically. However, given that defence spending in Japan was only 0.96 per cent of GDP in 2011²² (compared to 4.5, 2.4 and 1.2 in the US, UK and China respectively)—and that the increase has only taken spending back to 2010 levels—the change is not significant when compared to world standards.

Directly, there are few, if any, negative implications for Australia of a more capable and better equipped Japanese military. A Japan with a stronger military may strike fear in some of a return to a World War 2-era Imperial Japan, based on concerns that the 2013 *NSS* and 2013 White Paper could be stepping stones in Prime Minister Abe's greater plans of constitutional revision to allow Japan to be more proactive in military-related activities abroad.²³

Certainly, Prime Minister Abe has publicly expressed his desire to review Article 9 (also known as the 'pacifist clause') of Japan's constitution to allow collective and individual self-defence (that is, the use of force to settle disputes).²⁴ Individual and collective self-defence is considered a fundamental right of a state under Article 51 of the UN Charter,²⁵ and there would be obvious benefit in Japan continuing to pursue this agenda particularly in the context of a more assertive China.

However, to revise the constitution, Prime Minister Abe would require a two-thirds majority of support in both houses of the Diet, as well as the support of the Japanese people through a referendum.²⁶ Even if the constitution is revised, Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly asserted in a number of interviews and in the 2013 *NSS* that Japan still plans to be a 'peace-loving nation'.²⁷ Regardless of intentions, a militarily-stronger Japan is unlikely to cause any direct threat to Australia given its strong mutual US security alliance and the strength of the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship.²⁸

A second direct negative implication is the differing views of Australia and Japan of the threat and opportunities posed by China.²⁹ The different strategic outlooks in relation to the rise of China—and, in particular, the negative view of China by Japan—may be a simple matter of geography, a factor of history, or represent a miscalculation by Australia. Given this difference of perspective, the Australian Government may want to consider whether its public focus on Japan through the 'best friend in Asia' or 'strong ally' comments is wise, particularly considering Australia's large economic interdependence with China.³⁰ Hugh White recently contended that 'Abbott seems not yet to understand how much pain ... [China] can inflict on him and on Australia. He is about to get a lesson on the nature of power'.³¹

Japan's 2013 *NSS* and 2013 White Paper articulate a much more pessimistic view of China compared to its 2012 Defence White Paper,³² and use quite provocative language regarding the perceived China threat:

China has attempted to change the status quo by force, based on its own assertion.... Some of China's activities in the sea/air surrounding Japan involve its intrusion into Japan's territorial waters, its violation of [our] airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause a contingency situation.³³

To support these statements, the 2013 White Paper includes a map detailing a number of alleged Chinese incursions into waters near Japan.³⁴ To address the perceived threat from China, the 2013 White Paper focuses heavily on investment in capabilities for littoral operations (amphibious vehicles) and for maritime and airborne surveillance capabilities.³⁵ From an Australian perspective, Japan's development of an enhanced capability to defend against Chinese aggression could be seen as a positive benefit in that it may deter or defeat any aggression before it escalated into broader conflict, thereby minimising the prospect that Australia, in support of its alliance relationships,³⁶ might become involved.

Indirectly, the implications for Australia depend largely on the reaction of China. While both the modest increase in defence spending and a possible change in the Japanese constitution (or even a concerted push to make the change) are unlikely to have any direct effect, Australia will need to be cognisant of the reactions of China. It could see constitutional change, as well as an increase in defence spending, as escalations in an already tense relationship with Japan. Unsurprisingly, the 2013 *NSS* and 2013 White Paper have elicited a sharp negative response from China, although to date the reaction has largely been through words, rather than actions.³⁷

Any significant Chinese reaction seems likely to occur in the area surrounding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.³⁸ While China and Japan have both been relatively constrained to date, the potential exists for tensions to escalate, with implications for the US-Japan security alliance and, by extension, through their bilateral relationships with Australia. Any serious escalation of tensions, involving its most significant economic partner (China), its most significant security partner (US) and its 'best friend in Asia' (Japan), would put Australia in a difficult position.³⁹

'Strengthen[ing] diplomacy to play a more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity'

Of the initiatives or strategies articulated in the 2013 *NSS*, 'strengthening diplomacy' is the most promising for Australia and represents a key direct benefit. As previously discussed, Australia would be significantly impacted by any conflict involving the US, China and Japan. However, the diplomatic efforts of Japan, and those of the US and Australia, have the potential to play a key role in minimising the likelihood of that outcome. The 2013 *NSS* identifies Australia as one of many diplomatic focuses for Japan. In particular, it identifies strengthening economic relations and advancing security cooperation to shape the regional order as important focus areas.⁴⁰

Clearly, Japan and Australia share a common goal of security and stability in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. The two countries share a commitment to a number of regional multilateral forums and groups, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC and the East Asian Summit.

For its part, the Australian Government has identified collaborating with Japan in these forums and in the delivery of aid, development assistance and regional peace-keeping as key goals of its strategy for engaging with Japan.⁴¹ A strengthened role for Japan in these forums and through bilateral engagement, based on shared values and strategic interests, provides both countries with an opportunity to share the burden of diplomatic engagement, and exert additional and complementary influence over regional and global partners.

The 2013 *NSS* also specifically highlights China as a target for enhanced diplomatic engagement. In particular, the document identifies the objectives of:

[C]onstructing mutually beneficial relationships based on common strategic interests, minimising actions that may lead to escalation, developing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations, and encouraging China to adhere to norms and increase transparency.⁴²

All these key activities should be encouraged and supported by Australia. Australia and the US should also use their own diplomatic influence to further these initiatives in order to minimise the risk of heightened tensions between two of the major powers in the Asia Pacific.

'Defense equipment and technology cooperation'

A less obvious but directly beneficial outcome for Australia from the 2013 *NSS* is Japan's desire to engage in cooperation on the 'joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items'.⁴³ This initiative is effectively an opening of Japan's defence industry to the global market, which may benefit Australia in two ways. First, it will potentially allow access to Japanese advancements in technology to the Australian Department of Defence and, second, it will allow—pending outcomes of the Japan-Australia Free Trade Agreement and Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations—greater engagement and access to a new market for Australian defence industry companies.

In 1967, Japan developed 'three principles' on arms exports, imposing restrictions on to whom and under what circumstances defence-related goods could be sold. In 1976, this was further restricted when the Diet announced additional policy guidance that 'exports to other areas not included in the three principles will be also restrained in conformity with Japan's position as a peace-loving nation'.⁴⁴ These decisions have largely confined Japan's defence manufacturers to competing for the relatively-small internal Ministry of Defense market.

Of the companies in Japan manufacturing defence-related products, only four per cent of their sales, on average, are for defence-related material.⁴⁵ The relatively-small market, and the small proportion of revenue, has inhibited product innovation and production economies of scale for Japan's defence industry. Contrast this with the global consumer technology market, where Japan is seen as a prolific producer of sophisticated high-tech products, and one could reasonably conclude that both Japan and the rest of the world have missed significant opportunities for innovation and sales as a result of Japan's restrictive export control policies.⁴⁶

Japan has taken its first steps toward cooperation on defence equipment and technology through its December 2011 decision to select the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter as the next-generation fighter capability for the Japanese Air force. This decision will involve a number of Japanese defence industrial companies in the aircraft's final production and assembly.⁴⁷ As Australia is also a partner in the F-35A, a benefit may be realised in terms of pricing, due to economies of scale in production,⁴⁸ and potentially in the long term from any innovations that Japan may develop to improve the F-35A.

The Australian and Japanese Prime Ministers have already agreed to a joint research project on marine hydrodynamics.⁴⁹ The Australian Department of Defence has also already commenced discussions with Japan's Ministry for Defense on the sharing of submarine technologies, in particular propulsion technology.⁵⁰ Access to existing advanced Japanese technology would be a significant benefit for Australia, particularly for the cost effective and timely delivery of Australia's next-generation submarine capability. However, cooperation is a two-way street and as Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute points out:

In other words, the Japanese want to know what's in it for them—just as we would if they were eyeing a piece of our technology. So an urgent task for Australia should be to demonstrate to Japan that the benefits of collaboration will run both ways.⁵¹

Australia, if it wants to benefit from a more cooperative defence industrial relationship with Japan, must identify technologies and capabilities beneficial that it can share.

Conclusion

This article has presented the argument that Japan's 2013 *NSS* overall represents a positive outcome for Australia in the next ten years. While the 2013 *NSS* identified a number of initiatives the Japanese Government will pursue to maintain and improve the security and stability of its national interests, this article has focused on the direct and indirect impacts of three that are likely to have significant strategic impact for Australia in the next ten years.

Japan's plan to become more diplomatically engaged both in the region and globally is the key benefit, because of Australia's and Japan's shared values and security goals for the Asia Pacific region. In particular, Japan's plan to open up a number of areas of dialogue with China to identify common interests and to ensure their often-tense relationship can be managed and improved is a positive outcome.

Japan's plan to open up its defence industry to more cooperation with external partners also represents a good outcome for both the ADF and Australia's defence industrial base. In consumer technologies, Japan is seen both as a global leader and innovator and, by opening its defence market, Japanese defence companies will now have a greater driver to innovate in order to compete and produce on a global scale. This can only represent a good outcome for Australian defence capabilities that may now include Japanese technology.

The implications for Australia of the increase in Japanese defence spending and the 're-architecting' of the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) will depend considerably on China's reaction. Should China see this as aggressive action from Japan and act accordingly, the Japan-China relationship would be further destabilised and Australia's security relations with both Japan and the US would be impacted.

On the other hand, should China become more aggressive in its power projection in the region of its own accord, having a Japanese SDF capable of countering that threat is an important security outcome for Australia and the region. However, while the long-term benefit to Australia of a more self-reliant and assured Japanese SDF is significant, Australia will obviously have to manage its outward support so as to not undermine its own direct relationship with China.

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In 2010, Chris took up a role within Defence in the cyber security field, providing ICT security advice, assistance and expertise to Defence and the broader Australian Government. He is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College.

NOTES

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The Use of Air Power as a Coercive Instrument: lessons from Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

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Introduction

The early 20th century saw the introduction of air power as an essential and decisive capability in military campaigns. Air power's flexibility, versatility and lethality attracted military strategists, such as Douhet, Trenchard and Warden, to write extensively on its application to achieve defeat or annihilate an adversary. The beginning of the 21st century, however, has seen a decline in inter-state conventional warfare and an increase in conflicts based on clashes of philosophical and political ideology. The resulting violations have sparked moral outrage from the international community, creating an ethical perception for some form of intervention, despite often lacking a political or legal case to use unlimited force.¹

Consequently, where traditional diplomacy fails, states have turned to coercive diplomacy; that is, the use of 'limited force to demonstrate resolve, with the threat of more force to come should the adversary not capitulate'.² The political sensitivities of such a strategy, combined with the need to respect state sovereignty, minimise civilian casualties and avoid long-term commitments, has seen political leaders turn to air power as a means of achieving their political ends.³ However, despite the available literature on the coercive application of air power, recent air operations have illustrated the difficulty that the US and its allies have faced in transforming their undeniable military superiority into successful, coercive efforts.⁴

Accordingly, this article conducts a case study of NATO's 2011 air campaign over Libya (Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR) and addresses how coercion theory was applied in that operation. It looks at whether the operation was successful in coercing Gaddafi to concede to NATO's demands, and aims to establish a better understanding of the theory of coercion in order to assist future military planners in understanding why an air campaign may not be successful in coercing an adversary, even where coercion theory has been correctly applied.

In doing so, the article firstly provides an overview of current coercion theory and outlines the essential elements of coercive diplomacy. This is followed by an examination of air power capabilities, highlighting the characteristics that make air power an ideal tool of coercive diplomacy. It then provides an outline of the Libyan crisis and coalition goals, and discusses how air power and coercive diplomacy theory was applied in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. It concludes with an analysis of why the operation did not successfully coerce Gaddafi, and identifies the factors that should be taken into consideration in designing future coercive air campaigns.

Theory of coercion

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* ⁵

Despite unparalleled military superiority, the last decade has seen the US and its allies engaged in a number of international efforts in which military force alone has not been able to secure their political objectives. In many cases, diplomatic efforts have also been far from successful, resulting in calls for a revitalisation of Western diplomacy, led by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocating a 'smart power' strategy, combining diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and legal tools to influence the behaviour of state and non-state actors.⁶

This has led to the employment of coercive strategies, such as coercive diplomacy or, in Thomas Schelling's words, 'the diplomacy of violence'.⁷ Rather than using actual military force to defeat an adversary, coercive strategies are premised on using the potential hurt of military force to threaten an adversary for the purpose of coercing favourable behaviour.⁸ As Alexander George explains:

Threats of punishment [are only used] if the adversary does not comply with what is demanded. If force is used ... it takes the form of an exemplary or symbolic use of limited military action to help persuade the opponent to back down.⁹

This is an attractive strategy as it allows the adversary to avoid suffering the hurt of military force while enabling the coercer to tread softly on the concept of state sovereignty and minimise political risks, operational costs and casualties.

Studies typically divide the concept of coercion into two main categories: 'deterrence' and 'compellence'. Deterrence has widely been accepted as using the threat of military force to prevent an action from occurring.¹⁰ The aim of the coercer is to dissuade an adversary from carrying out an action that has not yet materialised.¹¹ Compellence, on the other hand, covers the proactive and reactive threat and/or actual use of limited military force in an attempt to stop action that the adversary has already taken.¹²

Compellence also encompasses the sub-category of coercive diplomacy, a concept that covers reactive action only. While the term coercive diplomacy has no universally-agreed definition, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define the term as 'getting the adversary to act in a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity for organised violence but choose not to use it'.¹³

Under this definition, coercive diplomacy is successful if the adversary complies with the coercer's demands while still having the choice to resist. Schelling expands on this by providing four conditions that are necessary to coerce an adversary to choose to comply:¹⁴

1. The aim of a strategy must not be to inflict pain on the adversary. Rather, it must focus on manipulating the adversary's mind so they believe avoidance of pain outweighs the benefits of resistance. As Schelling explains, 'the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply'.
2. The threat of pain must be clearly communicated to the adversary, giving the adversary the choice to avoid it because 'the object of a threat is to give somebody a choice'.
3. The conflict between the coercer and the adversary cannot be a zero-sum game; 'our interests and our opponents [must] not be absolutely opposed'.
4. The infliction of pain on the adversary must be 'allocated over time and apportioned in its intensity'.

However, as Byman, Waxman and Larson point out, '[c]oercion is simple in concept but complex in practice'¹⁵ and, as such, the challenge is developing a coercive diplomacy strategy that successfully encompasses these conditions. In formulating such a strategy, many have adopted a cost-benefit analysis approach.¹⁶ This relies on the adversary weighing up the pain or 'cost' they would suffer should they choose to act contrarily to what the coercer wants.¹⁷

The hope is that the adversary will think rationally and choose the benefits of a negotiated solution over the costs of military force. This happens when, as Robert Pape explains, 'the benefits that would be lost by concessions and the probability of attaining these benefits by continued resistance are exceeded by the costs of resistance and the probability of suffering these costs'.¹⁸

In addition, as coercive diplomacy is heavily dependent on the adversary's decision-making process, it is essential for the coercer to have accurate and detailed knowledge of the adversary, including an understanding of what they value, their decision calculus and the limits of their endurance.¹⁹ This will enable the coercer to manipulate coercive effects, regardless of the adversary's rationality, so they can attack the adversary's 'true centre of gravity' which, in coercive diplomacy, 'does not lie in the physical world, in [the adversary's] economy or even his military forces but ... between his ears'.²⁰

Air power as a tool of coercion

More than most other forms of military power, politicians find airpower easy to manipulate, to employ or withhold, in the hope of achieving nicely measured political effects.

Dr Eliot A. Cohen²¹

While the objectives of coercive diplomacy are political in nature, military force is almost always a necessary means of achieving them. International law, sanctions and conventional diplomacy have rarely been effective in bringing an end to hostilities and restoring order.²² Military interventions conducted under coercive diplomacy, however, are often politically sensitive, requiring the avoidance of long-term commitment, minimisation of casualties, and the delicate handling of state sovereignty.²³

Consequently, political leaders have often turned to the advantages of air power, optimistically viewing it as a panacea to these issues. As Eliot Cohen observes, '[a]irpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment'.²⁴

Air power—'the ability to create or enable the creation of effects by or from platforms using the atmosphere for manoeuvre'²⁵—is seen by many as an innately coercive capability, containing many characteristics that make it an ideal tool of coercive diplomacy. It can attack a range of targets, from tactical to strategic, and can be applied discretely, reassuring political leaders who face continuous international scrutiny by allowing them to maintain control over the parameters of a particular mission.

Long-range strike capabilities enable deeper infiltration of enemy territory without first having to defeat enemy ground forces and without the need to involve neighbouring countries for use of their military bases. Technical developments, such as precision-guided munitions, global positioning systems, advanced sensors and higher bandwidth connectivity for data transfer and command and control, have contributed towards military successes, increasing target acquisition and destructiveness while using minimal force and reducing collateral damage.²⁶

This allows coercers to minimise their physical and political footprint, and to maintain popular support both internationally and at home. Air power also allows for the rapid and lethal deployment of military force, enabling targets anywhere in the world to be destroyed quickly, efficiently and without the need for boots on the ground. Not having to deploy ground forces means that air power can be withdrawn as quickly as it is deployed, allowing for both flexibility and minimal commitment in a campaign. Further, the combination of speed and lethality means that hostilities can potentially be halted before a full-scale crisis has time to evolve.²⁷

Categories of coercive air strategies

Robert Pape outlines four categories of coercive air strategies that utilise the above attributes of air power to target an adversary's decision-making process, namely punishment, risk, denial and decapitation.²⁸

Punishment seeks to change adversary behaviour by using air power to inflict enough pain on its civilian population to force the adversary to concede or risk being overthrown by domestic civil uprising. Pain is inflicted through aerial targeting of 'peacetime industrial and commercial establishments; important buildings, private and public; transportation arteries and centres; and certain designated areas of civilian population'.²⁹ The aim is to 'inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time'³⁰ and to punish harshly when the coercer's demands are not met. Ideally, the fear of pain should coerce the adversary.³¹

The strategy of punishment, therefore, will only be effective if the adversary believes that the coercer's threats are both credible and capable of being carried out. The use of a punishment-based strategy was witnessed in Israel's 2008 Operation CAST LEAD over Gaza. During that operation, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister, Eli Yishai, stated that Hamas would be punished for their continued attacks against Israel, warning there would be 'a price tag for every rocket fired into Israel', and that 'even if [Hamas] fire at an open area or into the sea, we must damage their infrastructure and destroy 100 houses'.³²

Similar to punishment, a risk-based coercive strategy also aims to inflict pain on the adversary's civilian population through economic destruction. The strategy of risk is premised on the adversary seeking to avoid future pain. Risk differs from punishment in that it does not follow Douhet's theory of 'ultimate ruin in abeyance'.³³ Instead, the coercer increases the level of destruction over time, holding valuable economic targets as hostage to future ruin unless the adversary concedes. As Schelling notes, risk is 'contingent upon the real anticipation of future violence It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behaviour, if the power to hurt can get it at all'.³⁴

For risk to be successful, however, the coercer must communicate to the adversary that 'the bombing is contingent on the [adversary's] behaviour and will be stopped on compliance with the coercer's demands'.³⁵ Once the adversary realises they are in total control of their fate, a cost-benefit analysis should theoretically lead to their decision to concede. The US 'Linebacker II' operations in Vietnam employed a risk-based strategy that targeted and destroyed railway lines, warehouses, electrical power generation, and petrol, oil and lubricant supplies.³⁶ The increased level of destruction in this counter-civilian coercive strategy was successful in compelling North Vietnam's leadership to negotiate after having destroyed the North Vietnamese's will to endure further losses.

In contrast to punishment and risk, denial aims to frustrate the adversary's military actions through destroying enough of its military capability. Coercive air strategies based on denial seek to destroy not only forces in the battlefield but also military communication facilities, military supplies and arms manufacturing industries. The expectation is that an adversary will concede after either determining that the benefits of continuing their current behaviour are not worth the cost of significant military losses or after realising that they no longer have any means of achieving their strategic objectives.

While there appears to be a fine line between coercion by denial and brute force, the difference is in the objective of the strategy; if the objective is to convince, it is denial; if the objective is to destroy the adversary to the point where it can no longer fight back, it is brute force.³⁷ For example, NATO's counter-military attacks in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, during the Bosnian war in 1995, targeted heavy weapons, combat support, and command and control facilities,³⁸ leaving Bosnian Serb forces intact but no longer able to achieve their objective of defeating the Croatian land offensive. After suffering significant military losses, Milosevic agreed to concede to NATO and UN terms in exchange for the cessation of NATO air strikes.³⁹

Finally, decapitation, a concept deriving from the theories advanced by Colonel John Warden, targets an adversary's leadership. Pape identifies three sub-categories. The first, leadership decapitation, essentially removes a particular decision-maker if he or she will not concede. The intention is that their successors will concede by reason of wanting to avoid becoming a future target. The second, political decapitation, uses military force to create a conducive environment for domestic opposition groups to overthrow the adversary's leadership, replacing it with one that will comply with the coercer's demands. Thirdly, military decapitation attacks command and control networks, isolating the adversary from their fielded forces.

Pape's decapitation concept, however, appears to contradict the essence of coercive theory in that it critically fails to give an adversary a choice. It aims to thwart rather than convince and, most importantly, does not focus on influencing adversary behaviour and decision making. Accordingly, some question whether decapitation can form the basis of a coercive strategy, as a strategy designed to kill an adversary is contrary to the fundamental theory and philosophy of coercion.⁴⁰

Credibility, capability and communication

In addition to the category of coercive strategy, a coercer must also consider 'perception'. An adversary's perception of the coercer is highly significant and is a critical element of a coercive air campaign.⁴¹ Of particular importance, as was observed above, is the coercer's credibility, capability and ability to communicate to the adversary.

The importance of credibility lies in the extent to which an adversary believes that the coercer's threat is real, as it provides the foundation of an adversary's cost-benefit analysis. An adversary's perception need not be correct; what is important is whether the threat is believed.⁴² For example, Saddam Hussein's refusal to pull out of Kuwait was largely influenced by his perception of US credibility in committing to

such a campaign.⁴³ Saddam believed that the US would be deterred by the number of casualties likely to be sustained in ground combat. The US, in fact, decided to employ air power instead, an option that Saddam had failed to take into account in his cost-benefit analysis.

Capability requires the adversary to believe that the coercer actually has the resources needed to carry out the threat, regardless of the coercer's will. Without this, the threat lacks substance and any coercive efforts will likely be futile. Communication ensures the adversary understands the nature of the threats, what actions will cause hurt to be inflicted, and what actions will result in military force being withheld. Where communication is not clear, the adversary will not be able to comply with the coercer's demands, frustrating the success of the operation. Accordingly, coercive diplomacy relies on communicating a threat and, at the same time, offering a way out.⁴⁴

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Democratic populations demand intervention on humanitarian grounds but do not understand that military force is often necessary to create a receptive environment.

Major George D. Kramlinger⁴⁵

In 2010, a revolutionary political uprising swept through the Arab world. Beginning in Tunisia, the citizens of various Arab states led domestic demonstrations essentially calling for political reform and the removal of their leaders. When the 'Arab Spring' reached Libya in February 2011, demonstrators in Benghazi called for the removal of General Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled the Libyan state for 42 years. As the protests quickly spread to other towns, Gaddafi made it clear that he was not going to step down without a fight, ordering his military to use deadly force, including live ammunition from snipers, military helicopters and fighter jets, against civilian demonstrators.

In response to the escalating violence and international pressure, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 (UNSCR 1970) on 26 February 2011, just 11 days after the initial demonstrations started in Benghazi. Among other things, UNSCR 1970 demanded an immediate end to violence, authorised the International Criminal Court to prosecute crimes arising from the situation in Libya, and established an embargo controlling not only the import and export of arms but also restricting mercenaries from entering Libya.⁴⁶ Additionally, the resolution imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Gaddafi and other key members of his regime.

On 27 February 2011, Libyan rebels formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) with the aim of 'remov[ing] Qadhafi from power and establish[ing] a unified, democratic, and free Libya that respects universal human rights principles'.⁴⁷ The US and the Arab League soon established communication with the NTC, with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton holding a meeting with its leader, Mahmoud Jibril, in Paris on 14 March, conveying to Gaddafi a message of international support for the legitimacy of the NTC.⁴⁸

Subsequently, Gaddafi increased his violence against rebel supporters, threatening to 'come house by house, room by room We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity'.⁴⁹ This statement provoked the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) on 17 March 2011, which condemned attacks against civilians, called for the establishment of a no-fly zone, and authorised 'all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack'.

Coalition goals

Unfortunately, the UN was designed to deal with conflict between nation-states rather than armed intervention into domestic affairs.... Consequently, politics often interferes with writing a clear statement of scope when crafting a UN resolution.'

Major George D. Kramlinger⁵⁰

With UNSCR 1973 as its legal foundation, the US entered Libyan air space on 19 March 2011 under the code-name Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. The operation was launched as a denial campaign, using B-2 bombers to destroy key airfields and fighter aircraft to target armoured vehicles, completely destroying Libya's integrated air defence system in the first 72 hours.⁵¹ Within two weeks, '25 per cent of Gaddafi's military had been reduced to rubble'.⁵²

On 31 March 2011, after successfully securing a no-fly zone above Libya, NATO took over under the code-name Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, implementing a three-tiered operation comprising:

1. The enforcement of an arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea;
2. Maintaining a no-fly zone; and
3. The execution of an air campaign over Libya to protect civilians from attack by Gaddafi's forces.⁵³

However, the ambiguity of UNSCR 1973 left military planners confused as to the desired political end-state. While the direction to use 'all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack' implied the limited use of military force, the absence of solid political guidance made it extremely difficult to plan an air campaign that tied military action to political objectives.⁵⁴

Complications grew as it became evident that the NTC was unwilling to accept any outcome other than Gaddafi's removal from power. The situation became even more dubious when, despite no UN endorsement for regime change, President Obama declared 'it is US policy that Gaddafi needs to go', British Prime Minister Cameron announced 'there is no decent future for Libya with Colonel Gaddafi remaining in power', French President Sarkozy stated 'Qaddafi must go', and the German Foreign Minister, despite Germany's abstention from UNSCR 1973, affirmed that 'the dictator cannot stay'.⁵⁵ Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy published their positions in a jointly-authored statement, 'Libya's Pathway to Peace', making it clear that 'Qaddafi must go and go for good'.⁵⁶

The campaign

Let's just call a spade a spade, a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences. That's the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that's the way it starts.

US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates⁵⁷

While Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was a pure denial campaign, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR opted to execute a combined denial and decapitation strategy. Within two days of adopting UNSCR 1973, coalition forces entered Libyan airspace, deploying 15 US strike and electronic warfare aircraft, and launching over 120 Tomahawk cruise missiles from US and British vessels.⁵⁸ The tactical objective of this first wave of strikes was to target more than 20 integrated air defence facilities along the Libyan coast, as well as to destroy Libya's military airfields.

The results not only denied Gaddafi the ability to use air assets to strike at his people or threaten NATO sorties but also enabled NATO to obtain air superiority and, hence, ensured the free movement of coalition air power. Additional bombing saw the denial of a range of Libyan military assets. NATO aircraft flew some 26,000 sorties, including more than 9700 strike sorties. Those sorties damaged or destroyed ±6000 targets, including ±1600 military facilities, >690 surface-to-surface missile sites and radar systems, ±425 command and control facilities, almost 600 tanks and armoured vehicles, >970 military vehicles, >400 artillery or rocket launchers, >1270 ammunition facilities, ten fighter and rotary wing aircraft, and ten warships.⁵⁹

As the operation continued, Gaddafi loyalists were prevented from obtaining resupply or openly manoeuvring across Libya, hampering Gaddafi's attempts to attack civilian demonstrators. While NATO maintained that it 'was not the opposition's air force',⁶⁰ it is evident that its denial air strikes not only hurt Gaddafi's forces but also boosted the NTC's morale⁶¹ and allowed the rebels to make further advances on the ground. The result was a shift in the local balance of forces, magnifying the NTC threat to Gaddafi which, according to Byman *et al*, dramatically increases the stakes in an adversary's cost-benefit analysis.

This similarly occurred in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, where NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces had the effect of both undermining military capability as well as enhancing the ability of the Bosnian Muslims and Croat forces to advance their objectives against the Serbs.⁶²

According to coercive diplomacy theory, NATO's denial strategy, along with the magnification of the NTC threat, should have resulted in Gaddafi deciding to concede to NATO's demands. With his military capability destroyed, support diminished and objectives thwarted, Gaddafi should have conducted a cost-benefit analysis and rationally concluded that conceding would be the best choice. But this did not happen. Accordingly, NATO progressed to a decapitation strategy.

The use of decapitation tactics started with isolating Gaddafi from his troops and the public by destroying command and control facilities, thus reducing his ability to command troops in the field and make public radio broadcasts. Then, on 20 October 2011, an American Predator and a French fighter jet attacked a fleeing convoy near Sirte. Intelligence sources confirmed Gaddafi was in the convoy and, within moments of the attack, NTC rebels arrived at the scene, beating and eventually killing the dictator.

Throughout the course of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, NATO air power destroyed every target identified and obliterated Libya's military capability, undeniably rendering the operation a tactical success. Yet despite inevitable military defeat and the real threat to his life in the days leading up to his death, Gaddafi did not concede. Gaddafi's demise was not the result of coercion; rather, he was killed by brute force, which brings into question the success of the operation as a coercive diplomacy campaign.

If the goal of coercive diplomacy is to influence the mind of an adversary so they choose to concede, then why did Gaddafi not choose to concede before he was killed? The coercive strategy employed in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR contained force and the threat of force, yet coercion nonetheless failed. Hence the lack of coercive outcome rightly raises concerns as to whether there are essential considerations missing from current coercion theory.⁶³

Why coercive diplomacy failed

If you know your enemies and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* ⁶⁴

While air power can play an essential role in coercive diplomacy, one must remember that it is still only a means to an end. Tactical success does not guarantee strategic success, which requires an in-depth understanding of the relationship between a target's destruction and the desired political end-state that is the objective of a coercive diplomacy campaign.⁶⁵

As discussed above, coercive diplomacy is premised on using the potential hurt of military force to threaten an adversary for the purpose of coercing favourable behaviour. What coercion theory fails to adequately address, however, is how to determine what actions will cause enough hurt to an adversary for them to choose to concede. As coercion is 'a cognitive process ... conducted at the strategic level',⁶⁶ a coercer will only know what will truly hurt an adversary if the coercer understands the adversary's mind, that is, their motivation, fears, belief system, culture, ideology, political influences and what they value most.⁶⁷

An adversary's centre of gravity might not reside in physical objects, such as infrastructure or military assets, but may include intangible values, such as pride, reputation, status or political support. Moreover, assuming that an adversary's motivations are similar to or the same as one's own will most likely result in unsuccessful coercive attempts.⁶⁸ Ben Bolland highlights the importance of understanding the adversary, cautioning that:

Rationality (as we see it) is not assumed on the part of the adversary, neither is the adversary assumed to hold the same set of beliefs and values that we do. They instead [might] operate from an entirely different set of beliefs and moral codes, which we would find hard to understand.⁶⁹

For example, Western culture and societies commonly value life above all else. Saddam Hussein recognised this when, during a conversation with the US ambassador in Iraq, he commented 'yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle'.⁷⁰ In contrast, elements of Arabic culture hold martyrdom in high regard, which is difficult for the West to rationalise. Accordingly, Western strategies that threaten death may be unsuccessful against some adversaries, for 'when people do not fear to die, what's the use of threatening them with death?'.⁷¹

In the case of Libya, NATO's understanding of Gaddafi was limited and out-dated. Libya had not been a country of interest to the West for some time and it held the lowest category of priority on the UK's nation watch list.⁷² Consequently, the US spent the first 11 days of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN gathering intelligence in order to gain an understanding of Gaddafi and Libya for the purpose of developing a coercive air strategy. In addition, academic opinions were obtained. However, despite the combination of intelligence and academic opinion, the information was not personal or detailed enough to gain an in-depth understanding of Gaddafi's mind, his motivation and what he valued most.

This lack of understanding led to incoherent ideas of what targets should be attacked and what type of coercive strategy should be employed. Accordingly, at the beginning of the campaign, when Gaddafi claimed that 'we will not surrender, we will not give up. We have one option—our country. We will remain in it 'til the end. Dead, alive, victorious, it doesn't matter,'⁷³ NATO should have understood that Gaddafi valued his pride and status as head of the Libyan state more than his own life. His statement made clear that he would rather die than surrender and be deposed. Hence, NATO should have known that it would be impossible to negotiate a settlement that included regime change and ought to have tailored its coercive strategy accordingly.

The coalition also failed to clearly articulate, unify and communicate its intended campaign objectives. NATO and the UN insisted that behavioural change, not regime change, was the objective of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, and President Obama's position appeared to be in alignment, affirming that the use of military force to depose Gaddafi was not on the political agenda.⁷⁴ Yet despite President Obama's affirmation, the joint publication 'Libya's Pathway to Peace' clearly stated a different position, namely that Gaddafi could not remain in power.

The NTC also demanded Gaddafi's removal and, while NATO maintained that it was not the NTC's air force,⁷⁵ it was NATO's air strikes that scattered Gaddafi's convoy during his escape, contributing to his capture and subsequent death at the hands of the NTC rebels. This conflicting communication questions what message Gaddafi was receiving and how he interpreted it. As Richard Goodman suggests, '[b]est case, Gaddafi received a mixed message. Worst case, in terms of coercion, Gaddafi received a clear message that was inconsistent with [the] underlying intent'.⁷⁶

If the intent was coercion, which originally appeared to be the case given NATO's denial strategy, then Gaddafi should have been given a way out. He should have had a choice to concede and that choice should have been a realistic option for him, that is, NATO needed to ensure that its demands were not absolutely opposed to Gaddafi's interests, leading to a zero-sum game. Further, NATO failed to clearly communicate to Gaddafi what he needed to do in order for NATO's military force to be withheld.

When Gaddafi eventually proposed a ceasefire in May to allow for negotiations, the NTC and NATO rejected it outright, as it did not include Gaddafi's removal from power. The NTC and NATO's actions made it clear that, despite NATO's insistence that the operation's objective was not to depose Gaddafi, there would be no negotiated outcome which did not include regime change. NATO's demands directly affected Gaddafi's vital interests by endangering his hold on power, his reputation, his status and his pride. This in turn pushed Gaddafi into a corner and gave him no choice but to continue resisting.

If NATO had understood Gaddafi's motivation or what he valued, it would have realised that its demands were too onerous. Combined with the lack of any positive inducement, this resulted in a cost-benefit analysis that indicated to Gaddafi that the benefits which would be lost if he were to concede were worth him suffering the costs of NATO's military force. Hence, Gaddafi rationally concluded that a negotiated settlement was not the better option. Indeed, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR turned into a zero-sum

conflict that, as Schelling warns, cannot produce the negotiated solution that coercive diplomacy requires in order to be successful. Accordingly, if regime change was, in fact, the objective of the operation, coercive diplomacy could not have succeeded—as coercion seeks to coerce, and no amount of behavioural change in Gaddafi would have satisfied NATO.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The above analysis of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR indicates that the operation failed to coerce Gaddafi for two main reasons: NATO did not understand Gaddafi and therefore turned the operation into a zero-sum game, and NATO did not identify clear political objectives and was therefore unable to effectively communicate to Gaddafi their expectations of him.

This highlights the complexity of coercive diplomacy, which requires a coercer to delicately balance military force, politics and psychology. The psychology behind an adversary's decision making is a central component of coercive diplomacy and, perhaps, the most important component. However, the available literature on military coercion remains largely focused on tactical coercive strategies, leaving a dangerous gap in current coercion theory.

Regardless of the many attributes that make air power particularly apt for use in coercive operations, if a coercer does not understand their adversary's mind, they will be left disappointed and confused when their tactical success does not yield the desired political or strategic results they hoped for. It is, therefore, essential that in planning future coercive air operations, military planners do not rely on past coercive campaigns as a model but instead specifically tailor each future operation to an individual adversary, so as to personally influence that adversary's unique decision calculus. In order to achieve this, a military planner must include an adversary's motivations, fears and values as the foundation of any coercive air strategy.

In terms of whether Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR would have achieved a different result had NATO obtained a better understanding of Gaddafi, no-one will ever know. It is impossible to conclude whether Gaddafi would have ceased his attacks on civilians and conceded to NATO's demands if NATO had allowed him to remain in power and save face. However, if NATO's strategy was a genuine attempt to coerce Gaddafi, NATO's lack of knowledge and understanding of the dictator turned the operation into a zero-sum game which, according to the psychology behind coercive diplomacy, could never have led to a negotiated solution. Hence, NATO's actions undermined not only the fundamental theory of coercion but also damaged any prospects of a successful coercive diplomacy operation.

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NOTES

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- 2 Gretchen Fryar, 'The Air Power to Coerce: the role of air power in twenty-first century coercive diplomacy', Master of Philosophy thesis, The University of NSW at ADFA: Canberra, 2012, p. 2.
- 3 Kramlinger, 'Sustained Coercive Air Presence', p. 1.
- 4 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 12, 2011, p. 153.
- 5 There are numerous versions: see, for example, Sun Tzu, translated and annotated by Samuel B. Griffith, *The Art of War*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1963.
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The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: a challenge for regional security?¹

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Introduction

Amid the vast and resource rich waters of the East China Sea exist a handful of disputed rocky islands which some see as 'sacred inalienable territory'.² Known as Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China,³ the five small uninhabited islands and three rocks—with an area less than seven square kilometres—are a source of ongoing tension in Northeast Asia.⁴

While the islands are currently under the administration of Japan, the dispute surrounding them is borne of different interpretations of historical circumstances and fuelled by enduring rivalries. These disputed claims have created what some have called an incendiary and 'truly dangerous situation'.⁵ However, others maintain that 'even though tensions between China and Japan are rising, an economic version of mutual deterrence is preserving the uneasy status quo between the two sides'.⁶

The aim of this article is to determine to what extent the dispute will constitute an ongoing regional security challenge. It examines the major aggravating factors which could lead to confrontation, including differing historical accounts, national identity issues and resource rivalry. It also examines the factors that serve to contain military adventurism, namely the US presence in the region and economic interdependence. The article concludes that while the potential of widespread Sino-Japanese conflict is unlikely, there nonetheless exists the potential for limited clashes and for tensions over the islands to remain a challenge for the security of Northeast Asia and, indeed, the wider Asia-Pacific region.

Historical interpretations

A lack of historical reconciliation is often cited as the root cause of contemporary Sino-Japanese tensions.⁷ For the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, this is demonstrated in the 'diametrically opposite views of history' which characterise the official narratives of the claimant states.⁸ For the Chinese, their respective claims 'rest on historical discoveries by ancient Chinese mariners and envoys'.⁹ China contends that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Under the Treaty, China ceded Taiwan to Japan, 'together with all the islands appertaining or pertaining' to it.¹⁰ Consequently, China argues the islands should have been returned under agreements struck at the end of World War 2.¹¹

In contrast, Japan's claim is weighted towards the norms of international law and focuses on concepts such as 'unclaimed territory', 'prior occupation' and 'inherent territory'.¹² Japan maintains that it laid claim to the Senkakus in 1895, some months after the treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, and that previously the islands were 'terra nullius'.¹³ Japan further argues that the islands were returned to it following the cessation of US administrative control over Okinawa in 1972.¹⁴ The fundamental issue with the conflicting historical narratives of the claimant states is that:

[B]oth historical discovery and effective administration are valid criteria under international law for states to claim title over an unclaimed or disputed piece of territory, although neither alone can be taken to establish ownership title beyond doubt or challenge.¹⁵

While referral to the International Court of Justice is an option for possible dispute resolution, China has rejected such a move as 'internationalising' its East China Sea disputes, arguing they are matters for bilateral resolution.¹⁶ Nor is such a referral possible while Japan maintains there is no territorial dispute and 'no claim to answer'.¹⁷ Hence, despite China having formally claimed the islands in December 1971,¹⁸ there have never been any jurisdictional-based attempts to settle the territorial dispute and ownership of the surrounding waters.¹⁹

Accordingly, the merit of the historical claims and their basis in international law are essentially moot, given the intractable perspectives of the claimants. However, these divergent historical narratives continue to shape the contemporary national identities of China and Japan, and their relationship with one another.

Identity, nationalism and Sino-Japan relations

Violent and bitter past conflicts—notably the 19th century Sino-Japanese War, the occupation of Manchuria (1931) and the so-called Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45)—have led China and Japan to view their relationship through a lens of enduring mistrust and suspicion.²⁰ In recent years, there has been an upsurge in national pride in both countries.²¹ Chinese nationalism, according to Nathan and Scobell, is ‘powered by feelings of historical humiliation and wounded national pride ... [which] contemporary policy makers often cultivate and manipulate to advance their agendas’.²² This includes using ‘anti-Japanese sentiment as a safety valve for the disgruntled public to vent their frustration’.²³ For example, local Chinese police purportedly ‘vacillated between encouraging and suppressing the riots’ that followed Japan’s nationalisation of the islands in 2012.²⁴

In Japan, it has been asserted that an ‘ever-growing fear of losing its position as an Asian power and its foothold in the international community’ is redefining Japanese national identity.²⁵ Zhao notes that as Japan confronts its declining economic power, when compared to China, ‘nationalist impulses will increase and conservative elements in Japanese politics will push for a more assertive security stance’.²⁶ Coupled with economic stagnation, an ageing population and a more inward-looking Japanese youth, Wan has argued that Japanese society is now ‘more conservative and less willing to listen’ to divergent views.²⁷ Katz has similarly contended that visits by Japanese politicians to the controversial Yasakuni Shrine, and a revisionist history of World War 2, are examples that reflect these growing ‘nationalist instincts’.²⁸

As a result of these forces shaping national identities, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have now ‘assume[d] exaggerated significance as symbols of sovereignty, status and security’, with the dispute arousing ‘thinly veiled nationalist passions in both China and Japan’.²⁹ Wan contends that Chinese and Japanese nationalists ‘feel angry both at the other side for treachery and at their own government for supposedly weak diplomacy’.³⁰ These sentiments have spawned a culture of ‘assertive activism’, which has included widespread protest activity and boycotts, and led to increased patrols of the islands by both nations, increasing the likelihood of confrontation.³¹

The development of volatile nationalist sentiments has resulted in China and Japan both viewing ‘themselves as the victim and the other as the aggressor’.³² Moreover, these conditions arguably prevent each government from taking a longer-term view and ‘from communicating to their respective constituents that compromise is both necessary and justified’.³³ Rather, nationalist sentiment sets and maintains the conditions for heightened tensions and increases the possibility of armed clashes and miscalculations.

Resource rivalry

A further destabilising factor is strategic rivalry between China and Japan over the economic development of the islands and the ‘murky realm of EEZ [exclusive economic zone] exploitation’.³⁴ The East China Sea is rich in hydrocarbons, with between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil and 1–2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proven and probable reserves,³⁵ likely enough to meet the energy demands of China or Japan for 50–80 years.³⁶ While a ‘principled consensus’ on development of the field was reached between China and Japan in 2008, the development project has been beset with ongoing tensions, suspicion and production setbacks.³⁷

To date, neither side has been able to move forward with joint development work. Although nationalistic politics and sovereignty issues play a role in the negotiations, these factors alone do not account for a failure to advance.³⁸ Rather, different and uncompromising interpretations of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as it applies to overlapping EEZs, are driving the dispute. In essence, China ‘claims the whole continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough’, while Japan ‘claims the same shelf to the median line between its undisputed territory and that of China’.³⁹

However, other factors also prevent the ready resolution of a joint arrangement. These include differing 'interpretations of what joint development means and which areas should be jointly developed' and the geography of the field, which would favour China over Japan as a result of its proximity to China's coastal industrial bases.⁴⁰ Finally, because of the topography of the Okinawan Trough, even if an agreement was made, it would not be technologically or economically feasible to transfer any hydrocarbons exploited directly to Japan for either processing or consumption.⁴¹ Collectively, these factors have led to a climate of resource rivalry between the two nations, where neither is prepared to yield for fear of favouring the other.

Consequently, 'until these disputes are resolved, it is likely that the East China Sea will remain underexplored and its energy resources will not be fully developed'.⁴² However, other factors serve to mitigate these tensions and constrain military action.

The US presence

In relation to the longstanding US presence in Asia, Cummings opines that 'whatever one thinks of the American role, it has maintained regional stability since the end of the Vietnam War'.⁴³ Indeed, Nye suggests that North Asia's prosperity owes much to the stability afforded by American alliances in the region and to the continued presence of substantial US forces.⁴⁴ For the US, its principal interest in the maritime disputes in the region is to 'ensure freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce'.⁴⁵ To achieve this, the US officially remains neutral on issues of maritime sovereignty.

That said, by virtue of the terms of its 1960 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security' with Japan, the consequences of any escalation in the dispute are high. Specifically, the US recognises that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fall under the terms of the treaty and that any armed attack on the islands would result in US action to defend Japan.⁴⁶ While US obligations under the treaty also serve to heighten the consequences of any 'accidental military miscalculations', Zhao notes that the US can be expected to actively discourage any provocative action, as its goal is the peaceful resolution of the sovereignty dispute.⁴⁷

Commentators have also argued that China 'accepts the United States provides a degree of regional order in China's neighbourhood', even though 'the Chinese leadership might prefer a reduction in the US influence and presence in the region'.⁴⁸ However, since the Obama Administration's announcement that it would intensify its role in the Asia-Pacific region,⁴⁹ the traditional view of the US as a stabilising presence in the region has not been without criticism. To some, the 'pivot to the Pacific' is seen as 'focused on dividing China from its neighbours and keeping China's military in check' through what is perceived as a thinly-veiled policy of containment.⁵⁰

In late 2011, a PLA spokesman ventured further, suggesting the US pivot was 'detrimental to the mutual trust and cooperation between countries in the region'.⁵¹ Manyin *et al* argue that such views and sentiments could lead China to become more determined to strengthen its anti-access capabilities and more assertive about defending its territorial claims.⁵² Despite these developments—and the assessment that 'Chinese analysts presently fear US power much more than Japanese power'⁵³—the US presence and its alliance with Japan remain considerable deterrents to any direct military action in the East China Sea. This is because such action would risk the very 'international environment which is conducive to China's "peaceful rise", as well as Japan's smooth economic recovery'.⁵⁴

Economic interdependence

Beyond the argued stabilising influence of the US, a number of commentators have contended that economic interdependence is a major factor preventing escalation of the dispute. Kim suggests that the 'growing trade interdependence for both China and Japan provides greater economic incentives for both parties to avoid disruptive disputes'.⁵⁵ Weigand also argues that Chinese officials are ultimately more concerned with economic success than territorial nationalism, asserting that:

Chinese officials have often opted to protect bilateral relations, especially with its economic partner Japan, rather than attempt to mobilise domestic gains or satisfy domestic demands.⁵⁶

At stake in the dispute are not just territorial sovereignty and potential seabed riches but a lucrative trade and investment relationship that has developed over the past 40 years.⁵⁷ Since 2007, China has been Japan's largest trading partner. Japan's exports to China totaled US\$73.54 billion in the first half of 2012, while its imports from China totalled US\$91.29 billion.⁵⁸ At the end of June 2012, Japan's cumulative investment in China reached US\$83.97 billion, making it the largest foreign investor in China. Similarly, China is Japan's biggest national debt holder—by the end of 2011, it held 18 trillion yen (approximately US\$230.5 billion).

These figures reveal that 'China needs to buy Japanese products as much as Japan needs to sell them'.⁵⁹ Put simply, China's 'export-driven economic miracle' depends on imports, with around 60-70 per cent of the goods China imports from Japan being the machinery and parts that China in turn needs to make its own products. As noted by Katz, China cannot 'single out Japanese products without damaging and alienating the networks of multinational companies that are fuelling China's march up the value chain and toward a higher standard of living'.⁶⁰

Nor can China take for granted its foreign investment. Rising wages and worsening pollution have already led some manufacturers to exit China. Should the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute escalate, further companies would likely relocate elsewhere. As for Japan, China's proximity, competitiveness, relative stability and the sheer size of its consumer market continue to make it an attractive investment, production and market destination for Japanese capital and goods.

The above dynamics have led Koo to deduce that the major risk to escalation of the dispute is not so much a tactical miscalculation but rather if 'Chinese economic success allows Beijing to be more aggressive towards Japan either economically or strategically'.⁶¹ For the foreseeable future, however, given the relative balance and complementary nature of their economic relationship, he argues that 'as long as profitable economic opportunities continue for both sides, it is likely that a system of control and restraint will become a stable feature of the ... dispute'.⁶² Katz echoes this view and suggests that although economic self-interest does not always override nationalist emotion, it does 'raise the costs of letting passions dominate foreign policy'.⁶³

Conclusion

In many ways, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is simply a lens which reflects the 'cold politics and hot economics' of contemporary Sino-Japan relations.⁶⁴ Divergent historical narratives, strengthening nationalism and resource rivalry feed a culture of enduring suspicion and enmity. To China, the islands are symbolic of the 'unresolved issues of Japanese imperialism', while to Japan, they demonstrate that 'the real issue is one of [perceived] Chinese aggression and bullying'.⁶⁵ Collectively, these factors have led to more maritime patrols by both China and Japan, and the declaration by the Chinese of an air defence identification zone over the islands, thereby heightening tensions and the potential for conflict.

Yet despite these destabilising influences, the 'two countries have successfully managed to contain their respective territorial and maritime claims thus far'.⁶⁶ Economic interdependence, underwritten by the stability and security of the US in the region, has created a powerful model for deterrence or 'mutual assured production'.⁶⁷ Neither side, thus far, has been prepared to test the model.

That said, in the absence of meaningful reconciliation in East Asia, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute—rooted in history and identity—is likely to 'continue to fester'.⁶⁸ Furthermore, as ultra-nationalists from both sides continue to exert for 'more assertive territorial and maritime policies',⁶⁹ the dispute is set to remain a regional security challenge, albeit one where military action is constrained by virtue of the US presence and the vested economic self-interest of both parties. What the region will be watching is whether China's rhetoric on its 'peaceful rise' is matched by its actions.

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Her more recent appointments have included Staff Officer to VCDF, Directing Staff at the Australian Command and Staff College, and Director of the LHD Systems Program Office in the Defence Materiel Organisation, as well as Command of HMAS Cerberus. She has a Bachelor of Engineering with 1st Class Honours from the University of NSW, a Masters of Science in Marine Engineering from University College London and a Masters of Management in Defence Studies from the University of Canberra. She is currently attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College.

NOTES

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- ¹ This is an edited version of a paper, titled 'The Senkaku Islands – A Challenge For Regional Security?', submitted by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College in 2014.
 - ² Chien-Peng Chung, 'Resolving China's Island Disputes: a two level game analysis', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, p. 49.
 - ³ Taiwan also lays claim to the islands and refers to them as the Diaoyutai. However, as Taiwan's claim parallels China's and, as it has not actively pursued resources in the region, the literature invariably focuses on the Sino-Japan aspect of the dispute.
 - ⁴ Robert M. Hathaway and Andrea Bartoli, 'Preface', in Tatsushi Arai, Shihoko Goto and Zheng Wang (eds.), *Clash of National Identities: China, Japan and the East China Sea territorial dispute*, The Wilson Center and George Mason University: Washington DC, 2012, p. 1.
 - ⁵ Shihoko Goto, 'Introduction', in Arai *et al*, *Clash of National Identities*, p. 7. Also Hathaway and Bartoli, 'Preface', p. 1.
 - ⁶ Richard Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013, p.1.
 - ⁷ Ming Wan, 'Causes and Prospects for Sino-Japanese Tensions: a political analysis', in Arai *et al*, *Clash of National Identities*, p. 33.
 - ⁸ Daqing Yang, 'History: from dispute to dialogue', in Arai *et al*, *Clash of National Identities*, p. 23.
 - ⁹ These discoveries occurred during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasties (1644-1911). Both dynasties sailed to the Ryukyu Kingdom of Okinawa. Chung, 'Resolving China's Island Disputes', p. 53.
 - ¹⁰ Ben Dolvin, Shirley A. Kan and Mark E. Manyin, 'Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: issues for Congress', in Daniel B. Samuel (ed.), *East Asia's Maritime Territorial Disputes, Claims and Consideration for the United States*, Nova: New York, 2013, p. 19.
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- 12 Srikanth Kondapalli, 'The Rise of China and Territorial Disputes', in Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Cheng-yi Lin (eds.), *The Rise of China – Beijing's Strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific*, Routledge: New York, 2009, p. 153.
- 13 Dolvin, Kan and Manyin, 'Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia', p. 19.
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- 15 Chung, 'Resolving China's Island Disputes', p. 53.
- 16 See, for example, Z. Pan, 'Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: the pending controversy from the Chinese perspective', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol.12, No.1, 2007, pp. 71-88; and Stephen Hoadley, 'Tensions in the East China Sea', *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 38, No. 6, November/December 2013, p. 27.
- 17 Hoadley, 'Tensions in the East China Sea', p. 26.
- 18 Goto, 'Introduction', p. 5.
- 19 Krista E. Wiegand, 'China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: issue linkage and coercive diplomacy', *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No 2, 2009, p. 173.
- 20 Evans J.R. Revere, 'The United States and Japan in East Asia: challenges and prospects for the alliance', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 35, 2013, p. 188.
- 21 Goto, 'Introduction', p. 5.
- 22 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China's Search for Identity*, Columbia Free Press: New York, 2012, p. 31.
- 23 Wan, 'Causes and Prospects for Sino-Japanese Tensions', p. 33.
- 24 Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', p. 2.
- 25 Wan, 'Causes and Prospects for Sino-Japanese Tensions', p. 33.
- 26 Quangsheng Zhao, 'No War in the East China Sea', in Arai *et al*, *Clash of National Identities*, p. 49.
- 27 Wan, 'Causes and Prospects for Sino-Japanese Tensions', p. 33.
- 28 Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', p. 6.
- 29 Hoadley, 'Tensions in the East China Sea', pp. 25 and 27.
- 30 Wan, 'Causes and Prospects for Sino-Japanese Tensions', p. 29.
- 31 Kondapalli, 'The Rise of China and Territorial Disputes', p. 153. Examples of 'assertive activism' include the widespread protests following the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain by Japanese authorities patrolling the islands in 2010 and after Tokyo's nationalisation of the islands through land purchases in 2012.
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- 33 Wan, 'Causes and Prospects for Sino-Japanese Tensions', p. 30.
- 34 Suk Kyoon Kim, 'China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea: a note on recent developments', *Ocean Development and International Law*, Vol. 43, 2012, p. 304.
- 35 US Energy Information Administration, 'East China Sea Brief', updated 25 September 2012, p. 2, available at <<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics-ECS>> accessed 23 June 2014.
- 36 Wiegand, 'China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute', p. 170.
- 37 Seokwoo Lee and Young Kil Park, 'Maritime Delimitation and Joint Resource Development in the East China Sea', in Harry N. Scheiber and Moon Sang Kwon (eds.), 'Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation', Papers from the Law of the Sea Institute, University of California, Berkeley–Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference, Seoul, Korea, May 2012, available at <www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Lee-Park-final.pdf> accessed 23 June 2014.
- 38 Guo Rongxing, 'Territorial Disputes and Sea Bed Petroleum Exploitation: some options for the East China Sea', Working Paper, The Brookings Institute Center for North East Asian Policy Studies: Washington DC, 2010, p. 10, available at <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/09/east-china-sea-guo>> accessed 23 June 2014.
- 39 Dolvin, Kan and Manyin, 'Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia', p. 18.
- 40 Rongxing, 'Territorial Disputes and Sea Bed Petroleum Exploitation', pp. 7 and 9.
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- 42 US Energy Information Administration, 'East China Sea Brief', p. 4.
- 43 Bruce Cummings, 'America's Perspective on China's Rise' in Hsiao and Lin, *The Rise of China – Beijing's Strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific*, p. 207.
- 44 Joseph S. Nye, 'East Asian Security, The Case for Deep Engagement', in James F. Hoge and Fareed Zakaria (eds.), *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1995, p. 90.
- 45 Kim, 'China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea', p. 302.
- 46 Reuters, 'Obama Says US-Japan Security Treaty Covers Disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands', *International Business Times* website, 22 April 2014, available at <<http://www.ibtimes.com/obama-says-us-japan-security-treaty-covers-disputed-senkakudiaoyu-islands-1575040>> accessed 23 June 2014.
- 47 Zhao, 'No War in the East China Sea in Clash of National Identities', p. 50.
- 48 See, for example, Rosemary Foot, 'China's Policies toward the Asia Pacific Region', in Hsiao and Lin, *The Rise of China – Beijing's Strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific*, p. 140.
- 49 See, for example, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 'Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament', White House website, 12 November 2011, available at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>> accessed 24 June 2014.
- 50 See, for example, Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolvin, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O'Rourke and Bruce Vaughn, 'Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "rebalancing toward Asia"', in Samuel, *East Asia's Maritime Territorial Disputes, Claims and Consideration for the United States*, pp. 153 and 166.
- 51 Statement by China's Defence Ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng on 30 November 2011, quoted in Manyin, Daggett, Dolvin, Lawrence, Martin, O'Rourke and Vaughn, 'Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "rebalancing toward Asia"', p. 165.
- 52 Manyin, Daggett, Dolvin, Lawrence, Martin, O'Rourke and Vaughn, 'Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "rebalancing toward Asia"', p. 153.
- 53 Min Gyo Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: between a rock and a hard place*, Springer: Seoul, 2009, p. 131.
- 54 Zhao, 'No War in the East China Sea', p. 51.
- 55 Kim, 'China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea', p. 302.
- 56 Wiegand, 'China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute', p. 178.
- 57 Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia*, p. 134.
- 58 Xinhua, 'Key Facts on China – Japan trade and economic ties', Globaltimes.cn website, available at <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/734634>> accessed 5 April 14. , noting that this same reference applies to the following two sentences as well.
- 59 Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', p. 1.
- 60 Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', p. 4.
- 61 Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia*, p. 134.
- 62 Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia*, p. 134.
- 63 Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', p. 4.
- 64 Kim, 'China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea', p. 302.
- 65 Hathaway and Bartoli, 'Preface', p. 1.
- 66 Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia*, p. 134.
- 67 Katz, 'Mutual Assured Production, Why Trade will Limit Conflict between China and Japan', p. 1.
- 68 Yang, 'History', p. 27.
- 69 Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia*, p. 133.

The Value of the Past in Contemporary Defence Policy Challenges¹

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Introduction

The release of the *2013 Defence White Paper* stimulated a broad-ranging debate regarding the future direction of Australian strategic and defence policy.² Generalising the themes contained in this discussion, one is left with a number of defence policy challenges. In the context of this article, a defence policy challenge is defined as an approach to reconciling Australia's strategic interests and objectives with force employment and force structure policies.³ It includes the measures taken to integrate Australia's alliance relationships across these domains.⁴

So what are today's main defence policy challenges? In the wake of the *2013 Defence White Paper*, most commentators identify two inter-related issues as being of particular significance. The first regards setting the appropriate level of defence self-reliance.⁵ The second relates to managing the costs and benefits of the US alliance.⁶ In meeting these challenges, it would appear sensible to look to past experience for precedent in policy design. This article will argue that some useful insight can be gained by examining these challenges through the prism of the dominant policy concepts which have defined the evolution of Australian strategic policy since 1945.

The article firstly contends that in broad terms, the two concepts defining Australian strategic policy have been 'forward defence' and 'defence of Australia'. It goes on to argue that the experience of each policy approach, particularly regarding the limits of the ANZUS alliance, illustrates that Australia should be self-reliant to address threats at the local level and conduct regional contingency operations.

However, the utility of using the two policy concepts as a lens is qualified by Australia's historical experience regarding direct major power threats since 1945. Moreover, it is reasoned that the dimensions of the cost-benefit implications associated with the alliance can be illuminated by Australia's past policy experience. The article concludes that Australia's increasingly close relationship with the US may have considerable increasing costs, with implications for force employment and force structure policy.

The evolution of Australian strategic and defence policy

From 1945, Australian strategic policy—particularly defence and foreign policy—evolved through two overlapping eras. Strategic policy was initially dominated by 'forward defence', which focused on contributing to US and UK objectives to contain communism.⁷ In this context, 'forward defence' was defined as:

[T]he policy of countering perceived threats ... as far from ... Australia as possible. [T]his involved deploying forces overseas, basing and exercising [them] in South-east Asia in peacetime, forming alliances with great [and] regional powers, and encouraging great power involvement in South-east Asia.... The policy was motivated by the belief that Australia did not have the population or resources to defend itself alone and by a perception of communism as a monolithic threat.⁸

'Forward defence' emphasised force structures that allowed integration into allied formations.⁹ During this period, Australia's overarching foreign policy remained isolationist in the sense that engagement with Asia was 'dominated by its integration into the broader struggle against communism'.¹⁰ However, a 'discordant note' was Australia's regional trade, particularly with Japan and China, which increased considerably throughout the 'forward defence' era.¹¹

The concept was gradually replaced in the 1960s and 1970s as Australia's 'great and powerful friends' withdrew from the region.¹² A new approach saw defence policy emphasise greater 'self-reliance', under what would eventually be termed the 'defence of Australia' doctrine, while foreign policy increasingly

embraced direct engagement with Asia, heavily driven by trade.¹³ Developed in the absence of any realistic threat, the concept of 'defence of Australia' was initially more heavily weighted towards the strategic objective of defending the Australian continent.

However, throughout the 1990s, the concept was adapted to include an emphasis on the objective of stability in the immediate region, and so-called 'niche contributions' to coalition operations in support of global stability.¹⁴ This approach was codified in the strategic interests articulated in the *2000 Defence White Paper*.¹⁵ Australia's strategic policy and its force structure since have essentially remained driven by the 'defence of Australia' and regional stability tasks.¹⁶

The purist form of 'forward defence' is contained in the 1956 strategic guidance, while the *1986 Dobb Review* reflected the 'defence of Australia' concept—and pits the two as polar opposites.¹⁷ On the one hand, 'forward defence' emphasises a forward-deployed posture and subordination to allied strategy to drive force structure priorities and employment policy. 'Defence of Australia' emphasises a self-reliant posture, force structure and force employment policy optimised for continental defence, and independent regional contingencies. In broad terms, the two concepts adequately define the evolution of Australian strategic policy and provide a basis for examining contemporary policy challenges.

Determining the extent of self-reliance within the alliance

Arguably, the core challenge facing contemporary Australian defence policy is balancing the level of self-reliant defence capability that Australia maintains against budgetary constraints, and the perceived limits of allied commitment to Australia's security. 'Forward defence' and 'defence of Australia' each provide useful insight into the alternative methods that past Australian Governments have employed to confront the challenge of determining the level of self-reliance required in defence policy.

Practical experience of each of the policy concepts has highlighted that the minimum level of self-reliance Australia requires is the capacity to respond to local level threats and regional contingencies. Australia has not yet had to face a direct threat from a major power that would provide a test-case for the upper extent of self-reliance. This is an area that should arguably receive greater attention as the rise of China complicates the strategic environment.

The inherent tension faced by today's strategic policy-makers in setting the limits on self-reliance is illustrated in the *2013 Defence White Paper* which stated that:

Australia's defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in deterring or defeating armed attacks on Australia, within the context of our Alliance with the United States.... We would seek and expect help from our friends if Australia came under direct attack.¹⁸

The White Paper also clarifies the limits of self-reliance, stating that Australia relies on significant support from the US for intelligence, logistics and access to technology.¹⁹ Moreover, it is explicit about the potential cost a more independent approach would entail.²⁰ Furthermore, it highlights that Australia continues to rely on extended US nuclear deterrence.²¹ What is missing from this document is an appreciation of the perceived limits of allied commitment to Australian security, which is necessary to establish the parameters of self-reliance.

The ANZUS security treaty is not a complete guarantee of Australia's security interests.²² The inherent limitations in the treaty are more apparent when its operative clauses are compared with the NATO treaty. For example, Article IV of the ANZUS treaty states that:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.²³

In contrast, Article V of the NATO treaty states that '[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them ... shall be considered an attack against them all'.²⁴ The wording of ANZUS is deliberately less explicit, since the US did not want to create an obligation requiring automatic military intervention.²⁵ The consequence of this lack of an explicit guarantee has meant that Australia has practical experience of US intransigence to its security interests in both the 'forward defence' and 'defence of Australia' eras.

Australia first recognised that it required a minimum level of defence self-reliance in the late 1950s.²⁶ While remaining committed to 'forward defence', the limitations of US commitment to Australian security became apparent as a result of US rejection of support in the dispute over West Papua.²⁷ The divergence of Australian and US interests continued into the 1960s as Indonesia rapidly increased its defence capability, with Soviet support, and was involved in 'Konfrontasi' against Malaysia.²⁸ Consequently, Australia was compelled to develop a more self-reliant defence posture, acquiring submarines, destroyers, fighters and strike aircraft, in addition to expanding the Army.²⁹ The Indonesian crisis highlighted that ANZUS did not completely guarantee US support, particularly against low-level threats where US interests were not fully engaged.

The 1999 East Timor crisis provided another perspective on the minimum level of self-reliance, this time under the 'defence of Australia' doctrine. The Timor operation demonstrated the need for the force structure determinant associated with self-reliance to extend to the maintenance of joint force projection capabilities, able to execute and sustain operations in the region. Echoing Australia's experience during the early 1960s, the US declined to provide 'boots on the ground', and limited itself to providing intelligence, force projection, logistic support, a Marine Expeditionary Unit at sea, and political pressure on Jakarta.³⁰

The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade subsequently concluded that the ADF was not well positioned to execute the operation, and that its success was contingent in part because Timor was close enough for helicopters to be flown direct from Darwin.³¹ Major deficiencies were also brought to light, including in relation to readiness, mobilisation, strategic lift, communications, engineering and logistics.³² The Committee agreed that budgetary constraints and the lower priority afforded to regional interests under the 'defence of Australia' doctrine were key causes.³³

Although counterfactual, it is worthwhile considering the implications for the operation had it been more kinetic or had the US been unable to provide the support it did because of higher priority operations elsewhere. The post-Timor force structure enhancements, driven by the increasing strategic policy emphasis on regional contingencies, went some way to remediate these issues, particularly during the 2006 redeployment to Timor.³⁴ As such, lessons identified in the practical application of 'defence of Australia' doctrine and the earlier 'forward defence' policy highlighted the need for Australia to be self-reliant—at least to the extent required to project and sustain a robust joint force into the Indo-Pacific region.³⁵

The utility of examining the minimum level of self-reliance through past policy concepts is qualified when considering higher-level threats. Frühling highlights that for Australia, as a small to medium power, '[u]ltimately, even a policy of self-reliance ... cannot avert the fact that, above a certain level of conflict, it remains dependent on its allies for its ultimate survival'.³⁶ Since 1945, Australia has not had to develop defence policy to address a direct major power threat to the continent itself, which the *2013 Defence White Paper* reaffirmed is unlikely.³⁷

However, as the region's armed forces accelerate the pace of their modernisation, today's policy-makers increasingly have to factor in a higher regional defence capability baseline, from which a future direct threat to Australia may eventuate.³⁸ Although Australia is not publicly treating China's rise as adversarial, Hugh White has argued that the potential for increased strategic competition in the region is more than a possibility.³⁹ Given the long lead times of major acquisition projects, adjusting the minimum future level of self-reliance arguably remains an immediate and major defence policy challenge.

If a significant threat to Australia were to develop in the near term, Australia may be forced to more directly embrace the deterrent value of the US alliance. In view of the contemporary appreciation of the lack of a security guarantee in the ANZUS treaty, the purpose and level of self-reliance that Australia maintains in this instance may take on a very different character from that envisaged in either 'forward defence' or 'defence of Australia'. Defence planners may need to look to the NATO experience during the Cold War for historical precedent in the event of a major existential threat to Australia.⁴⁰

Therefore, while the usefulness of past policy concepts is qualified when examining higher-level threats, they can at least provide some utility in determining the minimum level of self-reliance Australia needs for local-level contingencies.

ANZUS: understanding the cost

For over 60 years, Australia's alliance with the US has remained the 'cornerstone' of Australia's strategic policy.⁴¹ However, the benefit Australia derives from its alliance comes at a cost. The ongoing debate regarding the tension between Australia's alliance with the US and its economic relationship with China highlights the first potential cost confronting strategic policy-makers.⁴² Moreover, the expectation of burden sharing in US military operations is a further requirement of the alliance.⁴³

Examining these challenges through the lens of past experience provides some insight into the extent of the problem and potential implications. Balancing Australia's relationship with China—its number one trading partner—against the security provided by the US alliance is a fundamental challenge for defence policy-makers. Australia's exports to China currently amount to 29 per cent of Australia's total exports.⁴⁴ Clearly, this is a significant source of revenue for Australia, which could be threatened by any deterioration in Australia's relationship with China.

An approach to avoiding any negative implications from an increasingly close relationship with the US would be to retain the 'defence of Australia' approach, focusing inwards, increasing the level of self-reliance and minimising dependence on the alliance. In the increasingly-complex strategic environment highlighted by the *2013 Defence White Paper*, and with budgetary pressures exacerbated by an ageing population and the end of the mining boom, the higher cost of a more self-reliant defence posture would likely preclude this option.⁴⁵

The *2013 Defence White Paper* declares that Australia does not have to choose between its longstanding relationship with the US and its growing relationship with China. However, as Schreer asserts, the centrality of ANZUS in current strategic policy and the increasing US presence in Australia means the US has effectively already been chosen.⁴⁶ The impact of this choice is likely to be less than dire, even if there is 'blowback' from Australia's close alignment with the US.

The strategic policy dilemma between economics and security has precedent under the 'forward defence' era, when Australia built a significant trade relationship with China while actively participating in the global strategy to contain communism. By 1961, China had become the primary market for Australian wheat, with exports to China increasing through the ensuing decade to 40 per cent of Australia's total production.⁴⁷ Yet throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Australia's contribution to the collective defence strategy had brought it into direct conflict with China in Korea, in addition to fighting Chinese-backed communists in Malaya, and later in South Vietnam. The only point during this era where China temporarily disrupted trade was in 1972, in its efforts to force Australia to officially recognise China.⁴⁸

Hence, during the 'forward defence' era, Australia was able to navigate a 'middle road', when diplomatic relations were non-existent and its troops were in direct conflict with Chinese interests. What this says about today's challenges is that the threshold for trade disruption with China may well be higher than the debate makes out. As such, examining the relationship cost of the alliance through the lens of 'forward defence' is useful, since it helps shed light on the potential extent to which Chinese economic pressure should factor into the cost-benefit calculus.

Unlike the potential economic impact of the alliance, the expectations of burden sharing and involvement in US operations are arguably the more pressing defence policy challenges posed by ANZUS. Since 1945, Australia has deemed it necessary to deploy elements of its forces to participate in practically every major conflict the US has fought in,⁴⁹ including the 'limited wars' in Korea and Vietnam. While Australia's defence policy during the 'defence of Australia' era remained weighted towards continental defence, the deployments to the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were also driven by its alliance obligations.

In each case, Australia's contribution was limited by a combination of resolve to do more but also a lack of interoperable 'expeditionary' capabilities that could enable participation in high-intensity warfighting.⁵⁰ In addition to historical precedent, the US rebalance towards the region means Washington expects its allies to take a greater role in burden sharing. This suggests that Australia will continue to deploy its forces in US coalitions, thereby presenting the dilemma of how Australia's force structure and capability should be weighted.

The challenge for defence policy today will be balancing force structure and budgetary constraints against increased US demands for burden sharing in the region and globally. Moreover, the ADF will need to meet a minimum level of self-reliance to hedge against the lack of explicit security guarantee under ANZUS. This includes maintaining an increasing degree of interoperability to participate in US operations.

The risk this situation presents is that Australia's force structure and capability will not be optimised for defending Australia, regional contingency operations or major coalition operations. In the past, Australia solved this dilemma by making a choice. In the 'forward defence' era, it optimised its forces for coalition operations and accepted the risk that ANZUS was not an explicit guarantee. In the 'defence of Australia' era, the ADF was shaped around a self-reliant posture in the absence of allied engagement in the region, and was able to optimise its forces to that end.

With increasing US pressure to do more in the region, and growing fiscal pressures, Australian defence policy may need to economise its force structure towards a higher proportion of 'expeditionary' capabilities.⁵¹ Consequently, Australia will have to maintain stringent discipline in its force structure and force employment policies to ensure all capabilities are functional across the broadened array of military tasks and challenges that Australia now confronts.⁵²

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to argue that the defence policy concepts of 'forward defence' and 'defence of Australia' can provide some useful insight into present defence policy challenges. Since 1945, Australian strategic policy can largely be defined by these two concepts, which were driven by the circumstances of the time and the Australian Government's assessment of its strategic interests and objectives.

At the heart of each approach has been striking a balance between the level of self-reliance and the amount of faith that Australia places in the ANZUS alliance. This dilemma remains today. As this article has articulated, the practical application of both policy concepts provides a greater appreciation of the limitations and costs of the US alliance. It highlights that Australia needs to maintain the capacity to address threats at the local level and to be able to mount contingency operations in the immediate region. What that experience does not highlight is how defence policy should treat a higher-level threat to Australia.

The two policy concepts can also illuminate the dimensions of the costs associated with the alliance. While economic 'blowback' from China remains a challenge, the more significant issue is arguably the increased expectation for burden sharing and Australian contributions to US missions. This will impact on force structure policy, requiring stringent management to ensure Australia remains capable of defending its interests within the context of the alliance. As this article has illustrated, past policy concepts can have some utility in illuminating the dimensions of a contemporary problem and in assisting policy-makers to develop appropriate solutions.

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NOTES

- 1 This is an edited version of a paper, titled 'The value of the past in contemplating the present: an examination of contemporary defence policy challenges', submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff College at the Australian Defence College in 2013.
- 2 As an example of the breadth of the debate, see the themed issue of *Security Challenges*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2013. For the purpose of this article, strategic policy is defined as all measures taken by government that relate to the use or potential use of force in international relations: see Stephan Frühling, 'Strategic Policy and Strategy', lecture at the Australian Command and Staff College, 5 August 2013. Defence policy, on the other hand, pertains to measures that contribute to the use of force in the national interest, which fall within the scope of the Department of Defence: see Stephan Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War: a history of Australian strategic policy since 1945*, Defence Publishing Service: Canberra, 2009, p. 7.
- 3 Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, p. 7.
- 4 Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, p. 7.
- 5 Paul Dibb, 'Deconstructing the 2013 Defence White Paper', speech at ANU's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 22 May 2013, available at <<http://www.anu.edu.au/vision/videos/9081/>> accessed 4 August 2013. See also Stephan Frühling, 'The 2013 Defence White Paper: strategic guidance without strategy', *Security Challenges*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2013, pp. 46-7.
- 6 Dibb, 'Deconstructing the 2013 Defence White Paper'. Also Benjamin Schreer, 'Business as Usual? The 2013 Defence White Paper and the US Alliance', *Security Challenges*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2013, p. 37.
- 7 Martin Griffiths and Michael Wesley, 'Taking Asia seriously', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2010, p. 15.
- 8 Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior and John Connor, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, 2008, p. 245.
- 9 See, for example, the 1956 Strategic Guidance, as cited in Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance in the Second World War*, pp. 212-3.
- 10 Griffiths and Wesley, 'Taking Asia seriously', p. 15.
- 11 Griffiths and Wesley, 'Taking Asia seriously', p. 15.
- 12 Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, p. 44. Frühling highlights that from 1959, 'forward defence' began its slow transition towards 'defence of Australia'.
- 13 Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, pp. 44-5, and Griffiths and Wesley, 'Taking Asia seriously', p. 16. According to Griffiths and Wesley, from the 1970s onwards, Australian foreign policy increasingly evinced a 'prudential regionalism' as its basis. This approach has remained generally constant since this period and, therefore, provides the foreign policy context within which the 'defence of Australia' doctrine has functioned throughout.
- 14 Paul Dibb, 'The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: the history of an idea', in Ronald Huiskens (ed.), *History as Policy: framing the debate on the future of Australia's defence policy*, ANU E-press: Canberra, 2007, p. 12. According to Dibb, the author of the 'defence of Australia' doctrine, '[t]he so-called "defence of Australia" doctrine never focused solely on the defence of the continent itself: it also envisaged Australian forces operating further afield (albeit in limited numbers) if national interests required it'.
- 15 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2000*, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2000.
- 16 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2000*, p. 29. See also Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence Update 2003*, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2003, p. 12; and Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence Update 2005*, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2005, p. 12. *Defence Update 2005* stated '[w]hile Australia naturally takes a close interest in its neighbourhood, Australian security interests are not defined by geography alone'. This did not override the centrality of the 'defence of Australia' and immediate neighbourhood tasks. This was elaborated in Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence Update 2007*, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2007, p. 29; Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2009*, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2009, p. 41; and Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 28. All defence policy documents advocated force structure determined by the principal tasks of defending Australia and maintaining stability in the region, with contributions to broader roles and tasks drawn from the 'defence of Australia' force structure.
- 17 As quoted in Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, pp. 212-3. Also Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: report to the Minister for Defence*, Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra, 1986.
- 18 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 28.

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- 19 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 28.
- 20 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 28.
- 21 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 28.
- 22 Department of External Affairs, *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS]*, Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra, 1952.
- 23 Department of External Affairs, *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS]*, p. 3.
- 24 NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, NATO website, 4 April 1949, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm> accessed 12 August 2013.
- 25 Nick Bisley, 'An ally for all the years to come: why Australia is not a conflicted US ally', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, June 2013, p. 3.
- 26 The 1959 'Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy' was the first strategic assessment to call for a modest independent defence capability. See Stephan Frühling, 'The fuzzy limits of self-reliance: US extended deterrence and Australian strategic policy', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2013, p. 21.
- 27 Frühling, 'The fuzzy limits of self-reliance', p. 21.
- 28 Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, p. 19.
- 29 Frühling, 'The fuzzy limits of self-reliance', p. 21; and Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, p. 21.
- 30 Graeme Dobell, 'The "Arc of Instability": the history of an idea', in Huisken, *History as Policy*, p. 101.
- 31 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Maritime Strategy*, Parliament of Australia: Canberra, 2004, p. 60.
- 32 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Maritime Strategy*, p. 60.
- 33 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Maritime Strategy*, p. 68.
- 34 Mark O'Neill, 'Time to move on in the defence policy debate', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 3, September 2006, p. 360.
- 35 Guided by the Timor template and the lessons of the 'forward defence' and 'defence of Australia' eras, this joint force would integrate, as a minimum: a reinforced Army combat brigade; a joint special operations task force; the amphibious ready group; naval surface and sub-surface action groups; and RAAF air combat, surveillance and airlift capabilities; under the command of the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters.
- 36 Frühling, *Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War*, p. 50. For a discussion of the relative merits of whether Australia is a small or medium power, see Stephan Frühling, 'Balancing Australia's Strategic Commitments', *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007, pp. 145-59.
- 37 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 14.
- 38 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 14. It highlights the quickening pace of force modernisation in the region.
- 39 Dibb, 'Deconstructing the 2013 Defence White Paper'. Hugh White cautions against the significant optimism regarding China's rise contained in the 2013 Defence White Paper.
- 40 Steven Pifer, Richard Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin Indyk, Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, 'US Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: considerations and challenges', Brookings Arms Control Series, Paper 3, May 2010, pp. 5-6, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf> accessed 4 June 2014.
- 41 Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 56.
- 42 Schreer, 'Business as Usual? The 2013 Defence White Paper and the US Alliance', p. 37.
- 43 Bisley, 'An ally for all the years to come', pp. 5-6.
- 44 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 'China Factsheet', DFAT website, available at <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf>> accessed 12 August 2013.
- 45 Schreer, 'Business as Usual? The 2013 Defence White Paper and the US Alliance', pp. 35-6.

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- ⁴⁶ Schreer, 'Business as Usual? The 2013 Defence White Paper and the US Alliance', p. 39.
- ⁴⁷ Griffiths and Wesley, 'Taking Asia seriously', p. 16. Australia's total exports to China in that year reached A\$131.9 million: see Yi Wang, *Australia-China Relations Post 1949: sixty years of trade and politics*, Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2012, p. 12.
- ⁴⁸ Wang, *Australia-China Relations Post 1949*, p. 12.
- ⁴⁹ Bisley, 'An ally for all the years to come', p. 5.
- ⁵⁰ According to the author's discussions with members involved in the deployment, Australia's 'fitted for but not with' Navy struggled to deploy a task group to the Gulf War in 1991. While the Government had desired to send an armoured capability to Iraq in 2003, the lack of investment in these systems under the 'defence of Australia' policy meant that Australia's deployment to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was limited to special forces, as well as a minor naval contribution and a F/A-18 capability.
- ⁵¹ Dibb, 'Deconstructing the 2013 Defence White Paper'. Dibb is explicit about his concerns associated with the impact of the current fiscal constraints on the defence budget, particularly as a result of Australia's ageing population and the end of the mining boom.
- ⁵² Hugh White, 'Beyond the Defence of Australia', Lowy Institute paper No. 16, 2006, p. ix, available at <<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/beyond-defence-australia>> accessed 4 June 2014. White notes the requirement for stringent discipline in the contemporary era of defence policy-making.

Coercion as an Essential Component of Counterinsurgency¹

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Introduction

Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted a re-examination of counterinsurgency theory and practice. By drawing on the lessons of history, Western nations have sought to revise their doctrine and adapt their techniques to meet the circumstances of current conflicts.² As a result, the debate regarding the fundamental components of a successful counterinsurgency operation has been reignited.

History has been punctuated by insurgencies. Defined by the US Army as ‘an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict’,³ insurgencies throughout time have been variously described as small wars, colonial wars and insurrections. Despite the disparate circumstances, grievances, aims and methods of these conflicts, there is one consistent element—they are fought among the people.⁴ The insurgent relies on the population for concealment, sustainment and legitimacy.⁵ Therefore, a successful counterinsurgency must ensure it can effectively influence the population, denying support to the insurgent.

In 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer, British High Commissioner in Malaya, proffered one method of influencing the population; his quote ‘[t]he answer lies ... in the hearts and minds of the people’, has become synonymous with counterinsurgency, and ‘hearts and minds’ continues to underpin much of the current doctrine.⁶ However, over time, the notion of ‘hearts and minds’ has been misconstrued and presented as a ‘gentler kind of war’.⁷ This myth has obscured the reality that counterinsurgency has often employed draconian measures against the population in order to secure its compliance and meet operational needs.⁸

Within the modern context, the use of coercion needs to take account of the contention that coercive actions may undermine operational objectives.⁹ Indeed, this article seeks to demonstrate that while coercion is an essential component of counterinsurgency operations, it is a tool which must be applied judiciously. This will be achieved by broadly identifying the theoretical approaches to counterinsurgency, defining coercion, and illustrating the key considerations associated with the successful employment of coercion in counterinsurgency operations by highlighting examples from Malaya and Iraq.

Current theory and doctrine

The role of coercion in counterinsurgency must be understood within the context of the current theory and doctrine. Western nations have generally relied on the work of three key theorists when developing their counterinsurgency doctrine, namely the Britons, Sir Robert Thompson and General Sir Frank Kitson, and the French officer, David Galula.¹⁰ All three have personal experience in 20th century counterinsurgency operations and all three espouse a population-centric approach.¹¹

The term counterinsurgency may be defined as ‘the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency, while addressing its root cause’.¹² Current theory asserts that it is a complex and dynamic type of warfare, in which success cannot be achieved through a purely military solution.¹³ The population-centric approach acknowledges that within a stable society, the population consents to the government and the rule of law. It is the role of the insurgent to undermine stability by sowing discord and demonstrating the inability of the government to protect and provide for its citizens. Thus counterinsurgency efforts must be unified and tailored to meet the unique character of the insurgency.

There is no single solution for a successful counterinsurgency. However, the primacy of politics and the role of the population are constants. It is important for politics to retain the position of primacy, as a robust, legitimate government is the desired end-state of any counterinsurgency operation. The

government alone should wield the apparatus of coercion, and its representative organisations should work within the constraints of the law in order to retain legitimacy.¹⁴ But without the widespread support of the people, the government cannot retain its authority.

In an insurgency, the population may be divided into five broad groups.¹⁵ They are active supporters of the government, passive supporters of the government, active supporters of the insurgency, passive supporters of the insurgency, and those who are indifferent.¹⁶ The supportive element of the population must be respectively exploited or neutralised in order to help re-establish control. The majority of the population will be indifferent and will typically remain neutral, seeking only to minimise personal harm and maximise benefit.¹⁷ Thus counterinsurgency success relies on the ability of government forces to control and influence these populations.

Coercion is the tool most readily available to government forces to achieve influence over the population. The *Macquarie Concise Dictionary* defines coercion as '[actions] to restrain or constrain by force, law or authority; to force or compel by force, as to do something'.¹⁸ Within this definition are two main types of coercion: compellence and deterrence. Compellence seeks to make a target behave in a manner consistent with counterinsurgency objectives, whereas deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo, discouraging behaviour that may undermine the operation.

It is important to distinguish between coercion and the application of military force or violence. Coercion relies on the 'threat' of force to induce behaviour. Within the Western construct, this threat may take many forms. It may be 'hard power' offensive action or enacting the provisions of the law, such as fines or imprisonment, or it may be cognitive or 'soft power', shaping information to induce decisions which support the counterinsurgency's objectives.¹⁹ Propaganda is one example of cognitive coercion. But regardless of how unpleasant the options presented may be, compliance is ultimately a choice.

Further, as compliance is a choice, successful coercion relies on two key issues: credibility and persuasiveness. Credibility is founded on the ability of the counterinsurgent to carry out the threat and is underpinned by his or her authority and ability to act in accordance with the law. Persuasiveness reflects the degree to which the threat of force influences decision making; it is essentially an assessment of the relative impact of all possible consequences.

Persuasion may be complemented by concurrent counterinsurgency activities, such as infrastructure or economic development programs.²⁰ Current doctrine explains the concept of 'hearts and minds' as follows: 'hearts' is persuasion—convincing the people that government success is in their best interests, while 'minds' is credibility—demonstrating that the force is capable of establishing stability.²¹ This demonstrates that 'hearts and minds' is not an alternative to coercion but a means of enhancing its efficacy.

As coercion is intended as the foundation of both population-centric counterinsurgency theory and current Western doctrine, the discussion must focus on the degree to which coercion influences counterinsurgency outcomes. Is coercion essential to success? An assessment of its utility may be derived through an examination of case studies. Two primary examples have been selected, namely Malaya and Iraq. These examples have been selected as Malaya is widely regarded as an excellent example of a British counterinsurgency, whereas Iraq presented contemporary challenges to a Western coalition.

The foundation of this assessment is the recommendations made in the RAND Corporation's seminal publication, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, which sought to demonstrate the approaches to counterinsurgency most likely to result in success.²² The four recommendations that relate most directly to the employment of coercion and influence, drawn from the seven in the study, are:

- Pursue multiple, mutually-supporting lines of operation;
- Ensure the positive involvement of host nation government;
- Avoid the use of repression and collective punishment; and
- Ascertain the sources of insurgent support and target them.

It is acknowledged that all insurgencies are unique and that the examples presented will only partially reflect the complexity of the respective campaigns. They are not intended to be definitive but merely to demonstrate the key considerations in relation to the role of coercion.

The Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency (1948-60) was fought between Commonwealth forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). Orchestrated by the Malayan Communist Party, the insurgency was founded upon the dissatisfaction of the ethnic Chinese, who were predominantly poor farmers, with no land rights and no right to vote.²³ Operating in dense jungle, MNLA fighting units were difficult to locate and interdict. However, they had limited sources of external support and thus relied on sympathetic members of the domestic population to provide food and supplies.²⁴ The limited number of insurgents and the vulnerability of their support network to disruption were central to the overall success of the counterinsurgency operation.

During the Malayan Emergency, the host nation was always positively involved, if not in direct command of the operation. Although the British occupied the position of High Commissioner, Malayan officials ruled the states and, at the village level, those in charge were largely Malay nationals. Indeed, the initial actions of the insurgency were directed by the police, with assistance from the local army.²⁵ This reflected the legitimacy of the operation as a domestic policing issue and maintained the primacy of the government.

However, as the initial response to the insurgency was undertaken with limited intelligence, a number of innocent civilians were killed, villages were burnt down, and scores of ethnic Chinese were detained or deported to China.²⁶ Despite the extreme nature of these actions, they were generally within the law. The Malayan Government had declared a state of emergency which significantly extended the powers of security forces to address the emerging threat. The powers granted to security forces allowed the widespread use of coercion in order to meet operational objectives. These included methods such as curfews, cordon and searches, and detention without trial.²⁷

Despite being legal, the brutishness of a number of these actions often incited further animosity among the Chinese population, thereby increasing support for the insurgents.²⁸ In this regard, the failure to discriminate between insurgent and civilian, and the implementation of collective punishment, undermined the counterinsurgency objectives. During this initial stage of the insurgency, the government forces did not effectively deter insurgent supporters, nor did they establish credibility in the eyes of the people. In many respects, coercion was counter-productive.

In 1950, General Sir Rawdon Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in Malaya. He identified the need for a coordinated plan, directed at undermining the MNLA and securing the support of the Chinese 'squatters', while avoiding the adverse impact of punitive measures. It was a strategy of mutually-supporting lines of operation. A key component of this plan was to disrupt the MNLA support network through the forcible resettlement of the population.²⁹

To that end, 'new villages' were established to house approximately 400,000 Chinese squatters. These villages were managed by government forces, and control of the population was augmented by the imposition of significant restrictions to limit the movement of personnel, food and equipment. Although ruthlessly compelled to relocate, there were inducements that encouraged cooperation.³⁰ The villages were protected from guerrilla influence and, addressing one of the root causes of the insurgency, the Chinese were given their own land on which to build a home and grow food, demonstrating that the government was able both to protect and support them.³¹

This was the 'hearts and minds' approach further championed by Templer, employing coercion in a manner that supported rather than undermined the operation, and a good example of coercion as an essential component of counterinsurgency operations.

Iraq

Between 2003 and 2011, the war in Iraq presented considerable counterinsurgency challenges. The US-led Western coalition had invaded Iraq with the intent of eliminating its weapons of mass destruction (and arguably of removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power). The power vacuum created by the removal of the regime resulted in an insurgency, with Sunni Arabs forming the majority of insurgents. Although a minority in Iraq, the Sunnis were largely disenfranchised and marginalised as a result of coalition actions to disband the Iraqi Army and deny positions in the new government to members of the Ba'athist party.

At the same time, promises of democracy comparatively strengthened the position of the majority Shi'a population, exacerbating existing sectarian divisions.³² The Sunnis viewed the coalition as an occupying force and sought to induce its withdrawal. In addition, the Al Qaeda network employed foreign fighters to intensify sectarian tensions and support its objective of destabilising the nation.³³

Unfortunately, coalition forces did not have a comprehensive counterinsurgency program in place to counter this situation. As a result, the insurgency was able to progress, largely unhindered, for four years.³⁴ This operation highlighted the complexities of counterinsurgency where there is an absence of a legitimate government; where externally-based insurgents intervene to manipulate and inflame a local situation; and where modern media and the internet allow unrestricted messaging to reach a global audience.³⁵

Between 2003 and 2007, coalition actions were insufficient to stop, and often fuelled, the insurgency. The absence of a legitimate government was the most significant constraint. As such, the coalition was perceived by both Sunnis and Shi'as to be an occupying force, and they refused to accept its authority.³⁶ In 2004, the situation deteriorated after four US security contractors were murdered in Al Anbar province. Images of their bodies were broadcast internationally and, in response, the Bush Administration ordered the clearance of Fallujah, a provincial city west of Baghdad where the atrocities had occurred.

The clearance was directed contrary to military advice and the results were very damaging to the coalition. There was little consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council prior to the attack, strategic messaging was poor and civilians were not cleared from the area, resulting in unnecessary casualties. These actions, combined with insurgent propaganda, served as a rallying point for the Sunni minority, with the coalition accused of imperialism and indiscriminate use of force. Together with the concurrent Shia uprising in southern Iraq,³⁷ the situation reflected the inability of coalition forces to either influence the supporting populations or shape those that were indifferent.

During this period, coalition forces attempted to implement counterinsurgency techniques.³⁸ The US had learnt from the lessons in Fallujah and subsequent clearances sought to remove the civilian population before commencement of offensive operations. Actions to 'clear-hold-build' were designed to increase positive relationships, develop intelligence sources and improve insurgent targeting. However, the gains could not be consolidated, because of insufficient security forces. Sectarian divisions created concerns for the legitimacy of the security forces, with Sunnis viewing the predominantly Shia security forces as an enemy.

In 2006, one province reported that over 80 per cent of the population felt the central government was illegitimate and that Iraqi security forces were a threat.³⁹ The coalition had not effectively established itself or the government as a legitimate force. Credibility was further undermined by the insurgent's widespread use of suicide bombings, kidnappings and assassinations. In an environment where insurgent coercion was manifested in death threats and torture, coalition forces bound by international law and rules of engagement could not credibly wield sufficient coercion to influence the population.⁴⁰ By January 2007—after Iraq had descended into civil war—the strategy in Iraq was revised, as the situation had rendered ineffective the coalition's primary tool of influence, coercion.

In 2007, the revised strategy concentrated on defeating the insurgency and developing Iraqi capacity. US General David Petraeus had been employing counterinsurgency methods in Iraq earlier in the campaign; his appointment as Commander Multi-National Force-Iraq in February 2007, under the revised strategy, enabled him to proscribe a more focused direction for the coalition.⁴¹ In addressing the external influence of Al Qaeda, Petraeus authorised the arming of militias, despite their previous opposition to the coalition. It also reflected a method of countering Al Qaeda's role as one of the root causes of instability.⁴²

This helped to build trust, broaden Iraqi security forces and encourage the militia to become part of the solution for Iraq. In addition to arming the militias, General Petraeus requested the removal of key officials within the security forces whose political views were undermining stability. Initially denied, Petraeus employed coercion to achieve his aims, threatening to withhold military support from certain units.⁴³

This was a persuasive technique designed to compel action and it was one that helped maintain coalition influence with the government. It was, however, also a potential source of conflict. In order to maintain influence, stabilising forces must be willing to withdraw support when conditions are not met. This may not always be politically possible. However, unless the threat can be made and carried through, corrupt or manipulative host nations will have an unfettered opportunity to exploit aid and development programs.⁴⁴

The revised strategy of 2007 incorporated a significant number of reforms aimed at building the confidence of the public. However, unlike Malaya where a strong government enabled the legitimate application of coercion on the public, the absence of a viable government required coalition forces to focus on influencing the elites within Iraqi society. In this instance, coercion could not be achieved through force alone; it also needed to be based on the 'soft' powers of reputation, credibility and persuasiveness. Thus it can be demonstrated that within Iraq, while hard power was needed to influence the population, soft power enabled the coalition to assist Iraq in establishing credible security forces.

Conclusion

Coercion is an essential element of counterinsurgency operations but it must be applied judiciously. The key counterinsurgency theorists espouse a population-centric approach which places the role of the government in a position of primacy and highlights the importance of securing the support of the population. Coercion is one method of securing this support. Coercion seeks to influence the population by compelling or deterring action in accordance with operational requirements. Underpinned by credibility and legitimacy, coercion is complemented by the concept of 'hearts and minds'.

However, counterinsurgency is a complex and dynamic type of warfare in which there is no single solution. The application of coercion must be tailored to the specific circumstances. It must also be employed judiciously, as failure to do so may have an adverse effect on the overall outcomes. The case studies of Malaya and Iraq both contain examples where hasty military actions, employing hard power, adversely impacted the civilian population, undermining the credibility of government forces and consolidating support for the insurgents.

Conversely, it has been argued that persuasion can ensure that the application of coercion is reasonably tolerated by the population, provided the compelled behaviour can be demonstrated to improve their safety or address some of their key grievances. At a more strategic level, the application of soft power can also compel actions to support counterinsurgency objectives. But again, it must be employed cautiously to ensure that actions are not seen as punitive or undermined by an inability to carry out the threat. When applied judiciously, and underpinned by credibility and persuasiveness, coercion—as an essential component of counterinsurgency—is an effective means in securing the compliance of key actors.

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NOTES

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ADF Service Police: training and mentoring assistance to host nation police

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As a force multiplier, Service Police can readily provide competent mentors and advisers to assist host nation police in securing their own populace and providing base-level community policing. One of the obvious outcomes is that it could provide the opportunity for Australian forces to withdraw from operations earlier than expected.

The Defence White Paper 2013 specifically focuses Defence on the Asia-Pacific region and, in particular, the requirement for Australian forces to provide greater input into the region. This is where Service Police training and mentoring teams can come to the fore, both in deploying as a single entity in support of Australian or coalition missions and in assisting the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other government agencies in establishing or re-training host nation security forces. While this article derives largely from the policing experience in Afghanistan, the concept could readily be adapted for future deployments, whether in a distant theatre of operations or closer to home in the Asia-Pacific region.

The article will contend that the training received by host nation policing forces must be based on four key points of training; fostering the rule of law; transparency development within the organisation; promoting human rights; and community policing. These will assist the Service Police trainer and mentor to develop the host nation policing agency, while passing on critical skills such as officer safety training, weapons handling and firing, and first aid, all of which are likely to be relevant in most theatres of operation.

The article begins with a case study of the Afghanistan theatre of operations, before considering the historical context of recent Australian overseas police training and mentoring involvement, as well as recent capability shortfalls of the AFP. It concludes by discussing the prospective involvement of ADF Service Police teams in mentoring, liaison and advising in policing and mentoring operations now and into the future.

Policing in Afghanistan post-2001 – a case study

With the engagement of a new coalition authority to assist in the rebuilding of a post-conflict Afghanistan, stemming from the Geneva conference on Afghanistan in April 2002, the US and other donor countries agreed to support the rebuilding of its security forces. They established a ‘multi-pillar approach’, each to be led by a different nation.¹ The US took the lead to rebuild the Afghan National Army (ANA), Germany the lead for the Afghan National Police (ANP), Japan for disarmament and demobilisation, Italy for judicial reform, and the UK for counter-narcotics.

Focusing on the police sector, it was identified by 2006 that the European model of policing that the Germans were using to recruit, vet, train and field-place ANP members was taking far too long.² Moreover, the overall capability of the ANP was still rated at the lowest level, meaning the ANP needed to rely heavily (and at times completely) on coalition forces to assist with all facets of policing the populace. Compounding the situation, the insurgency had begun identifying and marking the ANP, targeting their weaknesses and shortfalls in capability and training.

Given the lack of resources, training and motivation of ANP officers, it is not surprising they were targeted. As the most visible manifestation of a local government’s presence, the police are typically the first to be targeted by an organised insurgency, both to gain popularity with the local population (in which the police may be held in low esteem) and to reduce the government’s legitimacy and credibility (by demonstrating the insurgents’ ability to defeat and dislodge police from local communities).³ Through much of these early years, ANP members were utilised as ‘quasi-soldiers’, supporting the ANA in counterinsurgency operations, which further undermined their effectiveness in community policing.

The circular nature of policing also took hold in that while the quantity of ANP officers on the ground began to increase, they were let down by the quality and lack of reinforcement of initial training. As a consequence of poor training and lack of accountability, police (across all the policing agencies) were often the first to become involved in questionable interrogation techniques, the accepting of bribes, and other unsavoury activities. Unfortunately, the ANP was no exception and its officers were widely seen by the local community as corrupt and inefficient in their dealings and interactions with the provincial communities.

Mentoring and training initiatives

Where there are no mentors, there is little accountability.⁴

It was about this time that the concept of using police observer, mentor and liaison teams and police advisory teams was revisited. Such teams were not a new concept, as the UK had used them previously in areas of operations such as Aden and Malaya, while the US had used them in the Caribbean and Latin America. They had also been employed very effectively in more recent conflicts, notably in Iraq, where these teams were embedded as part of a combat team, providing the capability of point-of-capture and detainee handling, as well as forensic evidence collection.

Accordingly, coalition partners commenced contributing more civilian and military police to assist not only the ANA but also the ANP and other Afghan Government agencies. They assisted the local security forces by reinforcing the training already received and being embedded with the host nation forces to oversee the reinforcement of that training.

While the role of trainers within policing schools and other training facilities was readily identified as being necessary, it was mentors on the ground—with the capacity to deploy forward to reinforce training already received and serve side-by-side with the indigenous force—who were recognised as crucial. It was also identified that police mentors could play an essential role in bridging the gap between theory and practice. Whether assigned to an ANP headquarters or a district police station, mentors provided a ready source of advice, assistance and practical solutions to ANP personnel, most of whom had little or no actual police experience.⁵

In 2007, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)—the multinational organisation responsible for the training and development of Afghan security forces⁶—sought to correct training deficiencies in the program by launching a new training initiative called ‘Focused District Development’.⁷ It aimed to enhance ANP capabilities by training all uniformed police in a single district at one time as a unit. The training program included seven weeks of instruction in military tactics, weapons use, survival strategies and counterinsurgency operations, and one week of training in basic police skills. While in training, the police received new uniforms and weapons, vetted leadership and increased salaries.

The instructors who delivered the training returned with the police unit to its district and remained there until the completion of the program. The teams provided the Afghan police agencies with continuing on-the-job training and assessed the progress of individual units in independently conducting policing operations. Units were evaluated on a variety of competencies, including equipment accountability, formal training, crime-handling procedures, and use of force techniques. Initially, the mentoring teams engaged in intensive training but they later pulled back to providing oversight as the Afghans exhibited greater competence in conducting operations.⁸

In April 2009, US President Barack Obama announced the deployment of 4000 additional soldiers to train and mentor the Afghan military and police forces. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated that the trainers ‘were at the heart of building Afghan security forces as quickly as possible’.⁹

This concept met with resounding success in the majority of locations in and around Afghanistan. It also achieved a number of coalition partner objectives in that it has enabled the ANP to continue actively policing their provinces while allowing coalition forces to gradually remove themselves from the front line into an oversight role. This enabled those forces to continue reinforcement training and eventually to hand over policing responsibilities, including mentoring and training, to the ANP.

Other examples

There are, of course, a number of other recent examples where Australia has provided policing assistance to stability and law and order operations in the Asia-Pacific region, notably the Solomon Islands and East Timor.

Solomon Islands

In July 2003, following years of ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands—which had deteriorated to a form of civil war on Guadalcanal Island, as well as criminal elements and other bandits creating no-go areas across the island chain—the first waves of soldiers, police and civilian staff of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) flew into Honiara to re-establish law and order and assist the central government to establish control and recommence commerce on the Islands.

Prior to the intervention, all policing was lost on the Islands, with militias controlling Honiara unopposed, and corruption widespread. Solomon Islands was on the brink of collapse, with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) unable to provide the security it was mandated to provide under the constitution. According to Acting RSIPF Commissioner Juanita Matanga '[w]e didn't know what to do, we had no other plan. We hoped that one day things would go back to normal'.¹⁰

RAMSI was raised under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, with its mission ratified by the Solomon Islands' parliament. Fifteen member countries contributed, with the AFP and other Australian state police forces contributing members. During meetings between police, military and Australian Government representatives, it was identified that the community within the Solomon Islands had lost trust in the RSIPF and that the re-establishment of this trust in the rule of law could take up to 10 years.

Police monitors, trainers and mentors were deployed by Australia and other participating nations and quickly gave the people of the Solomon Islands hope that their police could again effectively police their communities and maintain the rule of law. This is an on-going process and the AFP still has trainers and mentors deployed into the region.

East Timor

In 1999, after 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the people of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor voted for independence. During the Indonesian occupation, policing was conducted by the Indonesian Police. The dominant style was colonial, with the police effectively an auxiliary to the Indonesian Army and complementary to a larger intelligence service. Timor was always regarded as a military operations area and the Indonesian Police were always subordinate to the military commander.

In such an atmosphere, communities largely policed themselves. However, as the occupation tightened, this formal-informal policing receded. Following military intervention through the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), a coalition led by Australia was superseded by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999. UNTAET was established to run the country for an intermediary period and help shepherd it to independence.¹¹

During the building of the East Timorese forces, it was determined early on that the UN mandate would require the development of a new police service. The Australian Government responded quickly by returning AFP members to East Timor to train and mentor the fledgling force, albeit this time not as unarmed monitors but as armed law enforcement officers. These members assisted the East Timorese Police Service to develop its own capabilities and eventually create an environment where the host nation policing organisation conducted its own policing, thereby allowing all Australian policing and Defence support to withdraw, save for police and defence advisors on exchange programs.

Australian overseas police training and mentoring involvement

While it is readily acknowledged that AFP members, deployed as part of the AFP's International Deployment Group (IDG), have provided a highly competent and commendable service to the ANP and other regional policing agencies, they were limited in their scope of operations, particularly in the area of training and mentoring.

Established in early 2004, the IDG has the capacity to provide officers for domestic and international stability and security operations. The group contributes to the development, maintenance and restoration of the rule of law in countries that seek Australia's support, as well as to UN and domestic initiatives, such as the Northern Territory 'Emergency Response' (introduced by the Federal Government in 2007 to address allegations of child sexual abuse and neglect in Aboriginal communities).¹²

While the IDG's mission statement appears to provide a 'one-stop-shop' for all domestic and international policing requirements, international policing operations in high-threat/non-permissive environments are obviously quite different to domestic considerations. Moreover, during IDG deployments to Afghanistan, AFP officers were not permitted to deploy forward with Australian troops 'outside the wire'. This frustrated the reinforcement of learned knowledge in the field environment, and arguably contributed to skill degradation and outsider influence, which can go hand-in-hand with corrupt practices within the station/field environment, as identified in the Afghan case study.

Focusing for now on the Afghan campaign, Major Joel Bius—in his 2009 report on police mentoring in a non-permissive environment in southern Afghanistan—noted that:

[T]here was much pressure from the international community for civilian police officers to take on the task of developing the local police force, but ground reality in southern Afghanistan dictated that the military would be forced to take the lead. As a result, planners had to design tactics to integrate military forces into the police development campaign.¹³

This key facet of mentoring host nation police forces is where the ADF's Service Police teams could fill the void. Where the AFP cannot move into the field and take a mentoring role with the host nation policing forces, because of the complex nature of the environment, Service Police teams could provide this vital piece of training reinforcement for local police. Indeed, the US, UK and Canadian militaries successfully provided such capabilities.¹⁴

Moreover, not only could ADF Service Police provide this reinforcement of training but they could also provide the trainers and mentors within police academies, major bases and forward operating bases. They could also assist with training in the more militaristic forms of policing, such as combat survivability, first aid and patrolling. The end-state to this could be assisting the AFP to instruct host nation policing agencies with lessons on the more hands-on approach of basic policing skills.

Moving to other theatres of operations, another capability shortfall is the period between when hostilities end and the security situation becomes stable enough for the AFP's IDG to deploy into theatre, post-conflict. In those situations, ADF Service Police teams could deploy with ADF, coalition or UN support in a matter of hours, immediately providing policing situational awareness for commanders on the ground. They could also begin identifying host nation policing requirements and training shortfalls, reporting these issues back to Joint Operations Command so that programs and personnel could be put in place in Australia to assist with the planning and preparation for future deployment of AFP IDG trainers and mentors.

While this 'advance party' concept is nothing new, its implementation during the move to stability/rule of law operations is where ADF Service Police teams would come into their own. They would have the ability to immediately assist with the rule of law, and contribute a timely presence and experience in order to regain community trust in the central government or provisional authority. The so-called 'golden hour' is a critical time for security sector reform during stability operations because it can prevent security from quickly spiralling out of control. While follow-on steps will vary from operation to operation, they should involve training (and mentoring) indigenous police and other internal security forces to take over the primary responsibility of ensuring stability.¹⁵

Another capability shortfall was evident during the civil unrest in East Timor between May and August 2006. At that time, the Australian military re-deployed into theatre to restore order and prevent a full-scale civil war developing. It highlighted a shortfall in the AFP's mandate where stability operations have deteriorated in high-threat/non-permissive environments. In that case, it required a specialist police element, such as the ADF's Service Police, which could assist in the restoration of order with the deployed military forces by showing a 'presence' and support for the host nation policing service, while assisting the host nation policing agencies to maintain that presence in such an environment.

Once order had been achieved, the Service Police teams could readily revert to a training and mentoring role. Given that policing agencies are the most visible coercive instrument available to governments, and that they shape the outcomes by what they fail to do as much as what they do,¹⁶ it is important for trainers and mentors to be seen to be supporting the host nation policing agencies in any way they can, particularly in high-threat/non-permissive environments.

Developing an ADF Service Police capability for host nation assistance

There are a number of points to be addressed in identifying where Service Police could value-add to a host nation policing organisation. It is acknowledged that the training and education levels of ADF Service Police typically do not match their state and federal counterparts. However, the development of the theory and training aspects of host nation police forces are core tenets for policing agencies around the world, both civil and military, regardless of the theatre or country in question.

While decisions as to the rule of law components (police, prosecution, judiciary and penal) are made at the strategic level, the tactical level of training and education for host nation policing forces does not change and are areas where ADF Service Police should excel. Indeed, they could be expected to positively influence the battlespace by providing training, advisors and mentors in the key capabilities identified below:

- Patrolling and community policing;
- Combat skills and infantry minor tactics (including firearms handling and range/close quarter engagement);
- Ethics and values;
- Statement taking and record keeping;
- Arrest and detention procedures;
- Crime scene preservation, examination and security (including photography and evidence collection);
- Fingerprinting;
- Building and vehicle searches;
- Operational safety and training (defensive tactics); and
- Transition and support post-conflict.

This is not an exhaustive list and is not meant to suggest that ADF Service Police should be restricted to these particular capabilities. Figure 1, derived from a 2010 US study, shows suggested areas where ADF Service Police teams could feasibly deploy trainers and mentors in future high-threat/non-permissive, stability, and law and order operations.¹⁷

Stability policing

- *Para-military police force to deal with high-end threats*

capable of

- *Complex investigations of criminal and terrorist groups*
 - *Intelligence collection on high-end threats*
 - *Crowd and riot control of major civil disturbances*
- *Special weapons and tactics to arrest heavily-armed criminals or terrorists*

Community-based policing

- *Partnership between police and local community*

capable of

- *Police consultation with the community*
- *Adaption of police tactics to requirements of community*
 - *Mobilisation of community to help prevent crime*
 - *Adoption of mutual problem-solving methodology*

**Figure 1: Potential roles for ADF Service Police
in stability, and law and order operations**

Assessing host nation police capabilities

While the host nation police would likely have been in existence for a considerable time before any intervention, the breakdown of state control, and law and order, may have caused the organisation to collapse, allowing insurgents and organised crime to flourish. The first priority, therefore, must be the re-organisation, re-deployment and successful implementation back into the community of the host nation police force.

Before that can be done, the capabilities of host nation police must be quickly gauged through a range of assessment tools, including appropriate key performance indicators. While it is obviously desirable to be able to base the assessment of local capabilities on hard statistics and objective data, no police capacity building program is likely to have the desired level of evaluation capabilities. Accordingly, police development programs need to rely also on qualitative assessments—such as collecting ‘good stories’—which must also be evaluated for lessons learned or their potential use in public relations efforts.¹⁸

More broadly, training centres should be the starting point for developing the training programs and assessing the competence of host nation police force development (rather than the end-state). It is one of the few methods, along with mentoring, to synchronise performance expectations across the board. Basic police skills must be developed before the host nation police forces get to the stations, rather than ‘learning as they go’. Host nation police do not need training on how to conduct an investigation before they know how to draw their pistol.¹⁹

Relevancy for the ADF

The main point of this article is to highlight the capacity of the ADF’s Service Police to fill the capability shortfall the AFP cannot. This capability is not often seen outside of the special forces community but is one that should be given due consideration in any future force structure that is deployed to re-establish host nation law and order or stability. This point is reinforced in a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report which contends that:

In an executive policing mission, the international forces present are expected to enforce the law from ‘day one’, at which time the [civilian police] contingent is never in place. Moreover, in the early days of a mission, the situation is often so volatile that a convincing case ... [exists] for the military force, being the more capable and available actor, to maintain order.²⁰

It has also been identified in numerous reference material that the key in deploying police into a theatre of operations is not the quantity but the quality of the officers involved. Clearly, deploying untrained and ill-equipped police officers into a conflict or asking them to develop a capability they have no concept of themselves is a recipe for disaster. The identification of poor training and re-education of core policing capabilities takes valuable time and, more importantly, considerable human capital, both in financial and personnel terms.

It is, therefore, essential to provide the right tool for the right job. However, one of the problems, as noted in the International Police Institute's 2013 paper, 'Enhancing European Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping', is that suitably-qualified capabilities are in short supply:

With the realisation that many stabilisation tasks in a post-conflict context are related to community law and order rather than the use (or threat) of military force, the growing numbers of police personnel has been a major feature of UN peace operations over the last decade. There is, however, a lack of key specialised policing capabilities and a shortage of qualified police officers.²¹

This same point is reinforced in a 2009 'Future of Police Operations' briefing paper, titled 'International Police: improving professionalism and responsiveness', which notes that:

As numbers of UN police have increased, so have concerns that those deployed lack the requisite expertise to perform increasingly complex and specialised tasks. It is hard to find effective mission leadership, and the development of police doctrine and strategic guidance to the field have both lagged, even as 'police-keepers' must deal with increasingly robust mandates in challenging environments.²²

In that regard, Australia's future security environment will increasingly be governed by the effects of globalisation, the emergence of new major powers in Asia (notably China, Japan and India), the Asian economic resurgence, and fluctuations between the interests of the US and its ability to influence global issues. It also seems inevitable that some of Australia's immediate neighbours will remain troubled and insecure, both economically and in governance, requiring ongoing stabilisation assistance.

While Australia may contribute unilaterally to some such contingencies, others will likely need to be conducted within a coalition of disparate capabilities, aimed nevertheless at helping to shape the security environment in accordance with Australia's longer-term interests.²³ In these circumstances, and as previously identified, the lack of mentors on the ground in high-threat/non-permissive environments and the ability for ADF Service Police to assist the training and development of other nation's policing agencies will provide the Australian Government with a specialist capability that can multi-role and, indeed, quickly move from conventional warfighting to law and order operations as required.

Conclusion

Beyond 2014, it seems likely that the global security environment will continue to be dogged by small conflicts and the requirement for host nation capability development. In this environment, as the US, NATO and the UN reset after long and drawn-out conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the requirement for 'rule of law' deployments seems likely to continue, reflecting the trend over the past 20 or so years.

In this environment, there are a number of tasks that the ADF's Service Police could fulfil by providing the government-of-the-day with a highly-competent and motivated training and mentoring capability. This would enable Australia to assist 'on-the-brink' nation states, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, to rebuild their capacity to govern effectively by providing accountable law and order functions through a skilled and effective police force.

The capability to be provided by ADF Service Police would be highly effective in mentoring and moulding host nation police by assisted learning through hands-on, front-line policing, and classroom and coursework competencies. That ability to train and mentor host nation policing agencies in high-threat/non-permissive environments could be expected to develop further into a niche capability that could readily and quickly be drawn on to meet any future requirement of the Australian Government, either acting unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners. In the meantime, it is hoped that this article generates further constructive discussion regarding the employability of ADF Service Police now and into the future.

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Creating Stability in Post-conflict Situations: the handicap of Western sensibilities¹

Wing Commander Pam Bradshaw, RAAF

What we demand in this war ... is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.

US President Woodrow Wilson, 1918²

Introduction

US President Woodrow Wilson delivered the above statement to the US Congress on 8 January 1918, outlining his 'fourteen steps for peace' in relation to World War 1. It was the first time a statesman had linked international peace with the concept of democratic self-determination, human rights and stability.³ Seventy years later, Wilson's 'liberal peace thesis' influenced 14 major peace operations (the number is coincidental), launched by the UN between 1989 and 1999 in response to increasing concerns about the impact of intra-state conflict and state fragility on regional and international security.

These UN operations shared a common objective and strategy, namely to rapidly transform fragile post-conflict states into peaceful and stable liberal democracies.⁴ Thus, the UN based its post-Cold War peacebuilding strategy on the premise that rapid liberalisation—the establishment of liberal democratic and economic institutions in fragile or failed post-conflict states—would transform conflict-prone states into peaceful and stable states, reducing the likelihood they would return to intra-state war.

The influence of the liberal peace thesis and liberalisation on international peacebuilding operations has been the source of increasing debate over the last decade.⁵ Central to this debate is the presumption by the mostly Western international community that once democratic and economic institutions have been installed in a post-conflict state, recipient populations will naturally embrace and automatically benefit from those institutions, regardless of how incongruent they may be with respect to local culture, values and political characteristics.

As a contribution to the debate, this article discusses the outcomes from the internationally-sponsored liberalisation efforts in three specific post-Cold War UN peacebuilding missions—Angola, Namibia and Timor-Leste—and contends that rapid liberalisation and, in particular, democratisation can undermine the creation of post-conflict stability for two key reasons.

Firstly, democratisation is intrinsically a competitive and tumultuous process, whereby the rapid imposition of liberal democratic reform risks destabilising an already fragile, conflict-prone state by exacerbating existing political, social or economic tensions and potentially reigniting violent conflict.⁶ Secondly, democracy is historically a lengthy process. Hence attempts by the international community to impose democratic reform on fragile states, as quickly as possible, and without first building adequate domestic institutions that can manage concomitant tensions and address the root causes of the conflict, tend to create an ineffective and 'empty-shell' state incapable of supporting long-term stability.⁷

More broadly, this article contends that rapid liberalisation is a destabilising and thus ineffective blueprint for creating enduring stability and, consequently, that Western sensibilities are the biggest handicap to creating stability in post-conflict states. Importantly, it does not argue against the need for post-conflict stabilisation. Leaving failing or failed post-conflict states to fester in violence and disorder, rendering them vulnerable to criminality, corrupt governments or violent non-state actors, would be an irresponsible response from the international community.

Rather, the article questions the underpinnings of the liberal peace thesis, particularly the notion that liberally-constituted states are inherently more prosperous, humane and peaceful than non-democratic states, and the underlying belief by influential sections of the international community that this thesis is therefore an appropriate and legitimate premise to impose on fragile post-conflict states.⁸

It is beyond the scope of the article to discuss all the UN peacebuilding operations launched between 1989 and 1999 or, indeed, some of the other more recent coalition peacebuilding efforts launched outside the remit of the UN. Accordingly, the three post-Cold War UN operations discussed in this article were selected on the following basis:

- Angola (1991-97) was selected because it has been widely condemned as a comprehensive liberal peace failure;
- Namibia (1989-90) was selected because it continues to be hailed as a resounding liberal peace success; and
- Timor-Leste (1999-2012) was selected because liberalisation initially failed to create post-conflict stability but, more importantly, the peacebuilding operation subsequently evolved into a liberal-local hybrid approach which was successful.⁹

The key concepts

Before looking more closely at liberalisation and the three case studies, it is important to define the key concepts of 'liberal peace', 'stabilisation' and 'stability'. Liberal peace is a Western concept characterised principally by a peaceful democratic political system, a national constitution, good governance, security, respect for the rule of law, human rights, civil liberties, and an open, global market economy.¹⁰

Thus the premise of the liberal peace thesis—that the international community can create stability in a post-conflict state by stopping violent conflict and installing liberal political, economical and social institutions that mirror those found in the West—is permeated by Western sensibilities about the intrinsically stable and peaceful predilection of liberalised states.¹¹ Stabilisation is the term now commonly applied to the efforts by an internationally-sponsored peacebuilding force to end intra-state conflict by imposing liberal values and building a framework of liberal institutions within the recipient state. The UK's Ministry of Defence defines stabilisation as:

The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote ... political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.¹²

Similarly, the US Army defines stabilisation as 'ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and creating the conditions for normal economic activity and nonviolent politics'.¹³ Complementing the UK and US definitions, the ADF defines stabilisation as 'the buttressing of an existing political order, the shaping of interim arrangements following a crisis, or wholesale nation building following the collapse or removal of the previous regime'.¹⁴

Taking account of these definitions, it follows that stability is represented by a state that is free from violent conflict, and governed by a political body with the requisite legitimacy and capability to independently secure, protect and administer its borders and citizens.¹⁵ Thus stability is conceived to be more than simply a cessation of armed conflict between belligerents or the maintenance of a ceasefire. The broader concept of stability requires long-term peace, supported and sustained by domestic institutions that mirror those found in Western liberal states, notably democracy, a free-market economy, security, justice, good governance and effective administration.¹⁶

In this regard, Western sensibilities, and in particular democratisation, have traditionally been considered by the international community to be a panacea for protracted intra-state conflict. However, clarifying this definition of stability is critical to the following discussion on the liberalisation efforts in Angola, Namibia and Timor-Leste, as it provides a standard of effectiveness against which the outcomes of each operation may be evaluated.

The case studies

It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the complex political factors that contributed to the UN's intervention in Angola. Suffice to say that following decades of intermittent but destructive civil war, the key belligerents signed a comprehensive peace accord in May 1991, agreeing to participation in a multi-party democratic election process. Consequently, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) deployed to Angola in June 1991 to supervise the country's implementation of the peace accord, and in particular the preparation and conduct of national elections scheduled for September 1992.¹⁷

Despite the best efforts of UN personnel on the ground, and numerous extensions to its mandate, UNAVEM II comprehensively failed to create stability in post-conflict Angola.¹⁸ In short, Angola was neither culturally nor institutionally equipped to manage the significant political competition generated by the imposed multi-party election process, and efforts to politically transform the country through democratisation plunged the warring factions back into civil war.

The UN did achieve some initial success in setting the conditions for a successful election in that approximately 92 per cent of Angola's eligible voting population was successfully registered to vote, and the majority of those participated in the election under relatively peaceful conditions.¹⁹ However, sensing an early defeat at the polls, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rejected the election process, accusing its rival, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labour Party (MPLA), of widespread and systemic electoral fraud.

This was the beginning of a series of actions from both protagonists that ultimately undermined political reform in Angola and demonstrated that neither party was genuinely committed to democratisation. UNITA was clearly never going to accept a democratic decision that countered its political objectives, while the MPLA—which historically always supported a one-party over a multi-party government—lacked the political will to include UNITA in its post-election administration.²⁰ Consequently, when the MPLA was officially announced as the election winner in October 1992, UNITA immediately rejected the decision and launched a nation-wide operation to occupy municipalities by force, resulting in the resumption of heavy fighting between UNITA and government forces.

Despite the rapidly deteriorating political and military situation, the MPLA did not seek to negotiate with UNITA regarding possible power-sharing arrangements or a mutually-beneficial direction for Angola's future political system.²¹ The 'winner-takes-all' democratic election model left the politically-ambitious UNITA with nothing to lose and everything to gain by returning to armed conflict.²² Paradoxically, the very process adopted by the Western-led international community to foster stability between Angola's warring parties—the installation of liberal democracy—failed to end the armed conflict and instead exacerbated their violent pursuit of political objectives.²³

Contrary to the UN's failed attempt to rapidly democratise Angola, its earlier success in Namibia (1989-90) continues to be hailed as a resounding peacebuilding success.²⁴ It follows, therefore, that the outcomes of the rapid democratisation process in Namibia should resolutely counter the arguments against liberalisation posited above.

However, this arguably is not actually the case, as mitigating factors unique to Namibia's political environment—and remote from the liberal peace thesis—predisposed democratisation to occur in Namibia without the risk of resurgent violence. Before unpacking this statement further, it is important to provide some context surrounding the peacebuilding mission in Namibia.

Following decades of war between the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the *de facto* but illegal occupying power of South Africa, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed by the key protagonists in December 1988, paving the way for liberal reform. Consequently, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed into Namibia in April 1989 with a short-term political mandate to supervise and control the country's first democratic election scheduled for November of the same year, and to supervise the demobilisation of SWAPO forces and the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibian territory. UNTAG's mandate was clearly premised on Western liberal sensibilities; that is, it was essentially a political operation designed to transition Namibia from a war-ravaged, illegally-occupied colony to a stable, independent and sovereign state through a process of rapid democratisation.²⁵

At face value, UNTAG achieved its liberal mandate in Namibia in that it successfully carried out a democratic election and stabilised the nation. More than 95 per cent of registered voters participated in the country's first democratic election, few irregularities were reported, and South Africa accepted defeat at the polls without argument.²⁶ Three months later, the newly-elected Constituent Assembly approved the national Constitution and, in March 1990, the leader of SWAPO was sworn in as the first President of an independent Namibia. Since achieving independence, Namibia has sustained political and economical stability, and has continued to hold regular democratic elections in accordance with its constitutional commitment and without signs of resurgent conflict.²⁷

For these reasons, UNTAG's success appears to support the premise that rapid liberalisation can transform a conflict-prone state into a peaceful and stable state, reducing the likelihood of a return to intra-state war. However, notwithstanding the apparent success of the democratic elections in Namibia, there were a number of factors that created unique and favourable conditions for the elections to occur without the risk of resurgent violence, and therefore the destabilising effects typically generated by democratisation were significantly mitigated.

The first factor was that, unlike Angola's antagonistic political environment in 1992, Namibia's key protagonists had resolutely accepted that they were unlikely to achieve their political objectives by military means and, having been the subject of sustained diplomatic pressure from the international community for many decades, they each genuinely committed to resolving the political stalemate through a democratic election process.²⁸ Secondly, and once again contrary to Angola's political situation, Namibia's conflict was not purely intra-state in that it was started and sustained by an external actor—South Africa—which importantly withdrew once it was defeated at the polls.

South Africa's peaceful withdrawal from Namibian territory within a fortnight of the election meant that the key driver of Namibia's conflict no longer existed, hence a resurgence of violent conflict was, in effect, impossible.²⁹ The fact that rapid democratisation did not, in Namibia's case, destabilise the fragile state by exacerbating existing political tensions was more about South Africa effectively abandoning the fight, and less about the positive effect of rapid democratisation in transforming a violent state to a peaceful one. So Namibia does not necessarily provide a resounding endorsement for rapid liberalisation as a means to create stability in a post-conflict situation.

A further consideration is that peacebuilding, like warfighting, is fundamentally a political activity. Hence, the international community is usually driven to stabilise a fragile post-conflict state quickly in order to serve the respective national interests of its members—for example, relating to regional engagement or the maintenance of international security—rather than for purely altruistic reasons that will benefit the recipient country in the long term, such as actually resolving the key drivers of intra-state conflict.³⁰

For this reason, the international community seems to ignore the fact that it took Western civilisation many centuries of violent conflict to transition from authoritarianism and war to liberal democracy and peace. Instead, it typically imposes short and unrealistic timelines on liberalisation efforts in post-conflict states. This drive for rapid democratisation effectively denies the recipient state any opportunity to reach a natural equilibrium—to develop its own democracy over time—and risks outpacing the development and expansion of supportive domestic institutions ultimately required to sustain stability.

This outpacing is effectively a second reason why the liberalisation effort in Angola failed; the international community desired rapid democratisation to satisfy the national interests of its members to promote international security, and the result was a hurried and inadequate election timeline. Specifically, UNAVEM II's mandate imposed a time constraint of 17 months within which the mission was to achieve political reform. As a result, national elections were held well before the considerably fragile and still deeply-divided state was sufficiently disarmed and domestically prepared to withstand the significant tensions generated by a divisive electoral process.³¹

Moreover, at the time of the elections, the UN disarmament and demobilisation effort was still incomplete, and Angola did not have a unified armed force, a neutral police force or a robust judicial institution that could manage the escalating violence. The political climate was also still steeped with a sense of mutual mistrust, intolerance and lack of respect, and the population was still divided along ethnic-tribal and rural-urban differences.³² Consequently, when UNITA rejected the outcome of the democratic election and launched a violent insurgency against the MPLA, there were few if any domestic

measures in place to stop the country from plunging back into a violent civil war that, by 1995, had killed 300,000 people—more than the number of Angolans killed during the 18 years of civil war preceding the elections—with at least two million others suffering from a national humanitarian crisis.³³

Importantly, the legitimacy of the democratic election process was also significantly undermined, probably irretrievably. The expectations of the voting public were left largely unfulfilled and, with no tangible benefits to be seen from participating in the election, Angolans became increasingly disaffected.³⁴ These devastating outcomes suggest Angola's first democratic elections were held prematurely, before the state had developed the associated robust domestic framework required to cope with the election-induced conflict and this worked against the goal of stabilising the state through democratisation.³⁵

Tellingly, in a damning report to the UN Security Council in January 1993, the UN Secretary-General confirmed 'to all intents and purposes, Angola has returned to civil war and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991'.³⁶ Democratisation did not reconcile Angola's warring political parties. Instead, it exacerbated existing competitiveness and hostility, destroying the fragile peace established from the peace accords, and ultimately serving as a catalyst for a return to civil war.

The UN peace operation launched in Timor-Leste (1999-2012) offers a third and different experience of an international effort to liberalise a post-conflict state, and ultimately supports both arguments posited in this article regarding the destabilising effects of rapid democratisation.

Following a violent and deadly uprising in 1999 by pro-Indonesian militia, the UN deployed an international military force to Timor Leste (INTERFET) in September 1999 to restore peace and security. Once the militia had been defeated, the UN established a Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to serve as the nation's transitional governing authority, while a significant liberal state-building effort installed a new framework of domestic infrastructure and repaired the significant damage to physical infrastructure.

This reconstitution process was evidently premised on Western sensibilities; the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to UNTAET established new liberal laws and regulations, and repealed or amended the illiberal ones, consequently reshaping Timor-Leste's state institutions to mirror those seen in stable Western democracies.³⁷ Presumably learning from the problems of severely-constrained timelines evidenced in the 1992 Angolan mission, the UN encouragingly followed a more gradual liberalisation process in Timor-Leste.

In particular, it maintained a major presence in the country after the country's first democratic elections were held, with an emphasis on building the necessary domestic institutions needed by the Timor-Leste people to maintain stability in the long term.³⁸ Nevertheless, in the interests of promoting international security, the UN still attempted to transform Timor-Leste into a stable liberal state as quickly as possible. Avoiding an open-ended commitment to foster long-term stability within the state, the UN's decision in 2002 to withdraw UNTAET without resolving the root causes of the conflict saw significant violence resurge less than five years later, and the initial euphoria quickly evaporated.³⁹

UNTAET, therefore, provides a strong example of the tendency for rapid democratisation efforts to secure short-term stability at the expense of creating sustainable, long-term stabilisation by resolving the underlying causes of the conflict. The initial stages of UNTAET's success mirrored the liberalisation achievements seen in Namibia a decade earlier. Seven months after the successful August 2001 elections, in which more than 90 per cent of eligible Timorese voters participated, the newly-elected Constitutional Assembly signed into force Timor-Leste's first constitution, and a month later another round of peaceful elections saw the country's first President sworn in. Under the mostly Western transitional administration, Timor-Leste was rebuilt over a period of 12 months, and the country was declared an independent nation in May 2002.

By all accounts, it seemed UNTAET had successfully transformed the previously war-torn state into a stable and peaceful liberal democracy. The newly-independent state was no longer characterised by internal violence and a liberal framework of state institutions had been installed. It is important to note at this point, however, that following their defeat at the hands of INTERFET in 1999, the pro-Indonesian militia had actually withdrawn from Timor-Leste, well before the first democratic elections were held in 2001.

In this regard, and in striking similarity to the conditions of the 1989 Namibian elections when South Africa withdrew, the 2001 and 2002 democratic elections in Timor-Leste occurred in unusually favourable conditions in that there was effectively no longer an opposing armed force in the country and hence the destabilising effect of democratisation was largely mitigated.⁴⁰ As a result, by 2002 there were clear indications suggesting Timor-Leste had been successfully transformed into a stable, liberal state.

Critically, however, the state lacked experience in functioning as a democracy and, with weak state institutions, corrupt government officials and unresolved animosities between key political protagonists, it was very evident by 2006 that UNTAET's liberalisation effort had simply created an empty-shell state incapable of supporting long-term stability.⁴¹ In short, between 2002 and 2006, tensions and violence grew between many disaffected factions in Timor-Leste over differing views on the new government, human rights, and the future of country.

Essentially, the rapidly-imposed liberal governance structures were incongruent with indigenous Timorese customs, practices and values, creating in effect a divide between the urban political elite and the rural Timorese population.⁴² Additionally, corrupt political actors adopted improper liberal practices and exploited their power to favour particular ethnic groups over others, leading many Timorese to become disaffected with their government and viewing democracy as little more than a competition between factions favoured by the political elite.⁴³

In 2006, the situation imploded and Timor-Leste disintegrated to the brink of civil war. Ten per cent of Timorese people were internally displaced as a consequence of the civil violence, and the country's government and security forces were quickly overwhelmed.⁴⁴ In the wake of festering instability and a major humanitarian, political and security crisis, the UN had little choice but to establish another international force, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) to restore immediate security and work towards creating a more enduring stability than that which had been hastily delivered by UNTAET.

The Timor-Leste case study supports the second argument presented in this article regarding the inherently lengthy nature of democracy, and the risks of imposing liberal democratic reform without first building adequate domestic institutions and addressing the root causes of the initial conflict.

Summary

This article has discussed the outcomes from the internationally-sponsored liberalisation efforts of three particular post-Cold War UN peacebuilding operations in order to support the thesis that rapid liberalisation tends to be a destabilising and ineffective blueprint for creating enduring stability in post-conflict states.

The outcomes from the three peacebuilding operations suggest that the premise of the liberal peace thesis, and the Western sensibilities that underpin it, are flawed. Importantly, the debate to take forward is not whether the international community should attempt to create stability in a failing or failed post-conflict states but rather how future stabilisation efforts should proceed.

Deeply-divided post-conflict states with little to no experience in democracy, or liberal market economies for that matter, have time and again proven to be unfertile ground on which to rapidly impose Western sensibilities, values and institutions. Accordingly, unless they can be developed into a longer-term, liberal-local hybrid cooperative model of peacebuilding, future stabilisation efforts targeted at complex intra-state conflicts will likely continue to fail in fostering political reconciliation and longer-term stability.

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NOTES

- ¹ This is an edited version of a paper, titled 'Western sensibilities are the biggest handicap to creating stability in post-conflict situations', submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff College at the Australian Defence College in 2013.
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- ³ Roland Paris, *At War's End: building peace after civil conflict*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004, pp. 40-1; and Ponzio, *Democratic Peacebuilding*, p. 70.
- ⁴ Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver P. Richmond, 'Introduction' in Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, UN University Press: Tokyo, 2010, p. 7; Paris, *At War's End*, p. ix.
- ⁵ Roger MacGinty, 'Against Stabilization,' *Stability*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, p. 23; Marina Ottaway and Bethany Lacina, 'International Interventions and Imperialism: lessons from the 1990s', *SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2003, p. 72; Edward Newman, 'Liberal Peacebuilding Debates', in Newman, Paris and Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, p. 50; Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, 'Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 38, No.1, 2007, p. 29.
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- ⁷ Paris, *At War's End*, p. 7.
- ⁸ Boege *et al*, 'Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders', *International Peacebuilding*, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2009, p. 299; Monef Kartas, 'Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the "Good Governance" Discourse De-politicising the Local?', paper presented at the annual conference for the Nordic International Studies Association, Odense, Denmark, 24-25 May 2007; Newman, 'Liberal Peacebuilding Debates', p. 30; Roland Paris, 'Does liberal peacebuilding have a future?', in Newman, Paris and Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, pp. 102-3; Beatrice Pouligny, 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: ambiguities of international programs aimed at building "new" societies', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2005, p. 498; Edward Newman, 'Failed States and International Order: construct a post-Westphalian world', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2009, p. 436.
- ⁹ Ponzio, *Democratic Peacebuilding*, p. 17.
- ¹⁰ Paris, *At War's End*, p. 3.
- ¹¹ Richmond and Franks, 'Liberal Hubris?', p. 29; Paris, *At War's End*, p. 5.
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- ¹³ US Institute of Peace and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 'Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction', US Institute of Peace: Washington DC, 2009, pp. 11-232.

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- 28 Bertram, 'Reinventing Governments', p. 407; Paris, *At War's End*, p. 137; Schmidt, 'Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States?', p. 118.
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- 32 Paris, *At War's End*, pp. 66-8; UN, 'United Nations Angola Verification Mission II'.
- 33 Paris, *At War's End*, p. 67; UN, 'United Nations Angola Verification Mission II'.
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- ⁴² Boege *et al*, 'Building Peace', p. 608.
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Unfinished Business: the gaps in service to veterans

Cate Carter

Introduction

The return of the majority of troops from the Middle East Area of Operations, and the focus throughout Anzac Day of the contemporary veteran experience, thrust into the public eye a picture of just how crowded the veteran space has become. The rise of military charities and veteran support groups has somewhat decentralised the traditional role of the Returned Services League, and introduced the idea of public funding for rehabilitation. Investigations into the symptoms and therapies associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have contributed much to normalising mental health.

The community is awash with veterans. Or is it? As predicted, the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) is bracing for a tidal surge but it may not be structured to offer comprehensive and inclusive compensation. The military charities have a more conducive structure but limited funding. The result may be that some contemporary veterans simply disappear into the community, unhealed. This article will look at two emerging gaps in service to veterans. First, the 'reintegration' phase of transition and, second, the lack of dedicated services for women.

Reintegration

Reintegration is the final phase of the process known as 'disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration' (DDR). The ADF practises DDR predominantly when it is involved in stabilisation operations in a post-conflict environment. There, it is the foreign militias which are disarmed and moved into their new role but the process is not repeated with our own conventional professional force.

Much is written about post-conflict DDR. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, experienced in practising different forms of DDR, has developed a new approach called 'Second Generation DDR'.¹ This is a kind of post-modern approach to a proscriptive practice which adapted the phases to the local situation, swapped their order and even developed a new phase—'Reinsertion'. It advocates outcomes over process in an attempt to ensure societal stability and, more importantly, individual contentment. No such analysis has been applied to the transition of ADF members into the community.

DVA exists to support current and former members of the ADF and their families (and, in certain circumstances, Australian Federal Police) under various legislation. DVA has developed significantly during the recent period of operations, however, despite the new emphasis on 'biopsychosocial injury management' and 'vocational rehabilitation',² DVA is essentially structured towards welfare rather than reintegration. There remains a significant amount of money being distributed to veterans through claims for compensation for injury or illness.³ Despite a rather bureaucratic process, the financial rewards are significant, resulting in the veteran's income being subsidised by a full or part pension. This 'pensioning off' risks victimising the veteran and offers little incentive to seek a new career on separation. This is the reintegration problem: veteran pensions may actually be preventing effective reintegration into society.

Arguably what we are seeing now is the 'demobilisation' phase. The rehabilitation of members' physical and psychological injuries is well underway. Innovative rehabilitation solutions are being developed by military charities and funded by corporate and civic donations. Physical challenges, animal-assisted therapy and cutting-edge medical equipment are all now available to the Australian veteran. There is also an encouraging lean towards therapies which benefit both physical and psychological health.⁴ Despite the fact that it is largely subsidised by private donations, under-caters for women, and fails to acknowledge the potential benefit of alternative therapies, the rehabilitation arena is active.

What we need now is a 'reintegration plan'. This is not the domain of Defence, DVA or military charities. This responsibility lies with the very community which will receive the veterans. A tremendous effort is required from business, industry, government and academia to employ veterans in a meaningful way.

These sectors will benefit from the experiences of military professionals and need to develop pathways into their particular domains. Former military personnel will have to think about what they are going to do with the rest of their lives. Their identity in Australia in the 2020s needs to be something more than an ex-serviceman or -woman.

Some separated members will have 30 working years ahead of them. They don't just need a job; they need a career and, certainly, some meaning to their lives. There is much goodwill in the community towards contemporary veterans but this has been skewed somewhat by false mythology and a certain shrillness around the story of Anzac.⁵ Moreover, this good intent has not been helped by such incomprehensible statements as 'support the troops, not the war'. Such sentiments are unhelpful to people trying to earn understanding and recognition.

The social obligation

The social obligation to receive veterans back into the community prevents the development of a disenfranchised class. We cannot afford to lose another group of displaced people. An offering of training modules, places on courses, work experience, internships, cadetships and secondments needs to be provided, followed by a deliberate consideration of professional appointments. Veterans need priority and direction.⁶ Only then can they start contributing to society, becoming self-sufficient. This short-term plan is surely more efficient than a lifetime on welfare.

As our community understands little about military skills and experience, the beginning of this reception may be provided by the Defence Reserves. Reserve members already operate in one of the employment sectors. They know their profession and they understand the skills held by the members of the ADF. They could lead the way in establishing affirmative action policies and fast-tracked professional training for applicants.

Part of the problem is that we don't know how many veterans there are or where they are. Defence Transition Centres process members out of the ADF but cannot provide numbers of separated members by region, gender or year.⁷ If they don't know, it is difficult to imagine how the employing sectors can know. DVA only manages members who approach asking for assistance but even the Department would like to be able to contact members after separation to ask if they need assistance and offer appropriate services.⁸ Regular post-separation monitoring is sorely needed, and is one of the findings of a 2001 Middle East Area of Operations health study.⁹

Choice

Vocational choice also needs to expand. Often, veterans accept a future vocation with similar content to their service role. Jobs in security, logistics, emergency services and procurement seem familiar to ex-ADF members but invariably fail to provide the contextual richness of their previous experience or the cognitive stimulation for their intelligence. Military people need to prioritise how they have been taught to operate, rather than what they have done. Their abilities and skills are the capital they bring to the workforce.

Applying these skills to new fields may result in a rewarding contribution to a new occupation. Higher education can play an important role.¹⁰ By introducing the veteran to new disciplines, education can reveal an aptitude for academic expression and unlock a passion for a new field of study. Military people are well suited to higher education. They are often systematic, disciplined, methodical, enquiring, thorough, adaptable and critical—and have had exposure to cultural and political contexts which much of society has not. These attributes can already make them competitive in the job market, so we need to assess why some aren't finding meaningful work.

One answer could be in what they lack. A recent study to determine what was preventing employers from recruiting graduates from scientific, technology, engineering and mathematics degrees,¹¹ revealed that a 'lack of interpersonal skills' and 'lack of understanding how we do business' were preventing technically-proficient employees from being hired. While these factors may not be shared by former military people, such a study would be useful in identifying the professional proficiencies favoured by Australian human resource managers and subsequently designing ways for military people to obtain them.

A good example of this is the British program 'SkillForce'.¹² This non-profit charity offers mentoring to school students. Aiming to be 'the trusted bridge for Service leavers and ex-Forces into a new career in education', the program is based on the observation that 'the skills and experiences of ex-Forces personnel were valuable in engaging hard-to-reach young people and developing their confidence and skills'.¹³ SkillForce therefore recruits former military personnel as a deliberate policy and offers them diploma-level educational qualifications. The program began in the UK Ministry of Defence and is now funded by private donations, corporate partnerships and government grants. The program works because it recognises aptitude, legitimises it and tailors it to meet a growing need.

Big ideas like this are needed now, and need only start with one industry or one practitioner keen to share their vision, and who is able to invite ex-ADF members to participate.

Unfinished business

'Reception' requires the host community to recognise the abilities in the veteran, introduce him or her to new and inspiring vocations, and then provide assistance in pursuing those ideas. But it also involves listening to what the veteran wants. 'Troops First Foundation' is a US charity for wounded military personnel, which runs several exciting initiatives. One of them, 'Operation Proper Exit',¹⁴ is a program which attempts to fill the gaps in the minds of dislocated soldiers who have been suddenly and critically evacuated out of theatre. Not only are these soldiers unaware of how the situation ended tactically, they will often not return to theatre and will therefore be unaware of how things ended strategically. Operation Proper Exit takes them back into the theatre, so they can 'walk out on their own terms' and re-contextualise the situation of which they were a part.

A singular issue for the returning ADF member is that when they leave their theatre of operations, the task they began may not have been completed. Consequently, they may spend the next few years repeatedly trying to solve it, to no avail. It is their perception of promises made to people in theatre which remains. This is carried as 'unfinished business'.

Disengagement from the mission is handled systematically for formed bodies. In fact, there is an emerging trend in the lessons learnt from the entire duration of deployment to the Middle East Area of Operations that 'decompression activities', both in theatre and in Australia, added to the member's sense of completion.¹⁵ For individual staff rotations and embedded positions, this practice does not occur. The consequence of this may be that the sense of completion is more difficult to achieve, and may not be identified as 'unresolved' for some time.

Resolving unfinished business can also be the task of the host community. It starts with asking the veteran what might fill that gap. This may manifest in being involved in a charity which builds capacity in the post-conflict country; it may mean contributing to an ongoing partnership with industry or agriculture; or it may mean a return journey to see what has been progressed. It might not be a good ending but it will no longer be unknown.

As the tempo of operations has reduced considerably, and as individual units reconstitute, there is a shift towards demobilisation and the rehabilitation of members. It is feasible to assume that the pressure of successive deployments over the past decade will result in the separation from the ADF of a large group of people in the near future. At the moment, their reintegration is made more difficult in an environment of compensation, and a culture that distinguishes skills as either military or civilian. However, the social obligation of the public and private sectors can start to relieve this predicament. This might start with members of the Defence Reserves as advocates. The need for choice in vocational plans is critical, and the challenge of resolving 'unfinished business' is rewarding.

Women

The past ten years have seen female ADF personnel participating in the longest operational deployment in our history. As a natural consequence, there will be an increase in transitions of these women out of the ADF over the next ten years. They will concurrently be part of two recognised groups: contemporary veterans from the theatres of the new century, and women who have been exiting service since Vietnam. Questions of identity are common to both.

The identity of female veterans is the starting point for several findings in Samantha Cromptvoets' study into the health of female veterans.¹⁶ This study reveals the link between the lack of services designed for women and their perception of dislocation from the veteran community. Moreover, it posits an 'empowerment/disempowerment paradox',¹⁷ which highlights the contribution from military service to female empowerment, and the subsequent removal of that empowerment by the dearth of appropriate support mechanisms. It is worth noting that this paradox is also suggested by military writers, Skinner and Diggins, in their survey on Army's 'family friendly' policies,¹⁸ and population health writers, Feldman and Hanlon, in their survey of female veterans in warlike, peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.¹⁹

This suggests a kind of prematurity in the approach to women's issues in Defence. By themselves, policies which address pay and conditions, promotion, and combat opportunities have not resulted in sufficient satisfaction among women, and have given rise to new initiatives to recruit, retain and re-enlist more women.²⁰ Likewise, acknowledgement of returned servicewomen over the years has not translated into provision of equivalent services for women on separation from service. Equity policies need to be supported by implementation, feedback, refinement and enough time to grow a cohort of senior women to provide aspirational examples. A greater emphasis of female character and a variety of identities in service will no doubt assist the carriage of those identities to civilian life.

The ABC's recent Anzac program 'After the Parade',²¹ despite putting a senior, female Defence member on the panel, had no returned female members in the audience and, furthermore, identified women in the audience as wives, mothers and daughters of the featured male veterans. This remarkable oversight was compounded by a discussion of the statistics of PTSD in military women compared with those in the civilian community, without presenting any women who have suffered from PTSD to speak about their experience.²²

The stories of the featured male veterans were told through the lens of four veteran support groups.²³ While these groups offer a range of services, they are focused on physical challenges, the funding is private and challenging to sustain, and the marketing oriented to men. Women are rarely pictured participating in the activities and are instead portrayed primarily as the support group for the male veterans. Whether or not they have achieved brave and glorious feats, and regardless of how they have seen themselves in theatre, women are just not seen as—nor see themselves as—'warriors' or 'heroes' when they come home.²⁴ When women do not find mainstream support groups appealing, there is a risk of the rise of counter cultural support services to fill the gap. This is an alienating outcome which could potentially be harmful to women's health,²⁵ and reduce the number of role models for future female veterans and potential ADF recruits.

Women's healthcare

For a woman exiting service, looking after her own health is a new experience.²⁶ In the Services, a team of medical practitioners has monitored, prevented, cured and reminded the woman about all aspects of her health. This team has combined the particular requirements of her job with the gynaecological stages of her life. In-service healthcare is prolific, holistic, prioritised and free. On separation, civilian healthcare is a daunting prospect. Finding the range of general and specialised practitioners who have an understanding of her professional past can take years. The handover of each service medical file is done on an ad hoc basis, and sometimes not at all.

Not only is medical care no longer part of the woman's working day but neither is exercise. Cromptvoets' study found that after separation, the opportunity for women to do regular exercise is diminished.²⁷ It is now a personal responsibility and not always the priority of the new employer, and the constraints of the new role of the separated member. Post-service healthcare is ad hoc, fragmented, deprioritised and costly.

Women in service typically manage child bearing around postings and deployments. Pressure to achieve or avoid pregnancy is related to a number of variables peculiar to military service, in addition to age, health and relationship status. Effects of miscarriages and terminations immediately before or after deployment require the medical practitioner and patient to have an understanding of the physical and

psychological stressors of military operations, and a long-term aftercare plan to monitor recovery.²⁸ It could be suggested that early education of women about these matters during their military careers would better prepare them to continue their own healthcare after separation. Reproductive health is, therefore, a complex issue with servicewomen and requires a broader approach than perhaps simply referral to fertility specialists.

Balance

Maternal separation is an influencing factor on success of a transition. The military woman will manage both risk and expectation around issues of motherhood during a deployment but is often under-prepared to manage the post-deployment challenges.²⁹ Often there is a perception that the traditional support structure of female friends and relatives is judgmental, which may explain the finding that women are less likely than men to report negative impacts on their children.³⁰ This alienation from family support structures is compounded in cases of single parenting,³¹ which may only eventuate post-deployment or after separation from service. If women do find support for their own health, their children's health or their relationship with their children, then they can be prevented from accessing that support by the lack of childcare opportunities available to them.³²

Arguably, female veterans face a more balanced gender perspective once out of a male-dominated workplace. This means that their identity as mothers, partners or paid professionals develops in an environment where there is a higher population of women. The level of understanding of service life from this community of women can positively or negatively influence the success of the woman's transition experience.³³

An added complication to the social status of the female veteran is her perception of a double standard. When a mother deploys, there is a social perception that the family is without a primary care giver, leading to a subsequent increase in monitoring and offers of help. When a father deploys, the situation is normalised and extra assistance is perceived to be less.³⁴ Moreover, in the case of a mother deploying, the homecoming is seen as a return to a 'normal state'. Sometimes, the mother buys in to the paradigm. She may even overcompensate by reducing her work hours, taking extended leave or separating from service. This, of course was not the 'normal state' for the family before the deployment, and is likely to produce conditions which further complicate the veteran's environment.

The imbalance can also be detected in the weight of work afforded to studies. Research at the Centre for Australian Military and Veterans' Health has provided 22 completed studies over the last ten years.³⁵ Only two define topics which specifically relate to female veterans,³⁶ and yet women form 14 per cent of the ADF. The unspoken inference is that in our push for equity, we not prepared for the differences which affect the way we transition out of the force.

An alliance

In the US, the Department of Veteran Affairs is dealing with the same problem but on a much larger and more traumatic scale. US female veterans number 1.8 million and have above-average incidences of death, traumatic injuries, military sexual trauma, homelessness and incarceration. However, the organisations which manage veterans are finding the same challenges—census data gaps, funding, outreach, gendered healthcare, memorial recognition and access to childcare.³⁷

The US Department of Veterans Affairs has turned to a new agenda to address the increasing female veteran population.³⁸ The Department conducted its first contemporary survey of female veterans in 2009.³⁹ Out of a subsequent report, ten recommendations were made to the Department to enhance services for women, and a 'Women Veterans Task Force' was established in 2011. The Task Force builds on the systems already in place (like the Center for Women Veterans, Women Veterans Health Strategic Health Care Group and regional Women Veterans Coordinators) by filling gaps which allow women to access these services and reintegrate into the community.⁴⁰ The Department is supported by organisations like The American Legion, which provides resources and advocacy for policy change.⁴¹

The Australian experience does not need a special 'female military charity' but rather an alliance of professional organisations. Appropriate services already exist in the public and private sectors, so it would be efficient to draw on them. A positive step would primarily be a referral centre, where referred services could include support in:

- Reproductive and sexual health
- Relationship advice
- Sexual trauma
- Antenatal counselling
- Paediatric advice
- Mother/child counselling and workshops
- Psychological assessment
- Domestic violence
- Substance abuse
- Eating disorders and weight management
- Physiotherapy
- Oncology, and
- Reconstructive surgery.

In addition to healthcare, tailored professional services could be provided, including:

- Financial advice
- Tertiary study assistance
- Vocational assistance
- Children's education advice
- Small business advice
- Legal advice
- Spiritual and religious guidance, and
- Referrals to charities and aid organisations

Such an alliance would benefit from a patron—a community leader who could be an advocate for but not necessarily represent the female veterans.

Finally, we need to hear stories of successful transitions. On 25 March 2014, the White House honoured ten leaders who are 'Women Veteran Leader Champions of Change', highlighting their contributions to US business, public and community service sectors.⁴² Such recognition demonstrates that life after military service is not a compromise but a life made possible because of service.

Within the ADF, new initiatives, good leadership and community outreach have advanced the cause of the returned serviceman in recent years. Where women are concerned, it may have leant too far in the elimination of distinction and the tilt towards equality. Questions of identity, empowerment and disempowerment, the absence of statistics, perceptions of social support, underprepared healthcare practitioners, a lack of studies into reproductive health and maternal separation, insufficient childcare facilities and perceptions of gender imbalance all impede the successful transition of female veterans.

The sample group is small, and so it is natural to look at a country with a larger female veteran population for ideas. An alliance of professional services tailored to female veterans would serve the disparate female veteran population well. It would allow women to access a variety of general and specialist healthcare providers and professional services to enable their transition to take place over time. Only a good experience overall, not just while in the military but afterwards as well, would encourage other women to pursue military service as a fulfilling and exemplary career.

Conclusion

It is easy to rule a line under the end of a conflict and get on with planning the next one. But what has been created out of the conflict is a group of affected people. Unless we go further than merely reconstituting these people, there is a possibility they will be in limbo for the rest of their lives. We have learned this lesson at least once before. The consequence of being 'pensioned off', despite the concept having been practised for thousands of years, is that the transition is never finished.

The identity of veterans is unspoken within communities because it reminds us that we are prepared to sacrifice the living, not just the dead. When a society makes the social contract for its own security, it must take responsibility to care for those who provide that security. That is the social obligation.

There is much going on in the veteran arena. It is evidence that 'good men' are doing something. However, we could risk leaving part of the group behind in the rush. Dedicated services to women, which acknowledge their differences, and long-term reintegration plans within the community would fill in the emerging gaps in service to veterans, and start to share some of the responsibility with those who ultimately benefit from their service.

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NOTES

- ¹ UN, *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Practices in Peace Operations*, Department of Peace Keeping Operations: New York, 2010.
- ² The Department of Veterans Affairs' (DVA) 'Rehabilitation Framework' consists of medical, psychosocial and vocational rehabilitation services: see <www.dva.gov.au> accessed 12 May 2014.
- ³ DVA has approximately \$6.5 billion to spend in pensions and income support for FY2014/15. Minister for Veterans Affairs' media release, 27 May 2014, see <http://minister.dva.gov.au/media_releases/2014/may/minva036.htm> accessed 30 May 2014.
- ⁴ The ADF's 'Rehabilitation Program', the 'Wounded, Injured and Ill Diggers' Forum' and 'Soldier Recovery Centres' are recent initiatives which invite wider community support in the rehabilitation of serving members.
- ⁵ James Brown, *Anzac's Long Shadow: the cost of our national obsession*, Redback: Collingwood, 2014, p.18.
- ⁶ Under US federal law, veterans who are disabled or who served on active duty in the armed forces during certain specified periods or in military campaigns are generally entitled to preference over non-veterans, both in federal hiring practices and in retention during reductions in force: see <<http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/vetspref/main.htm>> accessed 2 June 2014.
- ⁷ Discussions with Separation Cell, [Australian] Army Transitions Group, Directorate of Soldier Career Management, 23 April to 12 May 2014.
- ⁸ Discussion with Director, Rehabilitation Review Project, DVA, 20 May 2014.
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- ¹⁰ Australian universities which offer coursework post-graduate studies, community access programs, bridging sub-degree programs and flexible delivery are well positioned to recruit members of the veteran community during transition from service.

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- 19 Susan Feldman and Clare Hanlon, 'Count Us In: the experiences of female war, peacemaking, and peacekeeping veterans', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2012, p. 212.
- 20 ADF, 'The Chief of the Defence Force Action Plan for the Recruitment and Retention of Women', media release: see <<http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/RR/Womenindefence/initatives.html>> accessed 15 May 2014.
- 21 ABC 1, 7:30 Anzac Special, 'After the Parade', 24 April 2014, see: <[Soundcloud.com/612abcbrisbane/tracks](https://soundcloud.com/612abcbrisbane/tracks)> accessed 29 April 2014.
- 22 ABC 1, 7:30 Anzac Special, 'After the Parade', at 49:35 minutes. A gap was also clearly evident in the absence of PTSD statistics for separated members who may never register with DVA or may wait a number of years before seeking help.
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- 24 A.E. Street, Dawne Vogt and Lissa Dutra, 'A new generation of women veterans: stressors faced by women deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan', *Clinical Psychology Review*, Issue 29, 2009, p. 692. Also Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, *Women in the Military and Women Veterans*, The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists: Washington, 2012, p. 2.
- 25 Cromptvoets, *The Health and Wellbeing of Female Vietnam and Contemporary Veterans*, p. 24.
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- 28 Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, *Women in the Military and Women Veterans*, pp. 4-6. Susan Neuhaus and Samantha Cromptvoets, 'Australia's Servicewomen and female veterans: do we understand their health needs?', *Perspectives, Medical Journal of Australia*, Vol. 199, No. 8, 2013, p. 531.
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policies', in *Military Medicine*, Vol. 178, July 2013, pp. 730-1. Also Susan Feldman and Clare Hanlon, 'Count Us In: the experiences of female war, peacemaking, and peacekeeping veterans', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2012, p. 216.

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- 36 The lack of research on contemporary Australian female veterans is highlighted in Samantha Cromptvoets' 2011 literature review 'The health and wellbeing of female veterans: a review of the literature [online]', *Journal of Military and Veterans Health*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Aug 2011, p. 25.
- 37 US Department of Veterans Affairs, *America's Women Veterans*, p. 32.
- 38 US Department of Veteran Affairs, *Strategic Plan FY2010-2014*, Department of Veterans Affairs: Washington DC, June 2010, p. 85, which states that 'the purpose of this initiative is to empower women Veterans by promoting recognition of their contributions, to ensure that VA programs are responsive to the needs of women, and to educate women about VA benefits and services, enabling them to make informed decisions about applying for, and using, VA benefits and services'.
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- 40 US Department of Veterans Affairs, *Strategies for Serving Our Women Veterans*, Women Veterans Task Force 2012 Report, Department of Veterans Affairs: Washington DC, 2012, p. 9.
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Review essay

Can Peace Research Make Peace? Lessons in Academic Diplomacy

Timo Kivimaki
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2012
ISBN: 978-1-4094-5202-7



Reviewed by Brigadier Chris Field, CSC, Australian Army

Since 2001, Dr Timo Kivimaki from the University of Helsinki, Finland, and the East Asian Peace Program at Uppsala University, Sweden, in cooperation with Universitas Tanjungpura West Kalimantan, has led a 'vigorous' study of conflict in the West Kalimantan province of Indonesia. *Can Peace Research Make Peace* defines conflict as 'violent, destructive disputes between any armed parties'. In turn, peace research is defined as 'academic investigation that produces knowledge that helps to prevent political violence'.

Sponsored by the European Commission, Kivimaki decided in December 2008 to step his class 'out of its educational setting and transfer itself into a peace process under the auspices of [the then] vice president of Indonesia [Muhammad Jusuf Kalla]'. This book offers 'a model of how purely academic work can serve the purpose of capacity building for peace and actual pre-negotiation for a peace-process'.

In emphasising 'peace' instead of 'security', this book presents alternate thinking and frameworks, which are relevant for ADF consideration. For example, *Can Peace Research Make Peace* emphasises the distinction between peace research and security studies, asserting that 'it is not analytically possible to advocate for the destruction of a village and its people in the name of peace, whilst it is possible to destroy a village in the name of security'.

Kivimaki aims to demonstrate the practical application of peace research in conflict resolution and to offer a 'menu of options for academic peace diplomacy'. This menu of options, or junctures on the path to conflict, includes peaceful actions designed to reduce opportunities for antagonism, motives for conflict, and opportunities for violence.

Given the subject matter, *Can Peace Research Make Peace* is not light reading. However, as noted in the *Defence White Paper 2013*, understanding Indonesia's security is not negotiable for ADF professionals:

The stability and security of Indonesia, our largest near neighbour, is of singular importance, and is our most important relationship in the region. Australia benefits from having a strong and cohesive Indonesia as a partner to our north, as Indonesia does from a secure Australia to its south. Geographic proximity means that Indonesia's and Australia's security interests are intertwined. We have a shared aspiration for the stability and economic prosperity of our region that underpins our partnership and is driving increased breadth and depth in our defence cooperation.¹

Can Peace Research Make Peace provides a unique perspective for ADF professionals on West Kalimantan, a province of over four million people. It is among Indonesia's four poorest provinces and has one of the lowest ratios of police and military forces per inhabitants in the world. The book questions whether 'experiences in West Kalimantan point to a more general strategy of practical peace research'. Kivimaki emphasises that 'academic peace work in West Kalimantan has been mostly focused on the process *before* ethnic leaders were ready to sit down and talk'. The ADF might bundle Kivimaki's focus on early intervention into planning for information operations, shaping operations or so-called 'phase zero' operations.²

Kivimaki's aim of 'capacity building for peace and actual pre-negotiation for a peace-process' relies on close cooperation with 'police, military, ethnic leaders and civil bureaucracy of the province and districts of West Kalimantan'. This cooperative approach closely aligns with the Australian Army's capstone doctrine *Adaptive Campaigning*. This doctrine recommends indigenous capacity building as one of five mutually-reinforcing and interdependent lines of operation. According to Army doctrine, indigenous capacity building means:

... actions to nurture the establishment of capacity within civil communities whilst simultaneously working to establish longer term governance and socio-economic capacity which meets the needs of the people. This may include; micro-financial initiatives, local and central government reform — security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.³

Kivimaki notes that one characteristic of the 17 'conflicts in West Kalimantan [between 1950 and 2010] has ... been the theme of "localness" and the rights that belong either to all Indonesians in the province or only to the "local" communities'. His view is that issues of 'localness' categorise the West Kalimantan conflict as an 'ethnic/community intra-state conflict', known as a 'sons-of-soil conflict'.

In West Kalimantan, Kivimaki defines 'locals' as Dayak and Madurese, and 'migrants' as Malay and Chinese. He assesses that localness was exacerbated from the mid-1990s in Indonesia due to the transition to democracy and 'decentralisation, in the sense of practical expansion of the power of the local people at the expense of the central administration in local affairs'. In other words, when Indonesian decentralisation and democratisation occurred, 'locals' were best positioned to assume business and government leadership, and people relied on community groups rather than the state for their security.

Since the early-1990s, 'sons-of-soil' issues—when 'local' communities compete with 'migrant' communities—account for 25 per cent of the world's intra-state conflicts. This is, therefore, an important and prevalent form of conflict requiring ADF understanding. In the future, the ADF may experience environments where 'the coexistence of people who see themselves as locals, and people the locals see as visitors, migrants or non-indigenous, is not uncommon'. Understanding that conflict in Indonesia, or other areas of the Indo-Pacific strategic arc, may include 'sons-of-soil' issues is important for ADF interactions with our neighbours.

Kivimaki summarises four categories of obstacles employed by conflicting parties to impede peace processes in West Kalimantan. First, conflicting parties use triggers and excuses to justify revenge. Second, parties find a way around fear and morality that most societies have in respect to brutality and violence. Third, violence is used to express one's loyalty towards a community. Fourth, conflicting parties find a way to circumvent law enforcement.

Instructive for the ADF is Kivimaki's view that recalcitrant, conflicting parties can be influenced to support peace processes. Kivimaki's research indicates that violence is countered when 'alternatives to violent demonstrative action' and 'explicit negotiation on the terms of inter-community interaction' occur. He recommends including the families of ethnic leaders in inter-community negotiations to potentially 'reframe [the] perceived images [between communities] in a way that ... emphasises the common basic issues shared and valued'.

The enduring value of this book is Kivimaki's emphasis on supporting peace rather than imposing security. To that end, *Can Peace Research Make Peace* provides another tool for ADF professionals to consider when responding to future strategic and operational challenges.

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NOTES

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- Shaping Operations:** Establish conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the population (including local leaders) and terrain: see US Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, Government Printing Office: Washington DC, February 2011, pp. 5-9
- Phase Zero Operations:** Executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behaviour of [all stakeholders]. US Defense Department, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Staff: Washington DC, December 2008, p. GL-6; also Charles F. Wald, 'The Phase Zero Campaign', *Joint Force Quarterly*, October 2006, pp. 72-5.
- ³ Department of Defence, *Adaptive Campaigning 09 - Army's Future Land Operating Concept*, Australian Army: Canberra, 2009, pp. xi-xii. The five mutually reinforcing and interdependent lines of operations are: Joint Land Combat; Population Protection; Information Actions; Population Support; and Indigenous Capacity Building.

Book reviews

The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard

John Blaxland
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2014
ISBN: 978-1-1070-4365-7
434 pages, \$41.95



Reviewed by John Donovan

John Blaxland's book covers the period from late 1972 until late 2007, from the election of the Whitlam Government to the defeat of the Howard Government.

He focuses on the many and varied operations conducted by the Army in that period. These ranged from disaster relief in Australia and overseas, through security operations and logistic support for major events in Australia, to support in some 'faraway places with strange sounding names' for the UN (an organisation Blaxland regards, probably correctly, as displaying 'corruption and incompetence'; that said, unfortunately, it is all that the world has at the moment). They also included significant military operations in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. Except when casualties occurred, many of the more extended operations received little publicity in Australia.

Against this backdrop, Blaxland comments on the development of the Army as it moved from a focus on divisional operations to operations by battalion groups, which included combat support and combat services support elements from across the Army. Later, the structure evolved further, to unit-level combined arms battle groups. There remained, however, a tendency for armoured units in particular to prefer to exercise *en masse*, even though armour was actually required to deploy for operations in smaller groupings.

In his discussions, Blaxland uses 'Five Reasons for Prowess' to benchmark the 'Army's journey of rehabilitation since 1972', namely individual training; collective field training; regimental or corps identities; ties with close allies and regional partners; and links with society. In each chapter, he assesses the Army's actions against these benchmarks.

A key change in the period was the establishment of an integrated Australian Defence Organisation. However, as former CDF General John Baker commented, the early stages of this process left the ADF essentially leaderless. This deficiency was not resolved until the establishment of the CDF's position as a commander replaced the position of Chief of Defence Force Staff, which had itself replaced the position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

According to Blaxland, a major failing during much of the period under discussion was the Army's lack of a systematic approach to passing lessons learned on operations through the training system to the rest of the Army. Blaxland emphasises frequently that institutional arrangements did not capture lessons learned and then disseminate them. Force structure and procedural changes were implemented tardily. There was a continuing 'lamentable pattern' of not using warning time to prepare forces adequately. Ultimately, however, the Army implemented an 'Army learning environment'—and while perfection will never be achieved, major improvements have occurred.

Blaxland laments the practice of using special forces for operations that once would have been carried out by standard infantry battalions. He blames the concern to minimise casualties that has marked many recent operations for this practice but suggests that it might be changing, with recognition developing that many current tasks can and must become the norm for all land forces.


While Blaxland makes much of the concern to minimise casualties, he also acknowledges that low casualty rates helped to maintain support for the Army's activities. An anonymous retired senior officer, quoted by Blaxland on a number of occasions, criticises this 'casualty cringe' as showing a 'lack of [government] courage', albeit his comment perhaps under-rates the importance of continuing community support for deployments.

One of the less well known changes mentioned by Blaxland is the greater use of Reserves, particularly during the last decade, both on overseas deployments and within Australia. Using Reserve elements in places like the Solomon Islands allowed Regular forces to focus on sustained operations in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, although Reserves also served in some of these.

This is an interesting book, though perhaps a little less space could have been given to some of the minor activities, in favour of more analysis of the changing Army.

Lost Boys of Anzac – First to Join, First to Fight, First to Die

Peter Stanley
New South Books: Sydney, 2014
ISBN: 978-1-7422-3397-0
368 pages, \$34.99



Reviewed by Lex McAulay

Dr Peter Stanley has presented another 'out of the ordinary' subject: the men who landed in the first wave at Gallipoli and were killed on that day. The title is from J.M. Barrie's *Peter Pan* and the 'lost boys' who never grew up.

There are 101 men in this category, and Stanley's book is the result of a tremendous research effort through official military records, civilian association and school records, and newspaper archives across Australia and the UK.

In a book of this nature, there is little of a cheerful nature. But what does stand out from the record of loss and grief is the wonderful effort made by the staff of AIF Base Records in Melbourne to account for every person killed, wounded or missing through the war years. It also went beyond this, answering communications from families and friends, and passing on such information as arrived from military and civilian sources overseas. This effort was complemented by that of the civilian volunteers in Egypt, Malta and the UK who visited hospitals and convalescent institutions to interview patients and staff, armed with lists of missing personnel.

As well as examining the 'lost boys' of Anzac, the book is a window into the Australia of 1914, the strongly Anglo-Saxon-Celtic society, the communications standards of the time, and the itinerant nature of the labouring class. It seems that many joined because of the drought at the time, which had resulted in loss of employment in many areas.

Although units were raised on a local basis, men from all over Australia, and from New Zealand and the UK, enlisted wherever they happened to be. Some families did not know a sibling had enlisted, let alone that he was killed or missing at Gallipoli. With what now seems an obvious lack of appreciation of what enlistment meant, some men gave their next-of-kin as a friend or even the landlady of their boarding house. Often these people had no idea of the family details of the individual in question.

Given the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic society of 1914, many of the same family names were repeated time and again in the records. Later, when investigations were made into missing men, honest but incorrect recollections were given about their sighting on hospital ships or in hospitals in Cairo or elsewhere, when in fact it was a different man but with the same family name.

The brutal fact remained that if a man was killed or wounded forward of what became the Anzac trench-line, there often was no solid record of his fate. The Turks made no effort to assist enemy wounded and, in 1919, Charles Bean was rightly contemptuous of the Turkish claim that Australian wounded had fired on them and had to be killed. Examination of the area in 1919 showed clusters of unburied remains in dips and gullies, untouched since 1915.

The first parts of the book examine the recruitment processes and what was recorded of the men, as well as their training and travel to Egypt, and their experiences there. It also covers the landing in Gallipoli, and what is known about the 'lost boys' on the first day of the campaign. Being in the first wave ashore, and with orders to get inland to the third ridge, at least four of the 'lost boys' are known to have reached that ridge.


The latter parts of the book examine the investigations into the fate of the men, the false trails, the constant hopeful letters, all in the respectful terms of the time when dealing with officialdom, and the despair when years passed with no accurate information available. The final section relates how the men were remembered through the years, sometimes with an annual notice in a newspaper, until the family members themselves eventually passed away.

Peter Stanley is unfair in blaming the failure on day one, and so the entire campaign, onto the Australian generals and brigadiers for not getting their units to the assigned ridge. He does relate the confusion and loss of unit control in the landing, made at dawn in a different location to that planned. Once boats reached the beach, those aboard were sent left or right to cope with perceived threats, regardless of the plan. In the confusion, commanders were unable to prevent their battalions dissolving and it took days for units to come back together.

Lost Boys of Anzac is a strong message about the cost of military service in the early years of the First World War to a section of our society. Regrettably, it soon was to be outnumbered by those families who lost men in the later campaigns of 1916-18.

***From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan:
British military intelligence operations,
ethics and human rights***

Jon Moran
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-4094-2897-8
180 pages, UK£60



Reviewed by Dr Ian Wing

This very timely book covers the changing role and effectiveness of British military intelligence since the 1970s. Its sweep commences in the grimy streets of Belfast and then takes the reader to the dangerous and complex politics of Basra in southern Iraq, and from there into the brutal green zone around Sangin in Helmand province. It provides an enthralling tale of determined hard work, often with inadequate resources, resulting in very mixed outcomes.

Jon Moran, an academic and researcher from the University of Leicester, is well qualified to review this process and make these assessments. His earlier works have covered British intelligence, security, policing, crime, terrorism and corruption.

Moran introduces his subject matter with a reminder that British Army intelligence had performed very well in the counterinsurgency operations in Malaya (1948-60) and Kenya (1952-60). The defeats of communist terrorists in Malaya and the Mau Mau in Kenya owed much to the Intelligence Corps and its close relationships with the security and police services.

He then sets his scope as being primarily concerned with what he calls the operational level (within which he includes the tactical level) rather than the strategic level. But when strategic intelligence failures contributed to operational failures, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, Moran points this out. He sees intelligence as being concerned with violence, either preventing it or making it more effective. And he judges the effectiveness of intelligence against the benchmark that it must reduce uncertainty, while acknowledging that it is usually incomplete with no intrinsic ability to guarantee victory.

Moran also introduces the topics of ethics and human rights, both of which have rightfully constrained military intelligence operations. Each of the three armed conflicts reviewed in the book contains evidence of the tendency to take a utilitarian approach to intelligence collection that can, at times, override ethics. Thus he considers tactical questioning, detention, interrogation, torture, death in custody, unlawful targeting and unlawful killing.

Questions of 'dirty hands', such as whether the ends justify the means, are frequently faced by military intelligence professionals. In some cases, doing good may require harming the innocent, which is euphemistically referred to as 'collateral damage'. Judgments about right and wrong must be considered using the concepts of proportionality and effectiveness. These are difficult issues which have no easy answers but they must not be avoided if we seek realistic solutions.

Two themes dominate the remainder of the book. The first is that military capability tends to wax and wane over time. So the skills developed in an armed conflict tend to erode until the next time they are required. And even when armed conflicts follow in close succession, each armed conflict is different, with new adversaries, requiring new approaches to intelligence. The second theme is that intelligence always operates in the context of the operational environment. This includes political pressure to accomplish more with less; strategic-level underestimation of actual enemy strengths; the need to maintain interoperability with allies who use unethical methods; and the 'can-do' attitude of under-resourced military forces facing very dangerous adversaries.

Moran devotes a chapter in turn to Northern Ireland (1969-2007), Iraq (2003-09) and Afghanistan (2001-02 and 2006-present). Northern Ireland saw the rise of the close relationship between military intelligence and special forces, particularly between the 14th Intelligence and Security Company (also known as the 'Det') and the Special Air Service. Intelligence-led operations, using agents and informants in close cooperation with security and police services, were perfected at this time.

In Iraq, the operating environment was more dangerous and foreign than Northern Ireland, and infinitely more complicated. Instead of Christian sectarian conflict, within the relatively-familiar British Isles, British military intelligence faced Muslim sectarian conflict in Arabian Iraq. One maxim of successful counterinsurgency is that it requires sufficient combat power to dominate the area of operations. This was not achieved in southern Iraq and so military intelligence became focused on force protection rather than enabling proactive operations. And yet, the close relationship between military intelligence and special forces provided a clue for future success.

As the situation in Iraq became more dire, the Joint Special Operations Command, led by US General Stanley McChrystal, began intensive intelligence-driven operations aimed at the 'decapitation' of extremist forces. The traditional intelligence cycle was greatly compressed, by a combination of improved intelligence sharing, the fusion of all available intelligence and wide dissemination, enabling the targeting process to occur within hours. Ultimately, the targeting phases of 'find, fix and finish' could occur within a 24-hour cycle between successive night raids. This has since become known as 'industrial counter-terrorism'. British special forces and military intelligence, along with other close allies, joined these operations. Moran argues that this was a sea-change:

Intelligence operations in Basra were limited by a number of crucial strategic and operational factors, and as the intelligence triumph of Northern Ireland fell away in time, intelligence in the south was revealed as limited in the extreme. In contrast 'industrial counter-terrorism' further north—which was predicated on focused collection of intelligence, a concentration of military power and rolling operations—seemed to show a way forward.

British operations in Afghanistan are discussed in two parts. The first relates to the successful initial invasion, which involved special forces, notably the Special Air Service and Special Boat Service, and the Royal Marines. The second relates to the prolonged campaign of counterinsurgency, principally in Helmand province in the Taliban-dominated south. This campaign revisited the problems of Basra, with inadequate combat forces and very limited intelligence support facing very determined insurgents. Here, as in Basra, the complex task of developing human intelligence sources (agents) was made more difficult by the high-threat environment and lack of troops. British Army units fought numerous engagements with great bravery but the Taliban proved very resilient. Once again, Joint Special Operations Command decapitation operations provided an effective method of reducing enemy combat power, and British special forces and military intelligence were integrated within them. However, as Moran points out, numerous ethical issues were raised by the process.


Moran concludes this work with a short chapter summarising the experience of British military intelligence over four decades of armed conflict. He also refers to the successful 2011 campaign to overthrow Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi. This campaign saw special forces and military intelligence back in action before the prolonged war in Afghanistan had ended. Fortunately, this deployment was shorter and perhaps it will become the desired model for future conflicts.

The book contains insights that will resonate strongly with Australian military professionals, particularly those with operational experience in our own successive campaigns in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. It is an outstanding book, highly recommended for those interested in military intelligence, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism and special forces. It also has much to offer for strategic policy-makers, operational planners, military historians, and students of ethics and human rights.

Vietnam: The complete story of the Australian war

Bruce Davies with Gary McKay
Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest, 2014
ISBN: 978-1-7433-1559-0
704 pages, \$55

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles



In spite of the ambitious title, this is not the complete story of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War. It would be too much to expect that such coverage could be contained in just one book, even for a book as voluminous as this. Rather, the authors have chosen to concentrate on particular aspects such as the higher levels of political and military decision making that led to Australia's increasing commitment to the war through to the eventual withdrawal from hostilities in 1971. It is more the story of how Australia's involvement as a nation evolved rather than as a blow by blow description of tactical operations as is found in the official histories. This is not to say that such operations were totally ignored. Rather, the discussion is selective and only occasionally goes into the detail to be found in the official histories.

The stage is set with a discussion of Vietnamese myths about the formation of what we now know as Vietnam. It quickly progresses from there, through the time of the Chinese Han dynasty, to French colonisation, Japanese occupation, the war against the French following World War II and the division of the country into North and South Vietnam. The inter-governmental and diplomatic exchanges that saw Australia first committed are reviewed as are the relationships between the Australian military commanders and their American counterparts. It is notable for the use of Vietnamese sources describing the conflict from their point of view. As may be expected, these can be at considerable variance from the Australian record.

The bulk of the book is devoted to discussing military matters and operations in which Australians were involved. While some coverage is given to the RAN and RAAF, the emphasis is on ground operations. In turn this concentrates on the Task Force at Nui Dat and the Training Team in various parts of the country. Other aspects of the ground war, such as the role played by the Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau, are given limited coverage.

Some events are examined in detail. The laying of the Dat Do minefield, and the subsequent casualties when the mines were lifted and used against the allied forces by the Viet Cong, is frequently mentioned. The vexed question of honours and awards is addressed in some detail. The battle at Long Tan is dissected at length whereas the battles for Coral and Balmoral are covered in a few pages. The intention does not seem to be to allocate more significance to one event over the other but instead to make a particular point. In the case of Long Tan, for instance, it was the lack of knowledge of the enemy in the early days of the Task Force and its lack of combat power.

This lack of combat power is one of several threads developed throughout the book. Although this was alleviated by the arrival of the tanks and the addition of a third battalion to the Task Force, the Australians remained reliant on American airpower as well as medium and heavy artillery. Another thread was the cultural and language problems that were never overcome and which were exacerbated by the continuous turnover every twelve months of units and personnel. A lack of properly trained junior leaders is suggested as being one consequence of rapidly expanding the army. Major General A.L. McDonald, the Australian Force Commander and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemingly was of this opinion. It is also one explanation offered for the sometimes mediocre performance of South Vietnamese army units.

When the occasion demands, there is no pulling of punches in levelling criticism at politicians and commanders and their decisions. Colonel Serong's activities, and Brigadier Graham's decision to have the Dat Do minefield laid, are quite critically examined. Even the relevancy to the conditions in Vietnam


of the Australian's jungle warfare expertise developed in Malaya is challenged. Frequent reference is made to what the Americans saw as the Australian's lack of aggressiveness, but which the Australians saw as the pursuit of pacification.

This is quite a large book comprising nearly 700 pages. It has a glossary, end notes and index that could in themselves make a small book. There is a large number of good quality black and white photos as well as several line maps of ordinary quality. I feel that more attention could have been paid to these maps as a reader unfamiliar with the area would perhaps have difficulty in following the narrative from those provided. The book itself is well written and, although a big read, is easy to follow.

In the writing of this book, the authors have raised several issues that warrant further consideration and from which there may be lessons to be learnt. It would be interesting to see a discussion of the relevancy of the issues raised to conflicts in which Australia has been involved since Vietnam so as to see if we have learnt anything from them. In that time, were we better able to handle the language and cultural differences than we did in Vietnam? Were there the same deficiencies in junior leadership in the all-regular forces deployed post-Vietnam compared to those that were suggested in the rapidly expanded Vietnam era army? Did these forces suffer from a similar lack of combat power that sometimes inhibited the scope of operations in Vietnam? If reading this book leads to asking and answering these questions, then it will be a worthwhile exercise.

The Unseen War: Allied air power and the takedown of Saddam Hussein

Benjamin S. Lambeth
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-6125-1311-9
435 pages, US\$59.95



Reviewed by Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd)

In 2003, in the race to publish the story of combat operations in and over Iraq after the conclusion of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there was little serious analysis undertaken because much information was either still classified or just not available on the public record. Most books simply listed a chronology of events and made some summary judgments about what happened. None was able to predict the unintended consequences of the war which still reverberate today. This book by former RAND analyst Dr Ben Lambeth takes a more critical view, given ten years since the event, allowing some measure of context and a refining of our understanding of what actually happened.

The Unseen War is divided into six chapters which cover the road to war, the air offensive, the allies, key accomplishments, problems, and a short commentary on the future of air warfare. I found the book incredibly detailed in all areas of who did what, when and with what, making the book a suitable reference for serious students of air power application. Chapter 3 goes into some detail about the allied contribution, including Australia, although the date of Australia's first involvement was earlier than Lambeth claims.

On reflection, the 'problems encountered' chapter is perhaps the most useful. It provides an honest appraisal of what went wrong and why, and through such lessons we can learn. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book as it covers off the problems discussed by General Michael 'Buzz' Moseley, the Combined Air Component Commander, in his post-campaign report. Lambeth also spends some pages on the problem of fratricide and on the failure of the Apache helicopter deep-attack mission north of Karbala, which he puts down to discontinuity between air force and army cultures. The V Corps Army

commander did not include the air component in the planning and execution of the mission, resulting in near disaster. It would appear that the US armed services are still not quite joint. Other problems such as tanker support, timely battle damage assessment and coalition information sharing are discussed and continue to resonate.


The review copy of *The Unseen War* was a paperback in slightly larger than A5 format with 435 pages including extensive notes, bibliography and index. Twenty six mainly aircraft photos grace the centre pages and the text includes maps and charts to illustrate specific points that benefit from illustration. While the matt paper is of relatively low quality and the print font fairly small, the text is easy to read and well written. Readers will note the density of technical information and can skip through if this becomes tiresome.

Dr Lambeth is no stranger to Australian audiences and readers alike. He is a regular speaker at RAAF Air Power Conferences and is widely published here as well as in his native US. He is also extremely well regarded for his accurate and astute commentary and, while a confirmed air power advocate, he is not an air force advocate per se.

I consider this book as essential reading for students of air power and the 2003 Iraq campaign. I note that 'Chapter 5 – Problems Encountered' is now on the Australian Command and Staff College required reading list for their study of the campaign, as it is perhaps the best review of air power in that conflict published to date. Highly recommended.

102 Days of War: how Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban survived 2001

Yaniv Barzilai
Potomac Books: Dulles US, 2014
ISBN: 978-1-6123-4533-8
167 pages, US\$24.95



Reviewed by Dr Russell Parkin, Australian Defence College

Yaniv Barzilai's *102 Days of War* is a very useful addition to the already extensive literature on America's war in Afghanistan. This short, very readable book is a case study of US policy and decision making during the first crucial months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in late 2001.

Barzilai, a junior US diplomat, describes in detail how unfocused policy and poor decision making at the highest levels in the Bush Administration frequently resulted in confused planning and execution of military operations in Afghanistan. The work's main theme is the succession of human and institutional failures that occurred at all levels throughout the US chain of command. The cumulative effect of these blunders was the situation that allowed Osama bin Laden, much of his al Qaeda organisation and many of his Taliban allies to escape across the Pakistan border after they had been trapped in the rugged Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.

102 Days of War draws exclusively on open-source materials, including biographies, memoirs and government reports. Barzilai's research also included a series of interviews conducted with many of the main political and military personalities involved in the events he describes. In the final part of the book, there is a section on sources and methodology that provides not only a valuable list of the works consulted but also sets them in their political, historical and social context.

When read in conjunction with the 'Author's Note', the sources and methodology section presents the reader with an interesting and important sub-text to the main narrative of *102 Days of War*. Together, these two sections detail the problems Barzilai encountered in researching the book and then getting

official clearance for its publication. An extensive 11-month review of the manuscript was carried out by officials from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House National Security Staff to ensure it did not contain any classified material. Much of the material redacted by these agencies was already freely available in the public domain but, after a lengthy appeals process, the Department of Defense upheld all of its objections. Barzilai was then forced to alter the manuscript in order to comply with Defense's directives, while retaining the integrity of his narrative.


Barzilai concludes his Author's Note by stating his belief in the importance of protecting classified information. However, he caveats this with the assertion that

... rigorous historical scholarship is a universal good that can inform leaders about difficult decisions and help them to avoid the mistakes of the past. In this regard, the US government also has a keen interest in encouraging its employees to read and write about history. And who better to do this than the military officers, defense officials, intelligence professionals, and diplomats who are on the front lines of America's foreign policy and national security every day?

There can be no better recommendation for reading *102 Days of War* than this statement of the author's primary motivation for his study.

Australia and the Vietnam War

Peter Edwards
NewSouth Publishing: Sydney, 2014
ISBN: 978-1-7422-3274-4
338 pages, \$49.99



Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Scott, Australian Army

In Robert Strassler's edited history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recorded the Athenians saying 'the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in'. In Professor Peter Edwards's very well written book, *Australia and the Vietnam War*, it is shown that Australia too was motivated by fear, honour and interest in its involvement in the Vietnam War. Fear, honour and interest have always been, and are to this day, the common motivators in a nation's defence policy and strategy.

In *Australia and the Vietnam War*, Edwards seeks to explain 'how and why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War, how Australian forces fought the war, how the war affected Australian society and politics, and how "Vietnam" and "the Vietnam era" left enduring legacies on Australian politics, society, strategy and diplomacy'. The author successfully and succinctly achieves these aims and, in doing so, has written a book that should be the starting point for any study of Australia's commitment to Vietnam. *Australia and the Vietnam War* puts Australia's involvement in the conflict in the context of Australia's relations with Southeast Asia in the decades after the end of the Second World War. Contextualising in this way allows the reader to comprehend the origins of contemporary Australian defence policy—which will be useful to those without memories of the Cold War.

Professor Edwards is an Australian 'official historian' and general editor of the nine volumes of *Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975*. This experience has allowed him to heavily draw from the *Official History*, as well as more recent publications and commentaries of the Vietnam War. The resulting book is, therefore, very well researched and benefits from unrestricted access to official sources. At the end of the book, Edwards provides 13 pages of annotated 'further reading' that will enable any keen student of military history to further develop their knowledge and understanding of the Vietnam War from several perspectives, including in the context and from the perspective of our allies as well as from Australian soldiers.

Australia and the Vietnam War provides a very good study of the relationship between the Australian Government and its Defence Force, as well as a comprehensive insight into the decision making of politicians and military leaders. The sometimes poor relationship or perceived poor advice provided by the individual Services and Service Ministers, as well as the then Chiefs of Staff Committee (led by a Chairman who did not command the armed forces), eventually led Prime Minister Gough Whitlam to direct the 'Tange reforms'. These reforms created the modern Department of Defence and the ADF, aimed at ensuring the government-of-the-day received better advice to formulate higher defence policy. Edwards does very well to extrapolate the higher-level effects of the Vietnam War on the way in which Australia approaches defence policy and strategy to this day.

As a reader born after the Vietnam War ended and with limited memories of the Cold War, a key revelation from *Australia and the Vietnam War* may be that the politics, policy and security situation in the 1960s were similar to that of the past decade. There is still a communist 'threat' in Asia, although its nature has changed in the past two decades, and this threat has been joined by global Islamic extremist terrorism. West Papua and Papua New Guinea are still unstable, and Australia is bound by most of the same defence treaties and agreements that existed in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, Australia has joined the US and Great Britain in two wars that have not been a direct or immediate threat to Australia. As such, this book allows the reader to gain an understanding of how Australia approaches foreign policy and defence policy in the region and globally.

Australia and the Vietnam War puts contemporary defence and security issues into context. The longstanding preoccupation with a threat from Indonesia is explained, showing how a strategic assessment by the Defence Committee in 1963-64, in light of Indonesia's policy of *Konfrontasi*, described Indonesia as the 'only direct threat to Australia and its territories'. Despite this threat, Australia required the support of Great Britain and the US for security in the region, which led to Australia's involvement in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam in part to stop the perceived 'domino effect' of the spread of communism.

Edwards' book clearly steps through the metamorphosis of Australian defence policy since the Second World War. Commencing with Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies' 'Forward Defence', where Australia heavily relied on Great Britain and the US presence in Asia, the book moves to Whitlam's self-reliant continental 'Defence of Australia' at the end of the Vietnam war. Edwards then summarises the subsequent years, through Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's 'self-reliant defence of Australia in an alliance context' towards the present. The book gives a clear and concise synopsis of this policy metamorphosis.

Overall, Edwards has produced a very good book that should be read by anyone involved in the defence of Australia, whether they are uniformed members, defence civilians, politicians or bureaucrats, in order for them to understand the origins of modern Australian defence policy and strategy. *Australia and the Vietnam War* should also be the starting point for any study of Australia's commitment to the Vietnam War and other Southeast Asian conflicts. The book succinctly summarises nearly 40 years of Australian defence history, clearly capturing key events without getting lost in too much detail.