



OPSUM/SINCREP

OP TEVARA SIN VII

FROM: B66

OPSUM TVSN-B-06-01 AS AT DTG: 10 0500DE JUN 10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

ALL TIMINGS: LOCAL (DE)

SER	SUBJECT	DETAIL
1	TYPE OF OPERATION	LEVEL 1 INS INTERDICTION, CIED, INS NETWORK DISRUPTION AND POPULATION SECURITY
2	TARGET	s33(a)(ii) THREAT GROUP
3	DTG OF OPERATION	09 2300DE – 10 0500DE JUN 10
4	LOCATION OF OPERATION (GRID & DESCRIPTION)	MNBTK HLZ s33(a)(ii) 42S TA s33(a)(ii) HLZ s33(a) 42S TA 3725 6130 HLZ s33(a)(ii) 48 42S TA s33(a)(ii) TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3707 5940* TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3768 5961* TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3752 5986 TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3673 6039 TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3698 6111 s33(MGRS 42 STA 371 594
5	SUMMARY OF OPERATION	B66 DEPARTED MNB-TK TONIGHT s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) INTO THE FOLLOWING HLZ’S: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• HLZ s33(a)(ii) 42S TA s33(a)(ii)• HLZ s33(a) 42S TA 3725 6130• HLZ s33(a)(ii) 42S TA s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]





		<p>s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p> <p>3()</p>
6	ISAF PERSONNEL INVOLVED	TF66, s33(a)(ii)
7	OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES INVOLVED	s33(a)(ii)
8	FR MILITARY HARDWARE	s33(a)(ii) , s33(a)(ii) , s33(a) , AND s33(a)(ii)
9	FR CASUALTIES/EVACUEES	NIL
10	ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED	NIL
11	ENEMY MILITARY HARDWARE	NIL
12	ENEMY CASUALTIES/EVACUEES/ CAPTURED PERSONS	NIL
13	CIVILIANS INVOLVED	137
14	CIVPOL/PROVOST INVOLVEMENT	NIL.
15	MEDIA INVOLVEMENT/INFORMED	NIL.
G16	ACTION TO DATE (TO INCLUDE WHEN/WHERE/TO WHOM THE HANDOVER OF THE CAPTURED PERSON OCCURRED)	NIL
17	FUTURE INTENTIONS	OP TEVARA SIN 7 WILL CONTINUE IAW s33(a) AND CONTINUE THE CLEARANCE OF TAI'S AND THE CONDUCT OF PCO AND COE.
18	EFFECT DESIRED	B66 HAS EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED INS SAFE-HAVENS IN CHENARTU SWK AND HAS MADE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO HAMKARI . THE INFLUENCE OF THE INS HAS BEEN UNDERMINED AND THE INFLUENCE OF





		s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] <ul style="list-style-type: none">[REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED] [REDACTED]
6	ISAF PERSONNEL INVOLVED	TF66, s33(a)(ii)
7	OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES INVOLVED	NIL



8	FR MILITARY HARDWARE	s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED], s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED], s33(a) s33 AND s33(a)(ii).
9	FR CASUALTIES/EVACUEES	NIL
10	ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED	30 APPROX
11	ENEMY MILITARY HARDWARE	NIL
12	ENEMY CASUALTIES/EVACUEES/ CAPTURED PERSONS	6 EKIA.
13	CIVILIANS INVOLVED	NIL
14	CIVPOL/PROVOST INVOLVEMENT	NIL.
15	MEDIA INVOLVEMENT/INFORMED	NIL.
G16	ACTION TO DATE (TO INCLUDE WHEN/WHERE/TO WHOM THE HANDOVER OF THE CAPTURED PERSON OCCURRED)	NIL
17	FUTURE INTENTIONS	THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE TO PLANNED s33(a) HOWEVER OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE WITH THE POPULATION WILL BE LIMITED AS A NUMBER OF LN, IN PARTICULAR WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE LEFT THE AREA TO THE N AND NE. THIS C/S WILL AGAIN ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE WITH LN TOMORROW AND CONDUCT FURTHER COE PRIOR TO s33(a) RE-POSTURING TO THE N IN TOMORROWS s33(.
18	EFFECT DESIRED	B66 HAS EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED INS SAFE-HAVENS IN CHENARTU SWK AND HAS MADE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO HAMKARI . THE INFLUENCE OF THE INS HAS BEEN UNDERMINED AND THE INFLUENCE OF GIROA HAS BEEN ENHANCED ENABLING FUTURE CF / GIROA ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN KANDAHAR.
19	s33(a)(ii)	s33(a)
20	DETAINED	SEVEN (7) TRANSFERRED TO MNBTK
21	DOCEX/CELLEX/MEDEX	NIL.
22	EXPLOSIVES/WEAPONS	NIL.
23	REMARKS	INITIAL INDICATIONS FROM COE CONDUCTED THIS MORNING INDICATED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE TENSION BETWEEN THE INS AND THE LOCAL POPULATION WHO HAVE OPENLY INDICATED THAT THEY RESENT THE TB FOR STEALING THEIR FOOD WHILE OTHERS HAVE HAD TO GO INTO DEBT TO



		<p>SUPPORT THEIR DEMANDS.</p> <p>s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]. THE THREAT LEVEL IN THE AREA IS VERY HIGH. THERE IS BOTH A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INS IN AND AROUND THE AREA AND A LEVEL OF C2 AND CO-ORDINATION THAT HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN OBSERVED.</p> <p>THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUAL PROBING FROM FIRST LIGHT PARTICULARLY OF THE s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] AND ALL POSNS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY MULTIPLE POSNS WITH BOTH SAF AND ROCKET FIRE INCLUDING A SUSTAINED HEAVY TIC THAT LASTED FOR APPROX 40MIN. THE INS ARE CURRENTLY USING THE W APPROACHES AND GREEN BELT TO INFIL AND EXFIL THE AREA. s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] IS STILL s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] AND IS EXPECTING A FURTHER ATTACK AND PROBING THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT.</p> <p>THERE WAS NO CIVCAS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, ROE OR TARGETING ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THIS OPERATION AND WAS CONDUCTED IAW THE DIRECTION GIVEN IN THE s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]. THIS OPERATION IS ONGOING.</p>
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		PLANNING FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE OP.
	EFFECT DESIRED	B66 HAS EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED INS SAFE-HAVENS IN CHENARTU SWK AND HAS MADE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO HAMKARI . THE INFLUENCE OF THE INS HAS BEEN UNDERMINED AND THE INFLUENCE OF GIROA HAS BEEN ENHANCED ENABLING FUTURE CF / GIROA ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN KANDAHAR.
19	s33(a)(ii)	s33(.
20	DETAINED	NIL;
21	DOCEX/CELLEX/MEDEX	NIL.
22	EXPLOSIVES/WEAPONS	NIL.
23	REMARKS	<p>s33(a)(ii)</p> <p>INS ACTIVITY WITHIN CHENARTU WAS AT A REDUCED LEVEL IN COMPARISON. PCO ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN LIMITED IN EFFECT DUE TO THE NUMBERS OF LN'S WHO HAVE NOW LEFT THE AREA. FURTHER DEPARTURES WERE NOTED THROUGHOUT THE DAY. s33(a)(ii)</p> <p>THEY HAD COMPLETED RESUPPLY IN THE EARLY MORNING AND WERE GOING TO ATEMPT ANOTHER COORDINATED ENGAGEMENT. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF s33(HAVE REDUCED THE INS ABILITY TO MASS NUMBERS IN CHENARTU AS THEY HAD DONE THE PREVIOUS DAYS. FOLLOWING THE ACTIVITY IVO TIZAK s33(a)(ii)</p> <p>IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA.</p> <p>s33(a)(ii)</p>





		<p>s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>THERE WAS NO CIVCAS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, ROE OR TARGETING ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THIS OPERATION AND WAS CONDUCTED IAW THE DIRECTION GIVEN IN THE s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. THIS OPERATION IS ONGOING.</p>
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OPSUM/SINCREP

OP TEVARA SIN 7

FROM: B66

OPSUM TVSN-B-07-04 AS AT DTG: 13 0500DE JUN 10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

ALL TIMINGS: LOCAL (DE)

SER	SUBJECT	DETAIL
1	TYPE OF OPERATION	LEVEL 2 INS INTERDICTION, CIED, INS NETWORK DISRUPTION AND POPULATION SECURITY
2	TARGET	s33(a)(ii) THREAT GROUP
3	DTG OF OPERATION	12 0500DE – 13 0500DE JUN 10
4	LOCATION OF OPERATION (GRID & DESCRIPTION)	s33(a)(ii) TAI s33(a)(ii) IVO MGRS 42S TA 370 611. s33(a)(ii) ON ROUTE TO s33(a)(ii) EAST AND WEST OF CHENARTU/ADAMKHAN KALAY VALLEY s3 IVOMGRS 42S TA 369 617 s3 IVO MGRS 42S TA 372 609 TAI s33(a) MGRS 42S TA 3673 6039 HLZ s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA s33(a)(ii) HLZ s33(a) MGRS 42S TA 3725 6130 SPOTTER IVO MGRS 42STA 3714 6093
5	SUMMARY OF OPERATION	DURING 12 JUN 10 REPORTING INDICATED s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii). CONCURRENTLY LN STARTED TO INFIL BACK INTO THE CHENARTU GREENBELT FM THE SOUTH. FOR THE REMAINDER OF 12 JUN 10 , s33(a) s33(a) CONDUCTED A SHURA IVO TAI s33(a)(ii) THE RESULTS OF THE SHURA INCL: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• COE WITH 9 X LN AND• 9 X BIOMETRIC ENROLLMENTS. THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERICS FM THE SHURA INCL; <ul style="list-style-type: none">• LN'S WERE FEARFUL OF CF TGTING BY HELO AND OF CF ARRESTING LN



		<p>FAMS;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE LN'S INDICATED THAT THE LN FAM'S WERE SCARED OF BEING DETAINED AND HAD MOVED NORTH AND NORTH EAST OF CHENARTU (TO VIC SAR KALAY AND MABANG KALAY (LOCS TBC)). ALL, LN'S INDICATED APPROX 70-80 LN FAM'S HAD FLED; AND • TOWARDS THE END OF THE SHURA THEY FELT SAFE ENOUGH AROUND CF TO ASK TO SEE IF THEY COULD COERCE THEIR RELATIVES TO RETURN TO THE VILLAGES. <p>s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]</p> <p>s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]</p>
6	ISAF PERSONNEL INVOLVED	TF66, s33(a)(ii)
7	OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES INVOLVED	s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii)
8	FR MILITARY HARDWARE	s33(a)(ii)
9	FR CASUALTIES/EVACUEES	NIL
10	ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED	NIL
11	ENEMY MILITARY HARDWARE	NIL
12	ENEMY CASUALTIES/EVACUEES/ CAPTURED PERSONS	NIL
13	CIVILIANS INVOLVED	NIL
14	CIVPOL/PROVOST INVOLVEMENT	NIL.
15	MEDIA INVOLVEMENT/INFORMED	NIL.
G16	ACTION TO DATE (TO INCLUDE WHEN/WHERE/TO WHOM THE HANDOVER OF THE	NIL



	<p>MOVEMENT. AT THIS STAGE IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS CURRENTLY NO GIROA PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THE POPULATION ALSO APPEARS TO BE VERY POSITIVE TO THE PRESENCE OF s33(a) WHO ARE WELL RECEIVED BY THE LOCAL POPULATION</p> <p>IT IS ASSESSED THAT THERE IS LITTLE PERMINANT INS PRESENCE IN AND AROUND CHENATU WITH A MAJORITY OF INS ACTIVITY INFILTRATING INTO THE AREA FROM EITHER THE SOUTH, SOUTH WEST AND WEST. THIS IS MOST LIKELY FROM SPIN KECHA WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE CENTRE OF THE INS PRESENCE IN THE AREA.</p> <p>IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT CHENARTU IS AN AREA THAT THE INS MOVE INTO TO GAIN FOOD AND SUPPLIES FROM THE LOCALS.</p> <p>THE LARGE NUMBER OF INS IN COMPARISON TO THE RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF FAMILIES IN THE AREA COULD EXPLAIN THE EXTENT OF THE DEPLETION OF FOOD, ETC AND THE REASON FOR THE RESENTMENT TOWARD THE TB.</p> <p>LN'S STILL REMAIN FEARFUL OF TB RETRIBUTION. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN FURTHER INFORMATION GAINED INDICATING A LARGE INS PRESENCE IN AND AROUND LWAR CHAGNEY.</p> <p>THERE WAS NO CIVCAS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, ROE OR TARGETING ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THIS OPERATION AND WAS CONDUCTED IAW THE DIRECTION GIVEN IN THE s33(a)(ii) . THIS OPERATION IS ONGOING.</p>
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OPSUM/SINCREP

OP TEVARA SIN VII

FROM: B66

OPSUM TVSN-B-06-01 AS AT DTG: 14 0500DE JUN 10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

ALL TIMINGS: LOCAL (DE)

SER	SUBJECT	DETAIL
1	TYPE OF OPERATION	LEVEL 1 INS INTERDICTION, CIED, INS NETWORK DISRUPTION AND POPULATION SECURITY
2	TARGET	s33(a)(ii) THREAT GROUP
3	DTG OF OPERATION	13 0500DE – 14 0500DE JUN 10
4	LOCATION OF OPERATION (GRID & DESCRIPTION)	s33(a)(ii) TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 370 611. TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3590 6194 TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS42S TA 3541 6321 TAI s33(a) MGRS 42S TA s33(a)(ii) TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 349 564 s33(a) MGRS42STA 349 632
5	SUMMARY OF OPERATION	s33(a)(ii) [Redacted text block containing multiple lines of obscured information]





	CAPTURED PERSONS	
13	CIVILIANS INVOLVED	288
14	CIVPOL/PROVOST INVOLVEMENT	NIL.
15	MEDIA INVOLVEMENT/INFORMED	NIL.
G16	ACTION TO DATE (TO INCLUDE WHEN/WHERE/TO WHOM THE HANDOVER OF THE CAPTURED PERSON OCCURRED)	NIL
17	FUTURE INTENTIONS	s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
	EFFECT DESIRED	B66 HAS EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED INS SAFE-HAVENS IN CHENARTU SWK AND HAS MADE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO HAMKARI . THE INFLUENCE OF THE INS HAS BEEN UNDERMINED AND THE INFLUENCE OF GIROA HAS BEEN ENHANCED ENABLING FUTURE CF / GIROA ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN KANDAHAR.
19	s33(a)(ii)	s33(
20	DETAINED	3
21	DOCEX/CELLEX/MEDEX	NIL.
22	EXPLOSIVES/WEAPONS	NIL.
23	REMARKS	<p>OPERATIONS OVER THE PAST 12 HOURS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL WITH THE REMAINING TAIS TO THE NTH HAVING BEEN CLEARED AND COE CONDUCTED IN EACH LOCATION.</p> <p>INS ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INTO THE HIGH GROUND WERE ENGAGED AND 1 X CAPTURED s33(a)(ii) .</p> <p>s33(a) HAS REPORTED A LARGE NUMBER OF PERS IN THE VILLAGES TO THE NORTH IN PARTICULAR WOMEN AND CHILDREN MATCHING INFO GAINED DURING COE YESTURDAY THAT SOME LN HAD MOVED TO THIS AREA PRIOR TO FIGHTING COMMENCING.</p> <p>THERE WAS NO CIVCAS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, ROE OR TARGETING ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THIS OPERATION AND WAS CONDUCTED IAW THE DIRECTION</p>





		GIVEN IN THE s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. THIS OPERATION IS ONGOING.
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OPSUM/SINCREP

OP TEVARA SIN VII

FROM: B66

OPSUM TVSN-B-07-06 AS AT DTG: 15 0500DE JUN 10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

ALL TIMINGS: LOCAL (DE)

SER	SUBJECT	DETAIL
1	TYPE OF OPERATION	LEVEL 2 INS INTERDICTION, CIED, INS NETWORK DISRUPTION AND POPULATION SECURITY
2	TARGET	s33(a)(ii) THREAT GROUP
3	DTG OF OPERATION	14 0500DE – 15 0500DE JUN 10
4	LOCATION OF OPERATION (GRID & DESCRIPTION)	TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 370 611 TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 349 564 TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3630 5660 TAI s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3633 5670 s33(MGRS 42S TA 350 571 s33(MGRS 42S TA 360 559 s33(MGRS 42S TA 366 571 HLZ s33(a)(ii) MGRS 42S TA 3668 5602 MNBTK
5	SUMMARY OF OPERATION	s33(a)(ii) [Redacted text block]





		s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
6	ISAF PERSONNEL INVOLVED	TF66, s33(a)(ii)
7	OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES INVOLVED	s33(a)(ii)
8	FR MILITARY HARDWARE	s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) , s33(a)(ii) , s33(a)(ii) AND s33(a)(ii)
9	FR CASUALTIES/EVACUEES	ONE NBC, s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AME TO ROLE 3 MEDICAL FACILITY, KAF..
10	ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED	NIL
11	ENEMY MILITARY HARDWARE	NIL
12	ENEMY CASUALTIES/EVACUEES/ CAPTURED PERSONS	NIL
13	CIVILIANS INVOLVED	48
14	CIVPOL/PROVOST INVOLVEMENT	NIL.
15	MEDIA INVOLVEMENT/INFORMED	NIL.
16	ACTION TO DATE (TO INCLUDE WHEN/WHERE/TO WHOM THE HANDOVER OF THE CAPTURED PERSON OCCURRED)	NIL
17	FUTURE INTENTIONS	PLAN AND PREP FOR FUOPS.
	EFFECT DESIRED	B66 HAS EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED INS SAFE-HAVENS IN CHENARTU SWK AND HAS MADE A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO HAMKARI . THE INFLUENCE OF THE INS HAS BEEN UNDERMINED AND THE INFLUENCE OF GIROA HAS BEEN ENHANCED ENABLING FUTURE CF / GIROA ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN KANDAHAR.
19	s33(a)(ii)	s33(





20	DETAINED	NIL
21	DOCEX/CELLEX/MEDEX	NIL.
22	EXPLOSIVES/WEAPONS	NIL.
23	REMARKS	<p>FROM TAI s33(a)(ii) LOCALS CLAIM TO HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH THE TALIBAN THEY CLAIM THE TALIBAN COME ABOUT ONCE A WEEK FOR FOOD AND WATER IN GROUPS OF TWO TO TEN.</p> <p>LNS STATED THE TB HAVE A COMBINATION OF LOCAL LANGUAGE AND ACCENTS THEY COULDN'T UNDERSTAND.</p> <p>THE LNS CLAIM THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHERE THE TB COME FROM OR WHERE THEY GO.</p> <p>THE REACTION OF THE LNS ON SEEING THE COALITION FORCE WAS POSITIVE THEY HAD CHAI AND WERE HAPPY TO SEE s33(a)(ii)</p> <p>THE ATMOSPHERICS TOWARDS THE FE MOVEMENT THROUGH SPIN KECHA INDICATED THE LNS WERE SCARED ON SEEING CF. LNS EXPLAINED THIS WAS DUE TO s33(a)(ii) IVO SPIN KECHA .</p> <p>ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO KINETIC DISRUPTION EFFECT s33(a)(ii) OF TAI'S IN AN AREA WHERE CF HAVE NOT BEEN IN SEVERAL MONTHS HAS ADDED TO THE DILEMMA CREATED DURING THIS OP FOR THE INS.</p> <p>DURING THE INFILTRATION A B66 s33(a)(ii) THIS MBR WAS AME TO KAF.</p> <p>THERE WAS NO CIVCAS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, ROE OR TARGETING ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THIS OPERATION. THE OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED IAW THE DIRECTION GIVEN IN THE s33(a)(ii) . THIS OPERATION HAS CONCLUDED.</p>





HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 633.11
Australian Special Operations Task Group
Task Force 66



See distribution

TF66-B OP TEVARA SIN VII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY – 10 – 15 JUN 10

References:

- A. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- B. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- C. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- D. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- E. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- F. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- G. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- H. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- I. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- J. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]
- K. s33(a)(ii) [Redacted]

Time Zone: Time zone used throughout this operational summary is DE (AFG local).

Date of Operation: 10 - 15 June 10.

Introduction

1. The aim of this document is to provide a summary of operations and operational effects achieved during the conduct of OPERATION TEVARA SIN VII (OP TVSN VII).

Task Organisation

2. The composition for TF66-B s33(a)(ii) during is OP TVSN VII is detailed in figure 1.






Figure 1. Composition of TF66-B for OP TVSN VII.

CONOP Summary

3. The approved CONOPS summary for OP TVSN VII is shown below in figure 2.



Figure 2. CONOP summary.

Situation

4. COMD RC(S) ME is to protect the population of KC from INS influence. ISAF SOF has been tasked as part of HAMKARI to disrupt INS safe-havens and deny FoM in key terrain as outlined in Ref A.

Mission Statement

5. TF66-B and s33(a)(ii) is to DISRUPT the INS TG network within CHENARTU during the period 10 - 15 Jun 10 IOT protect the population within URZ and SWK and enhance security and FoM along Route BEAR and protect the northern approaches to KC.

Commander's Intent

Purpose

6. The purpose of this operation is to protect the population within URZ and SWK; enhance the security and FoM along Route Bear and protect the northern approaches to KC.

Method

7. This operation supports COMD RC(S) s33(a)(ii) by disrupting INS safe-havens impacting on the security of KC and Route BEAR. TF66 will undermine the INS ability to conduct operations that threaten the northern approaches to KAF through the following:

- a. deny INS SA s33(a)(ii);
- b. functionally and physically dislocate the INS EAs / IED belt by s33(a)(ii);
- c. disrupt the INS network and protect the population through s33(a)(ii);
- d. conduct s33(a)(ii) IOT undermine the INS influence; and
- e. embolden the population to reject TB influence through the conduct of COE at local and regional level.

End State

8. **Red.** INS safe havens will be disrupted and s33(a)(ii) will be dislocated from key population centres. The disruption of these identified TAIs will establish a short to medium term disrupt on INS ability to conduct IED manufacturing and distribution. Complex attacks on LN/ANSF/CF will reduce along ROUTE BEAR.

9. **Blue.** TF66 will conduct disrupt operations IOT positively shape the battlespace ISO HAMKARI. CF FoA/FoM is enhanced due to the disruption of INS leadership and IED facilitators and s33(a)(ii) with the INS link between SWK and KC.



10. **Green.** ANSF capability is practically enhanced and ANSF capability to provide security is demonstrated in the eyes of LN.

11. **White.** INS malign influence reduced and LN FoM enhanced. GIRoA strategic messaging accepted and support for and confidence in GIRoA/CF enhanced.

Concept of Operations

12. This operation was conducted in 5 phases:

- a. **Phase 1:** B66 – s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii)
- b. **Phase 2:** B66 – s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii)
s33(a)(ii)
- c. **Phase 3:** B66 – s33(a)(ii) ;
- d. **Phase 4:** B66 – s33(a)(ii) ; and
- e. **Phase 5:** B66 – s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii).

Detailed Conduct of Operations

Phase 1 and 2

13. B66 departed MNB-TK s33(a)(ii) into the following HLZs:

- a. HLZ s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 42S TA s33(a)(ii));
- b. HLZ s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 42S TA 3725 6130); and
- c. HLZ s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 48 42S TA s33(a)(ii)).

14. s33(a)(ii)

[Redacted text block]

a)(ii)

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]



c. s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18. s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a)(ii) recovered a quantity of Russian TNT, Electronic Detonators and approximately 100 x 7.62mm long rounds. 1kg of OPIUM was discovered cached under the floor s33(a)(ii).

19. On completion s33(a)(ii) the FE were secure in the following locations:

- a. s33(a)(ii) – TAI s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 42S TA 371 594);
- b. s33(a)(ii) – TAI s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 42S TA 370 611);
- c. s33(a)(ii) – TAI s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 42S TA 364 593); and
- d. s33(a)(ii) – s33(a)(ii) IVO (MGRS 42S TA 367 600).

B66 TIC – 10 Jun 10

20. Throughout s33(a)(ii) 10 Jun 10, s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]

21. s33(a)(ii) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24. s33(a)(ii)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(ii)

[Redacted]

(ii)

[Redacted]

28. s33(a)(ii)

[Redacted]

29. Post attack, the INS were then observed withdrawing South through the greenbelt. The INS conducting the assault on TAI s33(a)(ii) demonstrated a great deal of resolve as well as a high level of individual and collective skills and discipline. This group of INS were well trained in their application of fire and use of ground. All SAF was accurate and effective. The attack was well synchronised with the suppression of s33(a)(ii) to the West and the nearby s33(a)(ii) position to the North East. The INS displayed little regard for LNs and the Mosque IVO of the COE being conducted by s33(a)(ii). Total INS numbers, including those in the high ground, were estimated to be approximately 30 - 40.

30. s33(a)(ii)

[Redacted]

(ii)

[Redacted]

32. s33(a) received SAF from the South and East, including sniper fire from the West and s33(a) received SAF from the North and North West. Sporadic engagement continued for approx 30 min, with s33(a)(ii) providing surgical fire throughout the attack.

33. Approximately 30 minutes after the main assault on FE B an INS MG position, with two INS, were observed in the high ground MGRS 42STA 35874 59119. At approx 1820DE, C/S s33(a)(ii) engaged the INS position s33(a)(ii), resulting in 3 x EKIA.

34. During s33(a)(ii) 10/11 Jun 10, s33(a) questioned 10 x FAMs during the conduct of the clearances of TAI s33(a)(ii) and TAI s33(a)(ii), with 3 x POI being released and 7 x POI subsequently detained.

35. s33(a)(ii) in Figures 3 – 9.



Figure 3. s33(a)(ii) Engagement 10 Jun 10.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

s33(a)(ii)



Figure 4. s33(a)(ii) Engagement 10 Jun 10.

s33(a)(ii)



Figure 5. s33(a)(ii) TIC AM 10 Jun 10.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

s33(a)(ii)



Figure 6. s33(a) TIC PM 10 Jun 10.

s33(a)(ii)



Figure 7. s33(a) IC AM 10 Jun 10.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

s33(a)(ii)



Figure 8. s33(a)(ii) TIC PM 10 Jun 10.

s33(a)(ii)



Figure 9. s33(a)(ii) TIC 10 Jun 10.

[Redacted]

36. The following assets supported the TIC during 10 Jun 10:

- a. s33(a)(ii)
- b. s33(a)(ii)
- c. s33(a)(ii)
- d. s33(a)(ii); and
- e. s33(a)(ii)

37. Due to another TIC involving s33(a)(ii) until approximately 25 min into the TIC. B66 was s33(a)(ii) to attrite PID INS in the greenbelt.

38. At s33(a)(ii) on the 11 Jun 10, s33(a)(ii) and s33(a)(ii) patrols were s33(a)(ii) to engage possible INS dismounts. The result was NSTR, with s33(a)(ii) returning to their strong points during AM 11 Jun 10.

39. At 0505DE, s33(a)(ii) of a spotter location to the South East of TAI s33(a)(ii) with NSTR.

40. During AM 11 Jun 10, C/S s33(a)(ii) conducted COE in the immediate area around TAI s33(a)(ii). Although only 10 x LNs attended the COE, the sentiment was consistent with previous COEs in the area, with a negative attitude towards INS. s33(a)(ii)

41. During the morning the FE s33(a)(ii) Throughout the remainder of the day TF66-B remained postured to complete the task if required. At approx 1300DE the FE was s33(a)(ii)

42. During the afternoon of 11 Jun 10, s33(a)(ii) continued to s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) also conducted engagement with LNs and commenced s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) was conducted during s33(a)(ii) 11/12 Jun 10 at HLZ s33(a)(ii) and TAI s33(a)(ii)

43. During AM 12 JUN 10, reporting indicated that INS believed the FE had s33(a)(ii). Concurrently, LNs started to foot move back into the CHENARTU greenbelt from the South. At approx 0930DE, an INS spotter was PID with s33(a)(ii) and reporting IVO MGRS 42STA 3714 6093 and s33(a)(ii) South of TAI s33(a)(ii) (MGRS 42STA 372 609). Due to the tactical situation s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) LNs were again seen leaving the village areas and moving South.

44. Throughout the remainder of 12 Jun 10, s33(a)(ii) conducted a shura IVO TAI s33(a)(ii) The results of the shura included:

- a. 9 x LNs attended COE, and

b. 9 x LNs s33(a)(ii) .

45. The general atmospherics from the SHURA included:

- a. LNs were fearful of CF targeting s33(a)(ii) and of CF arresting LN FAMs;
- b. the LNs indicated that the LN FAMs were scared of being detained and had moved North and North East of CHENARTU to vic SAR KALAY and MABANG KALAY. In all, LNs indicated approx 70 – 80 LN FAMs had fled; and
- c. towards the end of the shura they felt safe enough around CF to ask if they could coerce their relatives to return to their villages.

46. At approximately 1600DE, s33(a)(ii) and C/S s33(a)(ii) conducted s33(a)(ii) positions IVO TAI s33(a)(ii) this move was in preparation of the next phase and clearance north towards ADAMKHAN KALAY. Due to the difficult terrain, s33(a)(ii) was in location at 13 0345DE Jun 10.

47. Throughout the remainder of 12 Jun 10, s33(a)(ii) indicated the INS trying to establish contact with other parties, however a number of INS remained silent through either being KIA or not wanting to answer.

Phase 3

48. At approximately 13 0320DE Jun 10, s33(a)(ii) commenced a s33(a)(ii) to TAI s33(a)(ii) At 0402DE, s33(a)(ii) conducted s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a)(ii) The results included:

- a. TAI s33(a)(ii) - s33(a)(ii) ;
- b. a further 14 x FAMs discovered around the cordon;
- c. s33(a)(ii) revealed NSTR;
- d. biometric enrolment of 20 x FAMs; and
- e. after initial questioning, 2 x FAMs detained.

49. At 0629DE, s33(a)(ii) conducted s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a)(ii) The s33(a)(ii) , including 4 x FAMs found on the outer cordon. After s33(a)(ii) , all POI were released with NSTR s33(a)(ii) .

50. At 0715DE, C/S s33(a)(ii) at MGRS 42STA 349 632, PID 1 x INS with a weapon approximately 400m to the west of their position s33(a)(ii) . The INS was WIA but managed to withdraw to the West, s33(a)(ii) indicated a significant blood trail.

51. At 0830DE, s33(a) conducted s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a) The s33(a)(ii), including 10 x FAMs found on the outer cordon. During s33(a)(ii) 2 x shotguns were found with NSTR for the s33(a)(ii).

52. During the s33(a)(ii) s33(a) indicated that INS were trying to ascertain the FE dispositions. INS indicated that they were not going to try and reinforce ADAMKHAN KALAY as all approaches are covered by CF. The INS also indicated not to try and place weapons down and move into the village area and blend in as LNs, as the CF are "smart Americans" and it will not work.

53. During the s33(a)(ii) of the valley towards ADAMKHAN KALAY, the FE was directed to s33(a)(ii) of SPIN KECHA. On s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a) the FE consolidated IVO TAI s33(a)(ii) in preparation for s33(a)(ii) to SPIN KECHA. With temperatures over 50 deg in the high ground, s33(a)(ii) into TAI s33(a)(ii) at approximately 1630DE.

Phase 4

54. At 2130DE the FE stepped off s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a)(ii) after a s33(a)(ii).

55. Throughout s33(a)(ii) 13/14 Jun 10, FE B conducted s33(a)(ii) into SPIN KECHA, simultaneously with s33(a)(ii) IVO MGRS 42S TA 350 571, MGRS 42S TA 360 559 and MGRS 42S TA 366 571.

56. At s33(a)(ii) 14 Jun 10, the FE commenced s33(a)(ii) of TAI s33(a)(ii) resulting in NSTR and s33(a)(ii). The FE then commenced a s33(a)(ii) towards and including SPIN KECHA. During s33(a)(ii) on TAI s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) with nil occupants and NSTR. On completion s33(a)(ii) transitioned to PCO and engaged with the LNs. LNs from TAI s33(a)(ii) claim to have little to do with the TB. The LNs claim the TB come about once a week for food and water in groups of two to ten. LNs stated the TB have a combination of local language and accents they couldn't understand. The atmospherics towards the FE presence through SPIN KECHA indicated the LNs were scared on seeing CF. LNS explained this was due to s33(a)(ii) IVO SPIN KECHA.

Phase 5

57. The FE s33(a)(ii) IVO HLZ s33(a)(ii) on completion of PCO for the remainder of the day. At approximately 2200DE, the FE s33(a)(ii) from HLZ s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) arriving successfully at MNB-TK.

Key Enablers

58. s33(a)(ii)

s33(a)(ii)

59. **Mobility.** The FE s33(a)(ii) as well as s33(a)(ii), confirming the benefits of being enabled s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) provided at short notice and was well appreciated by the FE.

60. **Offensive Support.** The FE deployed s33(a)(ii) to neutralise insurgent fighting positions in high ground. The s33(a)(ii) which was again reinforced during the conduct s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii) were INS fighting positions, employing PKM and RPG fires against the FE.

s33(a)(ii)

61. During OP TVSN VII, s33(a)(ii) This was evident during 48 hours of s33(a)(ii) The s33(a)(ii)

Legal

62. There were no legal issues that arose during OP TVSN VII.

OC TF66 B Comments

63. OP TVSN VII IVO Chenatu was the culmination of an operational sequence conducted s33(a)(ii). Initial operations in SWK identified the information deficit that needed to be rectified if the TG network within the region was to be effectively disrupted. This void was filled through s33(a)(ii) s33(a)(ii). The information gained was rapidly exploited through s33(a)(ii) and force the INS network to concentrate within their traditional safe haven areas such as the Chenatu Valley. OP TVSN VII was designed to be the decisive action against the INS TG network within SWK whereby TF66-B would s33(a)(ii) the INS safe haven s33(a)(ii), clear known INS TAIs, Attrit the INS TG and connect with the population. This was to be synchronised with s33(a)(ii) within AKK.

64. TF66-B s33(a)(ii) 9/10 Jun 10. This was followed by the initial clearance of TAIs and the establishment of s33(a)(ii) and s33(a)(ii) on the key terrain on the high ground to the west of the Chenatu green belt. During the 24 hours that followed s33(a)(ii) came under sustained heavy and coordinated attack as INS firstly attempted to regain the key terrain s33(a)(ii) and subsequently multiple attacks on s33(a)(ii). It is estimated that s33(a)(ii) actions that occurred during the period resulted in approx 16 INS KIA. s33(a)(ii) indicated that they had been surprised by the ferocity of the response, had lost significant numbers of fighters and required to both resupply and replan prior to any further actions against the CF element.

65. During the following morning s33(a)(ii) to imminent attack later in the morning with the INS reorganising somewhere in the south. It is assessed that s33(a)(ii) coincided with the area in which the INS were conducting thier preparations for attack. TF66-B continued s33(a)(ii) IVO Chenatu throughout this period s33(a)(ii) during the early evening. Dispositions that were further attrited by the FE s33(a)(ii) once identified. The combined effects of s33(a)(ii) over this period has resulted in the unprecedented neutralisation of the INS TG network within E SWK. It has also caused the movement out of the area of all key leaders, several of which are suspected to be wounded.

66. Over the following three days the Company s33(a)(ii) north, clearing TAIs IVO the Chanatu Tangay and subsequently south clearing the TAIs IVO Spin Kecha and southern Chenatu Valley. During these operations the FE connected further with the population and developed a detailed understanding of the tribal dynamics within the region identifying that northern Chenatu was certainly far more tribally homogeneous and Toki based. This is significant as it is the tribally fragmented nature of southern Chenatu that make it open to exploitation by the TB and it is therefore northern Chenatu that is better suited to s33(a)(ii). Spin Kecha and Southern Chenartu were virtually devoid of civilians during s33(a)(ii) in this area. This further confirms the assessment that the Southern Chenartu/Spin Kecha area is more likely to be the physical centre of the insurgency within SWK as apposed to the Chenartu Valley itself.

67. Conditions faced throughout the operation were challenging with temperatures in the high s33(a)(ii) of 50 degrees during the day and an average temperature of over 45 degrees throughout the valley. The terrain itself was rugged and dominating demanding that s33(a)(ii) deny the terrain to the INS. The FE conducted s33(a)(ii) from the northern extremity of the De Chenatu Tangay to Spin Kecha on little sleep and with only s33(a)(ii). This was a domination of the area at a level that has not previously been seen by the INS who struggled to maintain awareness of the FE dispositions and were completely overwhelmed by the actions.

68. Overall OP TVSN VII has been successful on a scale that had not been anticipated on inception and has vindicated the operational sequence developed and executed that has resulted in not only the enduring disruption but the neutralisation of the INS TG in SWK. The actions of TF66-B during this operation have demonstrated the ability of TF66 to force project into and deny INS safe havens and sanctuary areas, separate the INS from the population and promoted GIROA legitimacy. It has resulted in the almost complete capitulation of the INS network in E

SWK at a level that is unprecedented in the area. In doing so TF66-B has demonstrated a sophisticated operational design involving the full spectrum of SOF tasks.

CO TF66 Comments

69. The results from these series of strikes has undoubtedly struck a severe blow to the INS on the Eastern SWK side of RTE BEAR which will potentially mean that they will be largely ineffective this fighting season. Of particular note is the number of out of area fighters who were involved in CHENARTU. There is clearly a linkage between SWK and ZABUL Province that IOT deny this approach to the Taliban. It must be recognised that the B66 effort in CHENARTU. This worked exceptionally well providing COMD RC(S) with a significant contribution to his main effort by protecting the northern approaches to KANDAHAR CITY. Finally, it should be noted that the courage and gallantry displayed throughout was common place.

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