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Number
November 2021Date
November 2021
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Publication: The Looking Glass
The November 2021 issue of The Looking Glass examines the release earlier this month of the latest in what has come to be referred to as the annual 'China Military Power Report' (CMPR) from the Pentagon to the US Congress. It provides a wealth of detail on China's ongoing military modernization, capabilities acquisitions, evolving military doctrine, and strategic posture.
Coming at a time of heightened tension and the apparent open embrace of 'strategic competition' as the organising principle of Sino-US relations in both capitals, this CMPR is perhaps more significant than usual not only for what it tells us about China's military power and ambitions but also what it tells us about American perceptions of Chinese power. It is clear in reframing its assessment of China's objectives. It asserts that Beijing wants to “match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and revise the international order to be more advantageous to Beijing's authoritarian system and national interests”.
The PLA's acquisition, development and deployment of new capabilities in it nuclear forces and posture, deployment of new missile systems, enhanced expeditionary capabilities, and its push to master 'intelligentized' warfare are headline items. But, much of the CMPR assessment is based on a reading of top CCP leaders' official pronouncements on a wide range of foreign and defence policy issues. Although such statements are important government leaders and officials often make lofty and aspirational statements and directives that are intended to “steer” relevant bureaucracies, agencies and provincial governments toward implementation. However, such desires are not translated into actual behaviour in most cases. If we accept that China has a clear intention to “surpass” the United States, a key question that remains is does it in fact have the capabilities to do so?