Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine


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Edition 3
FOREWORD

1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDPs) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFPs) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations. ADDPs are pitched at the philosophical and high-application level and ADFPs at the application and procedural level. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have standing; however, it provides authoritative and proven guidance which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.

2. The ADF recognises the importance of doctrine. Over the years a range of publications have been developed, covering both joint and single-Service operational matters. This third edition of ADDP–D reflects Australia’s strategic position in a global environment.

3. Doctrine is a description of the application of force to achieve Australia’s national interests domestically and internationally. Doctrine states the ADF’s philosophical military approach to the operational environment. Doctrine development is a dynamic process based on professional experience and judgement. Its application must be tailored to a given situation or event.

4. ADF commanders and staff should be familiar with the contents of this publication.
AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

Proposals for amendment of ADDP–D are to be forwarded to:

Director
Strategic Policy Division
Russell Officers
CANBERRA

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DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY

The hierarchy of ADDPs and ADFPs and the latest electronic version of all ADDPs and ADFPs are available on:

- DRN located at: http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/adfwc/; and

Selected unclassified ADDPs and ADFPs have been released to the public and are available on the internet at: http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/doctrine.html.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is an instrument of national power and ADDP–D conveys the nature and purpose of the ADF in a contemporary environment. Ultimately the ADF’s emphasis is on defending Australia.

1.2 ADDP–D is the capstone document in a hierarchy of publications from which all ADF joint and single-Service doctrine is derived. This publication provides overarching guidance for the employment of the ADF in support of Australian Government objectives.

1.3 ADDP–D is primarily intended to provide guidance to members of the ADF, particularly those in command and leadership positions. However, anyone with an interest in Australia’s defence will find the publication a valuable resource.

Strategic guidance and role of military doctrine

1.4 Australia is an independent and outward looking nation. Its democratic institutions, cultural diversity and record of constructive international and regional engagement underpin its participation in world affairs. In a changing and challenging international environment, Australia pursues bilateral, regional and multilateral strategies to advance its national interests, within a context of global responsibility.

1.5 Australia’s system of government is a product of both its history and its national values. Australians are proud of their peaceful society. Australians believe that change should occur by discussion, peaceful persuasion and the democratic process, and reject violence as a way of changing people’s minds or the law.
1.6 The ADF is responsible to the Australian Government. The decision to deploy the ADF on operations is determined from a whole-of-government perspective. The Australian Constitution sets out the national system of government, and the *Defence Act 1903* is the legislative basis of the political and military relationship.

1.7 The government’s use of the ADF also reflects Australian values of respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, freedom of religion, commitment to the rule of law, democracy, equality, tolerance, fair play, compassion for those in need and pursuit of the public good.

1.8 The whole-of-government approach to national security necessitates the coordination of planning with other government agencies and at times non-government or foreign government agencies. The government determines the direction of Defence and is responsible for the operational use of the ADF. Defence provides strategic options and advice that assists the government in its decision making process.

**Context and framework of Australian Defence Doctrine**

**Publication—Doctrine**

1.9 ADDP–D is one of a suite of key documents that support strategic planning for operations, international engagement, preparedness, capability development and budgeting. The other documents are:

- *Defence White Paper*;
- Defence Planning Guidance;
- CDF Preparedness Directive;
- Quarterly Strategic Review;
- The Strategy Framework;
- CDF Planning Directives;
- Future Concept Papers; and
- other Defence doctrine, concepts, and publications.
ADDI–D describes:

• the nature of military doctrine, its purpose and application;

• the nature of war, armed conflict and the ever-changing environment in which the ADF may operate;

• national security and strategic policy issues applicable to Australia;

• the ADF as an instrument of national power under the direction of the government;

• the constitutional, political, legal and administrative contexts and arrangements within which, and under which, Australia may use armed force;

• the Australian approach for the conduct of military operations; and

• the nature of preparedness and readiness of the ADF for operational activity.
CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF WAR

Executive summary

- While the characteristics of war and armed conflict may change over time, the nature of war is immutable. It represents the use of organised force to resolve a difference between nation-states or non-state groups.

INTRODUCTION

2.1 When considering how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) undertakes the various tasks government requires it to perform, it is useful to consider the nature of conflict and war.

War and armed conflict

2.2 War is a clash of wills involving organised violence as an extension of politics. In war, the fundamental goal is to make the adversary comply with your will. The term armed conflict is often used to describe war, and while there are important technical and legal differences between the two, for the purposes of ADF doctrine, the terms war and armed conflict are used interchangeably. The term armed conflict in particular involves legal distinctions that must be carefully considered as part of the planning process.

Armed conflict as a political act

2.3 While in one sense, the existence of armed conflict represents a breakdown of normal political relations, in another sense it represents the continuation of political relations, but with the added dimension of armed conflict as a means of achieving political objectives.

2.4 Some nation-states, and some non-state actors, are more willing than others to use armed conflict as an instrument of policy. Despite strong legal restrictions on the application of force, the attractiveness of armed conflict as a policy option varies according to many factors. These include:

- cultural or religious influences involving a high tolerance for, even willingness to, employ violence;
- the financial cost of engaging in hostilities, and the ability to meet that cost;
- the vigilance and preparedness of the adversary;
• the likelihood of achieving objectives by non-violent means;

• the habitual propensity to use violence as a means of achieving aims; and

• the likely impacts on third parties.

2.5 Armed conflict is not an end in itself. It is a means of achieving national objectives. For most states, the damage, destruction and high cost of armed conflict mean that hostilities are usually an option only if the protection or promotion of some vital national security interest is at stake and cannot be achieved any other way.

Spectrum of conflict

2.6 Conflict—including war—can be illustrated as a spectrum, which ranges from peace (as an ideal) to general war. This spectrum is illustrated in figure 2–1.

![Figure 2–1: Spectrum of conflict](image)

2.7 At one end of the spectrum is stable peace, a situation with little or no violence. The activities of the actors are confined to peaceful interaction (which may include peaceful competition, cooperation, and assistance) in politics, economics, etc.

2.8 Moving along the spectrum, a stable peace may degenerate into a condition of unstable peace, where two or more factions threaten or use violence to achieve their objectives. In some cases, force may be applied by outside powers to limit the conflict.

2.9 Continuing along the spectrum, unstable peace may give way to irregular warfare; manifested by terrorism, insurgency, criminality, political and sectarian violence, and civil war. This phase of the spectrum includes other wars that are restricted in some way—often termed limited war or regional war.

2.10 The other end of the spectrum from peaceful interaction is true interstate conflict—general war. This term is used to cover war between nation states in which the total resources of all parties are employed and the national survival of one or more states is in jeopardy. General war is widespread, and will have implications for combatant and non-combatant nations alike. World Wars I and II are classic examples.
Levels of war

2.11 At any stage in the spectrum of conflict, war is generally regarded as being conducted at three levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Figure 2–2 illustrates these levels.

2.12 Strategic level. The strategic level involves the overall direction of national and military effort, and the overarching political objective of the conflict. This level can be divided as follows:

• National strategic refers to the political dimension of the conflict beyond the military level, both domestically and internationally, as well as mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to support the war effort. The political dimension relates both to the desired political end state, and to domestic considerations enabling the conduct of hostilities.

• Military strategic refers to the military planning and general direction of the conflict; setting the desired military end state and the broad military approach to achieving that end state.

2.13 Operational level. This level involves the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations to achieve strategic-level objectives. This level is under the command of a joint force commander. In an Australian context, operations could involve the ADF alone, or the ADF and other militaries in allied or coalition operations. The operational level serves to link the strategic and tactical levels.
2.14 **Tactical level.** This level involves the planning and conduct of battles and engagements that are sub-sets of a military operation.

**Constraints**

2.15 Although war is a violent clash of wills, its conduct is invariably subject to constraints. These can circumscribe the political aims of a conflict, the intensity of combat operations, the geographic extent of military actions, the duration of hostilities, and the kinds of military operations and activities conducted. Such constraints are:

- **Practical.** Hostilities may be constrained by the equipment and the respective military capabilities of the belligerents, by the cost of war, and by problems of distance, climate, weather, terrain and oceanography in conducting operations.

- **Legal.** Both international law and domestic law place limits on armed conflict.
ADDP–D Chapter 2

• **Moral.** These considerations are now largely absorbed into international norms and values. Other moral and ethical considerations will shape and influence how the war is conducted.

• **Political.** These could include awareness by the belligerents of their mutual need to conduct political relations beyond the present hostilities. In the case of a coalition arrangement, political considerations are governed by what is acceptable to all coalition partners.

• **Environmental.** Environmental, cultural and heritage considerations may constrain the conduct of the war.

### WAR AND WARFARE

**Introduction**

2.16 There is an important distinction between war and warfare. The nature of war—imposing your will on the adversary and making them comply—is immutable. Additionally, war will always involve terror, violence, chaos, suffering, social and economic dislocation, and destruction of life and property.

2.17 In contrast to the immutable nature of war, warfare—the conduct of war—can change over time. Although warfare always requires the application of planning, military skills, organisation, communication, logistic support and leadership, it is the application of these elements that is subject to change. Technological developments transform both the weapons of war and the general conditions in the society fighting a war. These can include the state of a society’s transport, communications, health, education systems, and also the role of the mass media. The political environment (whether domestic, regional or global) in which wars are fought also changes continuously over time.

2.18 The interplay between war and warfare will be explored in this section.
ENDURING ELEMENTS OF WAR AND WARFARE

Friction

2.19 Friction is the accumulation of physical and psychological factors that cause operational plans to fail or not proceed as planned. It is a feature of warfare that is both pervasive and serious. No amount of training or planning can entirely eliminate friction. Military operations may be hampered by:

- factors external to a fighting force, for example, adversary resistance, harsh terrain, harsh climatic conditions, unfavourable weather, logistic delays and restrictive rules of engagement; or
- factors internal to a fighting force such as fear, exhaustion, indecision, misunderstanding, confusion, errors, and inadequate planning, training or equipment.

2.20 Since friction is an inevitable part of warfare, a fighting force must recognise and accommodate it. A fighting force can reduce friction by:

- using simple, flexible, clearly communicated plans;
- fostering good discipline, leadership and morale;
- paying proper attention to administrative and logistic support arrangements; and
- displaying persistence, perseverance, resilience, and flexibility.

Uncertainty

2.21 In armed conflict, uncertainty, disorder and disharmony are enduring features, commonly referred to as the fog of war. The lack of accurate or timely information, situational understanding, or the presence of information overload and contradictory information contribute to the fog of war.

2.22 A degree of uncertainty is inevitable in warfare. This can be mitigated by:

- addressing intelligence and information shortfalls;
- using simple and flexible plans, including contingency plans;
- having clear command and control arrangements;
- effective training;
• fostering initiative and mutual support at all rank levels; and
• improving information and communications technology systems and processes.

2.23 A fighting force that is creative, flexible and decisive can also exploit opportunities that arise from its adversary’s own experience of uncertainty.

Violence and danger

2.24 Armed conflict is invariably violent and causes fear, trauma, injury and death. Armed conflict also usually results in destruction of physical assets, disruption and distortion of normal economic activity, degradation of the physical environment, dislocation of populations, and severe political and social stresses. These considerations are powerful arguments for the avoidance of armed conflict where possible.

2.25 However, where armed conflict does occur, these same considerations are also powerful arguments for the importance of fostering and maintaining effective leadership, good discipline, high morale, strong group cohesion and realistic training. A force that does this will be better equipped to withstand the inevitable dangers and pressures.

Population focus

2.26 Conventional war seeks a change in the policies, if not in the outright existence, of a government by coercing government leaders or defeating them militarily. Irregular war, conversely, seeks to undermine a group or government by influencing the population, which is often the centre of gravity. The focus of irregular warfare is not primarily on the military or destructive capability of an adversary (state or non-state). In irregular war, distinctions between military and civilian may be blurred and the notion of a front line or linear operating environment is meaningless.

Changes in warfare

2.27 Although war is an enduring element of the international system, warfare changes over time. Warfare contains multiple threats resulting from state and non-state actors exploiting all modes of war simultaneously using advanced weapons, non-military tactics, terrorism and disruptive criminality to destabilise an existing order.

2.28 Change is ever-present in warfare. Some of the factors that may influence change in the characteristics of warfare include technology, asymmetry, globalisation, political and legal constructs, changing demographics, and social and cultural factors. Such changes have resulted in the emergence of new domains, such as space.
2.29 Environment and domains. The operational environment (OE), previously known as the battlespace, embraces all the elements, conditions and circumstances influencing the employment of capabilities and the decisions of the commander during campaigns and operations. Within the OE there are a range of overlapping and interrelated physical and non-physical domains in which, or through which, military activity takes place. There are four physical domains: maritime (including sub-surface), land, air and space. The two non-physical domains are information (including cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum) and the human domain. Further detail on domains and environments is contained in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0—Campaigns and Operations.

2.30 Information and technology. Information and technology are significant enablers for belligerents. Technology has expanded the operational space through mass communication, creating the potential for the cyber-mobilisation of dispersed communities. Groups have seized on the globalisation of information to execute the strategic communication campaigns that are central to their activities. The content and delivery of information has therefore shifted from the mass propaganda of revolutionary insurgents, from the 1950s to the 1970s, to highly tailored campaigns. Adversaries have been quick to exploit the mobile phone, internet and social networking sites for recruiting, training, educating, motivating and controlling new members. Information now permits targeted individual mobilisation; an alternative to traditional mass mobilisation.

2.31 Globalisation. In addition to information flows, transport and financial systems facilitate the global movement of adversary money, equipment and people. In terrorism and insurgencies in particular, clusters of cells or teams gravitate towards each other in informal communities of interest—to exchange intelligence and weaponry, reinforce a commonly held narrative, or train and conduct attacks—before dispersing, perhaps never to meet again. Some groups employ a version of mission command based on intent, ideas and ideology being passed through both the virtual domain and by word of mouth. Insurgency is no longer bounded by the aim of self determination. Instability emanating from fragile states and sympathetic populations in developed states can take the form of a franchised, globalised insurgency whose goals encompass profound changes to the international order.
2.32 **Adaptation.** States may choose to convert military units into irregular ones and adopt new tactics. They may also be quick to cooperate with non-state actors where they see mutual benefit. Adaptive adversaries combine various types of warfare in the same time and place. Consequently, attempts to counter them are unlikely to be successful if pursued in a linear, sequential or purely military manner. Evolving threats demand an agile and adaptive response. When warfare or conflict impact a fragile state and its population, a comprehensive approach that combines the military, development, governance and rule of law measures of different organisations and nations is one means of achieving such a response.

2.33 **Protection of civilians.** Protection of civilians has risen in importance as a key objective and determinant of mission success. Military forces must have the mandate and ability to provide a population with adequate physical protection against harm by any actors. This is especially challenging, as adversary tactics may include the use of measures such as improvised explosive devices or suicide terrorist attacks that deliberately target civilians.

2.34 Warfare is becoming both politically and militarily more complex to manage. Military-related technological developments will also have profound effects on the cost, tempo, duration and dangers of warfare, on military command and control, and on the political-military interface in war.
CHAPTER 3

THE NATURE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Executive summary

- Doctrine is fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

- Military doctrine is an officially sanctioned, formalised and written expression of institutionally accepted ideas about what armed forces do and how they do it.

- Military doctrine, strategic policy, and military theories and concepts are related.

- Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine is written to provide either philosophical, application or procedural guidance. These are not the same as the levels of military activities, although they do roughly correspond to the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

- Australian Defence Doctrine Publication–D (ADDP–D)—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine is the ADF’s capstone joint doctrine publication.

- ADF doctrine is periodically updated using an established doctrine development cycle.

At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory.


INTRODUCTION

3.1 This chapter describes the nature and application of military doctrine in general, and its use by the ADF specifically.

3.2 Military doctrine is an officially sanctioned, formalised and written expression of institutionally accepted principles and guidance about what armed forces do and how they do it. It contains fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.
The history of military doctrine

3.3 Over the last three centuries, the scope of both military thought and military doctrine incrementally expanded. In the case of doctrine, this expansion accelerated during the nineteenth century as European and English-speaking militaries attempted in Napoleon’s wake to reach an understanding of his method of warfare. The numerical expansion, industrialisation, professionalisation and bureaucratisation of many militaries during the nineteenth century were influential factors underlying the expansion of doctrine.

3.4 It was not until the turn of the twentieth century that doctrine took on a form easily recognisable in comparison to contemporary publications. It is at about this time that it became formally separated from military theory and concepts by virtue of its new status as officially sanctioned, institutionally-authored military publications, explicitly designed to provide guidance for the conduct of military activities.

ROLE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Relationship between policy, military doctrine and concepts

3.5 There is a close relationship between policy, military doctrine and military concepts. The purpose of policy is to state ‘what’ is to be done and not done, while the ‘how’, now and into the future, is the function of military doctrine and concepts.

3.6 Policy. National policy is the government’s judgement on what is necessary, possible and in the national interest.

3.7 Defence policy is the directive statement of what is to be achieved. It is flexible and generally enduring. It must be capable of rapid review should the strategic environment change. Policy informs the development of military doctrine.

3.8 Military doctrine. Military doctrine, henceforth referred to simply as doctrine, is informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about the ways that military forces can be used in support of national policy. Doctrine is more enduring. Doctrine defines how current military operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. Although doctrine is authoritative, it requires judgement in application. The principles it contains are not immutable.
3.9 The primary intent of doctrine is to provide guidance for the conduct of military activities. Doctrine also provides a mechanism for the analysis of key operational challenges and assists in the delivery of professional military education and training.

3.10 There are a number of influences on, and key roles of, military doctrine. These are shown in figure 3–1.

3.11 **Concepts.** If doctrine is about how the military prepares for, conducts and sustains operations, then concepts are those untried and untested ideas about how the military thinks it may conduct operations in the medium to long term.

3.12 Not all concepts will become part of doctrine. A concept becomes doctrine if it successfully completes a process of rigorous debate, systematic analysis and practical testing during both training and operations. This process transforms an untested and creative concept into an accepted tactic or process.
DOCTRINE AND THE LEVELS OF WAR

3.13 Australia chooses to both categorise and command war at three overlapping levels—strategic, operational and tactical. Although this understanding of war is common in western countries, it is not necessarily universal. Thus, references in this document to levels of war or levels of command relate to the Australian categorisation of war, and may not be applicable to other countries.

3.14 The levels of war are:

• **Strategic.** At the national strategic level governments determine overarching strategic and policy goals that have military as well as other aspects. As a result of these goals militaries develop strategies to implement the military aspects of national strategy.

• **Operational.** The operational level provides a bridge between the strategic and tactical levels. At the operational level campaigns and operations are planned and conducted, with the aim of translating strategic objectives into a series of tactical actions. Operational planning encompasses the manoeuvre of tactical units as well as the provision and sustainment of logistics and administrative support.

• **Tactical.** At the tactical level missions are planned and executed with force applied directly against adversaries, with the intent of achieving victory at a particular time and place.

3.15 Tactical successes collectively contribute to achieving operational and strategic objectives and thus support policy and national strategy.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

3.16 Doctrine publications are written to provide philosophical, application or procedural guidance and can be applied across the levels of war. This relationship is shown in figure 3–2.
ADF joint doctrine consists of:

• ADDPs; and
• Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFPs).

ADDPs provide philosophical or application guidance, while ADFPs provide more specific tactical, technical and/or procedural guidance in a joint operation. All joint doctrine publications are categorised according to the common joint staff system used by the ADF.1

ADF joint doctrine publications are arranged into three tiers:

• Tier 1: the ADF’s capstone doctrine publication (ADDP–D),
• Tier 2: the principal doctrine publications within each functional grouping—Command and Control (0 Series), Personnel (1 Series), Intelligence (2 Series), Operations (3 Series), Logistics (4 Series), Joint Planning (5 Series), Communication and Information Systems (6 Series) and Training (7 Series); and

1 ADDP 00.1—Command and Control provides further information about the command joint staff system.
• Tier 3: other joint doctrine publications which are subsets of the groupings in Tier 2 (ADFP 0.X.X, ADFP 1.X.X).

3.20 The Chief of the Defence Force is the approving authority for all joint doctrine. The authority to approve the majority of joint doctrine has been separately delegated to doctrine sponsors for their respective series in the doctrine hierarchy. This arrangement is intended to facilitate rapid approval of the doctrine and acknowledge the sponsors’ responsibility and specialist leadership in functional subject areas.

Single-Service doctrine

3.21 Each Service produces a principal doctrine publication, which is influenced by, and influences, ADDP–D and covers fundamental doctrinal aspects of the maritime, land and air environments. These principal publications guide the development of each of the Services’ own hierarchy of doctrine publications.

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

3.22 ADF joint doctrine publications are reviewed periodically to ensure that they remain relevant. Further details about ADF joint doctrine development and roles and responsibilities of series sponsors are found in Defence Instruction (General) ADMIN 20–1—Australian Defence Force Joint Doctrine.
CHAPTER 4

AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Executive summary
- Australia seeks to promote and protect its national security interests.
- Australia is relatively secure from conventional attack due to its geographic and economic position.
- Australia’s national security community provides a comprehensive approach to security issues.

INTRODUCTION

4.1 This chapter outlines the main features of Australia’s strategic policy as a sovereign nation, in support of its security interests, and as shaped by our national power base.

4.2 Countries consider their national power in different ways. Australia understands national power to be influenced by our strategic geography, politics, economy, culture, demography and other elements as shown in figure 4–1.

AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL POWER

Strategic geography

4.3 Australia obtains much of its security from its geographic environment. As an island nation it is relatively secure from conventional attack. Australia—the only island continent-country in the world—has a large landmass, no land border with another country, a substantial natural resource base and vast ocean surrounds that include extensive areas of very shallow water. Australia’s people, industries and infrastructure are largely concentrated on the coast, in the east, south-eastern and south-western fringes; remote from the major population centres of the world. Together, these physical characteristics pose enormous problems for a would-be aggressor.
4.4 However, while a conventional attack on mainland Australia would be difficult, there is a great deal to defend. Australia is a large country with a small population. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) would be thinly stretched if there was a requirement to conduct concurrent military operations over wide areas of the country and its sea approaches. Moreover, conducting military operations across a wide range of northern Australia is a challenging task in terms of logistic support, transport, demands on civil infrastructure and the adverse effects of harsh climatic conditions on the performance of people and equipment. These factors highlight some of the challenges associated with the defence of Australia.

Political

4.5 Australia forms part of an increasingly interconnected and international political and economic system, and maintains a strong interest in ensuring that this system functions effectively within an agreed international framework. Australia has a long-standing commitment to supporting the international framework, through collective security. This is evidenced by involvement in multilateral institutions and measures taken to promote international security and peace, and to provide humanitarian assistance in times of disaster.

4.6 Due to our political, geographic and economic position, foreign relations are integral to Australia’s national power. The Asia-Pacific region, of which Australia is a part, seems set to be the most dynamic region in the world over the next few decades. Within this construct, Australia will manage relationships with traditional partners and emerging powers, as well as assisting our neighbours to meet their own economic and political challenges.

Economic geography

4.7 Australia is highly dependent on international trade for its national economic prosperity in an increasingly globalised world. This trade requires that the sea lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans remain available for unimpeded use and that shipping is not threatened by adversarial forces. Australia’s relative isolation makes international trade a potential strategic vulnerability. The most important trade routes for Australia are those to the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, where the overwhelming bulk of Australian international trade occurs. Not only is Australia’s economic prosperity closely linked with the countries of this region, but it is also closely linked to the security of the region.
4.8 Rich natural resources, a well-developed industrial economy, and sound scientific and technical base also contribute to Australia’s overall national power. However, capitalising on these features requires extensive infrastructure. Both physical and informational/information and communications technology infrastructure are key enablers for national power and connect Australia to the world.

Figure 4–1: Elements of national power

Cultural geography

4.9 Australia is a country with a history of stable government under a system of parliamentary democracy. Principles of democratic government, including a respect for the rule of law and human rights, as well as social equity and fairness, are important to all Australians. The Australian ethic of egalitarianism and a ‘fair go for all’ has been a defining feature. This quality is largely drawn from a long history of immigrant settlers who arrived in Australia.
and were able to prosper through their own efforts—not their family background, ethnicity or religious beliefs. A wide and well-educated demographic base is an important contributor to Australia’s national power.

Threats to Australia’s security

4.10 A fundamental role of the Australian Government is to ensure the protection of Australia’s citizens, territory, airspace, territorial seas, maritime resource zones, and national and international political and economic interests. This role requires protection against conventional and non-conventional threats to national security.

4.11 Conventional threats are those that might be posed by military forces of other nation-states. These threats may be direct, for example, the threat or use of armed force on Australian shipping, aircraft or territory; or indirect, for example, the commitment of military acts of aggression in other parts of the world that put global security, or Australia’s regional security environment, at risk.

4.12 Non-conventional threats are those that might be posed by something other than the military forces of nation states. These threats cover a very broad range of possibilities, including terrorist attacks against Australian national interests at home and abroad; emerging dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; deliberate disruption of Australia’s economic activity, especially of its international trade; pandemics; threats to primary industries; attacks on the national information infrastructure; and transnational crime such as narcotics, weapons and people smuggling.

4.13 The government produces Defence White Papers which provide an analysis of the strategic environment, identify potential threats and outline the role of the ADF. These White Papers serve as the primary source of strategic guidance for Defence.

Protection of Australia’s national security interests

4.14 The protection of Australia’s national security interests is a matter of national policy, and requires the application of a whole-of-nation and whole-of-government approach to national security.

4.15 The cabinet is the premier decision making forum for the Australian Government. It sets the broad direction of government policy. National security issues, decision making and coordination are devolved to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Figure 4–1 indicates the flow of the elements of national power, which influences the Australian Government’s decision making processes.
4.16 The National Security Committee of Cabinet considers almost all of Defence’s submissions to the Australian Government. It focuses on major international security issues of strategic importance to Australia, national responses to developing situations (domestic and international) and classified matters relating to aspects of operations and the activities of the Australian intelligence community.

National security strategy

4.17 The government’s concept of national security recognises that Australia has circumstances and interests that differ from other nations. The strategic environment is increasingly complex and interconnected, and the boundaries between international and domestic security issues are increasingly blurred. The national security strategy is articulated through a number of mechanisms, including government statements and publications on Australia’s national security interests and the security challenges facing Australia.

National security community

4.18 In response to Australia’s complex and interconnected security environment, Australia has an integrated national security structure that enhances national security policy coordination to achieve strategic outcomes. The national security community is a whole-of-government approach, including national security departments such as Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as other departments and agencies that have responsibility for various areas of national security and which may take the lead on an individual security issue.

4.19 Australia’s national strategic outcomes and objectives are explored in chapter 5—‘Defence and National Power’.
CHAPTER 5

DEFENCE AND NATIONAL POWER

Executive summary

- The Australian Defence Force (ADF) operates under a system of civilian control, and all personnel are ultimately answerable to the Minister for Defence. In turn, the Minister is responsible to the Australian Government and the Australian people.

- While the ADF’s primary function is to deter and defeat attacks against Australia and its interests, the Australian Government may direct that it is used for other, non-warfighting tasks.

- The ADF operates under a rigorous command and control system, and strategic planning in Defence is a high-priority task.

INTRODUCTION

5.1 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of Defence as a contributor to national power. Defence, in this case, refers to the wider Department of Defence, of which the ADF is a constituent element. Defence is jointly administered by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary in a diarchy, which is outlined further in paragraph 5.26.

THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

5.2 The framework for Australia’s national system of government is set out in the Australian Constitution, with the function of the Commonwealth separated into legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities.

The Commonwealth’s executive power

5.3 Executive power enables the government to carry out the business of ‘national government’ through bodies such as government departments, statutory authorities and the ADF. It is understood that the Commonwealth’s executive power extends to the capacity to protect the constitutional organs of government, provide for internal security and enforce the laws of the Commonwealth.
5.4 This internal security aspect of the Commonwealth’s executive power is relevant to the roles and responsibilities of the ADF. The Constitution provides that the Commonwealth shall, on the application of the executive government of a State, protect the State against domestic violence (s.119). This could involve the use of the ADF in aid to the civil authorities of a State, for instance in taking counter-terrorist action using highly trained and specialised troops. Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act) provides a broad legislative process that must be complied with to facilitate this assistance. One of the key principles that regulate the use of the ADF in internal security is the primacy of the civil power.

5.5 The Commonwealth also has executive powers to preserve the ‘peace’ of the Commonwealth, including through the use of the ADF. In certain circumstances, the Commonwealth can act without receiving a request from a State Government under s.119, such as when it is necessary for the protection of Commonwealth property, services or interests. The use of the ADF for the protection of Commonwealth interests is also conducted using Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act.

5.6 Under the Constitution, only the Commonwealth can raise armed forces under s.114, control the armed forces and the Department of Defence under ss.69 and 52(ii), and exercise the prerogative executive power of declaring war and making peace. Such executive actions may be undertaken without legislative endorsement, though it has become a practice for the Prime Minister and/or Minister for Defence to inform Parliament of the deployment of troops and the conduct of ADF operations.

5.7 There are limitations on executive power. A fundamental restriction is that the government cannot exercise coercive powers against an individual unless that conduct is authorised by legislation or the common law. Where legislation exists it must be complied with, and to that extent limits the power of the executive government.

The Commonwealth’s legislative defence power

5.8 The Constitution provides legislative power under s.51(vi) to the Parliament for it to make laws with respect to the defence of the Commonwealth and the States.

5.9 The High Court has found consistently that the Commonwealth’s defence power is ‘elastic’ and can be defined only in terms of its purpose—that is whether the purpose of a Commonwealth measure could be considered to assist in the defence of the Commonwealth. If it can be reasonably considered that there is a sufficient connection between the subject matter of a Commonwealth law and the purpose of defence, the Court would normally hold that the legislation is authorised by the power under s.51(vi) to make laws with respect to defence.
5.10 The extent of defence power expands and contracts according to the degree and nature of the danger of international aggression or threat at a given period of time. The High Court has said that the executive could take a wide range of defence measures in times of actual war and (less widely) in times of imminent danger of war. This capacity contracts after the conclusion of hostilities and in peacetime.

Command of the Australian Defence Force

5.11 The Constitution states that ‘the command in chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative’ (s.68). Under well established conventions of practice, the Governor-General acts on the advice of ministers and in reality the system of responsible government means that cabinet ultimately exercises direct control over the ADF.

5.12 The reference to ‘command in chief’ therefore has only titular meaning, but does serve to reinforce civilian control of the ADF. In practical terms, power of direction over the administration of the ADF is exercised by the Minister for Defence on a day-to-day basis, in conjunction with the Prime Minister, other members of the National Security Committee and other ministers as appropriate.

5.13 As the government is responsible ultimately to the Parliament and the people under Australia’s constitutional system, it is recognised that, notwithstanding any necessary requirements for secrecy, the government would have to be prepared to answer to the Parliament and ultimately the people for any decisions it made in relation to the use of the Defence power or of the ADF generally.

5.14 CDF and the Secretary of the Department of Defence are accountable to the Minister for Defence. This is cemented in legislation by s.8 of the Defence Act, which gives general control and administration of the ADF to the Minister for Defence.

5.15 It provides further that the powers vested in the CDF, Chief of Navy, Chief of Army and Chief of Air Force by virtue of s.9 of the Defence Act, as well as the powers vested jointly in the Secretary and the CDF (s.9A), shall be exercised subject to and in accordance with any directions of the Minister.

5.16 The command arrangements in the ADF will be further explored later in this chapter.
The Australian Defence Force and law enforcement

5.17 Although the primary responsibility of the relevant civilian authorities, there are certain circumstances in which the ADF may be involved in law enforcement and other duties. This can include where the ADF is called out to defend the Commonwealth or a State in accordance with Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act, or where the Commonwealth grants other law enforcement powers to ADF members through legislation, for example in maritime fisheries enforcement.

AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC POLICY

5.18 Australia’s strategic policy is not part of military doctrine per se. However, doctrine influences the interpretation and implementation of strategic policy. Moreover, strategic policy represents the policy context in which doctrine is applied.

5.19 Australia’s strategic policy is aimed principally at preventing or terminating attacks against Australia or its interests. The policy is not aimed at any particular threat or contingency, rather it seeks to address the enduring fundamentals of Australia’s strategic situation.

Australia’s strategic interests

5.20 Australia’s enduring strategic objective is the protection of our strategic interests. These interests are outlined in Defence White Papers, and are based around four themes:

- **A secure Australia.** This is the defence of Australia against direct armed attack by state or non-state actors. While Defence would have the lead in securing Australia against state-based attack, efforts against non-state actors are best led by civilian agencies; however, Defence can play a role in preventing or responding to such attacks. This is Australia’s primary strategic interest, to be protected above all else.

- **A secure immediate neighbourhood.** Australia has an interest in the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, from Indonesia to the South Pacific. This recognises the need to support the internal stability and cohesion of our neighbouring states. It also includes preventing or mitigating attempts by nearby states to develop the capacity to undertake sustained military operations within our approaches.
• **Strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific.** Beyond the immediate neighbourhood, Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. This includes a stable and cohesive Southeast Asia, a peaceful regional security environment and unimpeded trade through regional sea lanes. Australia recognises the importance of the continuing presence of the United States.

• **A stable, rules-based global security order.** Australia cannot be secure in an insecure world. To this end, we are committed to the United Nations (UN) Charter, preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can manage emerging threats effectively. As part of this, Australia has an interest in supporting non-proliferation regimes, which counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

**DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC POLICY**

**Defence as the provider of military power**

5.21 Australia pursues its strategic policy objectives by a combination of military and non-military means. The principal non-military means for contributing to strategic policy objectives is international diplomacy. For example, in recent years Australia has been at the forefront of international diplomatic efforts to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, Australia has actively supported efforts to promote good governance within the region, and in doing so has contributed to regional stability and security.

5.22 The ADF provides the military means by which the Australian Government pursues its strategic policy objectives. The size, disposition, capabilities and activities of the ADF are consistent with the objectives and priorities of Australia’s strategic policy.

**Defence posture**

5.23 Numerous factors have a bearing on defence posture, and these can be divided into the physical and political dimensions. The physical dimension includes the level of spending on national defence; the size, composition, training and equipment of the force; location of force elements; and preparedness of the force. The political dimension relates to a nation’s will to apply armed force.
Australia’s defence posture is an expression of its willingness and ability to defend its population and protect its territorial sovereignty. Although the ADF has a suite of offensive capabilities, the overall posture is essentially defensive, and is designed to be non-threatening to, and supportive of, other countries in the region. In particular, the ADF’s regional activities are largely designed to underscore Australia’s strong commitment to a partnership approach to regional defence and security issues.

Australian Defence Force support of strategic policy

The principal tasks for the ADF are a product of Australia’s enduring interests and defence posture. Broadly speaking, the ADF has four principal tasks, in descending order of importance:

- **Deter and defeat attacks on Australia.** The principal task for the ADF is to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations in defence of Australian territory. Under Australia’s policy of defence self-reliance, the ADF must be able to undertake these operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries. This includes supporting domestic security and emergency response efforts.

- **This task does not require a purely defensive or reactive approach.** In pursuing our aim of establishing air superiority and sea control in places of our choosing, we need to be prepared to undertake proactive operations against an adversary’s bases and forces, as far from Australia as possible.

- **Contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor.** The second priority task for the ADF is to conduct military operations, in coalition with others as required, in the South Pacific and East Timor. These operations may relate to protecting our nationals, providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), or stabilising the security environment. Given our size and resources, Australia and Defence can be expected to take a leadership role in this area; however, operations will inevitably involve other agencies, and usually involve other countries.

- **Contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region.** The next most important task for the ADF is to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region. This task spans a full spectrum of potential military operations, from high-end conflict in support of our Southeast Asian partners, to HA/DR operations or the evacuation of our nationals.
• Contribute to military contingencies in support of global security.

Finally, the ADF must be prepared to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world, in support of efforts by the international community to uphold global security and a rules-based international order, where our interests align and we have the capacity to do so. Such operations will generally—but not always—be authorised or under the overall leadership of the UN.

Strategic level command and control arrangements

5.26 Defence is a diarchy with two chief executives: CDF and the Secretary of the department. CDF and Secretary have joint responsibility for the administration of the ADF, except for matters falling within the command of CDF, or as otherwise stated by the Minister, where CDF has sole authority. In keeping with the diarchy, the Minister issues a joint directive to CDF and the Secretary, informing them of their responsibilities. An example of this directive can be found at the end of this chapter.

5.27 Within the diarchy, CDF commands the ADF and is the principal military adviser to the Minister. In this regard, the Minister would look to CDF for advice on matters that relate to military activity, including operations. The Secretary is the principal civilian adviser to the Minister and carries out the functions of an agency head within the Australian Public Service. As an agency head the Secretary has, on behalf of the Commonwealth, all the rights, duties and powers of an employer in respect of APS employees in Defence, as per section 20 of the Public Service Act 1999. The Minister would look to the Secretary for advice on policy, departmental issues and on the stewardship of Defence resources.

5.28 The high level command and control arrangements are outlined below, and further information is provided in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.1—Command and Control and ADDP 3.0—Campaigns and Operations:

• The CDF commands the ADF and is supported by the Office of the Secretary and CDF.

• The Service Chiefs are responsible to CDF for raising, training and sustaining their respective Service elements ready for operations, and for advising CDF on defence policy, military strategy, and the employment of their respective Service capabilities and elements.

• CDF may elect to command operations directly, but normally exercises command through the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS). CJOPS is responsible to CDF for operational level planning and the conduct of ADF campaigns, operations and other activities. CDF requests the Service Chiefs to assign forces to CJOPS for operations.
5.29 There are five principal committees that support the management of the ADF. These are:

- **Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force Advisory Committee (SCAC).** The SCAC is the pre-eminent Defence committee for the week-to-week management of the department. The SCAC is the default committee for business that requires the attention of the Secretary and CDF, who are joint chairs. The Secretary and CDF are the only standing members of the SCAC—all other participants are co-opted as required by the chairs. The SCAC is a direction and decision making body. It is not a discussion forum or a committee that notes particular actions.

- **Defence Committee (DC).** The principal focus of the DC is on the enterprise management framework, including the annual plan process. It sits monthly and considers issues with significant impact on the Defence enterprise, such as corporate restructures and major force structure changes. The DC is chaired jointly by the Secretary and CDF. The Secretary, CDF, group heads and Service Chiefs are standing members of the DC. All other participants at DC meetings will be co-opted as required by the chairs. The DC is a direction and decision making body. It is not a discussion forum or a committee that notes particular actions. The decisions of the DC are binding across the Defence organisation.

- **Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC).** The principal functions of COSC are to provide military advice to CDF to assist him in discharging his responsibilities for the command and management of the ADF, and in providing military advice to government. COSC sits monthly and is chaired by the CDF. It includes the Secretary, CDF, Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), Associate Secretary Capability, Associate Secretary Chief Operating Officer, Service Chiefs, CJOPS and Deputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S).

- **Defence Capability and Investment Review Committee (DCIRC).** The DCIRC exercises strategic control of the end to end capability process, including acquisitions, the Defence Capability Plan, projects of concern and progress with current acquisitions, as well as new investment policy. The DCIRC is chaired by the Secretary. Membership includes the CDF, VCDF, Associate Secretary Capability, Associate Secretary Chief Operating Officer, the Service Chiefs, Chief Executive Officer Defence Materiel Organisation, DEPSEC S, and Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security (DEPSEC I&S).
Strategic Command Group (SCG). The SCG provides CDF with situational understanding on intelligence, policy, major operational and strategic issues, and advice on military options. In doing so, the SCG assists CDF in his command of the ADF, provides a secure forum for CDF to issue direction and intent, and coordinates the Defence strategic management response to a critical incident. The SCG typically consists of the CDF (chairman), Secretary, VCDF, Service Chiefs, DEPSEC S and DEPSEC I&S.

STRATEGIC LEVEL PLANNING

Strategic development

5.30 Strategic development ensures that Defence is structured, equipped, and prepared to shape and respond to Australia’s security environment in accordance with government policy. The output of strategic development is informed judgement, promulgated through a hierarchical set of documents that focus on Australia’s security requirements for the near and longer terms, support decision making and guide further planning (see figure 5–1).

5.31 Defence offers advice concerning the military dimension of Australia’s national power to government. This advice is a distillation of military advice and the military aspects of government’s overall national security policy. Increasingly, the whole-of-government approach to national security makes it necessary to coordinate Defence’s plans with other government agencies, and at times non-government or foreign government agencies, before those plans are executed.
5.32 The strategic guidance process produces advice (expressed as strategic assessments), judgements, policy and responses. Such advice informs and enables choices for senior level decision makers. It also provides guidance for strategic planning for operations and capability development, international engagement, preparedness and budget planning.

5.33 Planning is a function of command at all levels, and is essential for the successful conduct of military operations. The essence of planning is the drawing together of ends, ways and means. A good plan will aim to ensure that its desired purpose can be achieved in the optimum way, and with the most efficient use of resources.

5.34 More information on strategic planning in Defence can be found in *The Strategy Framework*. 

Figure 5–1: Government direction and strategic guidance
Strategic level considerations

5.35 At the military strategic level, the development of military estimates and concepts of operations covers a range of considerations, including:

- political,
- military,
- legal,
- financial,
- sustainment,
- temporal,
- international, and
- public affairs.

5.36 In addressing the military dimension, at the strategic level planning must consider the adversary’s perceived objective; political, economic and military situation; vulnerabilities, especially critical vulnerabilities; vital and critical interests; and likely courses of action.

5.37 Likewise, strategic level planning must consider our own military objectives supporting the political outcome, constraints on military operations, restrictions imposed upon the use of force, and assumptions made and deductions drawn from the analysis of the situation.

Accountability and public information

5.38 Operations involving the ADF require both Defence and the government to balance the military need for operational security with the need for openness and accountability in accordance with our democratic political system. In a liberal-democratic political system, it is essential to maintain an unbreakable link between ADF operations and political control. The latter ultimately relies on community support.

5.39 Accordingly, ADF operations are carried out with the maximum degree of transparency achievable.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

5.40 Both in times of armed conflict and in peacetime, international law (as well as domestic law) has a significant impact upon ADF operations.
The primary sources of international law are reflected in Article 38 (1) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Those that make the law are treaties, custom and general principles. The subsidiary sources (those that identify and/or apply the law) are judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.

The international law of particular relevance to armed conflict falls into two main categories:

- the laws governing the resort to armed conflict, and
- the laws governing the conduct of armed conflict.

### Resort to armed conflict

The UN Charter is the primary source of law governing the use of force. It requires all nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other nations (Article 2 (4)). However, the Charter does permit resort to armed conflict in two circumstances:

- pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution made with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security; and
- pursuant to Article 51, which stipulates that nothing shall impair the inherent right of collective or individual self-defence.

Some have argued that humanitarian intervention is, or should be, a ground for the application of military force. This is a contentious but developing area of the law.

### Conduct of armed conflict

This area of the law, commonly referred to as the law of armed conflict (LOAC), applies in situations of international armed conflict. Traditionally LOAC was perceived to fall into two main strands:

- Hague law, which governs the means and methods of armed conflict; and
- Geneva law, which secures the protection of the victims of armed conflict.
5.46 Never entirely separate, these two strands have tended to merge over the years, especially in relation to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which Australia has signed and ratified. There is no great practical advantage in distinguishing the two. The basic principles of LOAC are:

- **Military necessity.** Provided that the kind and/or degree of force is not otherwise prohibited, it is permissible to use that kind and that degree of force—but only that kind and that degree of force—necessary to secure a legitimate objective.

- **Distinction.** A distinction must be drawn between that which can be attacked (i.e., military objectives and combatants) and that which cannot be attacked (i.e., civilian objects and civilians). There is also a prohibition on indiscriminate attacks. This includes attacks causing excessive collateral damage or incidental injury.

- **Unnecessary suffering.** The principle of unnecessary suffering forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction on adversary combatants that exceeds legitimate military requirements. This principle can apply in one of two ways: firstly, some weapons are prohibited absolutely, and secondly, the use of weapons in a certain way is prohibited.

- **Proportionality.** The principle of proportionality seeks to strike a balance between the requirements of military necessity and the humanitarian interest of sparing civilians and civilian objects. Proportionality requires that incidental casualties amongst the civilian population, and damage to civilian objects, should not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage resulting from an attack.

5.47 These general principles form the basis of the more specific provisions governing the means and methods of armed conflict and the protection of its victims.

5.48 Despite the narrow exceptions that permit the resort to military force, under international law member states are nonetheless obliged to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Such means could include direct negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or an arbitrated or judicial settlement.

5.49 Australia is a founding member of the UN, and is legally bound by the provisions of the UN Charter.
How force may be used

5.50 Australia is a party to many treaties that govern LOAC and has taken additional measures to make the treaty provisions generally binding under domestic law.

5.51 An important source of LOAC exposition is the jurisprudence of tribunals such as the International Military Tribunals constituted in the aftermath of World War II for the trial of German and Japanese war criminals. Other, more recent, examples are the UN tribunals set up to try alleged war criminals from the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. A permanent International Criminal Court was established in The Hague on 1 July 2002.

Rules of engagement

5.52 Further to national policies, the government gives direction to CDF on the national objectives to be achieved by military action. In turn, CDF provides direction to subordinate commanders in the form of rules of engagement (ROE).

5.53 ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and the limitations within which force may be applied. Although endorsed by the government, CDF is the ultimate authority for the issue of ROE. In amplification of CDFs ROE, subordinate commanders may issue their own ROE. In doing so they are limited to providing additional guidance and/or imposing further restrictions, and may not expand the scope for the use of force.

5.54 Without limiting or replacing the command function, ROE guide the application of force. In accordance with international and domestic law they may be used to authorise the full extent of legally permissible actions. Alternatively, they may prohibit and/or limit such actions. ROE must be revised as required to reflect changing political and military circumstances.

5.55 ROE for combined and coalition operations are developed by Australia, with consideration made for operating with either alliance and coalition partners, as may be required in the circumstances. Where a difference does arise one ROE will be designated to take priority. Normally this will be the Australian ROE.

5.56 For further information refer to ADDP 06.1—Rules of Engagement and ADDP 06.2—ROE Operational Rules.
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVE TO

MR NICK WARNER
Secretary of the Department of Defence

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ANGUS HOUSTON, AO, AFC
Chief of the Defence Force

Presented: In accordance with my powers under section 8 of the Defence Act 1903, acknowledging the joint responsibilities of the Secretary and the CDF under section 9A of the Defence Act 1903, and recognising the role and responsibilities and authority of the Secretary as defined by the Public Service Act 1999 and Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, I give you strategic direction to achieve the Government’s defence outcomes.

Accountability: You are accountable to me for Defence’s performance, having regard to our statutory responsibilities. Any authorisation or delegation of my authority with respect to Defence is through you, within the limitations below.

Result: I expect you to deliver:

a. under the sole command of CDF, operational deployment of the ADF to enhance our national strategic interests and our alliance relationships, to strengthen regional security and to successfully conduct joint military exercises and operations;

b. identification, development and provision of current and future capability to enable our armed forces to defend Australia and its national interests;

c. enhanced intelligence, strategic policy, scientific and information capabilities, responsive to whole-of-government requirements;

d. timely, accurate, co-ordinated and considered advice to the Minister and Government;

e. proper stewardship of people, through developing and maintaining workforce skills and career structures, building and maintaining Defence’s reputation and providing a living and working environment that attracts and retains people;

f. sound management of financial and other resources, operating within budgeted financial performance, meeting statutory requirements for preparing financial statements and optimal management and use of the Defence estate; and

g. appropriate planning, evaluation and reporting documents, including an annual Defence Management and Finance Plan, the Defence Capability Plan, and periodic Strategic Reviews and White Papers, incorporating the above.

Guidance: You should pursue these results through effective leadership and management, and should ensure that:

a. your actions are prudent, lawful and ethical;

b. your actions are consistent with:

(i) Government policy,

(ii) the Secretary’s role as principal civilian adviser and with his statutory responsibilities and authority, particularly under the Public Service Act 1999 and the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997,

(iii) the CDF’s role as principal military adviser and his statutory responsibilities and authority as commander of the Defence Force under the Defence Act 1903; and

c. you make decisions, and offer advice, considering:

(i) the impact on relationships with others who contribute to national security, including with the leadership of foreign Armed Forces and other Australian agencies with national security interests,

(ii) the input to the Chief Executive Officer of the Defence Minister Organisation,

(iii) the risk to the sustainable delivery of Defence outcomes; and

d. the CDF’s proposals for promotions to Brigadier equivalent and above are made in consultation with the Secretary, VCDF and the Service Chiefs.

JOEL ITIZGIBBON
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE

DATED THIS [Date] DAY OF DECEMBER 2007
Parliament House, Canberra ACT 2600. Tel: (02) 6273 7600 Fax: (02) 6273 4138

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CHAPTER 6

THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO WARFARE

Executive summary

- The principles of war support the Australian approach to warfare.
- When combined, the aspects of manoeuvre, networking, interoperability and decision superiority strengthen the Australian Defence Force (ADF) approach to warfare.
- Australian warfighting characteristics underpin the six joint warfighting functions.

INTRODUCTION

6.1 The conduct of warfare is invariably constrained. The ADF operates within the context of broader national objectives, a multinational environment (including coalition operations) and within international law and custom.

National objectives

6.2 Australia’s geography, population, culture, international political relations and military alliances, along with other factors, strongly influence the way in which the ADF conducts military operations.

6.3 The government takes a whole-of-nation approach to national security. This is critical to ensuring that limited national resources, including the ADF, are used to maximum effect when deterring and defeating attacks on Australia and contributing to the global community.

Multinational environment

6.4 While Australia’s defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia and unique strategic interests there is the capacity to do more when required. Through the maintenance of alliances and international relationships, Defence contributes to military actions to uphold global security and a rules-based international order.

6.5 In this multinational environment the ADF operates with the armed forces of other countries and, where appropriate, leads multinational operations. This includes not only operations with allies, but also with the armed forces of other nations whose training, doctrine, organisational culture
and equipment may be very different to that of the ADF. For detailed information see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.3—*Multinational Operations*.

**PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

6.6 Principles of war are time proven and fundamentally important to achieving success. The principles are relevant irrespective of changes over time in the methods, techniques, weapons of war and Australia’s geo-strategic position. Annex A describes the principles of war in detail.

6.7 The principles are:

• selection and maintenance of the aim,
• concentration of force,
• cooperation,
• offensive action,
• security,
• surprise,
• flexibility,
• economy of effort,
• sustainment, and
• morale.
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE APPROACH TO WARFARE

6.8 As a result of the national and international environment in which the ADF operates, the ADF approach to warfighting is a combination of the following:

• manoeuvre,
• interoperability,
• networking, and
• decision superiority.

Manoeuvre

6.9 Manoeuvre theory emphasises the shattering, or at least disruption, of the adversary’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than concentrating on destruction of adversary materiel or the holding of territory.

6.10 Manoeuvre theory also emphasises the need for the ADF to take the initiative, and to apply overwhelming pressure, at times and places (and in ways) the adversary least expects. The ADF focuses on achieving the precise application of decisive effort—incorporating use of surprise where possible—against accurately identified critical vulnerabilities.

6.11 Manoeuvre theory is also preferred for reasons of comparative advantage. It is essentially a fluid form of warfare. It confers advantages to the force that has relative strengths in the areas of:

• speed and flexibility in decision making;
• devolution of decision making at the operational and tactical levels;
• intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
• mobility;
• innovative training, doctrine and procedures;
• versatility in weapons and personnel;
• adequate and flexible logistic and combat support; and
• familiarity with the terrain, climatic factors and the operational environment generally.
Interoperability

6.12 Interoperability is a critical enabler for the ADF. It defines the extent of force integration and cooperation within the ADF and with non ADF forces. Although comparatively small, the ADF participates in, and even leads, multinational operations in support of national security objectives. The ability of the ADF to operate alongside other defence forces is an important political consideration.

6.13 The ADF therefore aims to achieve an appropriate level of interoperability with other defence forces. The degree of interoperability that is required is a matter of judgement, and varies from country to country, from Service to Service, and from element to element within each Service. ADF interoperability with other forces is achieved through regular interaction with regional and allied forces, and comprehensive supporting policies (for example, foreign language training of ADF personnel).

6.14 The ADF has a relatively high level of interoperability with the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand as a result of commonality of equipment and, more importantly, from interoperable procedures, common language, familiarity with each other’s modes of operation and shared values. However, the ADF has a lesser degree of interoperability with regional countries; such interoperability that does exist is mostly with Association of South-East Asian Nations countries and Papua New Guinea.

Networking

6.15 A networked force derives its power from the effective linking or networking of systems to support the conduct of operations. This is characterised by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to create a high level of integration that can be exploited via self-synchronisation and other networked capabilities.

6.16 The continued development of networked intelligence capabilities is a high priority for the ADF, where intelligence elements from the strategic to the tactical levels share common procedures and are linked by secure communication systems.

6.17 Networking a force facilitates decision superiority. It helps the force to generate tempo, be agile and manoeuvre. At the same time it achieves a balance between the science of war (using technology for maximum effect) and the art of war (human capability).
Decision superiority

6.18 Decision superiority is vital to the successful application of manoeuvre theory and networked forces. Achieving decision superiority depends on:

- a comprehensive, Defence-wide information systems architecture, so that information is captured, processed and presented in ways that allow timely and accurate assessments and decisions;
- professional mastery in the management, interpretation and application of information; and
- a culture of command and control that emphasises boldness, initiative, delegation of authority and flexibility in decision making.

6.19 Decision superiority assists the commander to make and implement more informed and accurate decisions while using tempo and leverage to best effect. In this way, commanders orchestrate the application of the combat power at their disposal to maximise opportunities.

VALUES BASED LEADERSHIP

Waste no more time arguing what a good man should be. Be one.

Marcus Aurelius

6.20 Defence leadership is based on values, provides clear examples for behaviour and supports making appropriate choices in tough situations. Values are the essence of Defence and set the norms for behaviour and decision making.

Defence values

6.21 Defence values reflect the long traditions and distinctive identities of the Navy, Army, Air Force and the Australian Public Service (APS). Without diminishing the existing single-Service and APS values, or their use, specific Defence values provide a common and unifying thread for all people working in Defence. Defence’s values are:

- **Professionalism**—striving for excellence.
- **Loyalty**—being committed to each other and to Defence, in serving the government of the day.
- **Integrity**—doing what is right.
Courage—the strength of character to honour convictions (moral courage) and bravery in the face of personal harm (physical courage).

Innovation—actively looking for better ways of doing business.

Teamwork—working together with respect, trust and a sense of collective purpose.

6.22 The ADF recognises the importance of leadership in maximising operational effectiveness. Commanders and their staff set the example for others to follow, through their integrity, courage, respect and compassion.

6.23 Values based leadership helps the ADF to maintain morale and avoid wasted effort, and inspires superior performance. In most operations senior commanders are in a position to convey only guidance and so rely on the leadership of their subordinate commanders to achieve the mission.

6.24 ADDP 00.6—Leadership explores the role of leadership in Defence and the ADF.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

6.25 The ADF operates as a joint force by employing six joint warfighting functions related to the operational and tactical levels of joint operations.

6.26 The six joint warfighting functions are:

- command,
- situational understanding,
- force generation and sustainment,
- force projection,
- force protection, and
- force application.

Command

6.27 Command, including control, is exercised across strategic, operational and tactical levels. These levels reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing resources allocated to the management of the operational environment. Although developed with war in mind, the levels of command can apply to all military activity across the range of operations.
6.28 The command and control arrangements of the ADF reflect fundamental principles. These principles are:

- **Unity of command.** For clarity and simplicity there is a single, recognised command authority to respond to directions from a higher commander, and in turn issue directions to subordinates.

- **Span of command.** There is an optimal range and complexity of subordinate elements so that the commander operates and commands competently.

- **Redundancy.** There are alternative commanders and headquarters (as appropriate) nominated at all levels of command to provide redundancy.

- **Delegation of command.** The authority for subordinates to conduct assigned tasks.

- **Control of significant resources.** Delegation of resources and authority to task to the level of command that can best use them.

- **Obligation to subordinates.** To consider the interests of subordinates for health, welfare, morale and discipline of personnel.

**Situational understanding**

6.29 Situational understanding (SU) is essential to the successful application of manoeuvre theory. SU plays an important role in alerting Defence planners to the nature and scale of existing or emerging security threats to Australia and its interests, and is an essential prerequisite for the conduct of campaigns and operations. SU is a function of the following areas:

- **Intelligence.** Intelligence provides commanders and staff with an understanding of the operational environment and the adversary to support the conduct of campaigns and operations. Intelligence is the result of the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, interpretation and dissemination of information.

- **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).** ISR operations, or collection operations, are driven by the commander’s need for information to support decision superiority. The intelligence process is both a driver of collection operations and a user of the information collected.
Counterintelligence (CI). CI concerns those activities that identify, monitor and counteract the threat to security posed by organisations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, criminal activities or other attacks on Australia’s defence system. CI also aims to counteract and exploit the adversary’s ISR capability while concealing our own force elements from adversary ISR operations.

Information and knowledge management. Information management aims to provide the right information at the right time, to the right person, to support the decision making process while avoiding information overload. Knowledge management refers to the processes used to analyse, corroborate and refine information in support of the decision making process. Effective information and knowledge management improves situational understanding, accelerates the decision making process and supports the precise application of force. Information and knowledge management includes all activities involved in the identification, collection, filtering, fusing, processing, focusing, dissemination and usage of information. A commander’s critical information requirements provide the basis for information and knowledge management, as well as preventing information overload.

Geospatial information and services (GI&S). GI&S is the definition, assessment, collection, management, exploitation and dissemination of information about objects and attributes in space and time. GI&S helps define the operational environment and plays a key role in achieving objectives across the spectrum of conflict.

Strategic communication. Strategic communication is a term describing a range of activities in the information and cognitive domains to achieve information effects within the operational environment. Strategic communication aims to mould the perceptions and behaviour of a target audience in support of national objectives.

Force generation and sustainment

6.30 Personnel. The ADF is small in number and concentrates on the skills, values and quality of its personnel to maximise its combat power. The three Service Chiefs have responsibility to raise, train and sustain the force in being by:

- maintaining high levels of training, including multi-skilling;
- Implementing proactive recruitment and retention policies to maintain appropriate overall personnel levels, and to maintain appropriate age, rank, skill and fitness profiles;
• ensuring a high standard of arrangements for the care and protection of the force, and ensuring the protection of support arrangements for the force;

• ensuring personnel have appropriate, high quality and high-technology equipment;

• ensuring a high level and standard of commercial support from the civilian infrastructure and work force to provide support services to the ADF; and

• investing in reserve forces to ensure that an appropriate peacetime level of capability is sustained and can be drawn upon in time of crisis. This investment provides the ADF with key skills to complement and supplement its full time forces.

6.31 Equipment. Defence has a continuous capital equipment program which enables the ADF to have a capability edge and to maintain interoperability with key defence allies. Defence tends to select equipment which will perform in a range of roles and operational environments. Due to the high cost of military equipment, especially latest generation, the ADF tends to hold equipment in small ‘packets’.

6.32 Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, including personnel support and the communication and information systems needed to maintain and prolong operations until objectives are achieved. Sustainment planning considerations include industry capability, distance, destination, demand, duration, threat levels, available resources, priorities and risk.

Force projection

6.33 Movement and manoeuvre (force projection) allow friendly forces to exploit the operational environment while denying the same freedom to an adversary. Force projection encompasses a number of tasks, including:

• deployment, regrouping, assembly or movement of joint forces within the operational and tactical areas by any means (air, land or sea) to achieve objectives; and

• counter-mobility to delay, impede, channel or stop an adversary from effectively moving or manoeuvring, which may include sanctions, embargoes or blockades.
**Force protection**

6.34 Force protection is defined as all measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. Force protection encompasses all measures (except offensive operations to defeat an adversary) taken to protect the capability of a force from operational, environmental and occupational threats.

6.35 Each force protection measure adopted may provide protection against one or more threats. Measures include: nuclear, biological and chemical defence; fratricide prevention; joint personnel recovery; explosive ordnance disposal and mine awareness; personal protective equipment; fire and road safety; environmental health and preventative medicine; casualty treatment; radar warning receivers, early warning, counterintelligence and security activities; concealment and manoeuvre; and cyber security and network defence.

**Force application**

6.36 Force application is the primary purpose of a defence force. Careful military planning is essential and required to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives. Planning is divided into deliberate and immediate.

- Deliberate planning is the process of developing military strategic guidance to achieve the government’s national strategic objectives. The process is generally free of time constraints. It relies on a mix of assumption-based planning against current strategic guidance and futures analysis to account for possible future strategic environments.

- Immediate planning is time sensitive planning for the use of force application in response to a developing situation. This planning is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds.

6.37 Force application gains and retains the initiative. Successful action contributes significantly to the maintenance of own force morale and may reduce the morale of the adversary.

6.38 All action has the potential for loss or damage to own force elements and morale. In keeping with the manoeuvre approach, offensive action contributes positively to achieving the overall end state and attacking the adversary’s centre of gravity. Joint fire support, targeting, air defence, interdiction and information operations are important parts of force application.
6.39 ADDP 3.0—Campaigns and Operations provides further detail on the joint warfighting functions.

Annex:
A. Principles of war
PRINCIPLES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. Selection and maintenance of the aim is listed first because it is the overriding principle of war. The subsequent principles are presented in no particular order of importance, though they may vary in relative importance from one situation to another.

Selection and maintenance of the aim

2. Military action is never an end in itself; it is always a means to an end. It is of fundamental importance that the end always be kept clearly in view. This key principle applies equally at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

3. The aim of any military action should be selected carefully and articulated clearly. In order to lead to success, the military aim must be clear, simple, achievable and morally justifiable. The importance of each criterion for selection of aim cannot be overemphasised.

4. Selection of the aim is important because it will strongly influence the parameters of military action—the means, political timing and other constraints. Clear articulation of the aim provides a basis for checking the consistency of military actions at each level of warfare, and of plans for military actions, with the overarching aim. In this way the aim is maintained.

5. In a shifting, turbulent and complex political environment, problems can arise from the existence of single and multiple political aims, principal and subsidiary aims, conflicting aims and changing aims. Complexities and uncertainties of this type only reinforce the need for a clear articulation of the purpose of any military action. Only by such articulation can military action be directed to best effect.

Concentration of force

6. Concentration of superior force is the ability to apply force at the right place, at the right time, and in such a way as to achieve a decisive result.
7. Concentration of force is not merely a matter of numbers and firepower but also of superior combat skills, mobility, timing, selection of objectives, leadership, morale and the effective employment of advanced technology. Thus, a nation’s total combat power is not just the sum of its individual combat power elements. Combat power also depends critically on a range of qualitative and organisational factors; these factors collectively determine how well the individual power elements are combined and harnessed to achieve the overall level of force.

8. Concentration of force, along with the application of other principles of war, can enable a seemingly inferior force to defeat a potentially superior adversary.

**Cooperation**

9. Cooperation entails the coordination of all activities to achieve an optimum combined effort. Cooperation requires goodwill and the desire to cooperate at all levels within each Service, between Services, with the government and the community, and with allies and other friendly forces. Cooperation is as essential in planning and preparation during peacetime as it is during conflict.

10. Within the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and in the ADF’s relations with other forces, cooperation is greatly enhanced by the maintenance of joint and combined interoperability. In the broader national sense, comprehensive civil-military relationships, structures and procedures, such as tried and tested crisis management arrangements, are essential to effective cooperation. Cooperation is an effective means of combining the principles of concentration of force and economy of effort.

**Offensive action**

11. Offensive action is the use of lethal/non lethal means for a force to gain and retain the initiative. Offensive action is essential in most circumstances to the achievement of victory.

12. It is important to maintain a spirit of offensive action even in a defensive situation. This is not to be interpreted as licence for rashness that endangers one’s own forces unnecessarily or recklessly. But maintenance of a spirit of boldness and offensive action is vital if forces and commanders are to exploit opportunities to capitalise on adversary weaknesses, and to seize and hold the initiative. Offensive action contributes to the morale of one’s own forces and, if vigorously pursued, can shatter the cohesion of an adversary.
Security

13. Security is vital to:
   a. allowing own forces the freedom of action to operate effectively with minimal interference from the adversary, and
   b. denying the adversary an advantage.

14. Security may be achieved by such measures as sea denial, defence of vulnerable bases and entry points, protection of vital infrastructure, protection of information and communication systems, holding adequate reserves of forces, gaining air superiority or guarding flanks to achieve freedom of action.

15. Security needs to be held in tension with other principles of war, such as economy of effort and offensive action. Security does not imply undue caution at the expense of bold action. Rather, proper security allows offensive action a greater chance of success. Security is also often closely linked to the achievement of surprise.

Surprise

16. Surprise is a most powerful influence in operations. Surprise can wrest the initiative from the adversary; help reduce casualties from one’s own offensive actions; sow confusion, dismay and fear in the adversary; paralyse, at least temporarily, the adversary’s decision making processes; degrade their will; and interrupt the rhythm of the adversary’s offensive actions.

17. Every effort must be made to surprise the adversary and to guard against being taken by surprise (in this there is a close connection with the principle of security). Surprise can produce results out of all proportion to the effort expended.

18. Surprise is becoming easier to achieve because of the development of stealth technologies and night vision equipment, and harder to achieve because of developments in intelligence technologies that improve a force’s situational understanding.

19. When other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to the success of an operation. Surprise may be achieved through specialised tactics; simplicity, audacity and originality in planning and action; speed of action; the employment of technology; and the skilled use of deception.
20. The likelihood of achieving surprise can be increased through the application of targeted measures and techniques, including counterintelligence, operational security, counter-surveillance, concealment, deception and other measures to destroy, neutralise or deceive the adversary’s intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities.

21. The use of surprise is positively correlated with other principles of war, such as offensive action, security and morale.

Flexibility

22. Flexibility in operations is the capacity to adapt plans to take unforeseen circumstances into account to ensure success in the face of friction, unexpected resistance or setbacks, or to capitalise on unexpected opportunities. It is achieved by:

   a. **Planning.** All operational plans should be sufficiently flexible to allow commanders to expect the unexpected. Plans should always allow commanders some leeway to modify the ways and means of an operation in the face of unexpected developments, to allow the end to be achieved.

   b. **Combat support.** Combat support capabilities such as communications, transport and other logistic support should be flexible. In this way, forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at the critical time and in the critical location.

   c. **Decision making.** Importantly, the decision making process also needs to be flexible. This flexibility comes from a culture of delegation of decision making. This in turn requires a combination of high quality training of commanders, and a command culture that rewards sound judgement, initiative, resourcefulness, lateral thinking and boldness. Commanders at all levels need to have a clear understanding of their superior commanders’ intent, so that their decisions are directed toward achieving the operational objective.

Economy of effort

23. Economy of effort is the prudent allocation and application of only those resources needed to achieve the desired results. Economy of effort is needed as a means of balancing competing requirements. The more effective a force is in economising its allocation of resources in one place, the more resources are thereby released to permit concentration of force elsewhere. Economy of effort maximises the contribution of resources to the achievement or the maintenance of the aim.
Sustainment

24. Sustainment includes all support arrangements necessary to implement military strategies and operational plans. These arrangements include those logistic and personnel aspects necessary for the efficient support of a force. Force support arrangements are an integral part of an operation.

25. The art of sustainment lies in making the best use of limited resources, in improvising, in taking calculated risks where necessary and in overcoming any obstacles that arise.

26. Sustainment arrangements must allow for unforeseen circumstances and give all necessary freedom of action to the commander in carrying out a plan. Good sustainment arrangements can be vital to the achievement of an aim and play an important part in maintaining morale.

Morale

27. Morale is an essential element of combat power. High morale engenders courage, energy, cohesion, endurance, steadfastness, determination and a bold, offensive spirit. In any given situation, military success may depend as much on morale as on material advantages. Morale of the fighting force is an embodiment of the national will to resist aggression and coercion.

28. The basis of military morale includes primarily a clear understanding of, and belief in, the aim. Those personnel involved must have a conviction about the necessity, legality and morality of an operation. High morale is built and maintained by effective leadership, good training, appropriate discipline, good sustainment arrangements and confidence in the support of the Australian people.

29. History abounds with examples demonstrating that effective leadership will sustain high morale even when all other factors are against it.

30. Actions taken to destroy the adversary’s morale directly through combat, and indirectly through psychological operations, are an important means of reducing the adversary’s combat effectiveness. Conversely, actions taken to sustain popular support for the ADF, through public information and other activities, can also play an important role in maintaining morale.
CHAPTER 7

PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILISATION

Executive summary

- Preparedness is part of the deliberate planning process that provides options for government to deal with issues and events that affect Australia’s national interests.
- Mobilisation is a natural extension of preparedness in that it is the transitioning of forces from the deliberate planning for preparedness to the conduct of specific operations.

INTRODUCTION

7.1 The Australian Government expects that the primary focus of Defence will be to deter or defeat threats to Australia’s unique strategic interests by preparing appropriate military forces and associated support that will provide the government with options to respond across a range of possible contingencies, now and into the future. These expectations of government are directed by the Minister for Defence under the authority of the Defence Act 1903, and providing for them is called Defence preparedness; a part of the Defence deliberate planning process.

PREPAREDNESS

7.2 Historically, preparedness doctrine in Defence has been based purely on training for the conduct of armed conflict. However, government expectations increasingly include tasks that employ Defence’s unique skills and capabilities in situations that cater to wider national interests. These activities can vary from deterring the onset of an emerging issue, to conducting armed conflict, to policing and humanitarian assistance and other activities as directed. Government also expects Defence to acknowledge the cost of conducting these activities.

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1 Deterrence activities are those activities, including international engagement and military presence, which aim to influence the thinking of regional players and shape the geo-strategic environment to Australia’s advantage, particularly in terms of avoiding armed conflict.

2 The Minister for Defence issues a Ministerial Directive to Secretary of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force.
7.3 Defence preparedness is the central unifying/organising concept for articulating the Chief of the Defence Force's performance expectations to meet the Defence business model output of a prepared joint force-in-being (JFIB). It mandates the management of Defence preparedness through an integrated, future focused, whole-of-Defence performance management approach, which can adapt to changes in Australia’s strategic environment.

7.4 Defence preparedness comprises two components: an overarching definition, and supporting detail, which provides necessary context.

7.5 Defence preparedness is defined as the sustainable capacity of Defence to deliver a prepared JFIB, able to accomplish directed tasks and provide contributions to government for emerging issues and events that affect Australia’s national interests.

7.6 This is achieved through a whole-of-Defence governance system of preparedness management:

- which provides Defence resources to understand and shape Australia’s strategic environment;
- which efficiently provides effective JFIB contributions, within the limits of allocated resources, to meet government’s requirements in response to changes in Australia’s strategic environment;
- which requires the coordination of force generation activities to achieve prescribed training standards (competencies and currencies) for both baseline and more immediate short term preparedness requirements; and
- which comprehends the constraints and limitations of the JFIB and its supporting capabilities, as a basis for expansion through mobilisation, should strategic circumstances deteriorate or a substantial threat eventuate.
MOBILISATION

7.7 Mobilisation is a natural extension of preparedness in that it is the transitioning of forces from the deliberate planning for preparedness to the conduct of a specific operation or operations, irrespective of scale. This period essentially puts the finishing touches onto the preparedness training regimes to ensure that the selected forces being deployed do so at minimum acceptable levels of risk. Requirements during this period can vary greatly depending on the emerging contingency, from the deployment of a single individual to the whole-of-nation involvement. Defence is required to undertake adequate mobilisation planning in order to have appropriate strategies in place, and to assess the issues associated with mobilisation.

7.8 As it is difficult to foretell emerging contingencies, mobilisation and the conduct of subsequent new operations are not catered for in the Defence budget. The financial impact on Defence of mobilisation and the subsequent conduct of operations is usually reduced by government supplementation. However, in order to accurately assess supplementation needs, Defence must be able to attribute its total costs across its outputs to government. While mobilisation and operations are not strictly part of preparedness, they must all be managed in concert to ensure that the real cost of meeting government expectations can be recognised.

7.9 Defence preparedness and its management is a complex business, and in its entirety consumes an overwhelming majority of the Defence budget and effort. To sustain all these activities over time, preparedness processes must support the balancing of the immediate costs of operations\(^3\) against the medium term costs of sustainment, the longer term costs of coping with obsolescence and the requisite ongoing cost of providing administrative support. Therefore, Defence must also have appropriately organised support resources and a decision support system that assists senior leadership in achieving this balance.

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\(^3\) Operations refers to campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises and other activities as directed by the Chief of the Defence Force.
7.10 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.2—Preparedness and Mobilisation explains the concepts relating to Defence preparedness and mobilisation, while the Defence Preparedness Manual describes how Defence manages preparedness in the short, medium and long term. While there is a necessary focus on the Australian Defence Force and military preparedness, the rest of Defence plays a vital part in the sustainability of Defence’s ability to conduct operations. These concepts, therefore, should be extrapolated across all of Defence, including Defence civilians and contractors, in determining performance requirements in support of Defence outputs. To more fully understand the principles and processes of Defence preparedness and mobilisation, ADDP 00.2 must be read in conjunction with the Defence Preparedness Manual and the Chief of the Defence Force Preparedness Directive.
CHAPTER 8

EPILOGUE

Executive summary

- Doctrine needs to evolve to meet future challenges.
- The Australian Defence Force (ADF) needs to remain cognisant of domestic and international developments of significance.
- Doctrine supports all operations, both planned and conducted.

8.1 The regional and global strategic environment within which doctrine must be put into effect is constantly changing. The fluidity of the external environment puts a premium on the ADF’s ability to be flexible and agile.

8.2 To achieve this, and based on the Australian approach to warfare, the ADF needs to develop and maintain a high level of professional mastery in a wide range of warfighting skills and in skills at conducting many kinds of military support operations. The ADF also needs to be alert to domestic and international developments as they unfold so that it can anticipate and assess the military implications of these developments.

8.3 In carrying out the policies and tasks directed by government, Defence needs to display a high level of internal organisation and adeptness in operating, cooperating and liaising with a wide range of military and non-military organisations and sectors. These organisations and sectors include Australian private industry (especially defence industry), State and Territory governments, other Commonwealth government departments and agencies, the general public, the mass media, the defence forces of other nation-states, and supranational bodies such as the United Nations.

8.4 A mark of the ADF’s flexibility is its ability to offer the government a range of options on possible military responses to defence contingencies. The more the ADF is able to do this, the more the government will be able to respond to such contingencies with a suitable military option (where a military response is appropriate) and be able to deal with a situation using the optimal mix of military and non-military actions.
8.5 Good doctrine and training are essential parts of the development of a flexible and agile defence force. The purpose of doctrine and training is not to produce personnel who respond to situations in a predictable, unimaginative and doctrinaire way. However, in the absence of good doctrine and training, the ADF would risk responding to situations in an entirely intuitive, uninformed way. The purpose of doctrine and training is to educate commanders so that they can make timely, well informed judgements, and exercise initiative and resourcefulness, against the background of a solid understanding of the art and science of military campaigns and operations.

8.6 In a turbulent world, no nation-state can fireproof itself against the threat of external military coercion or attack. However, a state can maximise its security from such threats by implementing policies and undertaking activities that foster regional and global security, and by strengthening the domestic factors that influence national security. In particular, a nation-state needs to maintain professional military forces that have an effective and sustainable military capability.

8.7 As outlined in this document, the ADF has an important and, in many respects, unique contribution to make in safeguarding and promoting Australia’s national security. The ADF can best maximise its contribution to national security (within available resources) by focusing on the development of professional mastery, especially with regard to warfighting skills. It can also maximise its contribution by ensuring that its personnel, equipment, organisational arrangements and culture, military-political relationships, military-civil relationships and doctrine are highly developed and well maintained.
GLOSSARY

The source for approved Defence terms, definitions and abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Restricted Network at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/. Note: The ADG is updated regularly and should be checked for amendments to the entries in this glossary.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

armed conflict
Conflict between States in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims. It may also embrace conflict between a State and organised, disciplined and uniformed groups within the State, such as organised resistance movements. This definition has been addressed separately.

assigned forces
Forces-in-being which have been placed under the operational command or operational control of a commander.

attrition
The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel.

belligerent
In time of crisis or war, an individual, entity, military force or state engaged in conflict.

attrition warfare
A style of warfare characterised by the application of substantial combat power that reduces an adversary’s ability to fight through loss of personnel and materiel. Essentially, it aims at the physical destruction of the adversary.

campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area.

capstone doctrine
The single, foundational doctrine publication which sits at the apex of the doctrine hierarchy, and from which all other doctrine is derived.
coalition operation
Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

go coercion
The use or threat of force to persuade an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour against their wishes.

collateral damage
Incidental damage to persons, objects or locations arising out of combat action against a legitimate military objective.

collective defence
Where two or more sovereign states form a system of international organisation directed against threats to a specified area from an outside source, and intended as a system of self-defence, not as a system to keep the peace anywhere it happens to be threatened.

collective security
Where a group of sovereign states form a general system of organisation designed to deal with peace as an indivisible entity; therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire group of states, which must agree in advance both to react to such a threat and how to react against it.

combat power
The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.

combat service support (CSS)
The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.

combined operation
An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together.
command
The authority which a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Note
1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
2. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

conflict
A politico-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organised political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods.

control
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

deterrence
The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act.

doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

end state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates the objective has been achieved.

formation
An ordered arrangement of troops and/or vehicles for a specific purpose.

general war
Global armed conflict between the superpowers and their allies; generally limited to the use of conventional forces, although tactical and/or theatre nuclear weapons may be employed.
insurgency
An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

interoperability
The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

joint (J)
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate.

keystone doctrine
The principal doctrine publication in each doctrine series. Keystone publications support the capstone doctrine, and provide a framework for all subordinate doctrine publications in that series.

logistics
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel;
- transport of personnel;
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
- acquisition or furnishing of services; and
- medical and health service support.

manoeuvre
Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the adversary, in order to accomplish the mission.
manoeuvre warfare
A philosophy that seeks to collapse the enemy’s cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

military strategy
That component of national or multinational strategy presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

mission
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

mobilisation
The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources.

mobility
A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission.

multinational operations
A military action conducted by forces of two or more nations, undertaken within the structure of a coalition, an alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation such as the United Nations.

Note
It is used to encompass all related terms such as allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral.

national security
The ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption from outside, and to control its borders.

offensive operations
Military operations conducted for the purpose of seizing or retaining the initiative.
operational authority
The authority granted to a commander to use the operational capability of a unit to undertake a mission. This authority is granted without qualification and is described as either operational command or operational control.

operational command (OPCOMD)
The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration.

operational control (OPCON)
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

operational level of conflict
The operational level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

Note
It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

operation
A designated military activity using lethal and/or non-lethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes in accordance with national legal obligations and constraints.

peace enforcement (PE)
A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially.
peacekeeping (PK)
A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by a peace support force is normally limited to self-defence.

preparedness
The sustainable capacity of Defence to deliver a prepared joint force-in-being able to accomplish directed tasks and provide contributions to government for emerging issues and events that affect Australia’s national interests.

regional conflict
A conflict where the fighting is contained within a particular geographic area. Its political and economic effects, however, may reverberate further afield and there may be involvement from beyond the region, such as the supply of military equipment, advisers and/or volunteers by third parties.

reserve force (RF)
Personnel, units or formations earmarked for future use on mobilisation or against an operational requirement, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement.

security
Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, annoyance or surprise.

situational understanding
The accurate interpretation of a situation and the likely actions of groups and individuals within it. Awareness, analysis, knowledge, comprehension and judgement facilitate understanding, which enables timely and accurate decision making.

spectrum of conflict
The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war.

strategic level of conflict
That level of war which is concerned with the art and science of employing national power.

strike
An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective.
surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means.

tactical level of conflict
The planning and conduct of battle, characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

tempo
The rate or rhythm of activity relative to the adversary, and incorporating the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another.

terrorism
The use or threatened use of violence for political ends, or any use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.

theatre
A designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted.

Note
A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operation.

unit
A military element whose structure is prescribed by a competent authority.

whole-of-government
Denotes government departments and agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADFP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Australian Public Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Chief of Army</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Chief of Air Force</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDG</td>
<td>Chief Capability Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief Defence Scientist</td>
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<td>CEO DMO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer Defence Material Organisation</td>
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<td>CFO</td>
<td>Chief Financial Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>communication and information systems</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
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<td>CJOPS</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<td>CN</td>
<td>Chief of Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSC</td>
<td>Chiefs of Service Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCIRC</td>
<td>Defence Capability and Investment Review Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPSEC DS</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary Defence Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPSEC I &amp; S</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPSEC PSP</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary People Strategies and Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPSEC S</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defence planning guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIC</td>
<td>fundamental inputs to capability</td>
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<td>GBR</td>
<td>the United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI&amp;S</td>
<td>geospatial information and services</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance/disaster relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>information and communications technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JFIB</td>
<td>joint force-in-being</td>
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<td>JPR</td>
<td>joint personnel recovery</td>
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<td>LOAC</td>
<td>law of armed conflict</td>
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<td>NZL</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>QSR</td>
<td>Quarterly Strategic Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
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<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAC</td>
<td>Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Command Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>situational understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCDF</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>WoG</td>
<td>whole-of-government</td>
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