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Mastery Learning and Assessment in Naval Training
Dear Sir,

I am writing to you reference the article ‘Mastery Learning and Assessment in Naval Training’ by Lieutenant Commander L. H. Pyke RANR.

I would like to congratulate the officer on this article which described in detail the importance of Mastery Learning to Naval Training.

However, there was one area that was given little attention in the article. This was the production of sequences of exercises for Mastery Learning. Reference is made to “list the important steps and pick out the key points”. At a later point we read of “learning activities to assist the student to achieve the objectives”. I believe that we should be well past the point of making vague references to “learning activities”.

Apart from this, I value what has been written by Lieutenant Commander Pyke. Could I challenge the officer to write further on this topic. If modular Mastery Learning is to be integrated closely with the Training System, then a number of key points have to be resolved. I would like to ask the following of Lieutenant Commander Pyke:

- At what point in the Training System should the management of Mastery Learning be commenced?
- Does the Training System leave too much to the Instructor in the management of Mastery Learning?

These are areas in which I have become interested in recent years.

B. D. COPELAND
Major

Armed Forces and Society
Dear Sir,

The Australian Study Group on Armed Forces and Society is holding its 1984 Conference at the Canberra College of Advanced Education on 27 July, 1984. The theme is “Technological Change — Implications for Policy Makers, The Services and the Public”.

Papers will be presented on the following issues: technology and defence planning; technology and personnel issues; the media, mass communications and defence; and technology and combat effectiveness.

The Study Group will shortly be advising details of the conference, using its standard mailing list. Anyone who wishes to confirm his/her place on the mailing list, or wishes further information, should write to me or telephone on (062) 52 2705.

N. A. JANS
Lieutenant Colonel

EDITOR’S NOTE:

Lieutenant Colonel Jans may be contacted at:
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Belconnen ACT, 2616

Institution of Diagnostic Engineers
Dear Sir,

We would be most obliged if you would kindly announce (or include in your relevant ‘Diary’ page) that we are holding our FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION over the four days 4, 5, 6, 7 September 1984 at the City Conference Centre, 76 Mark Lane, London.

We were formed in April 1981 and appear to meet a need in industry in that we have enrolled over 3000 members in the 2 ½ years of our existence. Such members come from all industries and cover a wide range of occupations and distinctions. We have Professors from the University of Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from Brazil, Canada, Australia, Egypt, Greece and Poland. We have a Sergeant Instructor from the Nigerian Air Force, a Group Captain from the Sri Lankan Air Force (as also from our own R.A.F.), a retired Admiral from South Africa and a lady NCO in the Women’s Royal Air Force. We have many Chief Engineers, Consulting Engineers and Field Service Engineers, laboratory technicians, computer technicians, automobile engineers, marine engineers, aircraft engineers, print engineers, radio engineers etc. (continued on page 14)
THE KITCHENER VISIT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MILITARY COLLEGE

By Major J. L. Mordike, RAAOC

On 2 June 1909 the Fusionist Cabinet was sworn in under the capable and enlightened leadership of Alfred Deakin. It was a time of bitter division and disruption in Federal politics and the Fusionists, attempting to oppose Labor by joining the forces of hitherto divided conservative elements, proved to be uneasy bed-fellows. As Deakin immediately turned to defence matters there can be little doubt that he perceived the issue to be a focal point of unification for political factions and the somewhat apathetic Australian public. Since the Japanese annihilation of the Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima in May 1905, Australians, perhaps with a twinge of guilt, believed increasingly that White Australia might need sturdier barriers than restrictive immigration legislation. Major E. L. Piesse, subsequently Director of Intelligence in the Prime Minister’s Department during World War I, recalled the significance the Japanese victory held for Australians:

In no country did the success of Japan against Russia in 1905 produce a greater impression than in Australia. That war revealed to us a power with vast and efficient armaments on land and sea, distant only 2,000 to 3,000 miles from our northern coast, its population of unexampled patriotism ten times as numerous as ours and already as large as its resources seemed able to support.

It was in June 1905, during a Federal election campaign, that Deakin drew attention to Australia’s inadequate defence measures in a striking interview for the Melbourne Herald. In this interview, the man who was about to become Prime Minister of Australia until the end of 1908 and again in mid-1909, pointed to the changed balance of power in the northern Pacific as a result of the Japanese victory. Under Deakin’s leadership the new Government therefore integrated the design of a national defence force into its programme of laying the foundation of a new society — a society which reflected the aspirations and ideals of the nationalist movement. As well as expressing unique Australian social attitudes in their legislation, Deakin’s Government displayed its sensitivity to nationalist sentiment by promoting defence as a national responsibility. The new Prime Minister viewed subservience to the Admiralty for naval defence as being particularly offensive to the new nation’s pride and so the foundation stones of the Australian Navy were laid. In military matters, Deakin, wishing to avoid creation of an old world military caste, believed the answer lay in the creation of a compulsory and universal citizen militia. As with the naval issue, Deakin, whilst maintaining loyalty to Britain and the Empire, refused to adopt a supine posture of subservience to the Mother Country. Apart from satisfying national pride, the Australian Government from 1905 to 1908 adopted a defence policy which was primarily aimed at meeting an Asian invasion. But, in doing so, Deakin was making a statement of national independence which was contrary to Britain’s imperial policy. Britain’s policy for the Pacific region was based on a formal alliance with Japan and Deakin could only have felt uneasy when this alliance was renewed in August 1905.

In formulating their plans for military defence, Deakin’s Government had a difficult problem to overcome. Australia’s senior military staff officers looked to Britain rather than their own Government for policy and guidance and they were imbued with Britain’s ideas of imperial defence — they had no appreciation
of the Australian Government's anxieties for local defence and they adopted the conservative British stance of opposition to compulsory military training. Prominent amongst these senior officers was the Chief of Intelligence, Colonel William Throsby Bridges, who had been imbued with a sense of deferential imperialism by the British officer, Major-General Hutton, when Hutton had been the first General Officer Commanding Australia's military forces from 1901 to 1904. Bridges was also representative of the ring of military collaboration being deliberately developed by Britain throughout the Dominion forces. With the assistance of men like Hutton, Britain's objective was to gain Dominion acquiescence to imperial military plans. The Chief of Intelligence held a continual dialogue with his old master, Hutton, and in doing so Bridges illustrated his persistence in seeking guidance from British Army officers rather than the Australian Government.

In 1907 the Australian National Defence League's propaganda organ, CALL, cited Bridges as saying that the Swiss militia model, the basis of the citizen military scheme Deakin was promoting, depended for its success on an intense feeling of patriotism which certainly does pervade the Swiss nation, but is not, at present apparent, if existent in Australia. In a report Bridges submitted to Deakin in the same year he noted that the Swiss themselves were unhappy with their system and wished to extend the period of training for new conscripts. And when Deakin's original Defence Bill, incorporating his proposed scheme, was presented to the Parliament in September 1908, Bridges wrote to Hutton expressing the view that we can only hope that it will not pass and that ... It ... [was] ... iniquitous to leave everything to Regulations to prescribe — in a country where military opinion is of no weight against the popular view. Sensing the resistance to his military policy, Deakin ignored his senior Army personnel and committees. The Prime Minister selected a more junior officer, Major J. G. Legge, to work in conjunction with his Minister of Defence, Sir Thomas Ewing, and formulate plans for compulsory military service for the defence of Australia.

The nationalist sentiments on which Deakin's plans were based were echoed in a Morning Post article of 1907: There is a matured Australian sentiment that to secure effective local defence it is necessary to constitute an army on the lines that it is a duty, and not a hireling task, for the citizen to train himself to defend his country; that there should be no bright plumage and grand clothing to attract recruits; and that military skill rather than social position should be the first essential of leadership.

James Gordon Legge was born in London and attended Cranleigh School in Surrey before emigrating to Australia with his parents as a teenager. His secondary education was completed at Sydney Grammar School and from there he proceeded to Sydney University where, in 1884, he was admitted to the degree of Bachelor of Arts. In 1887 he attained the degree of Master of Arts and, in 1890, the degree of Bachelor of Laws. Having spent some time as a teacher at Sydney Boys' High School, Legge entered the legal profession during which time he displayed his capacity for industry by publishing a two-volume work on legal matters. Legge then turned to a full-time military career by taking a permanent commission in the rank of Captain in 1894 and five years later he was appointed to command the one and only New South Wales Infantry Company in the Boer War. This officer was in possession of qualifications and talent which could only have been rare amongst his military confreres and the official war historian for World War I was to describe the then General Legge as an Australian officer who had made his name by his administrative ability.

As well as his special talents, Legge had one further qualification which made him valuable to Deakin: since 1899 when he had delivered a paper at the United Services Institution in Sydney, titled "Suggestions for an Australian Defence Force", Legge had been an ardent advocate of universal military training, and was subsequently an active member of the Australian National Defence League. But,
significantly, Legge was also sympathetic to wider nationalist aspirations and in 1910 he was to remind the then Labour Minister of Defence, Senator George Pearce, that it was '... most necessary ...' to adapt military policy to Australian conditions '... where the methods of a Regular Army have to be modified to suit one composed of citizens, and where the class prejudices and sentiments of the Englishman must give place to the practical common sense and "judge a man on his merits" policy of good Australians ...'.

Legge, unlike his military superiors, had the intellectual capacity and understanding to develop the independent approach to military defence which accorded with the strategic and social sentiments of the Australian Government. To Deakin he could only have been a jewel in a sea of military dross and, in 1907, he commenced full-time work on Deakin's military scheme, being directly responsible to the Minister.

Legge continued to be involved with the training scheme until early 1911, including the brief period from November 1908 to June 1909 when the Fisher Labor Government was in office. His work was the basis of the amendments incorporated into the Defence Act in 1909 and, as well as introducing plans for universal military training, the amendments proposed the establishment of a military college for training professional officers to fill appointments as administrative and instructional staff in the scheme. The date of enactment was September 1909 and royal assent was given in December of the same year. By this time Legge had been promoted in rank to Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed as Quartermaster-General with the additional special duty of introducing the new scheme.

It was not the first time a military college had been proposed for Australia, but, until it had been decided to introduce universal training, there simply was not a sufficient requirement for officers to justify its establishment. In 1908, Bridges had advocated that an Australian college be established '... on the lines of West Point Academy in the United States or the Royal Military College in Canada [Kingston]' As might be expected, this was not an original recommendation, for Major-General Hutton, as commander of the Australian military forces in 1902, had advised the Australian Government that not only should an Australian college be based on West Point and Kingston but also '... the Great Public Schools of England ...'. Hutton, being an old Etonian, was recommending a type of education which was considered mandatory for military officers in Britain.

In July 1909, the month after becoming Prime Minister for the third time since 1903, Alfred Deakin formally invited the retiring Imperial Commander-in-Chief in India, Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, to visit Australia. Deakin explained that the object of the invitation was to have Kitchener '... inspect our ... [military] ... forces and fixed defences in order to advise this Government upon the best means of developing and perfecting the land defence of the country ... [so that] ... we should have much more confidence in completing our schemes'. The schemes to which Deakin referred were those which had largely been the product of Legge's work and which would be enacted before Kitchener arrived in December 1909 to commence his inspection. It might then be fairly asked what had motivated Deakin to act in this manner. The answer can only be in the faction-ridden and divisive nature of conservative politics at that time, as well as the general apathy of Australians. If Deakin and his new Minister of Defence, Joseph Cook, were to implement their military scheme they needed the support of politicians and the public; by enlisting the aid of Kitchener they were assured of both. The imperial warrior had achieved legendary status and from the moment the impending visit was announced Australia fairly buzzed with excitement; Deakin's invitation had been the act of an astute politician. But the point was apparently lost on the Bulletin when it observed with sarcasm that Deakin and Cook '... in tremulous and fear-stricken hesitation ... 'waited on' ... Herbert Kitchener, a man who was supposed to know something about army organization, to give them his valuable British opinion'. The Age more correctly judged the situation when it noted that the more conservative members of the Australian community had hitherto been opposed to the proposed universal training scheme but they '... enthusiastically supported the proposal to invite Lord Kitchener ... for no doubt they expected that his counsel would follow the lines of their old-fashioned Tory prejudices'.

...
Certainly Kitchener did not visit Australia without being fully briefed on the local defence situation and the proposed training scheme. He had been provided with all the information which was the basis of the 1909 Defence Act some months before his visit, as well as propaganda from the Australian National Defence League. But Kitchener had also indirectly received unsolicited advice from an Australian Army officer, Colonel William Throsby Bridges.

Bridges was born in Greenock, Scotland, the son of a Royal Navy officer and Mary Hill Throsby of the landed Throsby family from Moss Vale, New South Wales. He attended the Royal Naval School at New Cross in his early years. His family later moved to Canada and there Bridges attended Trinity College School to complete his secondary education. At that stage, intent on a career as an officer in the British Army, Bridges entered the Canadian Royal Military College, Kingston, but failed to complete successfully the second year of the three-year course. His failure to apply himself to his studies was most probably the direct result of a family financial crisis which caused them to settle in Moss Vale. Bridges, having become Kingston’s first ‘... drop-out ...’ — as one writer has referred to him, then followed the family to Australia where he began a period of inconspicuous employment in the civil service of New South Wales. After six years of such employment, and in response to the Sudan crisis of 1885, Bridges sought and achieved a commission in the New South Wales Artillery. It was an appointment that some claimed was strongly influenced by the support of the Colonial Secretary and acting Premier, W. B. Dalley, but, having achieved his aim, he did not manage to see active service in Egypt. Bridges, in contrast to Legge, embarked on his military career bereft of formal academic qualifications at the tertiary level and having failed his formal military training. Nevertheless, his immediate family connection with the Royal Navy and the colonial landed gentry made him an approximate, version of his British military counterparts; his social origins undoubtedly enhanced his acceptability to the British officers with whom he developed a special relationship throughout his career.

At the time of the invitation to Kitchener to visit and inspect the Australian military forces, Bridges was en route to London in the S.S. Oroya to take up a position as the Australian representative on the newly-formed Imperial General Staff. Whilst in Colombo on 30 June 1909 Bridges wrote to an acquaintance and British Army officer, Colonel G. M. Kirkpatrick, who was serving in India under Kitchener. Precisely what was contained in Bridges’ letter is not known, but Kirkpatrick’s reply from Simla on 8 July is of some interest. After commencing with the usual pleasantries, Kirkpatrick expressed satisfaction at Bridges’ appointment to the Imperial General Staff. He then continued by mentioning that he had heard that the Australian Government was seeking two British officers for service in Australia — one to become the Inspector-General to the Australian Army and the other to replace Bridges who had been the Australian Chief of the General Staff prior to his latest London appointment. But Bridges’ previous position had already been filled by Major-General Hoad, an Australian officer of known nationalist sympathies. Therefore, Kirkpatrick queried what that replacement officer was to do ‘... now that Hoad ... [was] ... CGS [Chief of the General Staff]?’ He then warned that ‘... Your selection will have to be very careful; for, if you don’t get the right man, the cause will be badly set back’. Whilst it is not stated in the letter there can be little doubt that Kirkpatrick’s ‘... cause ...’ related to the aim of the British General Staff to influence military policy in the Dominions and, in his new appointment at the War Office, Bridges would certainly be in a position to advise on the selection of officers for service in Australia. Kirkpatrick continued that he had ‘... always imagined that the Labour Party would be good administrators; and that he had found Bridges’ views on ... [Australia’s] ... new Minister ... [of Defence] ... Cook ... most interesting ... [and he further noted that] ... It will be curious to watch Deakin’s progress’. The British officer then finished his letter by mentioning that apparently arrangements were being made for Kitchener to visit Australia but he knew no details. The cable from Deakin officially inviting Kitchener was not despatched from Australia until the next day but its receipt obviously prompted Kirkpatrick to take greater interest in the contents of the original letter from Bridges.
On 15 July Kirkpatrick again wrote to Bridges informing him of the impending Kitchener visit and to:

Please regard the contents of this letter as absolutely for your own personal information. I read extracts of your letter of June 30th from Colombo to Lord K., who desired me to tell you that he was "exceedingly interested in your views;"... Without elaborating further, Kirkpatrick mentioned that Kitchener wished to take him to Australia and that approval was being sought. Deakin approved Kitchener's request and the British Colonel again wrote to Bridges on 2 September. In this letter he thanked the Australian officer for his "... most interesting letter..." of the 13 August and informed him that "... I shall look forward to hearing from you frequently now that it is settled that I accompany Lord K." Bridges was most probably taking the opportunity to ensure that Kitchener was appraised of his views on the Australian defence scheme.

The visit commenced at Darwin in late December 1909 and Kitchener was provided with the services of Legge as a result of this Australian officer's intimate knowledge of the proposed scheme and the local military situation. If Deakin had been seeking a focal point for public attention he was certainly successful. In spite of the Prime Minister's earlier assurances to the dour and taciturn imperial warrior that "... there will be little "fuss" apart from your military inspections...", Australia erupted into a frenzy of delight. His reception was similar to that afforded the visit of the American 'Great White Fleet' in 1908, and it may be assumed that similar emotions were excited: whilst Kitchener was a member of the peerage, a representative of a closed military caste, and aristocratic in his manners and deportment, he was also a visible symbol of confident Anglo-Saxon superiority and military power — a source of comfortable reassurance to Australians as they cringed in fear of the yellow horde. One British officer in Australia at the time observed that 'He was the greatest Englishman that had ever visited the country... [and the Australians]... mobbed him wherever he went and feted him to an alarming extent...'.

Typical of Kitchener's reception, as he briefly visited each State and some regional centres, was that given him in Sydney on 5 January. Kitchener arrived at Central Railway Station in a special train to be greeted by many thousands of people. There were flags and pot plants, pillars draped with ferns and bunting, eighty policemen to contain the enthusiasm, and the pathway from the carriage to the waiting motor car was carpeted in crimson. At a banquet given in his honour that evening at the Sydney Town Hall, Kitchener was informed by the newly-nominated High Commissioner to London, Sir George Reid, that it was hoped his visit would... result in the formulating of a definite scheme for the defence of Australia... [as]... There had been many schemes on paper... But something more was wanted'. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Joseph Cook, warmed to Reid's prelude by adding that in matters of defence it was... wise to get the best advice available... [and]... Without making any reflection on the excellent officers already here, everybody knew that Lord Kitchener was thoroughly capable of giving the advice wanted'. The Field Marshal's ego must have been on the point of bursting.

But the Sydney Daily Telegraph surpassed all for blatant sycophancy when it commented on Kitchener's final report, submitted on 12 February to the Parliament as a 'Memorandum on the Defence of Australia'. The Sydney newspaper praised the Memorandum for its detailed nature, a fact the article attributed to... having such an expert attached to the great visit as Colonel Kirkpatrick...", and reflected that "... it...[was]...true that our own experts ought to have worked out all these details, but what would have been their significance to the public compared with those which carried the endorsement "K. of K."?" The sad fact, of course, was that Australia's own expert, Legge, had worked out most of the details and Kitchener had done little more than lend his name — but this was more than Kirkpatrick had contributed. Later that year, Legge was to protest to the Minister of Defence about Kirkpatrick's involvement:

I have never tried to claim for myself the credit of working out Universal Training, and have always been satisfied for the responsibility to rest with the Military Board as a whole... but as an Australian I do protest against the credit going to an Englishman who has done nothing practically of it.
The degree of Kitchener's own contribution may be judged from his comments in a letter to a friend, written at the end of the visit. The Field Marshal complained that the visit had been '... rather hard work, not so much from the military point of view, but on account of the innumerable receptions by mayors, and those sort of people...'.

But public recognition was not afforded the Australian officer at the time. The week after Legge's death, in September 1947, Dr. C. E. W. Bean published an article in the Sydney Morning Herald in which he noted the fact that the early defence system was usually known as the '... Kitchener scheme...'. The memorandum of his own. One was that the upper age limit of 21 years for trainees be increased to 25 years, a modification which Bridges had earlier reported to Deakin as being contemplated by the Swiss in their own country. The establishment of the proposed military college was also recommended but with the added qualification '... that Australia can only expect to produce officers of the type required... [if the college was]... similar in ideals, if not altogether in practice... to West Point'. This, the Sydney Daily Telegraph consoled itself, must be good advice: '... but what must be Lord Kitchener's opinion of the English colleges?'.

The Bulletin was delighted with this puzzlement at the apparent rejection of an English model — '... the institutions at which the Sydney dailies gaze from afar with eyes of snobbish reverence...'. Nevertheless the recommendations warrant explanation and at least one contemporary Australian writer has expressed curiosity. What Kitchener, and, significantly, Bridges and Hutton before him, were recommending was an officer training college which was entirely different from those of England. The English colleges, Woolwich and Sandhurst, drew candidates from a select and privileged social group and whilst at the institutions they were virtually considered already to be officers. The duration of the courses were two years and one and a half years respectively, and somewhat leisurely in their nature. At West Point the course lasted for four years and three months under conditions of most severe discipline. An article in The Times provided the explanation:

For English officers these colleges... [Sandhurst and Woolwich]... represent only a stage in a progressive education. They come in the main from the great public schools, where they are imbued with an instinct of social comradeship and esprit de corps, and are, at any rate, supposed to have received a good general education...

The English colleges, Woolwich and Sandhurst, represent a modification which Bridges and Hutton before him, were recommending was an officer training college which was entirely different from those of England. The English colleges, Woolwich and Sandhurst, drew candidates from a select and privileged social group and whilst at the institutions they were virtually considered already to be officers.
their vigour and manliness of character . . . ' These schools . . . ', continued the report, ' . . . have been the chief nurseries of our statesmen'. And at the close of the century an erstwhile headmaster of Harrow, J. E. Welldon, recalled that as an English headmaster ' . . . looks to the future of his pupils, . . . [he] . . . will not forget that they are destined to become the citizens of the greatest empire under heaven . . . ' and ' . . . He will inspire them with faith in the divinely ordered mission of their country and their race . . . '.

Public schools nurtured the imperial rationale in the minds of those from whom the administrators and defenders of the Empire were drawn. They also emphasised and maintained the class differences of the parent society.

Attendance at a Public School was virtually an indispensable requirement for a professional career in England and throughout the nineteenth century they had little competition in the field of secondary education. Not only did the requirement for fees form an effective social screen for the pupils but where scholarships were available proficiency in Latin was stressed. This language could really only be learnt in a private primary education received in 'prep' school or from a family tutor. Public Schools therefore remained the preserve of the sons of the wealthy and privileged elite. Their curriculum emphasised character development in the form of manliness and Godliness and ignored technical and social change — gentlemanly characteristics were preferred to academic achievements and pupils were gradually inducted into the cult of 'muscular Christianity'. The schools reflected the conservative values of the society and confirmed the upper class assumption that it was their right and duty to lead others. Possession of such an education was a sign of innate superiority and an ideal qualification for the disciples of the British Empire. Rudyard Kipling praised the ' . . . Cheltenham and Haileybury and Marlborough chaps . . . [who] . . . went out to Boerland and Zululand . . . [and there] . . . lived or died as gentlemen and officers'.

In a similar fashion Brigadier Sir John Smyth recalled his days at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in England. When he started at the College in 1911 he found that there was an Australian in his class, . . . who . . . was determined to pass out top of the whole college. Short, square, and as tough as could be, he had tremendous application and tenacity and cut out everything which interfered with his work. He started with a great handicap as he had not been to a public school, and . . . [had] . . . a very broad Australian accent.

That this Australian ever gained entry to Sandhurst must have been due to the fact that his uncle was the Commandant of the British
Staff College but even this was not enough to escape the disparagement of his English peers. Given the opportunity to make recommendations on the training of Australian Army officers there can be little wonder that Kitchener embraced it as an opportunity to rectify what British officers saw as shortcomings in Australian youth and society.

In the Memorandum Kitchener therefore recommended that the minimum length of the course at the military college... to efficiently ground a cadet in his profession... [was]... three years. And showing that he really thought that entrance to the college should be restricted to the... public school class... he recommended that candidates for entry should be nominated from... the most capable of senior cadets... in the training scheme... "by the officer in charge of their area with ultimate selection by a board which might be constituted by... a board of examiners, or the Inspector General, or the Commandant of the College." In addition, Kitchener proposed that the parents of cadets should pay fees of eighty pounds per annum except in the case where a scholarship was obtained. In view of the fact that in November 1907 the President of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, Henry Bournes Higgins, had determined that the basic wage for an unskilled worker with a wife and three children to support should be one hundred and ten pounds per annum, it is clear that the proposed fees could only have been accommodated by families of some means. Scholarships should be limited to twenty out of an envisaged total cadet population of one hundred when the college was fully established.

Legge was to later advise the Minister on the matter of selection and fees that... These were two vital points on which... warned Lord Kitchener strongly that they were unsuitable to Australia... "On completion of the course at the college each graduate was to be sent either to India or the United Kingdom as an attached officer to a British regiment. For the young Australian officer this would be a valuable military experience but there was more to it, as one senior British officer, Major-General Sir Ian Hamilton, noted: it was a unique opportunity for young Australians... to imbibe the spirit and principles of the British troops with whom they may some day stand shoulder to shoulder."

Before Kitchener submitted the Memorandum on 12 February 1910 Australia was in the throes of a Federal election with Deakin giving his policy speech at Ballarat on 7 February. Under these circumstances the Prime Minister probably thought it was wiser to simply rubber-stamp Kitchener's recommendations and rest on any political gains already made as a result of the visit. Deakin therefore announced on 14 February, somewhat dramatically, that having appealed to Caesar, his Government would... defer to Caesar's judgment. Speaking in Tamworth on the next Saturday, the Prime Minister emphasized the importance of the proposed college and took care to point out that it would be open to the sons of the poorest, as well as the richest, through the proposed scholarship scheme. Deakin thought that future Australian soldiers might, as in Napoleon's time, carry a marshal's baton in their knapsacks.

But the Prime Minister, as he would have known, was avoiding the real issue, for, by accepting Kitchener's recommendations the majority of vacancies at the college would be filled by fee-paying cadets. This point was not totally lost on the public and three days later Deakin's Minister of Defence, Joseph Cook, witnessed a concerned speech on the subject at the Annual Methodist Conference in the Lyceum, Sydney. The retiring president of the Conference, the Reverend Joseph Beale, asserted that... if the recommendations be carried out, it is pretty certain that in a few years most of the officers of the Australian Army will be the sons of the rich and well-off people. The Sydney Morning Herald supported this statement as being... not an unfair criticism..." and called on Parliament to ensure that no prospective candidates suffer disadvantage as a result of not coming from a wealthy background. The newspaper further asserted that Australia should get full benefit from its talent whether it be from... the son of the labourer or... the wool king. The inane response from Cook, albeit with an ecclesiastical and military tone, was that... the churches are all wide enough to permit one minister to sing "Peace, Perfect Peace" while another prefers the hymn "Onward Christian Soldiers."

Not surprisingly, more trenchant criticism came from the Sydney Worker. The publication wondered whether Deakin, in giving his sup-
port to the recommendations, had really studied the proposals or whether he was deliberately trying to introduce a military system based on class distinction ‘... of the most odious kind’. In addition to the requirement for fees from most of the cadets, the Worker was critical of the proposed method of selection. It drew attention to the recommendation that candidates be initially nominated by Army officers and perhaps finally selected by people of the same calling. ‘Does Mr. Deakin believe ...’, asked the Worker ‘... that the officers of the Australian army, unlike the officers of any other service on earth, are going to hold themselves aloof from society and the pressure that society knows so well how to exercise?’ The article realistically surmised that a military élite would inevitably be created but an attempt should be made to prevent it being based on wealth. ‘A basic essential of the foundation of a citizen army ...’, it postulated, ‘... is equality of opportunity, with office for merit alone. Kitchener’s scheme ignores this, and is therefore undemocratic and unacceptable to Australia’. The article concluded by recommending selection of candidates by impartial methods and the complete abolition of fees.91

By contrast, the Manchester Guardian praised Kitchener’s recommendations and claimed that ‘... a good deal of ... [them] ... we could wish addressed to our own ... [British Army]’. The English newspaper mistakenly believed that the recommended fees were eight pounds (‘... is this figure credible? ...’ it asked) and compared them with the one hundred and twenty-five pounds charged at Sandhurst and the two hundred pounds annual allowance paid by fathers to keep their sons in an ‘... economical regiment ...’. Nevertheless the tenor of the comments is significant and the newspaper saw the proposed college as an indication of Australia’s desperate anxiety ‘... not to create a military caste which might injure and offend her strong democratic traditions ...’. Australia wanted officers ‘... who are only different from the rank and file in knowledge and training, not in social habits and standing’. The article considered the incompetence and lack of professional enthusiasm displayed by their own junior officers at that time and concluded that Britain ‘... shall not have an ideal army, or even a really efficient army, until it can cast its net for its officers as widely as the other professions and can compete with them on reasonable terms’.92 Clearly, the social values purveyed by British Army officers and their consequences were not universally appreciated in their own country.

However, the Deakin administration was not to implement any of Kitchener’s recommendations contained in the Memorandum because the general election for the fourth Commonwealth Parliament on 13 April 1910 gave a decisive victory in both Houses to the Labor Party.93 The new Government, under the leadership of Andrew Fisher, wasted little time in declaring that no fees would be charged at the proposed college.94 The new Minister of Defence, Senator George Pearce, when speaking on amendments to the 1909 Defence Act, outlined the policy for the military college. Not only would there be no fees but, on the contrary, cadets would be paid ‘... a certain sum to recoup them for their out-of-pocket and other expenses’. Further, it was decided that admission to the college would be by competitive examination with a quota being allocated to each State according to its population.95 During the debate only one voice was raised in objection to the Labor Government’s proposals. This came from Senator St. Ledger, a politician of the Manchester liberal school,96 who queried whether the State should pay for the education of a cadet from a wealthy background. ‘Is it right for the State to pay the cost of training for a military career, students whose parents are well able to pay it for them?’ asked St. Ledger. ‘I say that those who can afford to pay should be compelled to do so’,97 But Pearce would have none of this, for it would create class divisions among cadets at the college and the guiding principle must be that nobody could buy their way into the institution.98 The Labor Minister also expressed his concern that the standard of the entrance examination should be sufficiently high to ensure that prospective entrants had talent but also low enough to ensure that the sons of poor parents could achieve the required educational standards.99

In rejecting the Kitchener recommendations for the military college in relation to fees and selection the Australian Government was taking a unique step. Neither Kingston in Canada, nor West Point in America, nor Sandhurst and Woolwich in England, displayed such an egalitarian policy. As in much of the legislation
of the first decade of the Australian Commonwealth there was a unique Australian flavour of egalitarian and democratic principles. And Australians and their politicians were quite conscious of this in relation to the military college as illustrated by the following exchange during the Parliamentary debate on amendments to the 1909 Defence Act:

**Senator Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron:**

'It is a very liberal proposal.'

**Senator St. Ledger:**

'There is no military college in the world where a similar system obtains.'

**Senator Pearce:**

'I quite admit that.'

In 1919 Pearce was to record his feelings on the question of military officers:

As regards leadership in almost every other army in the world, this developed on a class. After the absorption into the A.I.F. [Australian Imperial Forces] of the Citizen Force officers, who proved themselves to be qualified, I laid down the principle that future officers of the A.I.F. must come from the ranks and that they must earn their commissions by competition with their fellows with the result that today more than half of the officers of the A.I.F. have come from the ranks. I have always set my face against social and political influence in the choice of officers and the success of leadership of the A.I.F. is largely due to insistence on these principles."

Pearce, of course, was influenced by the levelling doctrine of socialism but it would be a mistake to dismiss his egalitarian aspirations along with those of Legge, the Reverend Beale, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, or the *Worker*, and politicians in general, as being isolated or simply representative of sectional interests. For his part, Alfred Deakin had quite uncharacteristically given tacit approval to Kitchener’s recommendations in deferring ‘... to Caesar’s judgment ... ’ but this must be considered in the light of mitigating circumstances. Deakin’s Government had invited Kitchener to Australia and the Memorandum that resulted had been tabled in the middle of a general election. Deakin was also leading a Fusion Party which had some difficulty in maintaining cohesion because of its factional nature. His Minister of Defence, Joseph Cook, also gave the impression that he was somewhat mesmerized by the imperial officer. For the sake of maintaining unity amongst the Fusionists, Alfred Deakin had very little choice but to appear to accept the Kitchener recommendations and, simultaneously, praise the egalitarian nature of the proposed scholarship scheme. However, disregarding Deakin’s peculiar situation, there was unmistakably general support for the idea that an Australian military college should be based on an egalitarian social ethos. In this matter Australians were expressing their unique social ethos, as they had on many other issues. Even the Military Board, being comprised of senior Army Officers, saw merit in the proposals and some ten months later they recorded that the proposal for fees ‘... would probably have resulted in most of the... [college] graduates coming from families in easy circumstances, as in the British Army ... ’ thereby they would probably only serve for a limited duration. ‘In Australia ... ’, the Board continued, ‘... at present and under the system approved by the Government, permanent officers include very few of the “dilettante” class; they are rather men who make the profession their life’s work ... ’

The Kitchener visit provided an insight into Australian attitudes between the Boer War and World War I. The enthusiastic reaction of Australians is unquestionable proof of the strength of imperial sentiment within the community, a sentiment which was at times obsequious but always Kitchener was accepted as the unimpeachable authority in matters of defence. Such was the obvious public support for the man that Deakin, with one eye to the electorate, uncharacteristically announced his intentions to accept the recommendations without demur or a hint of criticism. George Pearce also felt compelled to accept most of what Kitchener recommended in uncritical fashion. Even though both these Australian politicians knew full well that the contents of the Kitchener Memorandum were mostly the work of an Australian officer, J. G. Legge, they continued publicly to ignore his contribution. Writing some forty years after the event, Pearce still declared that the basis of the Australian defence forces lay in the work of Kitchener, and one can only assume that he was so impressed by the imperial warrior that he convinced himself this was the case. More remarkable was the praise accorded Kirkpatrick — this man made no real contribution and
simply played a minor supporting role to the major protagonist. Underlying this reaction was a prevalent lack of self-confidence in the ability of local military officers. Nevertheless, Australians could not generally accept the discretionary selection of entrants to the military college. To this typically British suggestion was a prevalent lack of self-confidence in the ability of local military officers. Nevertheless, Australians could not generally accept the discretionary selection of entrants to the military college. To this typically British suggestion was a reluctance to pay for education at public expense with competitive entry.

NOTE
5. Ibid., pp. 221-222.

Note: Meaney is quite correct in dismissing Bridges as being of no use to Deakin in formulating plans for Universal Training. Unfortunately a small part of the evidence he cites on p. 157 is incorrectly quoted. Meaney quotes Bridges' report on the Swiss system in these terms: 'The Swiss army affords a proof ... that a democratic form of government and an efficient military system are incompatible'. In fact Bridges' report reads: 'The Swiss army affords a proof ... that a democratic form of government and an efficient military system are incompatible'. (My emphasis). See C of A, Parliamentary Papers, 1907 Session, Vol. II, No. 129, 'Report on the Swiss Military System, compiled in the Department of the Chief of Intelligence, 1907'.

15. Morning Post, quoted by Tanner, in op cit., p. 97.
18. Ibid., pp. 181-182.
20. Perry, op cit., p. 81.
21. Coulthard-Clark, op cit., p. 64.
22. Legge, Lieut.-Colonel J. G., to the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 12 November 1910, para 13, p. 6, Australian Archives, Melbourne Accession B197, Item 1804/1/7. Kindly brought to the writer's attention by Coulthard-Clarke, C. D.
23. Legge to Secretary, Department of Defence, op cit., para 1, p. 1.
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31. Tanner, op cit., p. 163.
33. Age, Melbourne, 22 February 1910.
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41. Kirkpatrick to Bridges, 8 July 1909, Bridges Memorial Library, Duntroon.
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47. British officer, quoted by Souter, in op cit., p. 151.
49. Ibid.
51. Legge to Secretary, Department of Defence, op cit., para 13, p. 60. (Note: Bridges report on Australian International Affairs 1901-1918, para 13, p. 6).
64. Ibid., pp. 4, 275, 277, 280.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (continued from page 2)

We publish a bi-monthly 32-page Newsletter full of technical articles relating to defect recognition and diagnostic techniques. A £250 prize has been set up for the best brief description of a diagnostic situation (to be described in less than 2 pages!) and other prizes are available.

Our TROUBLESHOOTERS DINING CLUBS are aimed at providing fellowship with the opportunity to exchange experiences (sometimes, to exchange or loan equipment) between fellow-members and under conditions of friendship and progress.

The First Annual Convention of the Institution of Diagnostic Engineers will be held at the CITY CONFERENCE CENTRE, London on 4, 5, 6, 7 September 1984. Further details are available from:

Institution of Diagnostic Engineers, 3 Wycliffe Street, Leicester LEI 5LR, England.

Dr R. A. COLLACOTT
Director
TWO INVASIONS OF LEBANON—
CONTRASTING FEATURES

By Major J. C. McAllester R.L.

CAPTAIN D. E. Lewis has identified (DFJ May-June 1983) outstanding features of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon which contrast sharply with those experienced by 7th Australian Division in 1941, in the “Syrian” campaign. The success of that campaign, coming as it did after the withdrawal from Benghazi and defeat in Greece and Crete, was a major contribution to Allied morale. Although both invasions were greatly influenced by terrain and as Captain Lewis has pointed out, followed identical routes, there are three features in which such contrasts exist that it might not be clear why 7th Australian Division took 5 weeks to accomplish what the Israeli forces achieved in 5 days. These three features are:

- speed of the advance
- support of the ground troops
- civilian casualties

The PLO force of 1982, estimated at 20,000 ‘regular’ troops was appreciably smaller than the 1941 Vichy French Army of Syria, variously estimated at 28,000 or 35,000 regulars and 25,000 or 10,000 Lebanese and Syrian troops plus gendarmes and German advisers. The Middle East Command of World War 2 allotted to the task 18,000 Australian, 9,000 UK, 2,000 Indian and 5,000 Free French troops — 34,000 in all. Hence in 1941 the defenders had considerable superiority in numbers over the invaders. The Israeli strength in 1982 has not been revealed in detail but would appear to exceed that of the PLO by approximately 50%. This factor together with overwhelming superiority in equipment both ground and air enabled the Israeli advance to proceed at remarkable speed.

Support of the Israeli ground troops in the 1982 invasion must have been as generous as in any invasion in history. The PLO were reported to have relatively few old Russian T34, T54 and T55 tanks pitted against two to four Israeli armoured brigades equipped with several hundred modern tanks including their own Merkava. The PLO were probably little better off than 7th Australian Division as far as means of dealing with opposing tanks was concerned.

In the air Israel claimed to have knocked out every SAM launcher provided by Syria on the first day. As Captain Lewis points out, the Israelis carried out many armoured assaults without the infantry dismounting from their APC’s. On the other hand support of the infantry in the 941 invasion was confined to the 25 pounder gun, the 2 pounder anti-tank gun, the 40mm Bofors gun, some 70 aircraft (none of which were seen on the coastal sector until the fourth day of the invasion) light tanks, armoured cars and Bren gun carriers and occasional naval gunfire. Field Marshal Wavel who relinquished Middle East Command in the third week of the Syrian Campaign believed that “an infantry-tank battalion would have been a better investment in Syria than in the Western desert” but in the event none was provided.

The Vichy French air forces in Syria had nearly 100 aircraft and their army included 90 ‘Renault 35’ tanks equipped with a 37mm gun and clearly superior to the light tanks of 6 and 9 Australian Cavalry Regiments. The spectacle of an Australian light tank receiving a direct hit, which occurred on several occasions, led to most unfavourable comments by our infantry on the thickness of their armour compared with the French Renaults. The only effective
weapon against the French armour proved to be the 25 pounder gun which when first employed in this role had a Field Regiment C.O. personally directing the operation in greatcoat over pyjamas and winning a DSO for this and other efforts!

Although the need for close artillery support of infantry threatened by tanks was demonstrated in this way on the coastal sector on 11 June 41 there has been a dearth of critical examination by historians of the sequel. In fact infantry were committed to attack in the same sector on each of the next two days in spite of complete lack of anti tank support on 12 June, and with some support by 25 pounder guns on 13 June only after severe casualties had been inflicted on our infantry by French tanks.

The attacks in these cases were each ordered by the brigade commander on the coastal plain south of Sidon. The first attack by two companies of 2/14th Battalion was directed at securing the road running along the Wadi Zaharani which joined the coast road 8 km south of Sidon. The attack failed and both companies were pinned down because the French tanks moved promptly forward, dodging our artillery fire, and “got in amongst” the infantry platoons. Both company commanders and one platoon commander were wounded, three other ranks were killed and 19 wounded all for no ground gained, in spite of “courageous but ineffective work with the .55 inch anti-tank rifle”.

Although 2/27th Battalion later that day crossed the Wadi Zaharani by moving to the right flank in rocky country inaccessible to tanks and took 200 prisoners, the lesson was not learned! The next day, 13 June 41, 2/16th Battalion was ordered to attack with all four rifle companies up the coastal plain towards Sidon. The two companies on the right of this advance were attacked by tanks and were scattered and disorganised, both company commanders being killed. One company continued to fight the tanks with grenades and the .55 inch anti-tank rifle which many Australians regarded as the most useless weapon ever inflicted on the AIF.

Little wonder that they described their efforts as “like trying to halt an elephant with peashooters”. The company was reduced to 19 all ranks who achieved a lucky hit on the engine of one tank and escaped at sundown.

The two pounder anti-tank guns then brought forward were ineffective and one of them was knocked out. The tanks were then engaged by 25 pounders at ranges of 1000 to 1300 yards assisted by carriers of 6th Australian Cavalry which gallantly acted as decoys to attract the tanks into view of the guns. This enabled the infantry to withdraw. Eventually Sidon was evacuated by the French, largely due to further success by 2/27th Battalion in flank attacks through the rocky country inland from the coastal plain. During these operations a private soldier of 2/27th Battalion “who had carried his Boyes anti-tank rifle every inch of the way from the border, sited up an enemy AFV, held his fire until the last moment, pressed the trigger and nothing happened; thereupon . . . picked up the rifle and cast it without any more ceremony to . . . the foot of the ravine”.

The only criticism of these operations contained in the official history is directed at the lack of tanks and mortar ammunition and control from Jerusalem. Neither the official history nor the histories of the battalions involved examines closely the tactics employed in the field. It is significant that both the 21st and 25th Australian Infantry Brigades were to encounter, a year later, Japanese forces whose frontal attacks were often limited to locating defences, followed by probing for the flanks and encirclement. The combination of full-scale frontal attack and some probing of the inland flank, as employed by 21 Australian Infantry Brigade in Lebanon led to heavy casualties in the 2/16th Battalion which was given the frontal task on each occasion, the third being at Damour where (fortunately) the terrain precluded the use of French tanks but (unfortunately) the defenders were well dug in with all approaches from the south well covered.

For the third time the 2/27th Battalion at Damour was given a flanking role, and did a magnificent job in difficult terrain. Two companies of 2/14th Battalion, making use of the access route cleared by 2/27th Battalion were able to reach the town of Damour capturing over 100 prisoners whilst 2/16th Battalion was still slogging away at the defences south of the town.

The other alternative flank manoeuvre employed successfully by the Israelis in 1982 but
unsuccessfully by the Allies in 1941, lay in seaborne attack on the coast. The use of a Scottish commando ('C' Special Service Battalion) to attempt to prevent the demolition of the Litani River bridge was a costly failure on 8-9 June 1941.

It is significant that the 2/16th Battalion, allotted three successive frontal attack tasks, suffered 262 casualties whilst 2/27th Battalion, given one frontal attack role with close anti-tank support from 25-pounders and two flanking roles, suffered 154 casualties. The Israeli casualties in 1982, believed to include 500 killed are not officially revealed but it seems most unlikely that they approached the Allied total of 4,700 in 1941 of which 1,552 were Australian.

The Australian infantry battalions of 25th Brigade, engaged on the inland routes in 1941, seldom had opportunity to outflank the French forces, so rugged is the terrain but it is interesting to note that the French outflanked and counter-attacked our forces and recaptured Merdjayoun, on 18 June 41 causing great confusion.

Civilian casualties in the 1982 invasion were enormous by comparison with 1941. The principal towns at risk in 1941, were as in 1982, Tyre, Sidon, Damour and Beirut. None of these was shelled in 1941 with the possible exception of Damour when it was believed evacuated by civilians. Nor did the French adopt the policy of installing weapons or troops in these towns. However, neglect of this policy occurred in Mezze near Damascus where 5 Indian Brigade was involved in house-to-house fighting and in Kuneitra, Merdjayoun and Jezzine where civilians had prior opportunity to evacuate. Unfortunately in Jezzine 2/31st Battalion used the basement of the Hotel Egypt as a Q-store; French bombers demolished it burying 40 soldiers of whom 17 including 3 quartermaster sergeants died.

It is difficult to determine all the factors which influenced the civilian casualties in 1982. The PLO appeared to have thoroughly infiltrated the towns and villages of the Lebanon. Therefore to be effective the Israeli attack was of necessity directed at such areas. Although Israel initially claimed to have the limited objective of driving the PLO back beyond rocket and artillery range of the border, it later became obvious that they aimed at noth-
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2. ibid p. 334
3. ibid p. 430
4. ibid p. 376.
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7. John Burns "The Brown and Blue Diamond at War" (1960) p. 49
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries:

MacDonald, Lyn, Somme, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson, 1983.
O'Neill, Robert and D. M. Horner, (eds), New Directions in Strategic Thinking, Sydney, George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
Steward, H. D., Recollections of a Regimental Medical Officer, Melbourne University Press, 1983.
FAULT POINTS IN THE TRAINING SYSTEMS

A TRAINING SYSTEM IS ONLY AS STRONG AS ITS WEAKEST LINK

By Major B. D. Copeland BA BEdSt RAAEC

Introduction

In recent years, increased emphasis has been placed by many organizations on the effective conduct of Training. Value has long been observed in the operation of Training programs which have 'clearly defined training objectives which are derived from a detailed analysis of the job which the trainee will perform after completion of Training'1. The primary criterion for success in the operation of a training program has been taken to be job capability. This is assessed continually and provides input for further development of the program.

For continued success of a training program and the Training System, practical support must be given to the instructor in his/her effort to pass skills to student personnel. Training Systems inevitably place some emphasis on methodology. However, the instructor may gain little benefit if there is a lack of emphasis on or absence of a most crucial component of the Training System. This is the support given in the preparation of sequences of exercises/problems for Mastery Learning by students.

It is contended that this could well constitute the 'weak link' in the Training System. Such a deficiency could ill prepare an organization for Training in an age of New Technology.

Aim

The aim of this article is to establish and examine the Fault Points that may occur in a Training System.

Background

This article has been written in conjunction with six (6) articles that have appeared in the Defence Force Journal. These are:

- A Programme in Problem Solving DFJ No 14 Jan/Feb 79
- Network Analysis and the Training Officer DFJ. No 25 Nov/Dec 80
- A Framework for Education and Training DFJ. No 32 Jan/Feb 82
- A Module in Fault Finding within Technical and Administrative Systems. DFJ. No 34 May/Jun 82
- Think Systems DFJ. No 41 Jul/Aug 83
- A Systems Approach to Mastery Learning. DFJ. No 44 Jan/Feb 84.

All of these articles have been written to highlight and explain aspects of Course Design and Development in support of the Training System.

These articles have been written in support of the viewpoint that the Training System is only as strong as its weakest link. The main area of weakness is taken to be the quality of support given to the instructor in his/her effort to promote the effective and efficient mastery of skills.

Rationale to the Training System.

Training Systems have been developed to ensure that Training is effective in terms of time, cost and standard of skills acquired by student personnel. The organization of various Training Systems may vary according to the types of systems involved within the organization concerned.
With continued experience and time on the job, a former trainee can be expected to consolidate and reinforce the skills acquired. Further training and experience may then enable the member to be considered as an Instructor in a given area of skill. Effectiveness will be enhanced if the member acquires skill in Instructional Training.

However, the effectiveness of the Instructor may well be limited if he/she has not been given the opportunity to develop skill in the following areas:

- analyzing tasks;
- breaking skills and tasks down to component sub-skills, variables and scenarios; and
- preparing mastery exercises.

**Mastery Learning**

Mastery Learning is a process by which student personnel acquire and reinforce skills of a given type through successful completion of a range of exercises developed in terms of given conditions and standards. Basic to Mastery Learning is the promotion of skills in terms of:

- simple to complex;
- component skills including Decision Making skills;
- systematic progression through the systems, sub-systems and processes under consideration;
- systematic manipulation of variables; and
- systematic development of scenarios.

If Mastery Learning is to be developed systematically within any Training System, then modifications need to be made at all phases of the System. Such a development has been reported in the US Marine Corps where Mastery Learning has been integrated into the Training System together with a variable time strategy for individual students. The approach is reported to ‘train marginal students for high technology jobs’

**Modification**

Mastery Learning is not a component that may be simply inserted as an adjunct to the Training System, or as an extra lecture on a course in Instructional Training.

Mastery Learning must be developed progressively at each phase of the Training System as follows:

- Systems should be established at the Job Specification and Task Analysis phases.
- Scenarios and variables should be identified through Task Analysis.
- Sequences of mastery exercises should be developed at the phases of Course Design and Course Development.
- Support in the application of Mastery Learning techniques should be given in developing instruction.
- The effectiveness of Mastery Learning would be determined through validation.
Scenarios
In a Training situation, it is important that students develop their skill through the appropriate range of scenarios, activities and variables. The student performs in a non-harmful learning environment to cover as many combinations of situations as possible that he/she may face on the job. As well the student may develop the ability to confront and solve problems for which no specific preparation was made.

Some activities involve simple and 'Determined' systems and single scenarios with few uncontrolled variables. Such activities include typing, weapon drill and marching.

Other activities are complex and 'Probabilistic'. These may involve multiple scenarios and many variables. Such activities are involved in Leadership, Tactics and Planning.

A scenario may be panoramic and involve extended activities such as the planning of a rescue in Antarctica or the deployment of troops. Other scenarios may be small and involve simple activities such as a spot check of unit equipment.

Poor Course Design can occur when inexperienced student personnel are confronted with 'panorama' type scenarios/problems without mastery of the smaller component scenarios/problems.

Difficulties for the Instructor
Without the appropriate background, the Instructor may be unable to produce sequences of mastery activities, especially when complex systems are involved.

Specialized personnel may be needed, not to produce esoteric works but logical sequences and solutions that may be used readily by the Instructor.

It takes skill to be able to produce simple to use, logical and comprehensive sequences in Mastery Learning.

To be effective in promoting skills through a Mastery Learning strategy, the Instructor must have at his/her disposal, sufficient exercises for explanation, practice, evaluation, remediation and revision.

The variation in abilities and motivation of Instructors must constitute a critical Fault Point in the Training System. The weakness will be lessened if special attention is given to provision of sequences in Mastery Learning.

Decision Making Skills
An Instructor may be involved with combinations of three groups of skills as follows:

- literacy and numeracy skills;
- hands on/manipulative skills; and
- Decision Making skills.

In the past, little emphasis has been placed on promoting the component skills of Decision Making on given courses. It is quite crucial that there be recognition of the importance of these skills, particularly in view of the onset of computer assisted/managed instruction.

If computer programmes are not geared towards promoting effective Decision Making, then perhaps we should put the computers back in their boxes.

New Wine in Old Bottles
Training Systems specify various methodologies for instruction and, at the same time, emphasize the importance of criterion — referenced learning.

By not promoting the practical application of Mastery Learning, we might not have moved significantly from traditional instruction and norm-referenced learning.

Some students are still expected to fail. Lessons may still be instructor centred rather than student centred.

If lessons/activities are to be student centred then the Mastery Learning strategy is mandatory. Activities will be:

- self paced/lock step;
- available for enrichment, reinforcement and remedial support;
- available to students in out of classroom hours; and
- available to the member's unit for practice by the member after the course has finished.

Future courses may well involve the student in completing mastery exercises in his/her unit under supervision. There may not be the necessity for courses to be conducted at a central point.

Foreign Students
Poor Course Design is often reflected in too much talking by the Instructor and too little mastery by students. This situation acts to the detriment of all students, particularly those for whom English is a second language.

The problem is thus magnified when Australian personnel work to train students from client Third World Nations.
Foreign students may well find difficulty in mastery of some skills if their individual levels of background skills are not established and used as a starting point for forward work and remedial support. Remedial support also involves sequences of activities for Mastery Learning.

In teaching the basic skills, the Instructor should, where possible, proceed from the students' 'known' to the unknown. No skills are 'common sense' to all people.

A group of students, for example, may have come to Australia from Papua New Guinea to attend a course in Hydraulic Systems. Perhaps a number of these students may be quite unfamiliar with the topic. However, all may have had contact with some of the following related processes:

- a car engine,
- a car/bicycle tyre,
- a car/bicycle pump,
- a hypodermic syringe,
- a pressure lantern, and
- a water reticulation system.

From this starting point, the Training Officer should be able to produce a sequence of practical activities and concepts upon which to base the Hydraulic System.

Conclusion

The Training Systems must change to meet the needs of the present and the demands to be made in the future. Opponents of change stand on unfirm ground when they assume that present Training Systems provides the mechanism to cover all exigencies. There is also the argument that changes will cost money. However, the extra practical support given to Instructors must make for increased overall effectiveness of the Training System. The mandate for promotion of Mastery Learning should be given to those whose professional lives are much involved in effective course development.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made in relation to the Training System and Training Policy. It is recommended that:

- Fault Points be identified formally within any system as a starting point for system improvement and for identification of appropriate skills, activities, variables and scenarios for Mastery Learning;
- Modifications be made in the Training System for identification of the above components;
- Study be made into the application of Mastery Learning within all systems — administrative, technical and tactical; and
- Appropriately experienced and qualified personnel be directed in support of the Training System to develop the above areas.

NOTES

2. Evans R. M. Military Curriculum Development. With Instructional Systems Development the Marines are combining mastery learning with variable time strategy in a curriculum that trains marginal students for high technology jobs in Educational Leadership Nov 81 P 121.

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Major Copeland has had a number of articles printed in the Defence Force Journal. He is at present posted to the Melanesian Pidgin Department at the RAAF School of Languages, Point Cook. The work of the department involves preparing government personnel for posting to Papua New Guinea. Australian Service personnel may also attend the courses to support their effort in training members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force who attend courses in Australia.
By Major A. R. Main, RAA

'educators perpetually investigate teaching, with the ultimate goal of improving it. What is to be improved, however, must first be understood.'

R. T. Hyman

Introduction

The implementation of the Army Training System (ATS) caused significant change to the training process and has necessitated detailed explanation to all persons involved in the training environment. The ATS established procedures for determining what should be taught to whom and to what level of performance. Prior to the introduction of the system there was little evidence of a co-ordinated approach to the achievement of specific training goals. Training policy was determined at the then Army Headquarters by the Directorate of Military Training on advice from Branch and Corps directorates, and sent direct to the geographic commands, Army schools and units. Corps directorates could further influence training directives in two ways; first, direct supervision of the school by the parent directorate, and second, by nominating selected personnel to the Military Secretary's Branch for posting to the school. What then were the requirements for nomination? There was, as now, no requirement to have attended a course designed to teach instructional skills and techniques, nor to attend such a course before starting instructional duties. Although the Army Methods of Instruction (MIT) team was then an established organization the generally accepted attitude was that 'Every Officer and NCO, by virtue of his rank, is an instructor.'

What seems to have been overlooked, within the ATS is that the instructor is the link between the managers of the system and the student. The RODC report (Study Two, para 1556) promised an examination of the matter in an apparently mistitled section, 'Training the Trainers'. The committee identified a need to prepare officers for training management and recommended a Staff Officer Employment Category for 'Training Management' but no observations on or recommendations for instructor training were made in that section. Currently, Headquarters Training Command interest appears to be limited to the retention of a basic MIT segment in NCO and WO Subject 1 courses, sponsorship of the Instructors Handbook, and being superior headquarters for the Army School of Instructional Techniques (ASIT). ASIT conducts courses in instructor development but, as was the case when the Army MIT team was operating, attendance at these courses is not mandatory for an instructor, nor is it likely to become so in the near future.

This article contends that the interest displayed by Training Command, and the Army in general, in the training of instructors is too limited and will remain so until a mandatory programme is introduced for initial and ongoing instructor training. Although it may have been unintentional, the need for such training has been identified by Training Command in TIB 44 (p 44-4) where it is stated: 'That which is necessary to job performance must be what is taught'. Therefore, prior to assuming an instructional appointment, the instructor must be trained because part of his job will be to
prepare and conduct training.' This article will show that the developments in educational theory, psychology and technology make it essential for all Army instructors to be given formal training if they are required to be effective in the performance of their duties.

INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT

'If an instructor is truly to be a conductor of the educational orchestra, he must perform functions other than those performed by the instrumentalists themselves.'

R. F. Mager

The Instructor

Throughout the Army the word 'instructor' is used generically to include all persons having contact with students in a learning environment. However, the classes of teaching in which an instructor may participate can be separated into drilling, conditioning, training and instructing. Drilling refers to a continuous repetition where the subject learns to carry out routines and procedures without fundamentally understanding what he is doing. Conditioning is the process by which a person, or group, learns to react physically to a particular stimulus. Training refers to a method of shaping habits of response in a limited situation; it involves the manifesting of intelligence and it is this critical element that distinguishes training from drilling and conditioning. Instructing involves giving reasons, weighing evidence, explaining events, justifying actions taken and drawing conclusions based on evidence. These performances are also expected of the instructor's student. Furthermore, whereas training is concerned with the arena of habits, instructing is concerned with knowledge or understanding.

A case was made some years ago by Captain W. Glynn for the development of professional military instructors within the Army. Glynn's argument was primarily for instructors trained in the areas this article has defined as drilling, conditioning and training. For the remainder of the discussion 'instructor' will be used in the context of those persons whose responsibilities in the learning environment normally lie within the parameters of instructing. The definition of instruction suggests some particular characteristics of the student and these will be identified before detailing the qualities of an effective instructor.

Characteristics of the Student

The most obvious characteristics of the instructor's student are that he is likely to be of mature age, beyond the conditioning and drilling phases of Hyman's continuum (Figure 1) and at least well advanced in the training phase. Therefore the instructor must understand the principles of andragogical education and Morrison says the instructor becomes:

'a facilitator, consultant, change agent, who creates a suitable climate for learning in an atmosphere of mutual planning, diagnoses needs, objectives and learning experiences with a group of students'.

Morrison claims that those instructor roles are necessary because from maturity onwards the individual is, and needs to be, increasingly self-motivated and self-directed.

The second characteristic of the student is that he will have a depth of experience. In the civilian field of adult education the depth of experience is regarded as significant only if it relates to the course being undertaken; within the Army environment that student's military experience will almost inevitably be applicable to the course being attended. Therefore the instructor may be placed in a situation where, relative to a group of students, the combined expertise of the group is greater than his own. He should not be intimidated by such expertise but be capable of using to advantage the experience, knowledge and skills that are important resources of the group.

A further characteristic is a lack of motivation, although it may not be true of all students. Student motivation, that is, 'a willingness to enter into a learning situation', is taken for granted in the field of civilian adult education for two reasons. First, the student's attendance at the course is self-determined, and second, he can select a course likely to be of benefit to his current employment or interests. The first reason partly satisfies the need for self-determination and the second enhances the student's 'readiness to learn'. The same opportunities are not usually offered to Army students. Students are nominated by either their corps directorate or the Military Secretary's Branch to attend courses such as career progression courses. These courses, and many others, are often related to future rather than current employment. For these reasons some students may enter the learning situation unwillingly and therefore lacking motivation be-
because self-determination has been denied and the course is probably not directly related to his current establishment position or appointment. Whilst it would be reasonable to expect mature-age students to accept the limitations of course panelling and career planning, the RODC 'Survey of Attitudes, Opinions and Aspirations' (Study Two, Chapter 7) is interesting in the context of motivation. A deduction from the survey is that not all Officers accept the military requirement to attend Young Officers and Tactics courses and so persons of such opinion will probably lack motivation at the beginning of a course. Obviously, there is a need for instructors to understand and implement the theories of motivation to enhance the probability of the student having a successful learning experience.

Maslow's model of the hierarchy of needs identifies self-actualization as man's ultimate behavioural goal. Self-actualization is described as using one's potential, becoming everything one is capable of becoming, growing, learning; Morrison sees active involvement of the learner (a manifestation of self-determination) as an important step towards achieving self-actualization. Whilst the needs are characteristic of all men, the instructor must understand the special relevance to the instructional arena. Knowles believes that one of the roles of adult educators is to facilitate the learner in his drive to take more control of his life because as a person matures his self-concept moves from one of being a dependent personality to one of becoming a self-directing human being. This redirection of self-concept may lead to a different relationship between the instructor and the adult learner when compared to that between the teacher and the adolescent student. The relationship should be more helpful than directing and this presents a paradox within the Army system; a hierarchical, directing organization restricting people who need to become more self-directing.

Some other characteristics of adult learners are listed in notes prepared by the Victorian Council of Adult Education (CAE) for guidance of their instructors. Similarities can be seen between these and the characteristics already listed; however, they are sufficiently dissimilar to necessitate study by the instructor. Characteristics from the CAE list pertinent to this article are:

- Adults are often acutely conscious of their self-image. They may be anxious about failure and often need reassurance and success to maintain their motivation.
- Self-fulfillment, growth and maturity are often more important goals than mastery of a specific skill or fact.
- Because an adult's 'readiness to learn' may be related to his current roles it is important to structure courses to meet his individual learning needs and interests, rather than predesign the content (a movement away from education as a preparation for the future towards education for now). This trend conflicts with the Army's leaning towards training for a variety of possible future employments and so indicates a further requirement for the instructor to understand and redirect student motivation.
The knowledge, skills and backgrounds will often be very different, thus giving a wider variety of starting points. This characteristic is of particular importance to instructors who teach an all-arms course. The characteristics of the student make it inevitable that the instructor will be confronted by complex behaviours and attitudes in any adult learning group. One of the prerequisites of an effective instructor must be to understand the implications that the characteristics of the student will have for the learning environment.

**An Effective Instructor**

Leonard Nadler describes the difficulties to be faced when defining a prototype of an effective instructor, or in his own terminology, a Human Resource Developer. The only clear picture is that of a person who has come to the position either as an instructor or training manager, with a variety of backgrounds and skills, and with little planned preparation for the duty. Unless career planning is carefully organized the instructor will be unable to appreciate the new relationships which are to confront him and will not have developed the necessary expertise. Without professional preparation:

'Instructors . . . have a tendency to develop within their own minds a role model of some teacher they had in the past who “turned them on”. The impression of this teacher, dimmed and altered by the passage of time, influences today's teacher as he stands in front of a class . . . Without sufficient professional preparation augmented by in-service opportunities the instructor is doomed to emulate a teacher out of his past.'

Mr. Ken Stafford, Senior Lecturer in Education at the Townsville College of Advanced Education, says there is no universal consensus of opinion on the definition of an effective instructor. He suggests a definition should describe:

'A hybrid creature who combines a grasp of subject matter, skill in the particular area being taught . . . personal qualities such as perseverance and understanding, commitment to the “system”, and that range of human qualities that appeals to men.'

He says the definition is likely to be complicated because effective instruction changes from situation to situation and teachers may operate in the area of psychomotor skills (these are not relevant to instruction within the context of this article), the cognitive (mental) domain or the affective (feelings, awareness) domain. Nadler concedes some further clarification of affectiveness for he agrees with Collins that in instructor is likely to be effective if he is able 'to recognise and capitalize on (his students') previous experiences . . . so that learning can be enhanced rather than impeded'.

Defining an effective instructor is obviously difficult, any definition is likely to be inappropriate to all situations and so therefore contentious. However, by extrapolation from the discussion of student characteristics and the instructor, certain areas of knowledge, ability and character pertinent to effective instruction can be identified. The areas of knowledge include:

- Current theories of learning.
- Methodologies, or strategies and tactics, of teaching.
- Student motivation.
- The learning environment.

That an instructor must have a good knowledge of the subject matter which he is to present to students is obvious, but unless he has been trained in the four other areas of knowledge, as listed above, the likelihood is that learning may not result from his instruction. These areas of knowledge must therefore be accepted as essential prerequisites for an effective instructor.

**THE INSTRUCTOR’S PREREQUISITES**

'A first step towards the development of the requisite skills is that of knowing what they are, where they fit, and how they are used.'

R. F. Mager

The instructor’s prerequisites are both qualitative (ability and personal characteristics) and quantitative (knowledge). Qualitative traits can be identified from annual personnel reports, course reports and pre-enlistment psychological test reports. However, qualitative prerequisites are unlikely to be evident until positive action has been taken to acquire knowledge because ‘trainers are not born, but must be made’. The components required for developing an instructor have been listed and will be described to show their relevance.
Current Theories of Learning

The instructor provides the interface between training planners and students; when the planner's task is completed the instructor assumes part of the management function. He manages the learning situation so he must know how learning occurs. The meaning of learning, like the effective instructor, has not been universally agreed but it is generally accepted that learning, in its broadest sense, is 'a change within the student that is brought about by instruction'.

Of all the influences on students' learning, teachers are usually the most important and to be effective an instructor must be able to implement strategies that are based on validated psychological knowledge.

The two major approaches to the psychology of learning are:

- A cognitive point of view that emphasizes the intellect and mental structures.
- A behavioural view that emphasizes control of environmental stimuli. Students are rewarded for achieving positive change in their behaviour.

The most promising contemporary cognitive theory is that of information processing where learning is divided into three phases: first, attending to new information; second, acquiring and retaining information; and third, retrieving information from memory and transferring it to new situations. Behavioural theory has derived from studies in the conditioning of animal behaviour. The basis of the theory is identifying the behaviour to be learned and then reinforcing the student for engaging in that behaviour. To strengthen a desired behaviour the instructor needs to give positive reinforcement immediately and consistently wherever he sees an instance of the behaviour. Recent important trends in behaviourism are a change from individual to group reinforcers, a focus on self-reinforcement, and the study of the effects of modelling and imitation on learning.

Specific teaching strategies have been derived from both theories and the instructor should master those strategies. As strategies are dynamic in-service instructor development is essential if benefits are to be gained from the findings from on-going educational research.

Strategies and Tactics of Teaching

Teaching strategies refer to the broad methods of instruction: lecture, tutorial, case study, lesson-demonstration, role-playing, gaming, brain-storming, programmed learning, computer-assisted instruction, independent study, leaderless groups. Tactics of teaching are related to the more detailed aspects of instruction such as the design of aids, use of aids, equipment, and so on. When planning teaching tactics it is important for the instructor to know that every task to be taught has a basic learning structure. Five basic classes of learning structure applicable to both instructors and students are listed by Davies (Figure 2). Any one tactic for a particular objective may be appropriate within a number of strategies; all ideas or problems or bodies of knowledge can be presented in a form simple enough so that any particular learner can understand it in a recognizable form.

The systems approach to training as used within the ATS gives the instructor a complete package in the form of objectives. What is to be taught, to whom, and by what method is, in theory, predetermined by a training manager or course designer and not the instructor. However, in practice many instructors are actively involved in the development of course packages and should therefore be able to recognise, and put to best effect, the important interaction between student ability and an
optimal teaching strategy. Training managers, unless they are in direct and regular contact with students to determine their attitudes and abilities, are unlikely to select the most appropriate methods of instruction.

**Student Motivation**

The two divisions of motivation are extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation refers to context factors which are imposed on the task or the student by an instructor or other external agent; intrinsic motivation refers to content factors which are inherent in either the task or the student himself. Davies says that 'problems of student motivation are more likely to result from the way learning is organized than from a simple unwillingness of students to work harder'. Initially, a student may be reluctant to enter into a learning situation because it represents a change to his life style, a threat to his security (due to the possibility of failure), and so has an effect on the satisfaction of the lower order needs as described by Maslow. Extrinsic motivation should be part of the instructor’s cure to overcome those initial apprehensions and then the student, according to Maslow’s theory, will progress towards attainment of higher order needs (esteem and self-actualization).

Many conventional teaching strategies appeal only to the basic needs, therefore learning tasks tend to aim at minimum performance which inhibits the realization of full student potential. The work of Frederick Herzberg is described by Davies to show the proper relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Herzberg has developed a theory of motivation based on attitudes and performance, a motivation-hygiene theory, which helps the instructor to systematize his role in providing compensatory conditions for poorly motivated students. As well, it helps the teacher to assess the relevance and importance of the actions he takes. Herzberg describes extrinsic motivators as hygiene factors because they are short-term matters, such as working conditions and interpersonal relations. Hygiene factors may cause feelings of dissatisfaction or unhappiness, making the learner become disinterested and passive. Although hygiene factors are not in themselves motivating, they are a prerequisite to effective motivation.

Herzberg claims that motivating factors have a general uplifting effect upon student performance and attitudes towards a task because they involve feelings of accomplishment, recognition, responsibility, and personal growth and development (Figure 3). Motivators appeal to the higher needs by offering challenge, scope and autonomy and can cause the student to work beyond his normal level of productivity, to adopt a creative approach, and to enjoy
feelings of high job satisfaction. Instructors can develop a powerful strategy for developing and harnessing student motivation by adapting the quality of the task to be achieved to the capability of the student.

The motivation-hygiene theory is only one modern approach to motivation. Motivational theories and their effects on learning are numerous and, in relation to education, are still in an early stage of development. The possible effects on learning are also numerous and the examination of just one theory has shown a need for the instructor to understand motivational influences within the learning environment.

The Learning Environment

The learning environment consists of all the students' perceptions of, emotional reactions to, and attitudes about the interaction among students and between the student and the instructor. The adult usually regards a new or different situation in which he is obliged to participate as a threat to his established security and so inevitably enters a learning situation with at least some apprehension, either conscious or subconscious, and at most with some anxiety. ‘Examination nerves’ are an example of that type of anxiety; to fail the test may result in loss of self-esteem or non-attainment of self-actualization. The provision of a secure learning environment is one of the most important principles to be observed when planning an educational experience for adults.

As well as being secure, the learning environment should be constructive. Instructors need to master the procedures for structuring learning as a co-operative activity, arranging the physical design of the classroom appropriately, managing interpersonal relationships, and holding positive expectations for students' efforts. A co-operative goal structure usually promotes more positive student attitudes towards the school or institution, subject areas and learning. The physical design of a room is both a symbolic message of what is expected to happen within the class and a direct influence on learning. Interpersonal relationships will not always be harmonious because adults are less flexible than adolescent students when their ideas are challenged. However, interaction should be constructive and the instructor must be skilled in conflict management. Finally, the expectations which the instructor communicates to the students, either overtly or covertly, can affect achievement. Ideally, teacher expectations will encourage students to achieve and perform appropriately.

Hamachek describes six conditions which contribute to good learning relationships within an adult student group:
1. a wide dispersion of friendship choices, as opposed to small clusters of friends;
2. a dispersion of power so that portions of the authority and responsibility for decision-making are shared by as many students as possible;
3. a psychological atmosphere that is more supporting and democratic than rejecting or authoritarian;
4. a norm structure in which the whole class has participated in developing;
5. response styles by both teacher and students that are geared more to probing and understanding than to evaluating and interpreting;
6. a general spirit of unification and "we-ness — a spirit that is usually the natural outgrowth of the five preceding factors".48

The first and last factors are beyond the direct control of the instructor; however, Hamachek says the last will result from achievement of the preceding conditions. The need for a supportive classroom climate is a crucial one if open communication is to exist because the fear of non-support and rejection is one of the greatest anxieties typically experienced by adult students. The initiative and responsibility for creating a secure learning environment lies with the leader of the group; therefore military instructors should be trained in this subject, as are civilian teachers.

CIVILIAN TEACHER TRAINING

'Beginning teachers should not be placed in schools or assigned to teacher classes for which they are not prepared.'
Professor J. J. Auchmuty

Within the civilian field of education the question of training teachers, lecturers and instructors is not whether it should occur but the time required for that training. A recommendation from the report of the National Enquiry into Teacher Education was:

'Four years' initial preparation for all teachers ... be set firmly and clearly as a target to be achieved during the 1980s.'49

Usually there are three separate components of an initial teacher training course:

- Formal instruction in a subject area to a level beyond that which the teacher will be required to perform.
- Formal instruction in educational theory and technology.
- Practical teaching experience, under supervision, at a school or college progressively throughout teacher training.

The first component is usually completed at a university or college in isolation from the other two parts. For example, the State College of Victoria at Hawthorn conducts a one-year Graduate Diploma in Education course for graduates and diplomates whose specialities may be as diverse as physical education and pure science.50 Each week of the 39 week course is divided between three days formal instruction at the College and two days teaching practice in a school or college. (A three week full-time orientation unit, 'Introduction to Teaching and Learning', is mandatory prior to commencing formal studies.) Study areas, and a sample of the sub-areas, are:

Principles and Methods of Teaching (237 hours)

- Creating a learning atmosphere.
- Approaches to assessment.
- Lesson preparation.
- Teaching strategies;
- Catering for individual differences between adult learners.
- Participation methods in adult education, small group techniques.
- Student assessment;
- Techniques of self-evaluation.
- Methodologies of teaching appropriate to particular subject areas.

Educational Psychology (78 hours)

- Learning.
- Instructional methods.
- Classroom interaction.
- Visual perception.
- Social influences on learning.
- Counselling.
- Personality and behaviour.

Education and Society (78 hours)

- Social context.
- Current problems and solutions to the problems.

Communication Studies (78 hours)

- Communication processes (skills, learning and media).
- Relational communication.
- Non-verbal communication.
- Visual communication.
- Language thought and communication.
A student receives 471 hours (equivalent to 628 military periods) of formal college instruction in the subject areas listed in addition to studies undertaken to improve his level of knowledge in his teaching. The College also conducts in-service, upgrading, and refresher courses for teachers.

THE MILITARY INSTRUCTOR

"Traditionally, instructional staff is drawn from the best of those performing operational duties." The Army instructor is likely to perform a mixture of activities within the educational arena; he may be primarily a driller, teacher, instructor or conditioner but his duties are likely to overlap into other areas of the teaching act. Two avenues currently exist within the Army for training instructors. First, basic MIT training is included in the Subject 1 promotion courses for Corporal, Sergeant and Warrant Officer; officer candidates are also given MIT training at RMC and OCS. The second avenue is through instructor courses conducted by ASIT.

The time allocated to MIT during the Subject 1 courses are: CPL 21 periods, SGT 20 periods, and WO 19 periods. The WO MIT segment includes several periods on course management. At OCS 42 periods are scheduled for MIT of which 20 are for assessed mutual instruction. The few periods allocated when compared to civilian practice are evidence of the basic nature of the level of MIT training. Draft syllabi for ASIT courses include approximately 80 periods for the Basic Instructor Course (24 periods of private study) and 135 periods for the Advanced Instructor/Supervisor course (34 periods for tests and course management training).

Although the first requirement given in ASIT's role is 'to train personnel in instruction', the responsibility does not extend to training all Army instructors. In 1977 there were 999 instructors posted to the almost 1100 establishment positions and less than 20 per cent of those instructors had attended an ASIT course. Career planning and selection of instructors had been haphazard and ASIT surveys have found that:

- On average 44 per cent of students attending instructor courses, and sometimes as high as 70 per cent, already employed as instructors.
- Between 20 to 40 per cent of students would rather not be employed as instructors.
- Warrant Officers and Officers who have had previous MIT training seldom return for updating and upgrading courses.
- Most Warrant Officers and Officer students who attend the more advanced courses do not benefit fully from those courses because up to 70 per cent of them have had little or no instructional experience or training.

The effectiveness of instructors who have been trained by ASIT in recent years may be inadequate. Since 1977 the increase in the scope of training conducted by that unit has placed such limitations on its functioning that serious gaps in . . . levels of expertise are developing and . . . some tasks are undertaken at a lesser standard than that which the army (sic) has a right to expect from its School of Instructional Training.

An Experimental Panel Report on the employment of instructors was circulated by Headquarters Training Command during October 1979. The report listed 'perceived deficiencies associated with (the) current system of instructor training' and made recommendations concerning the selection, training, employment and progression of instructors. However, no changes in Army policy towards instructor training have been identified since 1979, so the deficiencies given in the report are assumed to be still current. Some of the deficiencies were:

a. The standard of basic instructor is poor.
b. Absence of consistency in standard and duration of instructor training.
c. Lack of provision for updating of knowledge and for advanced training of instructors . . .
d. Resistance to change and absence of flexibility in instructor supervisors — as a result of c. above.
e. Lack of motivation and pride in instructors as a group.

The Army policy for the training of instructors is deduced to be that there is no requirement for mandatory training beyond the minimal MIT element included in LWC Subject 1 courses and within RMC and OCS syllabi. Career planning does not develop non-commissioned officers, warrant officers or com-
missioned officers along an instructional stream, nor are career managers obligated to determine an individual's aptitude for, or willingness to accept, an instructional appointment. Three further deductions become apparent:

- Any member of the Army could be posted to an instructional appointment (having received only the most basic MIT preparation some time earlier in his career).
- Attendance at an ASIT instructors course does not necessarily indicate selection for an instructional appointment, as it is not a career course.
- Any member of the Army, after an initial instructional appointment, might return to such an appointment after a short time, a long time, or never!

**Conclusion**

'With his eyes shut, even the prophet sees nothing.'

Anon

There are two significant differences between civilian and military instructors, the first being that the civilian enters into the teaching profession of his own accord. The second and more important difference is the training which the civilian must complete before he is accepted as being qualified. The training has been proven necessary because educational research is dynamic and learning is a complex process involving both the instructor and the student. Therefore as further information is obtained on factors affecting learning instructors must be prepared to modify their strategies and tactics of teaching.

The instructor exerts a strong influence over his students and if he is not effective then learning is unlikely to occur. To be effective the instructor must understand the characteristics of his students, be able to facilitate learning, and provide a secure learning environment. He must also know the current theories of learning and then be able to employ appropriate strategies and tactics of teaching. Finally, the instructor must understand the influences on student motivation so that an optimum learning situation is created and maintained. The areas of knowledge which have been described show that the instructor is a specialist who must be given formal training. His tasks are those of a professional for whom, in addition to the requirement for initial training, there is a need for on-going training to maintain expertise at the mastery level.

By introducing the ATS the Army has clearly shown that it recognizes the need to conduct formal training to prepare individuals for job performance. A weakness in the system is the instructor because few have been formally trained beyond the most basic level and the standard of training given since 1977 to the few is unlikely to have been adequate. Doubts arise concerning the adequacy of ASIT training because: the unit has not been able to maintain high professional standards; it is incapable of training all Army instructors; the combined duration of the ASIT Basic and Advanced courses is about one-third of a sampled civilian teaching training course; and few instructors follow a logical progression of selection for an instructional appointment, attendance at a Basic course and then later an Advanced course. Also, few students return to the unit for refresher training.

Until the Army recognizes the need for all instructors to be trained the ATS cannot be effective, as those persons who have the greatest influence on learning, the instructors, will not be able to perform their duties effectively. Initial training by itself is insufficient preparation for the instructor because as educational research provides more and better information on the process of learning so must that information be put into practice. To be effectively prepared the instructor must be given initial training, he must be given in-service training, and he must be given on-going training throughout his career. Without these activities, the Army's instructional system will fail to reach the standards expected by both its members and by the country.

**NOTES**

2. The ATS was introduced shortly after the reorganization of the Army into the functional commands.
3. Officer training courses and NCO and WO promotion courses did include a limited MIT element.
6. Discussions with COL P. Leeson, DPP, and LTCOL
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18. Cookson, C. 'Teaching Adults - A Few Notes.'
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22. Nadler. p. 179.
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27. Johnson. p. 204.
28. Modelling and imitating are processes of acquiring
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32. Davies. p. 177.
33. Davies. p. 177.
34. Davies. p. 177.

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THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: ITS INEVITABILITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. Grinter, Lawrence E. Parameters; Dec 82: 53-61 Discusses Soviet and Afghanistan relations prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, then Soviet options, her choice, and lessons learned.

THE THEATER NUCLEAR THREAT. Douglass, Joseph D. Parameters; Dec 82: 71-81 Discusses Soviet perceptions on the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare to enhance the takeover of more Western countries.

US STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND WESTERN SECURITY. McGarrah, Robert E. Parameters; Dec 82: 62-70 Concludes that US leaders of industry and government have much to lose and almost nothing to gain by sustaining their policies of military-industrial independence while trying to strengthen military and economic security.

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TOWARD A COHERENT ENERGY STRATEGY. Lantzke, Ulf. Washington Quarterly; Winter 83: 66-70 In orchestrating a coherent long term global energy policy, governments should recognize the economic and security implications of the West's overdependence on imported oil.

THE UNBUILT STREET — DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. Callaghan, Thomas A. NATO's Fifteen Nations; Oct/Nov 82: 26+ (3p) Shows a new move in the US Congress which may prove to be the catalyst to free the forces to build a two-way street among NATO Nations.

VERIFICATION: NO OBSTACLE TO ARMS CONTROL. Sharp, Jane M. O.; Pieragostini, Karl; Kennedy, Richard T. Arms Control Today; Jan 83: 1-9 A composite of three articles — verifying a warhead freeze; co-operative verification; nonproliferation policy; an exchange. The Soviets are unwilling to agree to on-site inspections, therefore the US has argued that a bilateral freeze is bad arms control because it cannot be verified.

TURKEY: NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN KEYSTONE. Milton, T. R. Air Force Magazine; May 83: 60-63 Having weathered the worst crisis it has faced in decades, Turkey now seems headed for better days. A fact that should bring comfort to its NATO allies. Problems remain, manageable but persistent, to challenge the leaders of this ancient country.

WESTERN SEA POWER: NEED FOR A CHANGE OF COURSE? Wettern, Desmond. Navy International; Jul 83: 413-416 With the Soviets' Naval power increased in the Atlantic, NATO must give urgent attention to the improvement of its maritime defences. This article compares the naval power of the Soviets and NATO at present and what NATO must do to catch up to the Soviet's future expectations.

THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN OUTER SPACE. Goedhuis, D. International Relations; May 83: 2284-2303 This article looks at the civilian and military uses of outer space, achieving a more equitable international economic order in space, and halting the military escalation in space.

DID IT REALLY MATTER? Hickman, William F. Naval War College Review; Mar/Apr 83: 17-30 The purpose of this article is to examine the use of naval forces as instruments of US foreign policy, using the hostage crisis at the American Embassy in Tehran as a case study.
SINCE the 1975 restructuring of the Department of Defence many articles have been written criticizing the resultant organization. Frequently authors claim that there is too much “civilian” control exercised within the Department. Others claim that “Central” exercises too much control over the Service Offices. Yet another group claims that “Central” has insufficient power over the three individual Service Offices. The only consistency that is visible in the themes presented is the apparent need for change — dramatic change at that.

When the Tange Report was implemented a small service element was established to support the new position of CDFS. This staff was neither large enough nor experienced enough in joint service procedures to properly support the CDFS in commanding the three Services. The Service “Offices”, as they were named, found themselves competing with “Central” for power. The result of this competition has been the growth of Defence Central and the three Service Offices.

Within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) there are now 41 positions held by officers of 2 star rank and above. Simplistically, this provides for a span of command of less than 2,000 personnel for each of these officers — hardly a demanding requirement for such an experienced officer. Certainly RAN and RAAF officers have to control very valuable items of equipment but is the value so high, or the control so complex, that it requires two star officers to manage it?

Senior officers must have their domains and, particularly in Canberra, this means seats on committees and the right to “staff” paper through their Branches. Given high rank it is only natural for any officer to want to exercise it. Regrettably, there is only a small defence force on which to carry out that exercise. The result is a dilution of the senior officer’s responsibility, a maze of committees and piles of paperwork. This leads to a lack of clear, quick decision making which is the supposed hallmark of service officers.

The competition between the Service Offices and Defence Central has prevented the establishment of a proper joint headquarters. The need for such a headquarters has been stated many times, but why haven’t the establishment changes necessary for its formation been implemented? Perhaps the reason lies in the parochialism that encrusts the three single Services. This parochialism generates inter-Service rivalry for funds and prevents sound force structures being developed. The Australian Defence forces are too small to be able to develop sufficient combat power individually as single Services. When brought together as a joint force, however, the ADF can produce considerable combat power.

The CDFS needs to have a proper joint headquarters with which to command any joint force that is established. This headquarters is essential for the proper and efficient functioning of any subordinate joint force. The establishment of such a headquarters would detract from the current functions of the single Service Offices. For the CDFS’ headquarters to work, virtually all of the operational responsibilities that currently exist in the Service Officers would have to be moved into Defence Central.

Two factors, therefore, seem to be working simultaneously to prevent the ADF from maturing into an effective force capable of meeting the requirements placed upon it. Firstly, there are too many senior appointments in the
ADF. Secondly, single Service parochialism is rife and prevents valuable lessons learnt from major exercises being implemented. The time has come for the Australian Defence Force to stand on its own feet and develop a force that is suited to our regional needs and not one that mirrors the traditional system introduced from the UK. To move to such a force does not require such a traumatic change as may be expected. The Tange re-organization set the ADF well on its way to producing the force required for our regional situation. What is needed is a continuation of the evolution begun in 1975.

The next step in the ADF's evolution is to give the CDFS the joint staff he needs to exercise his command. The single Services will never be able to mount an effective military operation independently and therefore, the Service Offices should pass their operational responsibilities to CDFS' staff.

The diagram in Figure 1 shows how this could be done. The current Chief of Joint Operations and Plans position would be split into Joint Operations and Joint Plans. Joint logistics would become an appointment in its own right.

A new position of Chief of Joint Mobilization Plans would be formed. This appointment should be filled by the senior serving reserve officer in the ADF, probably, but not necessarily, the existing Chief of Army Reserve. This change would allow a respected member of the civilian community to be responsible for working with other leaders of the community in the formulation of mobilization plans. Who better to deal with leaders of industry than one who understands the problems of both sectors of the community? The appointment of a two star officer to hold this position gives it the visibility it deserves. Within the ADF, separate organizations for reservists should be abolished as they should be controlled by full-time operations staffs at all levels.

JIO and ADFA should both fall clearly under the wing of CDFS. JIO's current lines of responsibility would, however, require modification. The Director JIO (DJIO) is currently responsible to both the CDFS and Secretary of the Department of Defence. Whilst the Secretary should have full and free access to JIO and its product it is vital for JIO to become more closely aligned with the uniformed side of the Department — this is the master of the Organization (the addition of the word "Defence" to JIO's title would further help recognition of the purely "Defence" nature of the organization's role).

The Natural Disasters Organization would, in this proposed re-organization, be headed by a civilian officer of two star status. A civilian, with a longer tenure of appointment than the current serviceman, is better suited to develop an understanding of the individual State arrangements and establish the essential rapport with the States.

A very important position in this proposed re-organization, is that of Deputy Chief of Defence Force Staff (DCDFS). This position, of three star rank, would replace the existing Assistant Chief of Defence Force Staff (ACDFS). This position would be in all respects that of Deputy to the CDFS. This officer would act as CDFS during the CDFS' absence rather than one of the single Service Chiefs as is now the practice. The office of DCDFS would have a major role to play in force structuring.

**Joint Force Organizations**

Three joint operational forces should be established in place of existing single Service arrangements.

The basic organizations shown in Figure 1 contain little that has not already been presented before. The only change lies in the titles of the forces. The titles "Joint Land Forces", "Joint Air Defence Forces" and "Joint Maritime Forces" are preferred because they in no way imply a particular strategic function as do, for example, "Continental Command" and "Maritime Approaches Command". The inclusion of the word "Joint" in their title also serves to drive home the nature of the Forces' organizations.

The three joint forces would be commanded by three star officers who would not be located in Canberra. These officers would be found by releasing the existing CNS, CGS and CAS. This alteration to the current system would have two major advantages. Firstly, these positions are practical command positions rather than staff positions with a command responsibility. Senior officers aspiring to become CDFS would therefore be assessed not only on their ability in the policy making role but also in a practical leadership situation.
Figure 1
Secondly, by placing these three star officers in command of joint forces, existing single Service parochialism will be ameliorated.

**Single Service Offices**

Under this re-organization the single Service Offices would retain only the personnel, training and logistic functions. They would be headed by a two star officer and be responsible for providing the trained manpower and serviceable equipment required by the three joint forces and CDFS’ staff. The titles of Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of the General Staff and Chief of Air Staff could be dropped in favour of Navy Chief of Staff, Army Chief of Staff and Air Force Chief of Staff.

**Materiel Procurement**

The existing single Service Materiel Branches currently contain staffs which duplicate each other and are thus wasteful on manpower. It is proposed that these organizations should be removed from the Service Offices and placed under civilian (three star) control. The resulting organization, perhaps titled the “Defence Materiel Procurement Division” would also incorporate the existing Chief of Supply and Support’s organization.

Such a combination would not only realize significant manpower savings but it would also prevent delays in contractual matters and make dealing with the Department of Defence easier for suppliers. Rather than having a choice of Service Offices and Defence Central Organizations to keep in touch with the supplier or potential supplier would have only one Division with which to become familiar.

The materiel procurement process is characterized by long lead times and the five Year Defence Programme. Results are long term and therefore civilian offices are more appropriate than Service offices for the most senior positions. The two star positions of Chief of Navy Materiel, Chief of Materiel Army and Chief of Air Force Materiel, would be disestablished. The senior servicemen in the proposed Division would be one star officers.

**Facilities**

Like materiel procurement this area is long term and one ideally suited to civilian expertise. For reasons similar to those put forward for combining Materiel Procurement into a single division, so too it is recommended that the facilities functions be removed from the Service Offices and grouped into a single Defence Central Division.

**The Committee System**

Under the proposed re-organization the committee system within the Department of Defence would be trimmed dramatically. For a start, the existing system of Service Office committees would be emasculated — mainly because the Service Offices themselves would have greatly reduced influence. The Service Advisory Committees, Materiel Committees and the like would no longer be necessary. Furthermore, because of the rationalized rank levels within the proposed new Service Offices, the majority of other Service Office committees would be replaced by day to day management functions.

The Defence Central committee structure would also be revised. The Chiefs of Staff Committee should be abolished and replaced by a CDFS Advisory Committee (CDFSAC). The CDFSAC is deliberately titled “Advisory” because that is exactly what it is. The final decision making responsibility rests with the CDFS, not the collective body. This committee would consist of the CDFS, DCDFS and the three joint force commanders. In this way operational experience would be brought directly to the CDFS.

Another important change that should be made to the Defence Central committee system is for the determination of operational requirements to take precedence over discussions on materiel solutions. The identification of an operational requirement is more important than selecting the solution. The existing Defence Operational Requirements Committee, junior to the Force Structure Committee, would be abolished. The CDFSAC would assume responsibility for determining operational requirements. Having determined the requirement, this would then be passed to the Materiel Procurement Division for satisfaction. A short list of equipment could then be referred to the CDFSAC for the final selection of equipment type. The role and composition of many other committees would also be dramatically altered. Space does not permit a full review of the potential savings. Suffice it to say that a major reduction in the number of committees within the Department of Defence could be realized.
Conclusion

The proposed re-organization represents a change from the existing situation that should be seen as evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Like it or not, the ADF can only generate combat power of any consequence by acting in a joint role. The move towards a truly joint organization was begun by the Tange reorganization in 1975 and it should now be taken another step further. The essence of this concept is the provision of the staff necessary to allow the CDFS to command the ADF.

By making the existing three star officers (CNS, CGS and CAS) commanders of joint operational commands several benefits accrue. These officers would bring current operational experience to Canberra in meetings of the CDFSAC. More importantly, they would be forced to think in joint terms, not parochially, in single Service terms. The establishment of the position of DCDFC provides CDFS with a proper deputy and furthers the joint service development of the ADF.

The reduction of the heads of the three Services to two star rank makes them accountable to the operational commanders. This again restores the requirement of operations to the forefront. Similarly, the raising of operational requirement determination to a position above that of determining materiel solutions establishes the correct priorities in the committee system.

This article presents a concept only and many areas have been omitted from scrutiny (eg Health Services). However, if the ADF is to realize its full potential, the evolution begun in 1975 should be continued and the competition between the single Services and Defence Central removed.

Australian Defence Force Academy’s First Rector

Professor Geoff Wilson, the distinguished physicist and Dean on the staff of the University of NSW, has been appointed the first Rector of the University College of the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Prof. Wilson has been Dean of the Faculty of Military Studies of the University of NSW at RMC, Duntroon, since 1978. It is a position he will continue to hold until the Faculty is absorbed into the University College at the beginning of 1986.

ADFA brings together officer cadets of the three Services to provide military training and to give them a balanced and liberal education in a military environment.

ADFA will take over the university teaching and some of the military training of cadets now run by the RAN at Jervis Bay, the Army at Duntroon and the RAAF at Point Cook.

The University of NSW has accepted responsibility for the academic integrity of ADFA and will give officer cadets their university education in science, engineering, social sciences and the humanities.

The degrees they receive will be degrees of the University of NSW.

Professor Wilson said: "The university has been teaching at Duntroon for more than a decade through the Faculty of Military Studies.

"The university has also been responsible for the initial tertiary education of Navy officer cadets at Jervis Bay," he said.

On the value of tertiary education to Service officers, Prof. Wilson said it enabled them to respond to the challenges of new technology and to take an intelligent approach to changes in social, political and strategic circumstances.

"Association with an existing university is crucial to the quality and nature of the education of officer cadets," Prof. Wilson said.

"Their tertiary education should be provided by teachers active in research and scholarship and part of the national and international academic community.

"Officers’ education levels must be comparable with those in other professions and with those of their civilian counterparts," Prof. Wilson said.
ALL IN: THE AUSTRALIAN HOME FRONT 1939-45.

By Jeff Popple, BA(Hons), Department of Defence

WORLD War I has captivated Australian historians and writers, like no other event in our short history. This is understandable as the symbolic, and actual, ‘blooding of a nation’ and the horrendous loss of a generation on the battlefields of Gallipoli and Europe is an occurrence of epic proportions. But it is not only the battles and the resultant ANZAC legend that has attracted attention. Historians have also been drawn to the home front to study the deep, abiding racial and religious divisions wrought in Australian society by the conscription issue.

This fascination with the First World War has tended to overshadow the Second World War, although the latter presents the historian with the unique opportunity to view Australian society under threat from invasion. Historians have been reluctant to take up the opportunity and have mainly concentrated on Australia’s part in fighting or the experiences of our POWs at the hands of the Japanese.

Apart from a few specialised accounts there has been very little attention paid to the home front. This is largely due to the course of the War itself, which was divided into two distinct phases: the European War and, from December 1941 onwards, the war against Japan.

There is little in the first stage to attract the attention of myth-makers and historians to the home front. Unlike World War I, there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the War in 1939, with most people carrying on ‘business as usual’. Enlistments in the 2nd AIF were no match for the outpouring of patriotism that saw an amazing rush to enlist in the original AIF in 1914. Even after Dunkirk and the fall of France, enlistment was not to reach those dizzy heights and the attitude and behaviour of the populace were to remain a concern for politicians, as Menzies lamented — the reaction of many people is “a statement that Australia is not playing its part”.

With the entry of Japan into the war things were to take on a different complexion. For the first time Australia was under threat, especially during the first months when the Japanese onslaught seemed unstoppable. Most Australians reacted with nobility and a strong sense of unity and common purpose towards this new threat. Unfortunately this quiet determination and perseverance under difficult conditions is usually overshadowed by the not so palatable: the public perception of panic at Darwin in 1942; the rush to the bush following the midget sub scare in Sydney; and the acrimony and moral deterioration associated with the ‘Yank Invasion’. Not the stuff of legends.

Recent studies have mainly concentrated on these unfortunate aspects, to the detriment of more important themes. The Second World War really represents a ‘watershed’ in Australian history. For the first time under threat, exposed to new dangers, Australian society evolved to meet the occasion.

Australians acknowledged the limitations of the British Empire and for the first time turned wholeheartedly to the United States of America for assistance. Women enthusiastically entered the workforce in larger numbers than ever before and participated in the painful restructuring of the Australian economy. Australians surrendered important freedoms and conceded new powers to the Federal Government.
welcomed thousands of Americans into their country, and although influenced by their presence retained a strong preference for their own way of doing things.

Michael McKernan in his new study (ALL IN, Australia During The Second World War. Nelson Australia. ix plus 286pp. $27.50) amply covers all these themes as well as providing the first analysis of the war in Australia from the point of view of men, women and children at home. McKernan comes to the task with impeccable qualifications. His last book provided a comprehensive and entertaining study of Australian society during the First World War. It was an impressive effort and if his recent study disappoints slightly, it is only because of the high expectations produced by its predecessor.

‘ALL IN’ is a handsomely produced book that takes the reader chronologically through the various stages of the War, as well as stepping aside to look at the larger themes of women at work, the American invasion and moral concerns. Probably the best chapters are the opening two, particularly the aptly titled first chapter, ‘Business As Usual’. In them McKernan accurately captures the prevailing atmosphere at the beginning of the War. The apparent lack of interest in the War, the slow enlistment rate, the Menzies Government’s indecisiveness and the indifference of militia recruits to overseas service. The laborious recruiting efforts are nicely detailed and are starkly contrasted to the wild, excited scenes of 1914. The only thing lacking is an account of the role of the press, particularly the Sydney Morning Herald, in trying to promote patriotism and enthusiasm by exaggerating the enlistment rates.

A concluding chapter takes a brief look at the post-war hopes of the people and the Government. It includes a short but interesting account of the initial reaction to the dropping of the atomic bomb. Most people were unable to comprehend it, although one woman welcomed it as the dawning of a new age: ‘Good’, she said, ‘we’ll be able to wipe out every Jap now. It’s a pity we didn’t have it for the Germans’.” (p. 265).

Undoubtedly, the hero of the book is John Curtin, the wartime Prime Minister who died in the job. He was an honest patriot whose plain goodness challenged Australian men and women to match his own self-sacrifice. He persuaded them to work harder, to accept rationing, to pay for the war and to put up with the unprecedented government control of their lives. Following Curtin’s lead many Australians worked long, hard and often dangerous hours, particularly in mines and munition factories. However, others found life not so grim. Nightclubs were packed, the ‘wowser’
Sunday was relaxed and the 1940 Melbourne Cup created an Australian on-course tote investment record of £127,376/15 for a single race.

Specialists may argue over their areas, but overall McKernan gives a good coverage of wartime Australia. The only complaint is the limited range of sources. Missing are the diaries, the letters, the church records, the autobiographies, the school magazines and reminiscences which he used to great effect in his book on the First World War. Admittedly, they are not as readily available yet, but searching out should have uncovered more. McKernan has extensively searched through the newspapers and magazines of the day for letters and comments, but surprisingly he does not use the 'Smith's Weekly'. This popular Sydney weekly was the unofficial spokesman for the returned servicemen from WW1 putting forward the returned soldier viewpoint in its editorials, articles and cartoons. It's more forthright approach casted an interesting light on many aspects of society, as well as revealing the more bizarre: one recruiting office in Melbourne was uninspiringly located in a funeral parlour.5

But these quibbles aside, 'ALL IN' is a well-argued, entertaining and lavishly illustrated book, that should appeal to the historian and general reader alike.

McKernan's book has been closely followed by 'TOTAL WAR: The Home Front 1939-1945' by Garry Disher. (Oxford University Press. $6.99 pb; 92pp.) Designed as a textbook for middle level secondary school students, 'TOTAL WAR' is extremely up to date, and includes references to McKernan's book and others released in 1983.

It highlights all the main concerns and issues in a fair and interesting manner. Even covering aspects which are usually glossed over in other studies; the slow transfer from the militia to the AIF; the fate and treatment of the Dunera internees and enemy POWs in Australia; pacifism and political surveillance; as well as a mature chapter on the decline in morals. There is also a very good and moving short chapter on the battlefronts.

The book makes excellent use of extracts from diaries, letters, newspapers, magazines, memoirs and government reports as well as using contemporary photos and paintings to great effect. In fact in its use of diaries and letters it outshines McKernan's book.

At the end of each chapter there are a series of questions and exercises for the students to do. The book certainly goes a long way towards raising the standards of history taught in secondary schools, as well as making it more interesting and 'real' for the students.

The only complaint is that some books are incorrectly cited in the bibliography, which is surely not a good example for high school students.

FOOTNOTES
3. The official history of the home front by Paul Hasluck concentrates on the political and governmental aspects.

Jeff Popple graduated from the University of New South Wales in 1980 (BA Hons) Military History. He joined the Department of Defence in 1981. Jeff is a keen Military Historian and has contributed to the Defence Force Journal on several occasions.
My dear friend,

Do not wonder too much how it was possible to get this brief note to you. Sufficient to say that I am being kept fully occupied on outdoor activities and my present supervisor insists I keep my mind on the job. It would be convenient to excuse my present condition on the grounds of insufficient warning of what was to come or that my best efforts to prepare were hampered by the indifference or even the negligence of others. Perhaps, but I must share the blame.

Besides I had had warning. I could see what was coming. Most of us knew deep down that the magnet of our riches would attract the speculator, the curious, the plunderer, the hungry and the desperate. Most of us knew we would be caught and caught badly.

Ironically I had had more warning than most. Well prior to what is now referred to as “The Landing” I, in company with my colleagues, visited our northern approaches. I had been aware of a land of great distance, few people, pockets of infrastructure, mountains of wealth whereas during my visit the full realisation of the juxtaposition between resources and vulnerability began to dawn upon me. I refer not just to the inadequacies of our caretaker forces of the time and the slender single thread of bitumen but, more to the point, the opportunity presented to our enemies to secure for himself a platform from which we would be unlikely to dislodge him.

I recall particularly a conversation with a long time resident of the area as he drew upon the local traditions and history to reveal a long held prophecy. He told of a people from the north whose frustrations were captured and directed against the Great South Land. The old man could remember the one occasion when the northerners struck a glancing blow that sent a tremour throughout the whole land. Had they pressed their advantage at the time the raiders may well have set in motion events the consequences of which would have exceeded their most sober expectations. I confess myself taken aback when the old man, obviously stirred by the memories of those days, turned upon me and pressed me hard as the defender’s representative. In his view nothing had changed.

My own fears were confirmed during my visit. I had expected dust, heat, mud, water to
aggravate the problems of moving men and materials and that we would be bedevilled by shortages of transport, water and fuel. Then I saw the thin ribbon of bitumen and realised that the railway line didn’t even exist. As my visit was during the Dry I had no idea at all of the impositions of the Wet.

I also miscalculated with regard to the warning we might receive and had assumed we would be able to place into position whatever resources would be required to at least slow down an enemy. Well technically you could say we had that warning. There were ample preliminary incidents associated with our sea lanes and off-shore resources; minor incursions; movement and counter-movement in the enemy’s likely assembly areas, charge and countercharge in the international councils. Certainly we had an impressive intelligence coverage and some pretty good assessments but for good security reasons this information had a very limited distribution.

Nevertheless the Parliament and the public were responsive to the signs and there was what was described as a modest build up in the size of the ADF and a general increase in the level of defence consciousness. The Government announced measures for the reinforcement of NORFORCE, primarily by lifting the ceiling on the ARES strength and by increasing the number of training days available. A sizeable percentage of the force was placed on FTD. A most encouraging move was the movement of a regular mechanised battalion to a temporary camp south of Darwin and the early concentration of two more battalions, drawn from ARES units to flesh out a brigade. It was understood in official circles but not generally mooted about that it would not be possible to equip these two battalions adequately nor finalise key support aspects of the brigade. Substantial reinforcements were put on notice.

Also encouraging was the concentration of a fighter squadron at the recently completed Tactical Fighter base at Darwin and activation of the reserve facilities at Tyndal. Reassuring though this presence was our private enquiries confirmed that without a sophisticated warning and Command Support System we were deceived by mirages.

The critics of course had a field day over these important redeployments, drawing attention to the absence of a maritime strike force. It was claimed, by way of official riposte, that it would be provocative to prematurely deploy the essential elements of such a force but that the Navy would continue to reinforce the patrol boat squadron permanently in Darwin, operating from its impressive new patrol boat base.

I returned to take up a staff appointment just before the landing. Certainly by then there had been progress made on local preparations. Forces in the area had got over some of the settling in and control problems and early plans agreed with the civil defence and local resources people. They had also been there long enough to be troubled by the magnitude of the defence task and to become infected by the belief they could do little more than offer a determined enemy a preliminary skirmish.

What happened on the Day? You know you do not really understand these things until they happen to you. True we had seen misery inflicted across a hundred lands and had nestled ourselves comfortably in the illusion of distance. As our Day unfolded it was as if it was on someone else’s screen.

Our intelligence told us the enemy was on the move and we had a shrewd idea of where he would land. As expected he struck in two prongs, initially at brigade strength to the east and west of the city against our thinly held frontages. Our two battalions, widely deployed and immobile because of the ground and our lack of vehicles fought well but pointlessly. The enemy’s naval gunfire and air support and his multiple landing techniques made the business of pinning and destruction a simple one indeed and echoed the lessons of a previous war.

We had expected some preliminary deception and disruption activities and our forecasts were accurate. Our rehearsed responses failed because we couldn’t cover the options. I recall vividly when I knew that our communication links had been lost and when the enemy, with an appalling indifference to casualties, secured sufficient control of the airfields and docks as to render them ineffectual for our purposes.

He didn’t have everything his way and the mechanised battalion, nominated as a reserve, gave a good account of itself in the predawn activities. The Brigade Commander, in a startling countermove used this unit as a very effective screen as the enemy attempted to get his forces ashore. We had given this old
chestnut of defend forward or back a great deal of attention and had agreed to make the maximum use of all available fire power at the time the enemy was most vulnerable. Certainly we took casualties to the naval gunfire but as the visibility improved so our vulnerability increased. Particularly distressing was the shortfall in our Air Defence resources and as the pressure increased so our totally inadequate force disappeared in a series of bloody and fruitless actions. Our ground forces were decimated, our patrol boats burning hulks and our aircraft blown out of the sky. Certainly it was heroic and added a new lustre to our gallant traditions. It was also a tragic waste.

Within a day an enemy armoured force had secured Tyndal. Within a week he had a division ashore and well dug in. Then, seemingly as part of his timed program, the rains commenced and he was free to continue his build up on the high ground, secure in the knowledge that the great moat so soon to develop would make it impossible for us to expel him. By the time the rains had ceased he would have turned our north west approaches into a fortress, fortress North West Approaches.

Lt Col J. WOOD,
Royal Australian Infantry
Australian Army Reserve

Lt. Col. Wood has contributed previously to the DFF in a series of articles entitled 'A Letter to a Friend'. His civilian employment has included overseas postings to Jakarta, Hong Kong, and most recently, Tokyo. He is presently on the Unattached List HQ 3 Div. FF Gp.

Australian Defence Force Academy's First Commandant

Commodore Peter Sinclair, RAN, will be the first Australian Defence Force Academy’s first Commandant.

He will be promoted Rear Admiral and take up the appointment on July 9.

Commodore Sinclair joined the navy in 1948 as a Cadet Midshipman and graduated in 1951. He served in ships of the Royal Navy and the RAN before returning to the UK in 1958 to specialise in gunnery.

On his return to Australia in 1962 he served as Gunnery Trials Officer and then joined HMAS Vendetta as Gunnery Officer in 1964.

After a posting on the Naval Staff in Canberra he joined HMAS Vampire as Executive Officer in 1967 and was then posted back to the Naval Staff as the first Director of Surface and Air Weapons in 1968.

He commanded the Daring class destroyer HMAS Duchess in 1970 and 1971. In 1972 he joined the Junior Recruit Training Establishment, HMAS Leeuwin, as Executive Officer and Deputy Naval Officer Commanding Western Australia.

Commodore Sinclair took command of HMAS Hobart in December, 1974, and then spent a short period as Commanding Officer HMAS Penguin before joining Navy Office as Director of Naval Plans.

He became Director General Military Staff in the Strategic and International Policy Division in 1979 and was promoted Commodore later that year.

MARITIME STRATEGY
IN THE SUPPORT
OF FOREIGN POLICY

By Lieutenant Commander P. L. Clark, DFC, RAN

Introduction

There is a mass of historical data which argues the relationship between maritime strategy and the support of foreign policy. The clearest and most persuasive examples, which date back to the days of Rome, are those applicable to the major world powers of the particular era in question. Whereas it has not been convincingly evident whether the relationship is pertinent to minor world powers.

Therefore consideration of the impact of maritime strategy on foreign policy, with regard to present day Australia (a minor world power), is dependent upon the appropriate interpretation of history. Nowadays, such a discussion is likely to be confused by the current stream of cliches contained in the vocabulary of the modern-day strategist. These include:

- sea denial,
- sea assertion,
- sea control,
- maritime strategy,
- national strategy,
- sea power,
- core force, and
- force-in-being.

Even the simple term strategy has many interpretations. These terms have now proven so meaningless (cliche) that it is mandatory that each author clearly define his own interpretation of the terms he wishes to use. Continual reference to the intended meaning of these simple words is important to keep the reader on course with the theme.

To examine the subject in an Australian context one must assemble and interpret the pieces of this dislocated puzzle with minimal reference to the catchwords of the present day strategist.

The aim of this article is to examine developments in the relationship between maritime strategy and foreign policy to establish whether such a relationship exists today. Then to move to the Australian context and discuss the factors that contribute both to the formulation of our foreign policy and the determination of our maritime strategy. Finally, the relationship between the military and political functions will be summarized to show how we in Australia perceive and utilise the implications of the relationship between foreign policy and maritime strategy.

Maritime Strategy and Foreign Policy

The very concept of maritime strategy in support of foreign policy implies that the utility of such a relationship can only exist during times of peace. For in effect, the relationship ceases to exist the moment (major) conflict breaks out with the consequent severing of diplomatic relations. Clearly then, the prime objective of this concept is the avoidance of war through the impact of maritime power on the political decisions of another nation.

The United States

The capability to favourably influence the political decisions of another nation is one of the major roles attributed to the navies of today. This role, more commonly termed ‘Naval Presence’ is one of the four major roles of the US Navy. These are:

a. Strategic Nuclear Deterrence,
b. Sea Control,
c. Projection of National Power, and
d. Naval Presence.

Thus this role is still held to be valid today in the United States. Why should this be so? Recent history shows how the United States used its maritime power to exert influence in Lebanon, the Cuban missile crisis, the Indian Ocean, and in a less traditional sense in Vietnam.
Of the above, the Cuban crisis appears to have had the greatest impact. Not only did it raise the threat of a major nuclear exchange, thereby heightening global speculation, but it also demonstrated the determination of the United States to exert military influence to achieve the political aim. Perhaps of greater importance is the fact that the proximity of this event means that most, if not all current military and political leaders in the United States can recall the impact of this crisis from their living memory. The favourable result undoubtedly imparted a clear understanding of the use of maritime power as a valuable tool of diplomacy.

**Diplomatic Influence**

Before referring to Soviet attitudes it is relevant to consider two more general points which also indicate the influence of maritime power.

Firstly, the diplomatic significance of navies is attested by the fact that the peace treaties concluded after the two world wars paid particular attention to limiting the size and capability of the naval forces of the defeated nations. Moreover, large portions of their battle fleets were either destroyed or divided amongst the dominant nations.

Secondly, the ability of armed forces to influence the attainment of the political objectives of their government largely rests with the maritime component of such forces. Despite the technology of today’s armies and air forces, they are not capable of exerting the subtle pressure of their maritime brothers. Rather, the use of these (former) elements would be typified by a massing of forces near the desired point of influence and this tends to develop an escalatory situation which cannot be controlled in a timely fashion. Thus under circumstances which call for military influence, navies have proved to be the preferred political instrument of a nation during peace. Not only is their power wielded indirectly, but also, they enable the political leaders to exercise a great deal more effective and timely control than is possible with the other elements of the armed forces.

**The Soviet Union**

There is little reason to doubt that the Soviet Union also implements this relationship to achieve its own objectives. One aspect is clearly explained in the following quote by Admiral Gorshkov: ‘With the emergence of the Soviet Navy on to the ocean expanses, our warships are calling with continually greater frequency at foreign ports, fulfilling the role of ‘plenipotentiaries’ (official envoys) of the Socialist countries. In the last three years alone, some 1,000 Soviet combatants and auxiliaries have visited the ports of 60 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. More than 200,000 of our officers and rated and non-rated men have visited the shores of foreign states’.

Furthermore, the emergence of the Soviet fleet on to the world’s oceans is not only an indicator of her economy and technology, but also emphasises her attitudes towards the importance of maritime power.

Since the Soviet Union is significantly less dependent on international trade than the United States, the tremendous growth of her maritime power is an expression of some other objective. Whatever her motives may have been, the Soviet challenge to the United States’ mastery of the oceans (since WWII) has been effective. The extent and effectiveness of this challenge is aptly described by the following quote by Admiral Zumwalt:... as of 1 July 1970 the US had a 55 per cent chance of winning a major conventional war at sea (with Russia) and was heading towards a 45 per cent chance as of 1 July 1971 and a considerably smaller one than that by 1 July 1972.

**Naval Presence**

Thus the two most powerful navies of today acknowledge and apply the principles of Naval Presence to support foreign policy and other political and state objectives.

Despite this and the events of recent history such as the Cuban missile crisis, which overtly proved that a nation’s determination can be convincingly expressed through its maritime forces, the Naval Presence mission fails to attract the detailed analysis and discussion which are frequently directed at the more ‘accepted’ roles of a navy.

This is not to suggest that Naval Presence is a power unto itself, but rather that it is inextricably linked with the potential of a navy for war. This capacity for war is amply demonstrated by today’s technology: a capacity to strike with unprecedented accuracy and destructive power. The selective control of
such awesome power transforms Naval Presence into the most subtle art of the military profession. While it enables a nation’s capacity for war to be assessed objectively by an opponent, its existence and or proximity implies nothing. Instead it generates a subjective response since the opponent is forced to interpret the intrinsic subtlety of Naval Presence.

The Future of Naval Presence

Although I have only just touched on a few relatively insignificant examples (at least in the context of history) it is hoped that the reader perceives that the relationship between maritime strategy and foreign policy survives, at least in the eyes of the two major world powers.

Some would argue that the importance of the Naval Presence mission has declined because of the continued developments in nuclear strategy. These weapons which reflect both the ultimate in military technology and capacity for war, tend to overshadow the capabilities of conventional military forces in the context of a major global war. Yet as much as they are the ultimate expression of a nation’s capacity for war, they are also the servant of peace between the two major world powers. It is considered highly unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union will again engage in an exercise of delicate nuclear bargaining as they did over Cuba.

Under these circumstances, the Naval Presence mission assumes major significance should the major world powers continue to compete for the attainment of political objectives, particularly in the Third World. Despite their acknowledgement of the importance of Naval Presence, there is much to suggest that little is likely to be achieved so long as they retain overall nuclear parity and a balance of the more conventional military power in the particular region in question.

Since such a balance of power has a neutralising effect, it is likely that the United States and Soviet Union will continue to direct major efforts towards maintaining such an environment in key areas.

However, the period in which the majority of nations were polarised either towards the Americans or Soviets appears to be drawing to a close as nations, such as Indonesia and Egypt, strive for true independence. Such a loosening of traditional alliances suggests that the super-powers will be less automatically committed to an opposing point of view.

FACTORS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA

Historical Perspective

Since the end of World War II there has been a fundamental change in the concept of and the relationship between maritime strategy and foreign policy. During earlier years, up to and including World War II, Australia reacted predictably to the call of England and the Commonwealth. Gradually this emphasis began to shift away from England towards a responsiveness to the United States. Whilst the ties with the United States continued to evolve, Australia also began to develop her own political interpretations and reactions based on the broader international issues.

During this evolutionary period the 60s saw Australian military involvement in Malaysia and Vietnam. Yet our committal to both conflicts was still influenced by the policies and attitudes of external governments. Although the former conflict heralded the end of an era of political and economic reliance on the United Kingdom, the latter marked a peak in political allegiance to the United States.

Since World War I, Australian Armed Forces have been committed to battle largely because of our ties with other nations. Our foreign policy has developed from the traditional ‘colonial’ response illustrated by our entry into the two World Wars, through a period of heavy reliance on the United States exemplified by the Holt/Gorton era of responsiveness to L. B. Johnson, to today’s uncertainties.

During this century our armed forces have operated as an extension of the military forces of another nation. Although independent command has been frequently exercised, the aspects of greater strategic importance have eluded the grasp of our military and political leaders. Despite having been proved in a tactical sense, Australia’s Armed Forces have yet to be tested as the sword of an ultimate expression of an independent Australian foreign policy.

Public Attitudes

It follows that if Australia has only ever contributed ‘colonial armies’ in response to the call of others, then undoubtedly this would be reflected in the attitudes of society towards
the government, the military and ultimately, Australian foreign policy.

Accordingly, I believe the following is a reasonably accurate assessment of Australian public attitudes towards future military (combat) involvement.

a. In the case of a major threat towards either our traditional or major allies, 'colonial armies' would be contributed in response to a call for assistance.

b. Since Australia has pulled her weight in the past, it is reasonable to expect that our major allies will come to our assistance in time of need.

c. It is almost unthinkable that the Australian Government should contemplate any totally independent military involvement, unless the country was under a direct and overt threat.

I have deliberately avoided another 'Vietnam' since it would diffuse the point that I wish to make: that the attitudes of this nation are still geared towards that 'colonial' type of response and a feeling that our allies 'owe' us protection. I believe that it would be highly unlikely that the majority of the public would support a Government decision to intervene in the affairs of another nation in our region, even as a pre-emptive strike in response to a direct threat to us.

The growing determination of the Government to express independent attitudes and influence, particularly in our region, is stymied by the populations lack of resolve and understanding of the implications of our new political ideals.

Economic and Political Issues

The termination of our involvement in Vietnam signified the resumption of the earlier trends towards a new style of Australian international politics. Our present policies reveal a determination for expression of independent thought on both regional and global issues. Current expression is heavily biased towards economic issues with the aim of achieving favourable overseas markets and a healthy internal economy.

As our foreign policy is therefore woven inextricably with these economic issues; international politics, particularly in our region, are moving towards a peak.

ASEAN, our nearest economic community, is developing as a determined political body with economic issues overshadowing the internal turmoil of the individual members. The archipelagic nature of ASEAN (excluding Thailand) coupled with the probability of respective 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) provides 'this economic community with a
powerful political weapon which cannot only be directed at Australia, but perhaps more importantly, Japan. Such an influence on Japan would have obvious implications on the Australian economy.

The ever-increasing demand for food, energy and industrial raw materials has heightened global interest in ocean resources. As technological developments continue to improve the feasibility and efficiency of removing such resources from the sea, there is a sense of urgency attached to the manner in which nations are staking their claims for EEZ's.

Since there is considerable potential for conflict over ocean resources, particularly in regions of competing and overlapping claims, the importance of maritime power is developing a new dimension and meaning even for small nations. Hence the foundations are set for a new era as nations seek to exercise political influence through their maritime forces, either in support or protection of their claims for rights to ocean resources.

Not only will Australia be faced with competing demands in our region, but in addition will have to accept the political implications and responsibilities if a 200-mile EEZ is to be claimed in Antarctica.

Thus the emphasis of Australian foreign policy on the region not only encompasses the broad economic issues but also seeks to ensure regional stability. For it is only during a period of such stability that our own trade policies can be vigorously pursued. Therefore the desire to seek both regional stability and the preservation of our claims to ocean resources begs the question of what the Australian Government is willing to do should either be contested.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, history has demonstrated that the relationship between maritime strategy and foreign policy has enabled political objectives to be attained without recourse to war. Although both the Soviet Union and the United States continue to be firmly committed to this concept, many smaller nations will be forced to make their own stance on this issue, should they desire to protect or enforce their claims for ocean resources.

The importance of ocean resources is drawing many small nations, including Australia, into a political arena where scope for future conflict abounds. Under such circumstances the question arises as to what extent the Australian Government is willing to go in the support of her ocean claims.

Similarly Government determination for independent political expression and the desire to promote a stabilising influence, particularly in the region, questions the determination behind Australian foreign policy.

It is under such circumstances that the maritime forces of a nation have and will continue to demonstrate that they have a valuable contribution to make to foreign policy. Regardless of whether the political or military leaders understand this concept of Naval Presence, the understanding and will of the Australian population does not appear to have kept abreast of changing political circumstances. Consequently, this disparity between the population and their elected political representatives serves to dislocate the political and military functions. Without cohesion between these two basic components, the principles of Naval Presence can neither be properly nor effectively utilised.

NOTES
2. Zumwalt, Elmo R. On Watch.

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PHYSICAL FITNESS IN THE MUSORIAN ARMY

By Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope, RAAOC

Introduction
The current debate in the Australian Army on Physical Training Tests (PTT), fitness standards and the physical quality of our soldiers is occupying considerable space in military journals. The official proposals are aimed at weeding out the unfit, the physically sub-standard and soldiers suffering from any form of disability. I find that surprisingly there are opponents to this plan. I support the proposal to improve the physical prowess of our Army and I base my support on my own experience from a recent exchange visit to Musoria. I can therefore speak with first hand knowledge and therefore a certain degree of authority on this matter.

The Musorian Army, as many of you know, has already made many of the hard decisions on physical fitness we in the Australian Army are now tackling. These decisions have been most significantly felt in the senior levels of field command. But before I go into the details let me explain the reasons behind the Musorian decision to improve the physical quality and fitness of their Army.

The Musorian Phoenix
As is well known, our relations with Musoria for the last decade have not been good. From the early 1970's to 1981 Musoria made many political and territorial claims on Australia. These claims were often backed by the landing of armed raiding parties made up of 'volunteers' up to battalion strength. Several of these incursions resulted in quite large clashes — with the Shoalwater Bay and Pilbara engagements now being recognised as battle honours by both the RAR and 1 Arm Regt. Finally, in 1981 in an attempt to invade and hold the resource rich areas of the Northern Territory, 101 Corps landed in Darwin. They soon overran our coastal defences and were able to push as far south as Katherine but, before they could be reinforced by 102 Corps, they were soundly defeated and destroyed in a series of brilliant mobile counter attacks by a joint force lead by the Australian Army. Musorian casualties in the invasion were enormous and it was fortunate for them that their plan to follow up with 102 Corps never eventuated or they would have had no Army left at all.

However, after the defeat of 101 Corps there was civil upheaval in Musoria and a limited rebellion within their Army. It took the Army almost a year to restore law and order, stabilize itself and regain its operational ability. On the matter of physical fitness one of the most important changes with the appointment to the position of Chief of Army Military Personnel (CAMP) of General Leatherhead, a former Musorian 5km, sit-up and heaves champion. Indeed, he is well known, even in Australia for his book on fitness which gives his personal philosophy of daily sit-ups, a run and heaves. Indeed many Australians have been known to imulate this regimen after Mess Dinners and other social events as a means of regaining condition.

EXCHANGE POSTINGS
In the 'Year of Peace' that followed the Musorian defeat of 1981 a number of exchange postings were initiated. I was one of those chosen and had the pleasure of being appointed to their Military Personnel Branch. One of the most important and far reaching initiatives with which I was involved was General Leatherhead's review of the fitness for battle of the middle to senior ranking officers of 102 Corps. The results of the review were alarming to say the least.

The Review
Among the commanders whose files I reviewed were cripples, epileptics and half-blind officers with a range of diseases and disabilities that would fill a medical dictionary. I could not help drawing the conclusion that if 101 Corps was similarly commanded then its defeat was so much more easily explicable. Curiously, before the war 102 Corps had a reputation for
efficiency, aggressiveness and the skilled use of bold innovative tactics which surpassed that of 101 Corps. In fact, as will be seen it must have been a paper tiger due to the unfit state of its commanders. Of course, such a devastating purge as took place had opponents, but fortunately I had the honour of attending the assembly at which General Leatherhead gave his speech and formally discharged the unfit officers. I am also fortunately endowed with a good memory so I can give you an almost verbatim account of that historic speech. Here it is:

The Speech

"Gentlemen,
I am here today to state the reasons why you are being discharged. There is but one reason and that reason is simple and blunt; the Army needs fit, healthy battle commanders and non of you assembled here today can qualify in that regard. I am not talking of mental health problems such as megalomania, stupidity and oedipal complexes — of which I suspect some of you, but of concrete physical disorders of medicine such as epilepsy, blindness and so on. Some of you have incurred your disabilities on active service and I can assure you will be compensated adequately, but the armed forces can no longer retain you as you no longer posses the physical characteristics we require. Why some of you were enlisted in the first place I fail to understand but I have taken it upon myself to correct that error now." (This statement caused some movement in the audience.)

Note that in the text I have asterisked those commanders who were disabled on active service. Now warming to his task General Leatherhead continued by suddenly turning on individual members of audience and revealed their medical secrets.

'I regret that you General Napoleon, Commander 102 Corps, are not exempt from this review and must be the first to go, must because of your haemorrhoids. We simply cannot risk their disabling you during some important battle. I realise they have not affected your past performance but we are looking to the future as we rebuild our Army. There can be no retraction of this decision and you are to hand over your Corps to General Percival within seven days. Commander 306MR Div, your secret must be revealed and you, like all other epileptics in the Army must go. Julius Caesar you are to hand over command of your division to General Custer before the Ides of March. General George Patton, Commander 305MR Div, I regret that your dyslexia is regarded as being incompatible with a successful military career. I regret also that 307MR Div Commander, General Alexander Great will also be joining you in retirement. Like Julius his epilepsy makes him unfit for military service. Unfortunately, Alexander cannot be here today as he is drunk once more despite his being recently discharged from hospital supposedly cured of his alcoholism. Such a man could never succeed in battle! You will respectively hand over your commands to General Cornwallis, on his return from Yorktown, and General Navarre, currently the Military Attaché in Hanoi. Other regimental commanders to be removed from their posts are:

Commander 917MR Regt, Brigadier Wavell(*) — Blind in one eye,
Commander 918MR Regt, My old friend Brigadier Douglas Haig — colour blindness,
Commander 919MR Regt, Brigadier Omar Bradley — knee problems rendering you unfit for PTT, and
Commander 409 Tank Regt, Brigadier William Orange for asthma.'

At this point I will interrupt my recounting of General Leatherhead's speech as many of the other discharged regimental commanders such as Eisenhower (stiff knee), Morgan (arthritis), Suffren (obesity) and Peter Great (Strangury) are not well known in Australia. However, two other commanders from the corps Combat Support Services deserve mention. General Leatherhead continued:

'I regret that we cannot exempt our Combat Support Services from this review. It is essential that our Combat Support Commanders be as fit as everyone else therefore the following officers must go:

Colonel Hannibal — Service Support Commander for 305MR Div discharged for epilepsy and partial blindness (*)' (Note: rumour has it that Hannibal suggested air landing troops west of the Blue Mountains then, using heavy transport, marching over them directly on Canberra. An imaginative
PHYSICAL FITNESS IN THE MUSORIAN ARMY

if preposterous plan which has caused him to be the butt of many jokes). Brigadier von Schlieffen, Comd 102 Corps Logistic Planning Staff is to be discharged for myopia (Note: it is commonly suspected in Australia that von Schlieffen was responsible for the logistic planning for the 101 Corps invasion).

Finally, I will mention only two battalion commanders as lesser light can be dealt with through normal channels. These are the CO 102 Reco Bn, LTCOL Nicholas Soult, who has done much good work for General Napoleon, but I am afraid your club foot bars you from further service. And LTCOL Eugene Savoy, as a hunchback you must go despite your past successes as your appearance is detrimental to morale and your disability gives you an unfair advantage when doing sit ups.

Gentlemen, I realise that this review has caused some dissatisfaction among you but the Navy has taken similar steps by discharging their three most recently appointed Admirals. They are particularly disappointed as they could have been expected to plan and lead our naval forces in any future conflict. These were Admiral Halsey for shortsightedness, Admiral Yamamoto who is missing two fingers (*) and Admiral Nelson who is nothing more than a seasick cripple missing both an eye and an arm (*). They will be replaced by Admiral Rozbdestvenski who has been recalled from Tsushima, Admiral Iachimo, currently visiting Matapan and Admiral Villeneuve is to replace Admiral Nelson his old adversary and rival in the debate over the ‘Trafalgar war games’.

By now General Leatherhead had warmed to his task and his voice reached a fever pitch as he drove home his points. Then suddenly he paused, the atmosphere was electric as he looked straight at his audience then, his voice cold as ice as he pointed out with irresistible logic the main question answered by the review:

‘I ask you to answer for yourselves, what sort of an Army would we have and what results we could expect to achieve if we allowed commanders of your calibre and physical condition to continue to lead our men in battle!’

The hall was silent and still; nobody moved as General Leatherhead said ‘There are three lessons we must learn from this exercise’: but before he could state them, the commander of General Leatherhead’s bodyguard rose with his wife and approached the rostrum. Clearly, General Leatherhead was annoyed by this interruption and raised his hand to halt them. But it was too late, Captain MacBeth and his wife, Lady MacBeth, suddenly pulled out concealed weapons and assassinated the General before escaping to Birnum Wood. (It is believed that Captain MacBeth’s motive was to prevent his being discharged for a disabled left leg. Lady MacBeth has since been captured and certified insane even though before the assassination she was president of a dry cleaning called ‘Outspot’. It would appear that an overpowering ambition for her husband was her motive.)

The death of General Leatherhead brought to an end the reforms on physical fitness he was introducing. It also heralded a new deterioration in diplomatic and military relations with Australia. Exchange postings for officers such as myself were terminated and it is now apparent that a new war is inevitable in the next one or two years.

However, the good news for Australia is that all the unfit officers in the 102 Corps who were to be replaced have been retained. Now, in the next war, we will only have to face the haemorrhoidal Napoleon, the drunken Alexander, the epileptic Julius Caesar and the dyslexic Patton. Against such leaders we need have no fear and I would recommend that Australians lose no sleep over the coming war. What chance could such men have against our physically fit commanders?

Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope graduated from OTU, Scheyville in 1967 and was allotted to RAASC. In 1973 he was transferred to RAAOC. He has served in a variety of regimental and staff appointments including overseas postings in Vietnam, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. He attended the Australian Staff College in 1981. He is currently a staff officer in H.Q. Log Command.

Reviewed by Greg Pemberton, Dept. of History, RMC.

For a combination of good and bad reasons this is a difficult book to read and to assess. On the plus side, this extremely detailed study of Australian national policy and high command during the Second World War offers a wealth of new information to what is a growing area in Australian historiography. This book represents a very impressive piece of research. On the other hand, one has to work very hard to extract the important conclusions from the evidence presented. David Horner has left most of his work to the reader. The structure of the book rarely allows the important themes that should run through this study to emerge. The general comments in the introductory and concluding chapters are disappointing.

The source of the problem is the absence in this work of what some people would call a “grand vision”, but which others would insist is a theoretical underpinning. This is one of the inherent problems of a simple narrative approach to historical problems. Instead of marshalling his evidence to solve puzzle-raising questions, he allows the pattern and logic of his study to be dictated more by chronology and the documentary record. At times it seems like a collection of edited documents. It is obvious that this book is based on a doctoral thesis.

Empiricist historians will retort that a priori concepts do violence to the “stuff” of history, but this ignores the truth that history is socially constructed, not self-evident. Themes are no more artificial than the “facts”. And even if it was possible to avoid using the former, we would be left with nothing that was meaningful. History would be a corpse. This is not to say that this book is not valuable. For the specialist, it will be a veritably inexhaustible quarry. For the general reader, it will be a pretty hard slog.

Horner begins by covering the familiar ground so well explored by John McCarthy’s pioneering Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39. He confirms McCarthy’s thesis that Australia’s insurance policy of the Singapore strategy and Imperial Defence proved as sound an investment prospect as the Nugan Hand Bank. Horner takes the story further. He demonstrates the growing awareness among some Australian leaders, particularly in the Army, of the fragility of Australia’s security in 1941. But, as Horner comments, “locked into the imperial strategy, it was already too late for Australia to demonstrate an independent strategic policy” [p. 54]. The consequences, he says, were that “Australia could no longer depend on Britain, and its security was in the hands of American strategists who were more interested in the Atlantic than the Pacific” [p. 64].

The main body of this volume consists of a very detailed record of the workings of the command structure of the Australian armed forces, its relations with the political leaders, and the relations of both to the military and political leaders of our major allies. Horner ranges widely from battlefield co-operation with the British in the Middle East and with the Americans in the South West Pacific area, to the interlocking of Australian military efforts into the general allied strategy for both theatres. For apparently sound reasons he concentrates mainly on the Army rather than the other two Services, examining closely the relationship between its commanders and the government leaders. The scope of this book is far-reaching. Some of the interesting points to emerge include the now familiar story of Britain’s refusal to accept Australia as an independent nation, MacArthur’s dominant role in Australian higher-level military planning
in the Pacific and his great personal influence over Curtin and Shedden; the relative inability of Australia to influence the policies of the great powers and virtual exclusion from most of the crucial international conferences that decided allied strategy and policy; and the relegation of the Australian Army to a minor role in the latter stages of the Pacific War, including MacArthur’s manoeuvrings to keep it out of the reconquest of the Philippines. It is the sobering story of dependence upon one great power being replaced by dependence on another.

One of the more positive aspects that emerge, from an Australian point of view, is the performance of the Army’s leaders. It was they, along with the Labor Opposition, who warned during the inter-war years against the frailties of Imperial Defence. During the war, it was mainly these men who fought tenaciously to uphold Australia’s sovereignty, at least at the operational level, against the High Command of Britain and America. Perhaps only Evatt exceeded them in enthusiasm, though Horner questions the extent of his effectiveness. Quite rightly, Horner identifies Australia’s leadership of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan as marking a new, more independent, era in Australian-United Kingdom relations.

Earlier in this review, I suggested that the main limitation of this book is its lack of an adequate theoretical dimension or insight. In fact, in the introductory chapter Horner does offer an attempt to set up some sort of framework on which to hang his material. But it is not convincing. It demonstrates little awareness of current social theory. Rather it owes more to the unsophisticated insights of military commentators such as Jomini, Liddell-Hart and, inevitably, Clausewitz, and the current official strategic doctrine of the Western countries that the former have influenced. All this leads Horner into an unnecessary exercise of artificially dividing the actions and policies of governments in international conflict into a series of distinct compartments. Hence the civilians decide policy, and the military decide the strategy to carry it out. But this is too simple. Horner is correct in emphasising that reading of Clausewitz’s famous dictum as being that statesmen and generals should harness their strategy to their political goals. But it implies far more than this. Horner seems to not understand that the implication, unwitting or otherwise, that follows from Clausewitz’s message is not merely a prescriptive statement of advice to national leaders, but also a descriptive statement of the structural relationship between politics and military action. Strategy structurally derives its logic, pattern and purpose in a functional sense from the political reality/formation that it serves and reflects. Ledin, although a great admirer of Clausewitz, was critical of his idea of “the mind of the personified state”. Instead, as he pointed out, war was not only a continuation of foreign policy but also class relations within the nation.

On this reading, the idea, reflected in American and Australian Services’ doctrine, that strategy is the passive servant of “national interest”, is somewhat naive. In the first place, the idea of a unified “national interest” flies in the face of the reality that social formations have structures that are connected and yet distinct and even conflicting. Second, it ignores the fact that war is an intensification, not a breakdown, of the continuing process of international politics. Thus military victory is not an end in itself. This makes nonsense of Liddell-Hart’s wisdom, endorsed by Horner, that the aim of strategy is peace. To corrupt what I have written elsewhere, strategy without the politics is like marriage without the sex. The former could have neither rhyme nor reason without the latter.

What, then, are the consequences of these theoretical weaknesses for Horner’s empirical conclusions? According to Horner, his book was concerned with “first, the national direction of war or strategic decision-making and second the problem of strategic co-operation between allies, in other words the theme is strategy” [p. xvii]. On the basis of the examination that proceeds from this aim he concludes that Australia, as well as the United States, “had not developed a coherent national strategy for the consistent pursuit of political goals by a combination of diplomatic and military effort” [see p. xxiii, 434]. But the
perceived failure of either country, is really a failure of perception by Horner. From the Atlantic Charter to the San Francisco Conference, the United States exhibited a demonstrable continuity of purpose: to restructure the world by re-opening Europe and dismantling the European colonial system to facilitate the expansion of the American economy. In this it was remarkably successful. For Australia, the problem was the more complex one of buying shares in the growing economic and military power of the United States while retaining what advantages remained from the declining Imperial relationship. The currency for the transaction was independence.

Horner's failure has two sources. Firstly, he has not drawn himself back far enough from the mass of documentary evidence to extrapolate the elements of continuity from the complexity; that is, the underlying logic. Secondly, and more importantly, he has failed to closely examine the broader politico-economic dimension that determined the pattern of Australia's military contribution to the allied cause. Horner laments that previously there has been "little attempt to describe in a comprehensive fashion the development of national war policy" [p. xix]. Yet he, in fact, makes little contribution to this aspect. His study is more concerned with the relationships between the High Commands of Australia and its allies, and between the Commands and the political leaders. The book is more anecdotal than analytical. In this respect alone, Roger Bell's *Unequal Allies* is a far superior work.

The central thesis of Horner's study, which is "the problems of allied co-operation in war, particularly those faced by a small country" [p. 163], trivializes the scale of the real issue here, which is dependence. Dependence is not a "problem" to be solved by sound judgement, it is a structural relationship. Horner castigates Australian leaders for the "tenuous connection between Australian grand strategy and military strategy" [p. 442]. He cites as evidence, participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme and the virtual free hand given to MacArthur over 1st Australian Corps in 1945. But these were less the mistakes of political leaders than the functional consequence of Australia's political, military and economic dependence on first the United Kingdom and then the United States. Australia had little scope to bargain. Horner exaggerates the degree of independence and influence Australia could have wielded by withholding its armed forces. The bigger political and economic stakes involved precluded this except in extreme circumstances.

In the above circumstances, it is very debatable whether one can really talk about Australian "strategy" in World War II in any strict sense. The degree of integration of Australia's armed forces into the larger formations and commands of its two major allies effectively meant that strategic decision-making was surrendered to the latter. The roles of the RAAF and the RAN in the war, which Horner does not cover in great depth, are cases in point. The broad disposition of Australian forces around the globe in 1939-45 was essentially a "political" decision. Their more specific strategic employment was mainly the decision of the allies' High Commands. This point can be further illustrated by reference to the post-war period.

The decision to send Australian forces to Korea in 1950 was also a "political" one that employed those forces outside the accepted zone of Australia's strategic responsibility. Vietnam could be added to this list. In view of this, Horner's conclusion that vis-a-vis the UK and the US, "Australia's sovereignty is no longer subject to the limitations displayed in the years before 1945" [p. 443] is unduly optimistic and based on a too narrow view of the nature of Australian dependence.

A final point is the contribution Horner's book makes to the growing historiographical debate surrounding the "turning point" for Australia as far as moving from the UK to the US camp is concerned. Horner concludes: "Whereas at the beginning of the war the dominant consideration had been the British connection four years later it was the American connection" [p. x]. This view is derived from the fact that, because Horner concentrates on the relations between Commands and commander, he inevitably gives emphasis in the latter stages of the war to Australia's relations with the US. Conversely, Roger Bell and Christopher Thorne have clearly demonstrated that, at the higher level of policy, Australian leaders as early as 1943 were seeing their future as resting more with the British Commonwealth than with the US. This reviewer's own research into Australian strategic planning in the immediate post-war period confirms this conclusion.

Reviewed by Col. J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED, (Ret)

THIS excellent book should not only be read by young doctors joining the Army, but should be compulsory reading for all young officers, both ARA and CMF.

Steward writes with first-hand information and experience, in a lively style which grips the reader from the outset. His vivid descriptions of the battles in Syria and on the Kokoda trail could only be written by someone who was there. Rumour also has it that “Blue” Steward fought some good battles whilst on leave. The troops of his regiment were very proud of their RMO.

There are some very good examples of soldier humour — when a warrant officer sustained a broken left leg as a result of being hit by a tin of biscuits dropped from a supply aircraft, one of the troops was heard to say: “Christ! I always knew those bloody biscuits were hard!”

The bravery of the soldiers in battle is well illustrated by several telling examples, including Corporal John Metson who, though shot through the ankle, refused to be carried out on a stretcher, because it would take eight “blokes” to carry the thing. He crawled on his hands and knees for three weeks through rain and mud, starving with the others, until he reached Sengai village, where the Japanese shot them all.

The magnificent work of the native stretcher bearers is told with admiration. The “fuzzy-wuzzy” angels will always be remembered by the grateful troops. The news that General Blamey was to take the 21st Brigade parade at the Koitaki cricket ground was expected to be an honour for its performance in the trying battles. However, Blamey informed the parade that they had been beaten by inferior troops in inferior numbers. Then he made his famous remark that “the rabbit that ran away was the rabbit that got shot”.

No doubt, this remark was in part made by Blamey due to the sustained pressure which MacArthur was exerting at that time.

General MacArthur and his Headquarters were totally ignorant of the conditions in the forward areas, and intelligence was sadly astray. Unbelievable as it may sound, the Engineer-in-Chief at GHQ, Major General Pat Casey US Army, ordered that the Owen Stanleys be blown up, and admitted later to Lieutenant General Rowell that he had issued the order.

“Blue” Steward and his great friend Padre Fred Burt were on parade at Koitaki when Blamey made his famous accusation. Like everyone present, they were deeply hurt and dismayed. At this time their Brigade Commander, Brigadier A. W. Potts, was made the “scapegoat” for matters which should have been sheeted home to others.

It is a pity that Steward’s comment on page 93 “the missing supplies were one of the mysteries of the Pacific war” begs the issue. The real mystery is why those responsible for the situation, were not uncovered. Potts was the victim of the bungling.

Because Padre Fred had later mentioned the Koitaki incident from the Pulpit in Perth, he was “carpeted” before Major General C. E. M. Lloyd, the Adjutant General at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, (Lloyd aptly known as “Gaffer”). This was a misuse of power by Lloyd, who should have known better.

However, Padre Fred became a legend. Although critical of Blamey over the Koitaki parade, Steward agrees that Blamey was a great and distinguished leader in both world wars.

This book should be available in the libraries of our tertiary institutions, so that the younger generation can get a picture of the courage, adaptability and performance of their forebears during World War II under the nightmare conditions of climate, swamp, near-impenetrable jungle, tropical disease and near-starvation (at times). In doing so, they played an important role in saving the country from invasion.


Reviewed by Jeff Popple, Department of Defence.

THE new paperback edition of Patsy Adam-Smith’s The Anzacs prominently displays the words True Story and Gallipoli on its front cover. The publishers have obviously attempted to cash in on the current interest in Gallipoli,
and rightly so, as David Williamson’s film script for Gallipoli was based upon the reminiscences presented in this book. However, it should be noted that the account of Gallipoli takes up less than half the book, the bulk of the book being concerned with the A.I.F. in France.

Ms Adam-Smith has presented the story of Australia’s part in the Great War as told in the words of the soldiers, via their letters and diaries and subsequent reminiscences. She has assembled these varied accounts into chronological order and bound them together with a prose commentary which, unfortunately, tends to be somewhat patronising and overly emotional. The author also tends to accept unquestionably these accounts and presents them as truth, ignoring that they might be coloured by emotion, prejudices, or in the case of the reminiscences, hindsight and inaccurate memory.

On the positive side, the book is interesting and easy read, and it does shed light on various aspects of Australia’s part in the Great War. For instance, the chapter on the 1918 mutinies is very interesting and Adam-Smith’s recreation of the real character of John Simpson Kirkpatrick, the man with the donkey, is an excellent tribute to a very heroic man.

The Anzacs is a good read, but Bill Gammage covered the same ground and did a better job back in 1974 with his book The Broken Years. Those interested in Adam-Smith’s use of oral history, should also read the Dawes and Robson book From Citizen To Soldier, which attempts to unearth the reasons why Australians enlisted in the A.I.F.

SOMME, by Lyn MacDonald, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson, 1983, recommended retail price of $35.

Reviewed by Lt-Col. E. Ross-Smith, RAAEC, PR.

The research that has gone into Lyn MacDonald’s latest history, simply called “Sommie”, is quite formidable.

I felt that anyone who interviewed 3000 survivors of one of the most costly campaigns in military history must surely get bogged down in detail.

But this former BBC radio producer and now full-time writer of vernacular histories, who has trudged over the battle scenes of the Western Front and spent countless hours poring over maps and diagrams, has produced one of the most prodigious collection of original material on the Somme campaign ever compiled.

She has cleverly selected the relevant sections of the interviews and matched them up with the historical documentary material available to all researchers.

This is the secret of this most absorbing book and the recipe is found in the foreword, where she claims that the larger such a mass of material becomes, the more difficult it becomes to make use of it unless one is gifted with a computer-like memory.

“Few working authors (and none whose field is military history!) can rise to the dizzy heights of owning a computer, but my life has been eased and my efficiency increased a hundredfold through the hard work and enthusiasm of members of the (1981) Sixth Form of the Harvey Grammar School, Folkestone, who, with real and breath-taking attention to detail, undertook the mammoth task of cataloguing, collating, indexing and cross-indexing some four million words of written and recorded material and then claimed to have enjoyed doing it!” said Mrs Macdonald.

The casualty figures alone are enough to keep the reader continually engrossed.

On the first day of the campaign on July 1, 1916, of the 150,000 men who had gone “over the top” all along the front, more than 57,000 had been killed or wounded.

To illustrate how she blends facts with her own observations, she reflects, “By a prophetic irony of fate, when the Central War Charities Committee had allocated particular dates in 1916 to particular fund-raising bodies, the first week of July had been designated ‘Women’s Tribute Week’.”

But the comment on the campaign which she has extracted from one of the survivors, Sgt Jim Myers of 25th Coy, Machine Gun Corps, 31st Division, seems to sum it all up, “The biggest mistake that was made on manoeuvres and training was that we were never told what to do in case of failure.

“All that time we’d gone backwards and forwards, training, doing it over and over again like clockwork and then we had to advance, when it came to the bit, we didn’t know what to do.
"Nothing seemed to be arranged in case of failure."

The 344-page book took 10 years to compile.


Reviewed by Greti I'mbcnon, Department of History, RMC.

THIS book is a collection of some nineteen articles from papers presented at, or arising from, a conference held by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in July 1980. According to Robert O'Neill, the purpose of the conference, and hence the book, was "to examine the major trends which have taken place in strategic thinking during the 1970s and to offer views on where these developments might lead in the 1980s [p. xii]. If there is any unifying theme underlying these disparate articles, it is that the world of the 1980s will be a more complex, uncertain and precarious place to live.

At the risk of being accused of being an apologist for the Soviet Union, I would suggest that a textual analysis of this book would expose a pronounced ideological slant against that country. In fact, the view that the main source of the new danger of the 1980s is the Soviet Union (witness Afghanistan), has largely been overtaken by the full blossoming of Reaganism. Many of the authors have an international reputation. There are some well-known Australian identities from the field of international relations and strategic studies, plus a refreshing smattering of figures from outside the usual US-UK monopoly.

The book is opened by Theodore Ropp's breezy and esoteric piece which attempts to give a coherent account of the major trends in strategic thinking since World War II. Hedley Bull examines the prevailing view of the 1970s, that the utility of force as an instrument of policy was declining, and prophesizes a more "Hobbesian" and violent 1980s. Werner Schilling outlines how US strategic doctrine has responded to the new situation of nuclear parity. His discussion, however, seems to assume US decision-making on armaments to be purely a bureaucratic decision of the US executive, and he makes no mention of the key role of arms production in the US economy. Geoffrey Jukes offers an interesting analysis of the Soviet arms build-up after the 1960s. Roman Kolkowicz then presents limited war as essentially a rationally-chosen policy option selected by both super-powers as a prudent alternative to nuclear conflict. He seems to take no account of it as a function of the increasing internationalization of conflict after the Second World War due to the integration of much of the world into the American and Soviet international systems. Force was employed in a limited fashion against indigenous populations essentially because those conflicts were never simply a problem that could be resolved by force alone. Hegemony in the globe, like hegemony in domestic politics, could only be upheld by a combination of actions. (For the indigenous populations, many of the conflicts were far from "limited").

Robert O'Neill's paper on insurgency and other forms of low-level international violence is a better analysis, but suffers from the same limitation of not exploring the socio-economic factors which are the source of such phenomena.

The other articles cover a wide range of topics, including Japanese, Indian, and Chinese strategic doctrine; the future development of arms control measures; the political control of military force; nuclear and deterrence and conventional warfare, plus several more. I only mention these in passing because it should be clear from the above paragraph that I am not in sympathy with the approach to the study of international relations and strategic matters that this book represents. Having criticized it, it behoves me to say why.

It is interesting to note the frequent references to Clausewitz. It seems that in the pursuit of legitimacy, the twins, international relations and strategic studies, are anxious to adopt a Founding Father. Clausewitz's great lesson was held to be the nexus between politics and military action. That is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go nearly far enough. While social theory has developed sophisticated theories of explanation and understanding, the newer twin discipline has lagged behind. To cite one major example, for many social theorists, economic activity might not be determinate but it is certainly integral to social
formations and social action. Politics without the economics, is like marriage without the sex.

This limitation is not altogether surprising. Its source can be traced back through the intellectual pedigree of the discipline. International relations and strategic studies emerged from those historical schools concerned with diplomatic and military history: subjects forged on the anvil of nineteenth century nationalism, the age of great national leaders and the formation of the European nation-states. As a direct result, the twin discipline falls into two fundamental errors.

First, it accepts the sovereign nation-state as the fundamental unit of social action (in the international sphere), much as neoclassical economics accepts the family as the fundamental unit in the economy. As a direct result, it underestimates the transnational forces and institutions at work in world politics, and de-emphasizes the divisions within the nation. Furthermore, it accepts a simplistic civil-military relations paradigm that wrongly assumes the primacy of the state over capital in the world's liberal democracies.

The second problem follows from the traditional focus of diplomatic history on the actions of national leaders as the prime motive force in international politics. The emphasis then is on intention, not function. Motives are seen as universal, ie human nature, while historically specific structural causes are ignored. There is little consideration given to those causal or structural factors that lie behind and regulate the motives of people but often exist independent of individual (though of course, not social) consciousness. Apart from the limitation such an oversight places on analysis, in practice it can, as Hannah Arendt said (On Violence, 1970, p. 7), "lead us to believe we have an understanding of events and control over their flow which we do not have". This book echoes the belief that neither superpower would rationally embark on nuclear war. The July Crisis of 1914 amply illustrates how such events can escape the control of quite rational men.

As a result, as far as serious analysis goes, this discipline, as it is now widely practised, rarely rises above the level of a detailed study of current affairs. Much of it, like this book, remains uninformed by the major advances that have been made in the epistemology, theory and methodology of social theory. This discipline often employs an approach which is historically superficial and theoretically naive. Where there has been an attempt in these disciplines to shed the cocoon of simple, implicit empiricism, it has only been to embrace the equally problematic positivist models of reductionism that abound in some academic disciplines. I am not suggesting that these malpractices are universal. They are merely dominant, just as pluralism is in political science, behaviourism in psychology, neo-classicism in economics, and empiricism in history. They are all clothes cut from the same cloth.


Reviewed by André G. Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

This is a book for the layman interested in a sweeping general survey of the subject; there is nothing new here for the professional scholar of twentieth century Asian affairs. Wilson justifies his project on the grounds that "while the diplomatic and political aspects of this Sino-Japanese War have been well covered by western authors, the actual fighting itself has not been satisfactorily narrated from a non-partisan point of view. This book tries to fill that gap". (p. 1).

When Tigers Fight is an adequate, if sometimes overly melodramatic, description of the titanic nine-year-old struggle which left the Chinese people with feelings of suspicion and bitterness toward Japan for a period lasting well over a quarter century. Only in 1972, when Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Tokyo to negotiate a Treaty of Amity and accepted what in effect amounted to a formal apology from Emperor Hirohito expressing sorrow and regret for the unfortunate events of the past, were there indications that the deep scars had begun to heal.

In this study one finds the usual complement of famous places and events associated with that giant armed contest: the incident at Lugouqiao, Shanghai, the savage rape of Nanjing, the Panay and Ladybird debacles, the Battle for Xuzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Changde and the Ichi-go offensive. The reader also encoun-
BOOK REVIEW

ters a veritable roll call of some of the twentieth century’s most influential military and political personalities who, in their various (and frequently limited) capacities, determined the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War: Claire Lee Chennault, Jiang Jieshi, Doihara Kenji, Prince Konoye Fumimaro, Mao Zedong, George C. Marshall, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, and Tojo Hideki.

Wilson contends that nothing of any value resulted from the Sino-Japanese War. He refers to it as “a one-off phenomenon, a tragic and wasteful episode which did no good to anyone, a negative example of the unwise use of military power. The fight of the tigers was an extraordinary event, a contest of technology and tradition on a continental scale. But it achieved nothing”. (p. 255).

On the whole, this is an acceptable book which even the specialist will enjoy reading.


Reviewed by J. Popple, BA (Hons), Department of Defence.

ELMER BENDINER’S book is dramatically sub-titled “A Personal Account of One of the Most Daring — and Deadly — Air Battles of The Second World War.” The deadly air battle referred to is actually the two raids on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in Germany which took place during August and October 1943. (Bendiner was a navigator aboard one of the Flying Fortresses which took part in the raids.) However, less than half of the book is devoted to these raids, the remaining 150 or so pages deal with the training of Bendiner’s crew, their experiences in England, other raids and, unfortunately, Bendiner’s reflections on life.

The first hundred odd pages make for rather tiresome reading. In these Bendiner reflects on his life, marriage, the morality of bombing, his fellow crewmen, and engages in some amateur philosophy. This is all written in rather cumbersome prose, in which flowery phrases like “my outermost cerebral shell” abound. These early sections give the impression that the author was never far from his thesaurus, unfortunately. This early section is slightly salvaged by the inclusion of some chapters which deal in general with the evolution of bombing strategies and trace the origins of the decision to bomb Schweinfurt. (It was first casually suggested at a Washington cocktail party).

When Bendiner’s account moves to England and he starts describing the early raids he took part in, the language becomes less flamboyant and the prose sharper. His description of the bombing raids and his broad comments on the bombing campaign are quite interesting, and are only marred by his occasional philosophical meanderings.

The first raid on Schweinfurt was scheduled to take place on 17 August. It involved an ambitious and complex plan which called for “the precise timing of a high-wire act” (p. 159). It involved 376 bombers, 146 of which were to take part in a diversionary raid on Regensburg, and nearly 400 fighters. Unfortunately, on the day of the raid bad weather was to upset the mission’s complex timetable. “The Regensburg decoys, the fighter escorts, the diversions and distractions so painstakingly plotted and timed in the scenario had fizzled”. (p. 167). Regardless the mission went ahead and out of the 230 bombers despatched to bomb Schweinfurt, 60 were not to return. The second raid on 14 October was also affected by bad weather. The diversionary feint along the coast towards the submarine pens had to be aborted, and the thick fog prevented 80 planes from joining up with the main formation. Only 291 planes crossed the English Channel to bomb Schweinfurt, and of them 29 were lost before they reached their objective and another 31 fell on the way home — 60 planes and 600 men missing.

Were the raids a success? Unfortunately, Bendiner does not analyse the raids sufficiently to be able to come up with a complete answer. (Max Hastings in his book, Bomber Command, suggests that they were not overly successful as the necessary follow-up attacks were not carried out immediately). This lack of a historical perspective is a chief deficiency of the book. Bendiner claims that he has conducted extensive research into the raids, however, it is not very evident. He does not consider the raids from the perspective of America’s daylight bombing policy, nor does he examine the effect of the high losses upon morale.

Once you get past the first hundred pages, Bendiner’s book is a fairly interesting account
of what it was like to be a navigator aboard a Flying Fortress in England during 1943. However, if you want an analysis of the importance of the raids, you would do better by referring to one of the more general histories of the bomber offensive or to Thomas Coffey's book on the raids.


Reviewed by André G. Kuczewski, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

To the average adult American who remembered hearing the fateful news of Japan's resounding victory over the United States' Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 came the nightmarish realization that the nation had suffered the pain of its most devastating defeat. Even more incredible was the thought that this punishing humiliation had been planned and executed by an allegedly inferior oriental state.

The inevitable reactions of the American people to their now uncertain future were unanimous. Initial feelings of disbelief and sorrow quickly gave way to expressions of shock, outrage and solemn promises of revenge. American newsman and radio broadcaster Carroll Alcott, voicing a sentiment shared by millions of his fellow compatriots, would later write: "It is perfectly clear that Japan's empire must be destroyed and her home islands locked up."

But as many American civilian and military planners soon realized, this would not be a simple task. For the next few months after the debacle at Oahu, a cloud of despair hovered over the United States as Tokyo's soldiers, sailors and airmen swept across the vast South-East Asian continent inflicting terrible casualties on American and Allied troops along the way. Particularly distressing to many was the fear that the brilliance and speed of the Japanese advances appeared more invincible with each passing day. Indeed, on 2 March 1942 one of America's best liked and respected war correspondents frankly acknowledged that Japan had successfully managed to acquire the upper hand in its battle with the Anglo-Saxon powers and seemed to be gaining ever increasing momentum as time went on. That the Pacific War would prove an uphill fight for the United States, he wrote in resignation, there could be no doubt.

No group of Americans were better aware of the giant task confronting them than the mariners and pilots who were attached to the United States Asiatic Fleet, the subject of W. G. Winslow's interesting study. The Fleet the Gods Forgot traces the tragic story of the naval task force sent out to intercept the Japanese armada in the waters of the Far East.

From the very outset, the American flotilla was doomed to failure. Although manned by dedicated and patriotic crews, it was beleaguered in every other respect. For example, in terms of large warships alone (battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers), the Japanese Navy had an overwhelmingly 10 to 1 superiority in numbers as well as in quality. This large advantage did not include such weapons as aircraft, submarines and other auxiliary and support vessels. In this domain also, the Japanese held a vastly more powerful force. In the words of the author, these statistics were "staggering odds against the Asiatic Fleet" that was "pressed into fighting a war it could not win . . ." (pp. 8, 12).

On 22 February 1942 the bulk of the "little Asiatic Fleet" encountered a Japanese landing force approaching Java. The American ships, despite a hopeless situation, attacked but were themselves ringed by destroyers and cruisers in point-blank fire and sunk. Less than a week later, on 1 March, the Japanese Navy delivered the coup de grace as her ships located and destroyed the remnants of the American fleet attempting to thread its way to safety through minefields off Surabaya. The saga of "a proud little fleet that met a vastly superior enemy head on, and literally fought to the bitter end" was over. (p. 298).

The Fleet the Gods Forgot represents a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of military history in Asia during the Second World War. The only negative feature of the book resides with Winslow's brief introduction where he attempts to saddle Japan with responsibility for the origins of the war. To argue this thesis at any length is to completely distort the evidence. It goes without saying, then, that Winslow's exercise in this regard, comprising of only a few pages, leaves a great deal to be desired and should have been left out altogether from the main narrative of his
In this way, Winslow would have done justice to himself and, more importantly, to his reading audience.


Reviewed by Col. J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED, (Ret.)

THis is the story of one of the best known and respected AIF Hospitals with service in Tobruk (during the siege), Jerusalem, Colombo, Redbank, Labuan and many other places.

It is the second very good book launched recently and dealing with the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps. A worthy companion for "Recollections of a Regimental Medical Officer" by 'Blue' Steward.

Both books are well written by authors who were there when the "bombs were dropping and the bullets were flying". The stories are told with deep feeling, knowledge and sincerity.

Goodman takes the reader through the formation of the Unit at Puckapunyal on 28 May, 1940 with interesting narrative until the final entry in the War Diary on 19 December, 1945. The CO, Colonel N. L. Speirs, is portrayed as the father figure of the hospital.

The most difficult and telling contribution by the Unit was during the siege of Tobruk, when it was bombed, shelled and strafed. The nurses were evacuated against their own wishes and against the wishes of the Colonel Speirs. However, the rest of the hospital rose to the occasion in typical Australian fashion. Some officers and troops were killed whilst operating on or attending to the wounded.

The last major task of the hospital was in Labuan, where they received and treated the emaciated Australian Prisoners of War from Japanese Prisoner of War Camps.

The author gives interesting detail of the intricate task of setting up a major hospital under desert conditions in Libya and in the jungles of Labuan. The dedicated work and bravery of the Women's Services are given the credit they deserve.

The reviewer also pays tribute to the nurses, whether it be in the troop ships, hospitals or casualty clearing stations. The presence of the nurses always brought out the best in the wounded and the sick. Likewise, they had a calming influence on the soldiers and were prepared to share in the common dangers.

In addition to being a 'must' for the Army Medical Service the book will have considerable appeal and interest for the general reader. It is a story well told and presented in attractive 'dustcover', with good quality paper and excellent photographs. The author and the publisher can be proud of their effort.


Reviewed by Lieut-Colonel D. J. Roylance, Deputy Director, Public Relations.

THE essence of successful warfare is secrecy. The essence of successful Journalism is publicity." This succinct quotation from the regulations issued to correspondents accompanying the British Task Force to the South Atlantic for The Falklands campaign highlights the war within a war which gave rise to a House of Commons Enquiry, Harris' book and the certainty that relations between the military and the media armed with an ever-developing technology, things will never be quite the same again. It was a war which, it must be said, the military emerged with considerably less glory and credit than they did from the actual campaign — and the media fared little better.

Harris' book is an eminently readable book and a 'must' not only for media people and Defence Information personnel, but for all from politicians down, who will be involved in formulating information policies to cover PR policies for future contingencies in which military forces may become involved.

In less than 150 pages, Harris deals with the jingoistic battles which rent an already competitive Fleet Street; the attack by the Government on the BBC; the empathy which existed between the Task Force Commanders and the media; the problems of media representatives struggling in the strange and frightening world
of military operations, far from home and in
a hostile environment, and of the difficulties
of the representatives of the MOD PR organi-
sation, dubbed "The Minders".

It was the five 'Minders' who copped a lot
of criticism from both the Services and the 28
media representatives with the Task Force.
Never was meat more firmly in the sandwich
than these hapless individuals. They were either
copping it from Senior Shipboard officers for
passing on requests from the media; or copping
it from the media for applying the censorship
regulations or failing to appreciate the media's
requests (or should it be demands?).

Harris decided that the five, civilian jour-
nalists from the MOD PR organisation, were
quite unfitted for their operational task. He
also finds that the media, poorly selected in
the rush to sail with the force, and convinced
they were only bound for a 'Sailing Holiday'
were not physically or psychologically prepared
for what lay ahead.

Happily in Australia we have uniformed PR
officers (Army) whose training should mean
that they are as prepared as anyone for their
wartime role, plus civilians (RAN and RAAF),
some of whom are Reserve officers and who
should also be better prepared than their UK
counterparts.

As one reads 'Gotcha!' the basics of PR
routine and media management fly out of the
window and create a bitter situation which will
forever scar those whom it touched. Indeed it
left me wondering whether the UK forces,
despite the PR success of the Army in Ulster,
had learned anything in the 130 years between
William Russell's reporting of the Crimean
War and The Falklands campaign. Certainly
the attitude of senior officers to the corre-
spondents seemed to be the same.

In Australia I believe we have a better
understanding of the requirements of the media
in war than was represented in this book, but
we will never really know until the crunch
comes. I suspect the media will be as ill-
prepared as were their British counterparts,
and they should read this book, too, and digest
its lessons.

But the big problem which will forever haunt
readers of the book from the military side will
be the sheer size of the problem facing us if
we have to fight in Australia.

The problems of The Falklands 'media war'
produced a House of Commons Inquiry and
Harris' book, and yet it was fought in a remote
corner of the world, the military controlled
communications, and there were only 28 media
representatives present.

Compare that to the situation to be faced if
the ADF is deployed to fight within Australia
where the media can get to the AO fairly
easily, and have all the domestic communica-
tion systems at their disposal.

Harris' book does not provide us with many
answers — but it gives us some idea of the
problem. It must be compulsory reading for
everyone who may be involved in such a
situation.

KG 200 THE TRUE STORY by P. W. Stahl.
London: Janes, 1981. £25.00.

Reviewed by Richard Pehin, Directorate of
Logistic Operations — Army

The covert nature of the KG 200's missions,
plus the fact that it operated captured
Allied aircraft, has led to some speculation as
to its real duties, a common belief being that
it used its captured B17s to easily approach
allied aircraft and shoot them down. This was
the basis of a popular novel published in the
late 1970s. Yet the truth is that many of
KG 200's operations were fantastic enough to
exceed the imagination of the most fanciful
novelist.

KG 200 was actually a collection of different
Luftwaffe formations which had duties outside
the normal ambit of the average air force
units. The roles of these formations included
insertion of agents, special reconnaissance mis-
sions, operating aircraft converted to drone
flying bombs and even a unit established to
conduct suicide attacks on allied bombers.
KG 200 was not controlled through normal
Luftwaffe channels but was at the disposal of
the German military and political intelligence
services.

The author was a KG 200 pilot and detach-
ment commander and relates much of the
formation's story from first hand. He tells of
a plot to assassinate Stalin, the establishment
of a chain of air bases across the Sahara to
allow infiltration of West African ports, flights
as far afield as Mosul in support of agents
and much more.
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