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Chairman's comments

Welcome to *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue No. 184.

As foreshadowed, this issue is themed on 'the ADF command and leadership experience over the last 20 years'. I am delighted that it contains a range of personal vignettes from all three Services, from the Chief of Navy to more junior officers, and covering ADF deployments to Somalia, East Timor, the Middle East and Afghanistan, from the early 1990s to present-day operations.


I am confident that readers will find many of the vignettes both interesting and informative. I also expect that serving ADF personnel will be able to draw a number of personal lessons and insights – particularly relating to leadership – from the wealth of operational experience reflected in the vignettes. Given the nature of this issue, the Board has decided not to award a 'best article' prize but is appreciative of the submissions from all contributors and the supporting maps provided by the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation.

As usual, we also have a selection of book reviews of material published in recent months. As we typically receive more reviews than we can readily publish in each issue, we have deferred several to the on-line version of the Journal, with only a referenced mention in the printed version. We remain keen to hear from readers wishing to join the list of reviewers. If you are interested, please provide your contact details and subject area/speciality to the Editor at publications@defence.adc.edu.au

Our next two issues, in July/August and November/December this year, will revert to 'general' topics. I encourage all readers – and especially serving ADF personnel of all ranks – to consider submitting an article for consideration. As Admiral James Stavridis USN said in his 'Let Us Dare' article last year, 'those of us who have chosen a life of military service ... [also require] the courage to share our thoughts'.

I hope you enjoy this special issue.

James Goldrick
Rear Admiral, RAN
Commander, Australian Defence College
Chairman of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board



Operation STABILISE and the future of maritime command

Vice Admiral Russ Crane, AO, CSM, RAN

In 1999, I was privileged to command HMAS *Success* during the initial phases of Operation STABILISE. We were standing off Dili harbour when the first troops landed as part of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), after the historic independence vote of the East Timorese people. Although *Success* served in the area of operations only between September and October 1999, due to maintenance requirements, her experience was defining for the future of joint maritime operations.

We had been preparing for a possible deployment for some time, as the political situation developed, and HMAS *Darwin* had been prepositioned around the Wetar Strait since 6 September. The execution order for Operation STABILISE was released on 19 September and our task group arrived offshore by dawn the following morning, along with HMAS *Darwin* and *Anzac*, and the destroyer HMS *Glasgow*. HMAS *Tobruk*, *Balikpapan*, *Brunei* and *Labuan*, HMNZS *Te Kaha* and *Endeavour*, French frigate FS *Vendémiaire*, USS *Mobile Bay* and others were also deployed in the area. The same morning, clearance divers secured the wharf and port area, and the land insertion began with special forces troops.

From the start, logistic support from the sea was a critical element to the success of the mission. With *Endeavour*, which was assigned to a resupply shuttle service to Darwin, we were the sole fuel supply for activities which required around 30,000 litres of diesel and aviation fuel each day. This posed many challenges in itself. Firstly, we had to ensure we met environmental compliance rules among all the coalition participants, which required close liaison and an ability to maintain solid relationships with partner navies. Secondly, and more urgently, we found that East Timor had no facilities to transfer fuel ashore directly, nor were there fuel supplies ashore which were available for INTERFET use.

We were able, especially in the early stages of the operation, to improvise a transport system by slinging collapsible fuel drums under a SeaKing and flying them to a shore dump. As the land operation expanded around the island, the reliance on *Success*' fuel and its distribution increased even further. Fuel trucks arrived in-theatre in mid-October—after our departure—and simplified the system because they could be brought out to the tanker by landing craft. Although neither system was efficient, they did prove an effective means of supplying an urgent need through the equipment we had available.

Success also supported the dispersion of the land force into outlying regions of East Timor, including the Oecussi enclave which was accessible only from the sea. The RAN's LCHs (landing craft heavy) and *Tobruk* led the insertion on 22 October into this isolated region, separated from the rest of East Timor by an 80 kilometre-wide strip of Indonesian territory and filled with refugees. This is one of my enduring memories of the operation, because of the sheer isolation and desperate need of this small region. The landing followed within days of the decision of the Indonesian parliament to recognise East Timorese independence and everyone on board had a firm sense of the historic moment in which we had the honour to participate.

More generally, INTERFET Commander General Cosgrove had ordered from the outset that our forces would not rely on the local economy for supplies. Although air transport was important, over 91 per cent of cargo and most personnel arrived in East Timor by sea. During my time off Dili harbour, the flow of merchant shipping into the port was constant, with as many as 18 commercial vessels present at a time, bringing goods of every description. It was convincing proof of the role of commercial tonnage in strategic sea lift.

Equally important was the level of support available to land forces in maintaining morale. The special forces and other combat troops who arrived in the first days of the operation were deployed in a difficult, hot and isolated environment and, like other RAN ships, *Success* was able to provide respite from the conditions. The scope of help we could offer was surprising to some, including showers, laundry services, hot meals and airconditioning. At every opportunity, fresh supplies or BBQ packs were transferred to shore or soldiers were brought on board for a short break. This would not have been possible without the absolute commitment of every member of the ship's company, especially the supply department and boat crews, and I still admire them for it. These 'hotel services' are, in my view, a not-to-be-underestimated part of maintaining morale on operations.

Above all, Operation STABILISE was a demonstration of the value of presence in ADF operations. The large and well-armed maritime task group which sailed from Darwin on 18 September 1999 received significant press coverage and, after its arrival in East Timorese waters, its ready visibility so close to shore eliminated any doubt as to international resolve. Indeed, to borrow the phrase of the Canadian joint task force commander, then Captain (N) Roger Girouard:

An armada is still an impressive and intimidating sight. The coalition's massed tonnage and naval might in the approaches to Dili helped convince those who needed to be convinced that the international community had in fact ranged itself in full support of an independent East Timor, in a way that coalition forces ashore could not.

The joint effects of Operation STABILISE, in which a multilateral force with land, sea and air elements was able quickly to restore order and support East Timorese independence are of great relevance to the ADF as it stands on the cusp of the new joint, amphibious capability offered by two LHDs (landing helicopter dock), the first of which was launched in February in Spain. From a leadership perspective, it reinforced the need for single Service excellence, coupled with an intimate knowledge of capability and ability to improvise within its limits, to contribute successfully.


This was a lesson that came more easily the longer *Success* remained in the area of operations, working in such close quarters with Army's troops and Black Hawks, with RAAF's airlift and with the powerful naval forces contributed by many other nations. In my view, this is the command culture on which Force 2030 will turn. Joint operations on and from the sea can only be as successful as their separate elements are in contributing excellence to the common goal.

Vice Admiral Crane joined the RAN in 1970. He sub-specialised as a mine warfare and clearance diving officer, training in both Australia and the UK. In 1981, he was posted to HMS Vernon in the UK as a mine warfare instructor on exchange with the Royal Navy.

On promotion to Lieutenant Commander, he assumed command of HMAS Curlew and later served as Executive Officer of HMAS Torrens. He also decommissioned HMAS Derwent as Commanding Officer and was Commanding Officer of HMAS Success between 1998 and 2000.

Admiral Crane also served as the inaugural Project Director for the Australian Mine Hunter Coastal Project, Director of the Maritime Intelligence Centre and Chief Staff Officer Command and Control Communications and Intelligence.

He was promoted to star rank in 2000 and posted to the Director General Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare, before being appointed as the Commander Australian Naval Systems Command in October 2001. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in May 2004 and assumed duties as Director General Coastwatch, before being appointed Deputy Chief of Navy in June 2006. He was appointed Chief of Navy in July 2008.



Middle East area of operations – 2004-05

Air Vice-Marshal Greg Evans, DSC, AM (Retd)

I was in command of Joint Task Force (JTF) 633 in the Middle East from November 2004 until May 2005. It was an eventful and troubled period, marked by a dramatic increase in insurgent violence and the elections held in January 2005. My staff used to joke that the bombings only started in earnest once I arrived, then look at me reproachfully.

My first inkling that a command in Baghdad was a possibility came in a call from the Air Commander, who asked 'would Baghdad suit for six months'? You bet! At that stage, the Australian contribution in Afghanistan had reduced to a handful of advisors and JTF 633 was changing markedly. So was the political situation. Abu Ghraib was becoming a household word and it was clear that there was a tough fight ahead to bring any sort of governance to Iraq. The exhilarating operational successes of 2003 looked very much like turning into a hard, dangerous occupation task which had not been planned properly. I was tremendously keen to go.

Force preparation at Randwick Barracks, briefings from CDF, the Service chiefs and the environmental commanders, and the administration of getting away seemed to happen quickly and soon I was sweating through the reception and staging process in Kuwait, then stepping off a C-130 in Baghdad to be met by Brigadier 'Hutch' Hutchinson, who I was to replace. 'Glad to see you mate', he said, 'hang onto your hat'.

As Hutch outlined the job, it became clear that much of the National Commander's role involved the management of a wide range of relationships. The relationship of the Australian task force as a whole with the broader coalition was the main focus. And given the number of tactical elements we were contributing, this could become quite complex. Australia provided naval contributions in the Gulf; the training team near Mosul; C-130, P-3, air traffic control and radar control unit contributions to the air effort; a significant number of embedded staff officers; the security detachment which protected our diplomats; and there were a range of organisations which supported the Australian effort. All of these had to be coordinated, integrated with or placed under command arrangements to coalition structures. There was a constant workload to keep all of these relationships healthy, vigorous and perfectly understood by all parties.

Relationships with other coalition partners than the US were also vital and required a lot of pro-active work. Towards the end of my tour, the Al-Muthanna Task Group deployed into the British area in the south near Basra. There was a tremendous amount of work to do with our British colleagues to ensure that the contribution Australia made was both useful militarily and perfectly understood by the British leadership, particularly in terms of rules of engagement and national sensitivities and limitations. A great deal of frank discussion was needed to achieve the levels of understanding required and I was thankful to be dealing with the sensible and culturally-sensitive Brits in these matters.

And, of course, we were in Iraq and after elections were held we were dealing with the sovereign government of Iraq. I found dealings with Iraqi officials to be tense, difficult and characterised by the deep cultural divides between the European coalition and them, and between elements of Iraqi society. I recall several visits to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence which the most seasoned diplomat would refer to as 'difficult'.

Which brings me to the crucial relationship with our diplomats in Iraq. The Task Force protected them, moved them around Iraq and supplied them. Without that effort, our diplomatic effort would have been impossible. Without their constant, skilful diplomatic efforts, our mission would also have been untenable. This was a truly symbiotic relationship which well illustrated how the military and diplomatic elements of national power must work together in times of tension. I am greatly indebted to the diplomatic staff of the day for their wise counsel and help.

Any one of these relationships could be needed at short notice. My first day in command was a bit difficult. An Australian staff officer embedded with US elements had heard rumours of illegal detentions and reported these back to Canberra. It was decided that a formal letter would be passed to my US colleagues, requesting that this be investigated. This letter was handed over, as it happened, on my first day. Of course, this caused a formal investigation and considerable angst. The investigation was carried out thoroughly and well and, in the end, the answers given to Australian Government queries were satisfactory but I felt most uncomfortable for a few weeks as this all progressed. The inherent strength of the relationship with our US colleagues was most useful in keeping this difficult issue in perspective.

One of our most longstanding commitments to the security of the Gulf has been the provision of a warship to coalition efforts afloat. During the early weeks of my command, I was given a graphic lesson in the meaning of the term 'National Commander'. While at my desk, I received a secure phone call from Commander Bruce Victor, Commanding Officer of HMAS *Adelaide*:

Sir, I've got a boarding party aboard a vessel aground near Iranian waters, they are now surrounded by Iranian fast boats, there have been threats of attack and demands are being made that they surrender. Plans are being made for an operation to rescue them which I think are ill-advised. I ask that you use the national 'red card' to prohibit this, we have a better way to get them off using our helicopter but I need a bit of time.

I agreed with his assessment, ordered restrictions on his options and he rang off. Several hours later, after a tense stand-off, the boarding party was lifted off by *Adelaide's* Seahawk, intact and unharmed. This brief introduction to naval boarding was a real eye-opener. I was very thankful for the expertise and calm professionalism of Bruce and his team, especially the boarding party who performed perfectly.

I frequently travelled to the Green Zone and to parts of the Red Zone. By the time I took command, this was always done in armoured vehicles due to the rising IED (improvised explosive device) threat. In the version of the ASLAV (Australian Light Armoured Vehicle) we were equipped with at the start of my tour, there was a small window near the rear ramp. Through this, I could watch Baghdad pass by as we travelled. We were very watchful for traffic jams, as they often preceded an attack.

The diggers would get very proactive if boxed in by traffic and I recall one day looking through the little observation window as we came up to a traffic jam, stopped and then pivoted off the road onto the central traffic island to clear the area. I ended up almost face-to-face through my armoured window with an immaculately-dressed Iraqi lady who had been crossing the road. Fine, powdery dust shot up and coated her business suit and hair, diesel exhaust blasted her and she just stood there with a look of flat resignation, eyes closed, lips compressed, holding her breath against the dust and smoke. Then we were gone, accelerating through the gears for the safety of the Green Zone. I often think of her, as a symbol of what we felt we had to do—and the real effect we produced—and wonder about her.

The Australian Army Training Team-Iraq was one of the most remarkable units I commanded. Their extraordinary efforts to train Iraqi street urchins to be soldiers were heroic, dangerous and all too often futile. It really was hard, dangerous work, done way up to the north near Mosul. Our resupply convoys to them had several very serious clashes with well-prepared insurgent ambush positions and did very well each time. The diggers seemed to like being ambushed. I recall one of them telling me it was good honest fighting, unlike just getting blown up by IEDs. It was remarkable watching the instructors dealing with Iraqi recruits. The recruits were equipped with AK-47 and they were very interested in the Steyr which the Australians used. Considerable trouble was taken to make the equipment used by the Australians the subject of myth and legend. Sensible precautions—and I wonder if this forestalled any trouble.

There were of course strict rules concerning local animals and contact with them. Diggers being as resourceful as they are, these rules ended up getting bent a little for 'Smufti', a mongrel Baghdad mutt which ended up with the run of the security detachment headquarters at The Flats, a partially-built office tower which served as their base. I was assured all rabies checks had been done by the vets who looked after our working dogs and that no senior visitors would ever see him, etc, etc. These arrangements seemed to work well until CDF visited one day. The officer commanding detailed two soldiers to 'keep that bloody dog away from CDF or else', and these arrangements worked well until CDF stepped through the door onto the roof of the flats. Smufti latched onto his shoelaces and refused to let go, growling and snuffling as pups do. General Cosgrove was terrific, completely ignoring the assault on his boots, until someone grabbed the pup and put him through a door into the central stair well. Not a word was ever said. Very impressive.

The security detachment was, shortly after this, subject to a massive truck bomb attack. There were a number of injuries but the protective measures taken meant none of them were permanent. The damage done was very sobering and prompted CDF to order the detachment's relocation to the Green Zone. This relocation was a very difficult thing to achieve and I was very proud of them for achieving it so flawlessly. Every part of the move was made to look like a routine patrol setting out, leaving the place empty as the last three-vehicle patrol moved out. The end of one era and the start of another for this longstanding mission to protect our diplomats in Baghdad.

I have a particularly clear memory of sitting in the operations room at my headquarters listening to the reports flood in as people voted in the elections which so much effort had been applied to. Each individual who went out to vote that day committed a significant act of personal bravery. It was a moving and eventful day.

It was very common practice for my staff and I to travel around Baghdad on the US Army Black Hawk shuttles which were everywhere, all the time. A truly amazing operation which saved a great deal of road movement and therefore exposure to IEDs. On one of these moves, I was looking out the window when I noticed a neatly dressed chap on a rooftop clattering away at us with the family AK-47. He missed by a wide margin but I pointed out to the loadmasters that we'd been engaged. 'Yeah, they're shootin' at us all the time out here', he said. He didn't add 'obviously, you berk', but there was no need to. I stopped bothering to scan for threats, realising it did no good. It was the same with mortars and rockets, which struck Camp Victory frequently. Old hands would loudly announce 'your allowances are safe' every time a mortar or rocket landed. 'Newbies' were a bit struck by this at first but worrying about what you can't change is pretty futile and takes effort.

Probably the group I worried most about was my bomb disposal technicians. They worked like dogs—in appalling circumstances—and lived the worst of nightmares. One day young Captain Tony Gilchrist came into my office for a visit, dog-tired and started talking about duck-hunting trousers. It took me a moment to catch what he meant—he needed them because he was ruining so many uniforms and pairs of boots, standing and lying in human remains while defusing secondary bombs. He wanted some of those rubber duck-hunting trousers so he could just hose them off. Very sobering; somebody dashed off to the base exchange to get him some.

I was probably most impressed by our medical staff at Balad Hospital. They did extraordinary things under intense pressure and saved many lives. It is remarkable that there are professors of surgery willing to give up months of high income to go and practise medicine under fire. I was very humbled to be in their presence while they worked.

I quickly noticed something of a tradition among the staff—cigars all round with anyone who was rotating out the next day. With amazing speed, I became one of the veterans, then a short-timer, then I was clipping the end off my last-night cigar. I wanted desperately to get home but I also desperately wanted to stay with the astonishingly-gifted people I had commanded for six months. But there was effectively a new, regenerated team and it was time to go. I vividly recall my last daily briefing at the palace. An Iraqi general who sat near me each day wished me well and asked me a question which had bothered him for months: ‘why don’t the Americans let the electricity work in Baghdad?’ I explained that the insurgency kept blowing up the transmission lines but he waved this problem away. ‘The Americans, my friend, they went to the moon. If they wanted the lights on in Baghdad, the lights would be on in Baghdad’.


I pondered on this, and on the lady beside my ASLAV armoured vehicle and on duck-hunting trousers, all the way home on our chartered flight. I still do.

After an extended period seeing nothing at all which is green, your eyes lose their memory of the colour. We landed in Brisbane in rain and the first green object I had seen in months came through the door of the aircraft. It was the Brigade Commander welcoming his security detachment home—and the green of his uniform hurt my eyes. The trees in my front garden were still startlingly green a week after I got back.

There are some strange after-effects which I noticed after getting home. I was embarrassed to find myself very agitated while standing in a line waiting to see a movie a day or two after I got back. I had to leave and go somewhere quiet. I realised later that I was anxious because in Baghdad we always tried to avoid bunching up or queuing outside for anything, in case of rockets. I had a great feeling of impatience with all these foolish civilians lining up like sheep and realised after a while why—I missed the sheer competence and focus of my people. I have seen no finer group anywhere and will never be part of anything so expert again. I wasn’t afraid of mortars falling in Castle Hill, NSW—I missed my colleagues and my place among them.

From a distance of five years—and retirement—I still have vivid memories of just how sheer, bloody expert they all were at their jobs. Young Hercules and Orion aircrew just calmly doing it every day, perfectly; embedded colonels who amazed their coalition colleagues; security detachment diggers who were always cool, calm and capable under threat; the training team stuck way up in the north trying to turn thousands of armed street urchins into an army; staff who developed the capacity to ignore mortars and rockets. They were just superb and I will always miss leading them.

Air Vice-Marshal Greg Evans joined the RAAF as a direct entry pilot in 1982, completing No. 121 pilot course and achieving a lifetime ambition to become a C-130 pilot with a posting to 36 Squadron. After a lengthy flying career, he held a number of command and staff positions, including command of 37 Squadron, Air Lift Group, JTF 633 and the Integrated Area Defence System in Butterworth. He finished his career as Deputy Chief Joint Operations Command and was the first to hold this position in the new Bungendore headquarters.



Operation SOLACE (Somalia 1993) and the lessons learned

Major General John Caligari, DSC, AM, Australian Army

in consultation with Colonel Dick Stanhope, AM (Retd)(now Australian Army Reserve)

Introduction

As the Operations Officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) Battalion Group that deployed to Somalia in January 1993, I faced a challenge as a major that significantly shaped my approach to command and leadership in the Australian Army.

Through this vignette, I intend to highlight what I learned with respect to command and leadership from a particular experience on Operation SOLACE and the ways in which this has influenced my approach to command and leadership since then. The aspects of command and leadership I focus on are understanding the big picture; judgment; courage of conviction; and the ability to communicate and convince.

Background

Our mission was to secure a humanitarian relief sector based on Baidoa—a town in south-central Somalia some 250 kilometres north-west of the capital Mogadishu—in order to support the non-government organisations' (NGO) distribution of aid to the people in our sector, most of whom were starving, with many dying daily. In essence, this meant keeping the NGOs operating in the sector and providing them with the security and, therefore, the freedom necessary for them to conduct their business.

Major Dick Stanhope was Battery Commander 107th Field Battery of 4th Field Regiment—1 RAR's direct support battery. Dick was also the Commander of the Civil Military Operations Team (CMOT). During the conduct of the operation, Dick and I worked very closely together and became good friends. Dick and I soon came to recognise that we had divergent roles in support of the Battalion Group Commanding Officer's (CO) mission.

I was responsible for the planning, scheduling and routine conduct of operations. This involved keeping everyone busy and alert by rotating forces onto four key tasks: securing the township of Baidoa, protecting NGO convoys and activity, patrolling the wider area, and defending the airfield around which the Battalion Group was based.

Dick Stanhope was responsible for all aspects of dealing with the local population, UN agencies and the NGOs. In our sector, we had 102 expatriate NGO workers spread across 43 different compounds, 20 of which were living accommodation. Each NGO varied in size and mandate but they employed a large number of Somalis as drivers, labourers and security guards. One significant challenge we faced was that we did not have the resources to provide complete security for the NGO and UN agencies.

Specific situation

As a Battalion Group, we had one mission but the two distinct parts of the conduct of that mission—mine and Dick’s—were conflicting. Dick’s objective of managing the relationship and activity of the NGOs occasionally came into direct conflict with the objective of the combat elements of the Battalion Group. An unintended consequence caused by the complexity of the circumstance to protect and support the NGOs was that Australian soldiers’ lives were put at risk. Conversely, if the Australian soldiers weren’t tasked to protect and support the NGOs, it could have created a larger security problem that would have cost more civilian lives and produced a situation in which the Battalion Group would have failed in its mission.

The problem for Dick and I was to ensure we came to the best compromise to achieve the Battalion Group mission. We needed to keep the NGOs in the sector and give them the best chance of effectively contributing to the relief effort. An additional problem was that the NGO guards were, in many cases, the enemy. These NGO guards, according to the mostly Westerners working for these aid organisations, were providing security for the NGO operations but were then fighting the Battalion by night. In fact, the security they provided by day was from themselves and from other rival groups. At night, they took advantage of their privileged position and knowledge of the movement of aid and money by stealing it.

Unquestionably, we needed local security guards to assist with NGO security but we needed to scrutinise the guard selection process and control the conduct of the Somali guards in order to minimise the likelihood of them turning on the people they were employed to protect. Additionally, we needed to help the NGOs reduce the opportunity and reward that the guards had been used to.

To provide security, we needed to ban the carriage of weapons. But if a security guard was to be effective in the eyes of the NGOs, he needed a weapon. Anyone with a weapon by day had it confiscated, unless he had a legitimate reason to have a weapon. Our problem was how to license legitimate guards without potentially arming them to fight us later. This situation came to a head when, on 29 March, C Company confiscated a SAR-80 rifle and 22 rounds of Australian 5.56mm ammunition from a security guard. We knew that an A Company soldier had lost a magazine earlier in the tour and assumed this was the missing item. This incident was the catalyst for a series of running arguments over the necessity for weapons in the hands of NGO guards. The carriage of weapons became an even bigger issue later with the raising of the Auxiliary Security Force, which was the first stage in establishing a new National Police Force.

The event

The specific event for analysis in this vignette is in two parts. The first was an altercation that almost came to fisticuffs and the second was our reconciliation. A series of incidents demonstrated the impact our different objectives were having on the Battalion Group mission very plainly. Dick and I had a very heated argument attempting to explain to each other the problems of doing business the way the other thought we should be doing our respective jobs. We were both under pressure from our respective constituents: I from subunit commanders of the Battalion Group, who were having to deal with the engagements their sections and platoons were having with the enemy; and Dick from the NGOs, who were worried about their security and had in their mind the option of withdrawing from Baidoa if they considered their safety was at risk.

It was apparent that while both of us had the Battalion Group mission clearly in mind, our approaches would remain in conflict unless we worked through the problem and arrived at a compromise. Indisputably, we all needed the NGOs to stay and do their job or our mission failed. But we also clearly didn't want to continue to endanger the lives of our soldiers unnecessarily by allowing the wrong people to have weapons. On reflection, I suppose we were too busy in the early days to gain a comprehensive understanding of each other's domains. However, events were proving we had to do just that and do it quickly.

Having nussed out how we needed each of our objectives to be executed in order to achieve the mission and put in place the mechanism to coordinate our efforts, a reconciliation celebration was in order. It had been a big relief. Dick and I decided to have a celebratory drink from the 'Bank'. It was a small room in the headquarters that had been set aside for the money we convinced the NGOs not to keep at their facilities and for beer that had been donated by various organisations, including the NGOs, which we were not permitted to touch without the CO's approval. Dick and I found an appropriate beverage among the pallets. We sat down on the floor for a hot non-alcoholic beer. After the CO almost had a fit discovering us drinking on the floor of the 'Bank', he agreed that the compromises struck by Dick and me made life much easier and the mission achievable.

'Understand the big picture'

In the early stages of the mission, Dick and I thought we had a good grasp of the objective and intent but clearly we did not. Like good Army officers, we approached our part of the problem with due analysis but failed to recognise the significance or take account of the impact of each other's objectives in achieving the same mission. The bigger picture involved both of us. The subtlety of the difference was the catch. We had done all the normal appreciation of the problem according to 'our world' but it was only when we were being harassed by our respective constituents that we realised the significance of the problem.

The lesson for me was that despite all the thought and planning that can go into preparing for and conducting a mission, there is always a bigger picture that may not be readily evident. It is a picture that must be constantly sought and this comes about only by accepting that everyone's intentions are good and that differences of opinion simply occur due to different interests and objectives. A thorough understanding of these perspectives and approaches is something that must be constantly and vigilantly sought and addressed in order to really understand the best way to achieve the objective or, on operations, the mission.

Judgment

While our individual judgment was sound, our appreciation of the other's perspective showed a lack of judgment, which occurred no doubt through a lack of experience. We did not appreciate the conflict in the achievement of our respective objectives quickly enough. It was only after a number of incidents and increasing pressure from our respective communities that we recognised the need to comprehensively address the problem. Once focused on the problem—and with guidance from the CO on where the balance lay—our combined judgment cracked the problem as best as it could be cracked.

This experience taught me the importance of learning from successes and failures. In my experience, the best of my subordinates have been those who have demonstrated the capacity to learn quickly. There is of course a level of judgment expected commensurate with rank and seniority. But those who can take defeat and failure on the chin and bounce back with demonstrated strengthening judgment and performance are the most valuable asset to any organisation.

Courage of conviction

Dick and I both had the courage of our conviction but we had not had sufficient experience in-theatre to exercise appropriate judgment. We both passionately argued that our objective was the paramount one but, ultimately, our conviction that the Battalion Group mission was what we were both attempting to achieve won out. While our 'courage' almost led to a physical fight between us, our friendship and appreciation of each other's motivations led to a resolution that saw the best possible management of the problem and ultimately the successful conclusion of the Battalion Group mission. Our conviction was to provide the best support we could to the CO and achieve the Battalion Group mission. And while it caused us a problem early on, our courage of conviction and our professionalism were what brought us together in the end.

I have watched closely those around me, especially on operations, to identify those who exhibit the courage of their conviction. This characteristic, when associated strongly with a demonstration of sound judgment and a keen ability to communicate, argue and convince, make for a powerful command and leadership capacity.

Communicate and convince

Once we agreed on the way ahead, we had a big job convincing our respective constituents of our new unified plan. The fact we were able to discuss the problem calmly after the crescendo the argument had reached was a testament to our enduring friendship and the respect gained due to the habitual relationship 107th Field Battery and 1 RAR had earned over many years of working closely together and having to trust each other.

We sorted out the way forward recognising the dilemma with which each of us was confronted. Our plan involved mutual compromise. This needed to be communicated to the company commanders of the Battalion Group and to the CMO teams so that they too could exercise better judgment and contribute to the communications plan when this issue was raised by everyone affected throughout the Battalion Group and the NGO community. We both had a deal of arguing and convincing to do, based on our understanding of where the compromise rested for the benefit of the Battalion Group and the mission.

I have learned that the more senior one gets, the more important skills such as communicating and convincing become. Of course, they must be coupled with an appreciation of the position of the issue within the big picture—and a good deal of judgment born of experience—but if the message can't ultimately be sold, there might as well not be a message at all. Furthermore, the message needs to be sold within as short a period as possible in order to maximise decision-maker's time, which is less and less as you rise through the ranks, given the breadth of issues being dealt with. A good communicator will provide the information to fill the gaps the decision maker might have—or feels they have—and no more, until he or she has all that they require to make that decision.

Conclusion

This vignette focused on an event that occurred during my tenure as the Operations Officer of the 1st Battalion Group on operations and highlighted four characteristics that I have come to regard as very important in command and leadership, especially as I experienced it on subsequent operations. While I have used a vignette from my days as a major almost 20 years ago, I am certain that the lessons I learned on Operation SOLACE have influenced my approach to command and leadership since then.

Major General John Caligari has multiple operational tours of duty. In 1989, he served with the UN Truce Supervision Organisation as a military observer, mainly in southern Lebanon, on Operation PALADIN. He was Operations Officer of the 1st Battalion Group during its deployment to Somalia in 1993 on Operation SOLACE. For his service on this deployment, he was awarded a CDF Commendation.

He deployed as Commander of the 1st Battalion Ready Group on HMAS Manoora for the evacuation of Australians from the Solomon Islands on Operation PLUMBOB and commanded the 1st Battalion Group on operations along the East Timor/Indonesian border, with the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor, on Operation TANAGER in 2000. For his command and leadership on Operation TANAGER, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. He was Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 633 (Australian National Commander, Afghanistan) on Operation SLIPPER in 2009. He is currently serving in Army Headquarters as Head of Modernisation and Strategic Planning — Army.



In the wake of an Admiral: some reflections on sea command in the modern era

Rear Admiral Peter Jones, DSC, AM, RAN

In this article I offer some thoughts on command at sea in the modern era. This is very much a personal perspective that will hopefully be of interest not only to those who will embark on such a command but also to those who need to appreciate the vicissitudes of this complex environment.

In late 2002, I was Commander of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) maintaining sanctions against Iraq in the North Arabian Gulf. At the time, I was operating from the USS *Milius*, a new Arleigh Burke Aegis destroyer. When not absorbed in the daily demands of sanction enforcement and monitoring Iraqi naval movements, my staff and I pondered the possibility of a command role in the looming war against Iraq.

As luck would have it, nestled in the wardroom bookshelf was a copy of Admiral 'Sandy' Woodward's classic *One Hundred Days*, which is his memoir of commanding the Royal Navy (RN) task force in the Falklands War.¹ I had not read the book since I was a lieutenant commander but, with the need to mentally change gear from sanction enforcement to littoral warfare, I reread with renewed interest. It is a treatise on naval task group command in the missile age.

Like many a successful submariner, Admiral Woodward is astute, analytical and decisive. He is also an insightful student of naval and strategic affairs. Fortunately for future naval officers, this taciturn officer was assisted in his memoirs by the writer Patrick Robinson, who had previously helped the America's Cup skipper John Bertram write *Born to Win*. As a result, Woodward's book was a much more revealing personal account than is the norm for naval memoirs.

As events turned out, I became the Maritime Interception Officer Screen Commander during the invasion of Iraq, with a mixed force of Australian, British, US and Polish ships. From a practical viewpoint, *One Hundred Days* proved to offer significant insights that I will now discuss.

Organisation

Woodward found it vital to have his battle watches headed by experienced captains that understood his intent and could make quick decisions. They had also to judge when and when not to call him to the operations room. The fluid and demanding environment of war makes it difficult to be prescriptive in this regard. Also, the staff had to be sufficient to allow for sustained 24/7 operations, which enabled Woodward to preserve his strength and objectivity as best he could.

On the basis of this advice from the book—and with a couple of months of unpredictable sanction enforcement under my belt—I knew that my staff needed augmentation. Fortunately, the RN was willing to provide an additional six officers and sailors to my staff of 18. Taking Woodward's lead, both my RAN and RN operations officers, Lieutenant Commanders Peter Arnold and Andrew Stacey, became the 'battle watch captains'. This arrangement worked wonderfully well.

Admiral Woodward developed a routine of frequent but short visits to his operations room in HMS *Hermes*. This allowed him to maintain his situational awareness yet not get bogged down in the detail. It became clear to him that he had also to be looking at the big picture and have a good grasp of the longer term issues. As part of that routine, he would adjourn to his cabin at day's end, have a scotch and pore over his notebook to review issues.

While not having the luxury of a nightcap, I found the frequent but short visits to the operations room similarly effective. Obviously, when significant events were underway, there was only one place to be. However, it was only when slightly removed that the broader context could be more clearly grasped.

Fortunately for my staff and I, during the war we were embarked in HMAS *Kanimbla*. She is well laid out with planning areas which allowed room for informal exchanging of ideas with task group staff, ship's company and the various 'visiting firemen' that came our way. This informal 'brain's trust' was invaluable for sifting ideas and testing them in discussion.

I believe, given the complexity of modern warfare, the need to informally access subject matter experts—no matter what their rank—is essential. To facilitate this, it is important for a task group staff to be a friendly, low-maintenance bunch that encourages involvement in the enterprise by those beyond the staff inner circle.

Planning

Admiral Woodward vividly described his planning process. He used a wide array of staff and emphasised the use of liaison officers. Importantly, he brought commanding officers into the planning loop once the 'straw-man' was done. This was to get their input, provide a sanity check and give them ownership. This principle is as old as Nelson, who gathered his captains (his 'band of brothers') prior to the Battle of the Nile. This was also the approach taken with our planning of the Khor Abd Allah (KAA) clearance operation.

The role of the chief of staff, in my case the competent and upbeat Commander Peter Leavy RAN, was critical in this phase. In any large operation, there are an array of plans, interdependencies and de-confliction that require close attention. The chief of staff has to orchestrate and facilitate that interchange. The corridor to *Kanimbla's* planning space became well-worn as planners from adjoining operations arrived with charts under their arms. Let there be no doubt—and this is especially the case in littoral warfare—a mistake in the planning phase can lead to fratricide. Indeed, we were to have one close call with a special forces boat coming unalerted out of the KAA. This incident showed that my Task Force Commander, Rear Admiral (USN) Barry Costello's fixation on measures to prevent 'blue-on-blue' was well justified.

A divergence from Admiral Woodward's planning experience was that, in our case, the MIF was essentially a bit-player in a large and highly complex invasion. Our remit was to:

- Inspect and clear any merchant ships and dhows exiting the KAA waterway
- Defeat any Iraqi naval forays
- Screen the coalition force from any Iraqi naval incursion
- Prevent any Iraqi mining operations

- Support the take-down of the Iraqi offshore oil terminals
- Bombard Iraqi Army positions on the Al Faw peninsula
- Escort the mine countermeasures force clearing the KAA, and
- Conduct riverine patrols to support the free flow of humanitarian aid shipping to Umm Qasr.

Our very closely prescribed duties effectively negated use of the joint military appreciation process. This may not always be the case and a firm grounding in joint planning is essential.

A cautionary note about the plan is that it is only that—a plan. One is not obliged to follow it to the letter. Yet there is a great reluctance at different levels to deviate from it. This is even when the enemy does the unexpected, the circumstances have changed or that the plan is not working. The MIF fell into that trap and had great reluctance to overhaul our riverine patrols. We did change but about a day later than we should have done. A key role for a commander, therefore, must be questioning the continued efficacy of the operational plan.

Relationships

In his new foreword in the 1997 edition of his book, Admiral Woodward talks about how each headquarters could only see part of the picture. As such, their actions can be perplexing. Woodward considered it essential to remind his staff that the other headquarters were just trying their best and not trying to muck them around. In fact, my staff and I experienced a similar situation. Over time, the relations and temper of the staff in the various headquarters get frayed and this is particularly so when people are tired or the pressure comes on.

Related to this, caution should be exercised in reacting tersely to issues by signal or email. I would not criticise anyone in print and gave out praise in at least equal measure—the old maxim: praise in public, criticise in private. The other rule was only take on one headquarters at a time. A commander and his staff being known as difficult does not encourage help when things go wrong (as they will).

In coalition operations, the command arrangements are often more cumbersome than they need be. An additional command layer (or more) will often exist. Moreover, national considerations are an ever-present factor and the existence of command areas with little role other than reporting back home or raising a red flag to the mis-assignment of forces is not unusual. To make this arrangement work requires goodwill, a personal relationship with each superior commander and good liaison officers.

In the Gulf in 2003, the RAN fielded liaison officers in the cruiser USS *Valley Forge*, the carrier USS *Constellation*, the 5th Fleet Headquarters, with the Royal Marines ashore, in a Kuwaiti missile boat, the lead US missile boat USS *Chinook* and the Polish support ship ORP *Czernicki*. Importantly, the liaison officers were the glue that held things together. Among other things, good liaison officers can tell you when your decisions look good or are not playing well at all. To do this, they need to be kept in the picture and trusted. My guide in picking liaison officers was unless you sorely missed their presence in your own ship, then they were not the right officer.

To navigate this potential command and control minefield, I found there were three things that need to be remembered:

- When an incident occurs, there are invariably at least two levels of headquarters watching events from a 'chat room' or some other electronic means. The actions of the on-scene commander are keenly watched and do not be surprised if helpful suggestions flow. It is important before this occurs that the commanders at the different levels clearly understand and communicate to their staffs the authority of each commander to undertake their role.
- There can be a clash of cultures between the people doing the fighting and those further removed, with the soul-destroying job of monitoring and preparing the next 'PowerPoint' briefing.
- Be thankful you are at the sharp end and not a watcher of events.

Like Nelson, Admiral Woodward placed great stock in his commanding officers. He established individual relationships with his commanding officers and would talk to them personally if he had difficult tasks for them. That sat well with me and I made the time to get in a boat and go talk to them individually where possible. In my time in command of the MIF, we had 37 ships pass through the command for varying periods. It was fascinating to see the difference in the approach of each captain and the resultant feel of each ship.

As the invasion planning neared its end, Admiral Costello came to the *Kanimbla* to review and hopefully approve our plan. All the MIF captains were present and, instead of a PowerPoint brief, we had a chart and cut-out ships to move around. The most potent advocates for the plan were the captains. All the Admiral's difficult questions were directed to his captains. He knew it was they who were taking their ships into danger and he would get candid and well considered answers. They could only do this through their active involvement in the final operational planning.

In wartime, captains can come under immense pressure and the way they deal with pressure varies greatly. Furthermore, how a task group commander manages a highly-stressed captain is a difficult matter. In my case, the vast majority of captains did a magnificent job but a few struggled. I took the view that my job was to encourage and get the captains through; not to recommend to a captain how to fundamentally review their command style. On reflection, I am not sure whether I dealt with this aspect as well as I could. Perhaps what I can say is that the captains who performed best were those who were professionally competent, shared information with their ship's companies and delegated as much as was reasonable.

In coalition operations, one is generally dealing with assigned units that are of first class quality. But there are rare cases where a captain can make his ship a danger to itself and the force. In that case, there can be no hesitation and I had one such coalition ship. My approach was to go discreetly through the respective national channels and the ship was promptly reassigned.

Another challenge for a task group commander is that the intent is to develop a synergy—an effect greater than the sum of the units involved. In the case of the MIF, this was evidenced by the need to field much larger number of boarding teams at any one time than we normally could. This required a much more interchangeable approach between coalition ships, helicopters, boats and boarding parties. An impediment to this aim can be rivalry between ships. Over my time, I had three pairs of ships that were keen rivals. One ship built its whole

ethos on 'bagging' its rival. In wartime, this is unacceptable. I asked the captain to see the issue from a broader task group perspective and he put initiatives in place to develop a more positive culture in his ship.

Risk

In wartime, the placing of mission achievement above the safety of your people is one of its defining characteristics. Like everything else related to command, it is not black-and-white. Admiral Woodward talks about the need to harden yourself to make decisions for the mission success, which is a difficult balance between regularly reviewing risk and allowing it to get in the way of other decision making.

For important decisions, where higher risk is involved, it is important for the Commander to talk to the affected party. Admiral Woodward did this with the commanding officer of a frigate prior to her run through the Sound where there was a risk of mines. I had a similar conversation with the commanding officer of the *Chinook* to explain why I was taking non-essential personnel off his ship. The ship was going to escort the mine countermeasure vessels and so was to be the first non-low magnetic signature ship going up the KAA. Among other things, the face-to-face meeting ensures both parties know the risks and the rationale for the decision.

Media

Admiral Woodward found issues related to the media drew on a surprising and, at times, an inordinate amount of his energies. I was therefore not surprised that media affairs came to be my second priority after operations. Fortunately I, like all MIF commanders before me, had many and diverse media representatives visiting the ships at sea. This reflected the US Navy's relatively open and confident approach to its media relations.

The best approach in facilitating media engagement was concentrating them on the command ship and sending them to ships where the action was likely to be. This reduces the burden on smaller units, who should not have the management overload, and the command ship can also provide the broader context for what is going on in the conflict. It is also vital to understand what each media group wanted to achieve and where they wanted to go. I was surprised how much these factors could vary.

A proactive and open approach to media increases the chances that accurate coverage of the task group's activities can be provided. This is not only important for the public but also for families, and provides a historical record of the sailors' contribution to a campaign.

Stress and pressure

Task group command is extremely draining and Admiral Woodward explains his need for routine. One must be aware of looking after yourself and developing a sustainable 'battle-rhythm'. Related to this was the importance he placed on being calm in public. Admiral Woodward recounts the confused scene in his operations room when HMS *Sheffield* was hit by an Exocet. All eyes were on him. I also became very conscious that when events were a bit tense or generally not going to script, there were quite a few eyes, young and old, checking on how I was coping with it all.

A useful aid is to have trusted friends who will give you a few home truths about how you are travelling both in terms of performance and general well-being. Fortunately, a couple of the more senior members of my staff filled that role and I was also fortunate in having a Naval College classmate, Captain Peter Lockwood RAN in the *Anzac*, keeping a weather eye on me.

Communications

Admiral Woodward emphasises that communications is the major cause of command and control problems. I also found this to be the case. It was the reason I moved from *Milius* to *Kanimbla*, where greater bandwidth and more ready access to Australian national systems could be assured.

One of the defining aspects in maritime operations is the rapid adoption of information communications technology and it is vital to seize the benefits of any advances where they can be obtained. There is a key competitive advantage to the maritime force that does so.

Summation

A point Admiral Woodward made in the foreword to Andrew Gordon's remarkable book, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British naval command*, was that:

It is difficult—but not necessarily impossible—in peacetime, when the stresses and unpredictabilities of war are hard to imagine (and still harder to simulate), to identify who would be good at it.²

This may be true. However, I believe the better we professionally prepare our prospective commanders, the more likely it is that they will succeed. As I have tried to demonstrate in this article, part of that preparation is to read about those who have gone before. It will provide context and more often than not show that what you are experiencing as a commander is not unique.

Rear Admiral Jones joined the RAN in 1974 and is a surface warfare specialist. His postings include Commanding Officer HMAS Melbourne, Commander Australian Surface Task Group, Commander Australian Naval System Command and Head ICT Operations/Strategic J6. Rear Admiral Jones has contributed to number of books on naval history and strategy, the latest being 'Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare' (Routledge, 2011). He is a graduate of the Advanced Management Program of the Harvard Business School and a Visiting Fellow at ADFA. He is currently serving in the Capability Development Group.

1. Admiral 'Sandy' Woodward, *One Hundred Days: memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*, HarperCollins, London, 1992.
2. A. Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British naval command*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1996, p. xii.

Reflections on health, leadership and the Specialist Service Officer

Associate Professor Susan Neuhaus, CSC, University of Adelaide

My Army career has been neither particularly long nor broad. However, I have had the fortune to have worked with both the Regular Army and the Reserve, and served in a number of roles; as a staff officer, a commander and a clinician. This paper is very much a personal reflection of the leadership lessons encountered at different points in that career, both on operations and in garrison, from my early years as a regimental medical officer (RMO) to the culmination of my career as a unit commanding officer (CO) and surgeon on operations.

RMO—early lessons in leadership

For newly-enlisted Specialist Service Officers (SSOs), much of Army is often a mystery. As junior officers, SSOs and GSOs (General Service Officers) are two distinctly different tribes, each with their own rules, codes and traditions. I was fortunate to have started my career in the regimental environment of Kapooka, where I was infused with the fundamentals of basic soldiering and the functions of a platoon commander. It was at Kapooka that my understanding of the relationship between the doctor and the commander, the basics of surviving in an Army culture and the ability to navigate a complex system—with sometimes competing obligations and responsibilities—were forged.

Clearly it is not necessary for an SSO to be able to site gun positions, storm parapets or set charges under a bridge to execute their role as a doctor or nurse or chaplain (and indeed it may be illegal). However, it is necessary to speak the language of the Army and understand the jobs of the combat force. As a SSO, it was attending commanders' orders and intelligence briefs, learning the linguistics of tactics and going to the range (albeit with extra coaching) that afforded me the credibility and knowledge I needed to function effectively. As a SSO, it is easy to deride the foundation courses that all officers are required to do, believing that our own job or profession has superiority. But such training has value far beyond. It creates peer groups, networks of 'go-to' people and it provides, most importantly, an understanding of the intention of commanders.

Officers wear rank and have the responsibilities and privileges that convey on them an expectation to lead. Too often we seek to exempt our SSOs from this expectation and thereby deny them the opportunity for personal growth and to develop their own leadership skills. As a 20-something year-old captain in charge of a medical team in Cambodia, I was young, naïve and—other than just over a year in uniform and six weeks at the Jungle Warfare Centre at Canungra—had little or no training in leadership.

The challenges that confronted me were those that confront all junior leaders: building the team, managing the diversity of skills and experience—along with the usual strains of providing medical support in a difficult and complex environment—and caring for individuals. The additional demands on a deployed RMO include those of professional isolation and a broad clinical responsibility, with new and exotic medical conditions to treat, the realities

of being on duty 24/7 and the inherent challenges of working and living among your patient population.

The relationship between the RMO and his/her CO is unique. Doctors are required to provide their COs with impartial advice—about matters such as alcohol and drug abuse, and sexually-transmitted disease—and to advocate for their patients. Such responsibility on young shoulders requires an RMO to develop the moral courage required to execute these responsibilities against an often intimidating rank gradient. The CO has a key responsibility to assist the RMO in this role but effort is required to build a trusting and meaningful relationship. It is interesting to note that the atrocities of Abu Ghraib may not have happened if the health staff had met their responsibilities (enshrined in the Geneva protocols) to report the mistreatment of captured soldiers.

Army is a great school and what it had most to teach me was not so much about medicine but about life, people and leadership. To have subsequently led teams and had it work; the feeling of truly knowing your people and getting the best out of them—there is no greater satisfaction. But it has taken time and patience, and application and more than one stumble along the way.

As many medical SSOs do not extend beyond their first appointment, there is a small window to seize the opportunities that time in uniform offers. Like most young doctors, my personal commitment to Army was sorely tested at times. I felt that professionally I was lagging behind my civilian peers while I was under a return-of-service obligation. But nothing could have been further from the truth. The experiences that Army offers are things that civilian counterparts could only dream of.

I continue to be amazed by what Australian soldiers can do when they have the confidence, permission and backing of their officers—and what I, in turn, have learned from them. Australian soldiers are renowned for their ingenuity and I have seen our medics in particular do amazing things—from constructing a humidicrib from nothing more than fruit boxes and fluoro lights, to delivering babies or demonstrating extraordinary compassion when confronted by a dying villager. In many ways, it is the soldiers who have been the best teachers of egalitarianism, of a ‘fair go’ and of universal compassion.

Clinical leadership on operations

Over the last two decades, Australia has had significant health assets deployed on operations. Each of these missions has underscored the importance of ‘clinical leadership’ in addition to health management. Effective leadership among health professionals is crucial for the efficient performance of any health care system and particularly in an operational setting. Clinical leadership encompasses not only technical proficiency and patient-care decisions but must also address issues of clinical teamwork, communications, resilience and effective teaching. It requires the ability to manage teams of highly trained (and often highly ranked) health professionals, who may have limited experience in military environments or with the clinical problems they will encounter.

Experienced clinical leadership is also required to inform and manage issues that are inherent in deployed military operations, such as limited access to investigational facilities, constraints in ward accommodation, high dependency nursing and intensive care, and management of

scarce resources such as blood products. Clinical leaders require resilience, empathy and a broad understanding of the operational objectives to enable them to deal with the frequent ethical complexities of health delivery in this setting.

Australia does not have the capacity to provide robust training in operational medicine. Although it is widely assumed that civilian professional competence translates into operational competence, specific clinical and military training is required to enable health specialists to adapt their clinical skills to the demands of an austere/conflict environment. Neither the benign health environments of elective surgery nor the highly resourced multidisciplinary trauma centres provide the full complement of skills required in an operational environment.

Close teamwork is recognised as one of the key variables in delivering good quality health care. Specialised health teams are frequently drawn from the Reserve and come from disparate units and sometimes Services, often without the opportunity to have operated together. Current deployments of health staff into coalition and multicultural environments also pose specific challenges and differing attitudes, particularly in relation to standards of care and limitations to treatment. It is only through robust clinical leadership that variations in treatment protocols and care matrices can be resolved and such teams can be forged, often at short notice.

Many health staff are also poorly prepared for the realities of operational medicine. It is simplistic to think that health staff are not influenced by their environment or do not have concerns about their own professional, personal or military competence or are immune to the effects of conflict. Operations are not always a positive experience. The impact of multiple severe mutilating trauma casualties, infant casualties, end-of-life decisions, fatigue, adverse medical outcomes, varying cultural values and the evidence of inhumanity can take a large personal and collective toll. Regrettably, health staff frequently consider themselves immune from any risk of psychological stress and there are deeply ingrained barriers to health staff seeking or accepting assistance.

Clinical excellence on operations not only requires well-led, technically competent providers but also an ability to synthesise the lessons learned, the provision of effective teaching and access to the research opportunities that underpin evidence-based care. This process of 'clinical governance'—the process by which patient outcomes are monitored and continuous quality improvements are made—is increasingly recognised in the civilian health system as integral to achieving the best patient outcomes and to inform the clinical advances of the future. The ADF should not be exempt the same standards, scrutiny and self-reflection required of civilian medical practice and this remains the purview of clinical leadership.

Command relationships in the clinical environment

In a regimental setting, command relationships are clear. However, command relationships within Army health are somewhat more challenging. Health is characterised by the dual pillars of 'clinical' and 'command, administration and logistics'. This is confounded, however, by issues of rank/remuneration and conflicting hierarchies, which are not encountered in other parts of Army.

Current rank systems in Defence health create friction and lack clarity and unity of command. Clinical seniority does not equate to military seniority. Junior ranked officers are frequently placed in 'command authority' relationships over senior clinicians, both in garrison and on

operations. In many cases, this situation arises because it is the junior officer who possesses the greater military and/or administrative experience. However, these relationships are confusing, create difficulties with multiple reporting lines and are open to misinterpretation by non-health personnel. I have experienced both sides of these relationships and would comment that they demand exceptional levels of maturity, grace and humility to function effectively.

By contrast, the civilian health sector is characterised by a functional 'distributive model' of leadership, where a single individual may have a leadership role in one area but not another. Multidisciplinary care is the norm and, while there remain tacit seniority or experiential gradients, there is no 'rank distinction' between senior clinicians, allied health care providers or administrators. Leadership roles are transferrable depending on the requirements of the situation.

This situation will gradually change as force structure changes in Army health provide increased leadership roles for its non-clinical GSOs, many of whom have demonstrated remarkable leadership, underpinned by a robust appreciation of clinical, as well as administrative, requirements. These changes will not, however, abrogate the requirement for clinical leadership—the decisions that dictate patient care will, and must, always remain the purview of the clinician.

Operational health planning is also an area that is challenged by the dichotomies within health structures. Few clinicians will be skilled in health administration or defence logistics. Even fewer have a robust appreciation of the issues involved with military health planning, disaster response or the provision of deployed health assets. However, it remains vital that clinicians as well as health staff officers remain engaged within planning processes. Close working relationships between medical and operations staffs, and a shared understanding of the operational picture—achieved by participation by medical staffs at operational briefings and access to real time tactical information—are pivotal to providing the best health support outcomes.

Pragmatics of Reserve command

In 2007, I assumed command of the 3rd Health Support Battalion (HSB), an integrated Regular and Reserve unit capable of providing level 3 (surgical) health capability to the Land Force as one of the 17th Combat Service Support Brigade's three deployable health capabilities. At the time, the conflicting priorities of Army, surgical practice, an academic career and a young family loomed dauntingly large. I vividly recall, on the pre-command course, feeling overwhelmed by the burden of governance briefs and audit presentations and wondering how it could possibly be achieved in the allocated 50 training days. It became evident early on that a pragmatic approach to command was required!

Time management is a challenge for all COs but particularly in the Reserve and with a command that spanned two states, with the brigade headquarters in a third. While my solutions may not work for other Reserve commanders, I rapidly realised that I needed to master 'directive control', empower my staff and accept that I didn't have to do everything or attend everything personally. Instead, I needed to ensure that I had sufficient presence, that my intent was clear and that I was always available. Despite advice otherwise, I also decided that I needed a second-in-command rather than an executive officer. This was a philosophical decision but provided clarity when I could not be there, as the second-in-command (a very competent Regular Army GSO) spoke for me and with my absolute authority.

Situational awareness is difficult to maintain as a Reserve CO. Short notice taskings, governance deadlines and crises do not align to Tuesday evening or weekend training timetables. Theft, fraud, accidents, charges and attempted suicides inevitably occur at the most inconvenient of times. For me, compartmentalising Army from the other parts of my life would not have been workable. Instead, I found that dedicated time with my ARA staff enabled me time to meet my administrative and governance requirements, do weapons checks and freed me up for the business of 'command presence' during 'Reserve time'. Arguably, physical training with my cadre staff was one of my most worthwhile time investments.

My unit's priority was to provide operational health support and training. Reserve training days provide limited opportunities to shape and influence the unit and every opportunity must be seized. Quite ruthlessly, anything that did not align with these objectives was relegated in priority.

Ten years earlier, there would have been very little chance that any member of a Reserve unit, other than specialist medical staff, would deploy overseas. By 2007, the increased tempo of operations meant members of all ranks and trades were serving in operations in East Timor, Bougainville, the Solomons, Iraq, Afghanistan and in support of national operations, such as the Aboriginal intervention. The need for operational focus had never been greater and each and every member had a very real role, whether that be in training or on deployment.

Command of a Reserve unit brings unique challenges. As with SSOs and GSOs, the Reserve and Regular Army have distinctly different cultures. However, in health—unlike, for example, Reserve infantry—Reserve personnel provide skill-sets that simply do not exist in the Regular Army. There is no attempt to 'replicate' a Regular Army structure—rather the challenges are to take highly skilled clinical individuals and develop a culture of readiness, an operational focus and to attain basic levels of military proficiency, including personal fitness, weapon proficiency and resilience.

Regular and Reserve staff bring differing attitudes, skills and experience to Army as a whole. Inevitably, differences in expectations, rank standards, remuneration and working hours can cause friction. The Reserve is unique in that members may have served in a single posting for their entire career, with entrenched views and limited experiences of the wider Army. Motivations between the Regular Army and Reserve differ, as do their family expectations, in particular to weekend training or deployments. A key challenge for a Reserve CO is to manage these cultures, each of which bring depth and strength to the organisation, provided one culture is not allowed to dominate and mutual respect is achieved.

Leadership can only grow and flourish in a supportive environment. As CO, I was fortunate to not only have brilliant staff but also a Commander and headquarters staff who were immensely supportive. Peer support was also crucial and, unlike previous COs of 3HSB, being a lieutenant colonel rather than colonel was a tremendous advantage. While few unit commanders have more senior ranking officers within their unit, peer equality made it much easier to garner valuable support from my Regular Army colleagues—particularly the two other HSB COs and the brigade headquarters lieutenant colonel-level staff officers—and I remain grateful for their advice, support and counsel.

Conclusions

Professional mastery in Army health is not just the ability to treat the casualties of conflict. Pivotal is the ability to apply medical skills honed in civilian practice to a conflict environment. Equally important is the ability of administrators, commanders and clinicians to share an understanding of their roles and responsibilities, to speak a common language and to work under a system that has clarity of command.

Army recognises leadership as 'core business'. To develop clinical leadership, young health professionals need to be instructed in the theory and practice of leadership and mentored in both military and clinical aspects. Strategies should be put in place at all levels to maximise the opportunities for clinicians to develop leadership skills, particularly the skills needed to forge small teams and to work in difficult and complex clinical environments.

I hope that SSOs of the future will be afforded the same opportunities that I have had. I feel privileged by the lessons I have learned. Now that I have moved on from Army, I realise how very fortunate I have been, as these same lessons developed during my time in uniform resonate in my civilian health practice; building teams, negotiating bureaucracies, training young specialists and the managerial and administrative skills required for committee and board positions.

In all of my roles, my task has been to support the men and women of the ADF. I believe they deserve the very best health support our society has to offer, both in the area of operations and long after their return. I am very proud to have been a part of Army's health commitment.

Colonel Neuhaus enlisted in the Regular Army in 1987 as an undergraduate medical officer. Her operational service includes RMO Force Communications Unit UNTAC, Officer Commanding Combined Health Element Bougainville and Clinical Director Uruzgan Medical Centre, Afghanistan. She was the recipient of the Deputy Chief of the ADF Reserve's prize for Best Reserve Student at the Australian Command and Staff College in 2001. She was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross for her services as CO 3rd Health Support Battalion and promoted to Colonel in 2008.

Following return to full-time civilian surgical practice and transfer to the Inactive Reserve, she has retained an active interest in Defence and veterans' health—including as Ambassador, Defence Reserves Support Council and a member of the Veterans Health Advisory Council (SA)—and is widely published on issues of strategic health.

Operations BASTILLE and FALCONER: legal support to commanders

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Wing Commander (then Squadron Leader) Duncan Blake, RAAF

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Much of what commanders do involves the management and balancing of risk. One such risk is legal risk. This goes further than considerations of individual responsibility for violations of law. Failing to comply with law—or even the perception that the law has not been followed—can undermine the success of operations. The following article discusses some of the legal challenges that were faced during Operations BASTILLE and FALCONER in 2003 and the way in which commanders at all levels were supported by legal officers. While this article has an Air Force focus, the way in which legal concerns shape planning and execution across the tactical, operational and strategic levels is applicable across the ADF.

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Introduction

The exercise of command is integrally linked with lawful authority. This review of the legal issues dealt with in the planning and execution of air combat operations in Iraq in 2003 provides useful examples of how legal support assisted commanders to achieve operationally-favourable outcomes. This review also demonstrates that legal support must be accessible—from the squadron through to the strategic level; deployed and in rear headquarters; and in the single-Service, joint and coalition environments.

Two broad and inextricably linked legal policy and process streams affected ADF combat operations in Iraq. One stream involved the ADF as a whole and the Air Force in particular, ‘operationalising’ the law. It was necessary to ensure that the application of the law, primarily the law of armed conflict, was not an academic activity but rather was integrated into a dynamic process that would serve military commanders and the civilian government within the timeframes of modern conflict. It was necessary to match legitimately high expectations regarding the levels of governance and accountability that should be applicable to the targeting process with a robust process that could deal with pre-planned, time-sensitive and immediate targeting.

The second stream involved dealing with the complex nature of coalition operations. It quickly became apparent that any ADF involvement in a conflict in Iraq would inherently require the ADF to ensure that the Australian approach to the application of the law—including issues as diverse as prisoner-of-war handling and refuelling of coalition aircraft, possibly carrying anti-personnel land mines—would work within a coalition environment. That is, ADF commanders had to be equipped and prepared to apply Australia’s legal obligations and

view of international law, while operating with forces that neither necessarily shared those obligations or those views.

ADF commanders at all levels had to remain mindful of these streams while planning and executing combat operations. It followed that ADF military lawyers, particularly from the Air Force, were required to provide ongoing support to those commanders with respect to these streams, both inside the area of operations, as well as back in Australia.

Planning the legal battlespace

In the early stages of planning for potentially highly complex operations in Iraq, commanders and planning staff had limited guidance to frame the parameters of the operation. A commander is required to fuse lawful authority (by exploring courses of action that are legally permissible) with other elements of command (such as strategy and operational art). Legal support to initial planning ensured that not only were 'impermissible' operations not pursued but, more importantly, permissible and feasible military options were left on the table.

Prior to operations in Iraq, the ADF had not executed major military operations against another state for some time. As for the Air Force, the last bomb dropped on an enemy target was in Vietnam. It took some time for planners to become attuned to the permissible scope of operations in international armed conflict. It was often the case that the lawyers were required to say 'that course of action will be lawful' when it was being (wrongly) assumed that rules of engagement or other orders would be constrained by 'peacetime' law.

During the planning phase, senior commanders and staff at the strategic level, with the assistance of their military lawyers, quickly understood that 'interoperability' with the US meant much more than just the ability to share logistics support and communicate. Whereas Australia is a party to *Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949*, the US is not. This meant Australia's legal obligations—and particularly its legal obligations when undertaking targeting—would be different. Also, it became apparent during planning discussions that Australia and the US might have different political and legal rationales for operations against Iraq. This was likely to further exacerbate differences in rules of engagement.

The critical role of legal support during the planning stage was to identify the differences between the potential coalition partners. What forces to deploy, what level of command and control to grant to coalition commanders and even the structure, role and duties of Australia's own deployed commanders were influenced by these legal issues. If Australia could not simply 'accept' a target nomination from the US, it would be necessary to deploy an Australian means for target validation. Moreover, in a coalition context, 'command' is more complex largely because of the different sources and content of lawful authority for military activities. It would be necessary to isolate and attribute responsibility for the various elements of a targeting decision or, as discussed below, 'who owns the bomb?'

Who 'owns' the bomb?

As planning developed, and staff at Headquarters Air Command and 81 Wing became involved, an issue that had been unresolved for many years took on a renewed focus. Commanders became particularly concerned with the question colloquially phrased as 'who owns the bomb'? In other words, who is responsible for a targeting decision and its consequences? This

question had been doing the rounds for many years but with insufficient impetus to get it resolved. Planning for potential operations in Iraq provided that impetus.

The issue of 'who owned the bomb' had two main components. At the tactical level, for the pilot the issue was whether the pilot had to undertake, or at least validate, the assessment of the target as lawful, the assessment of expected collateral damage, the assessment that collateral damage would be lawful and compliance with any other relevant rules of engagement (ROE). Alternatively, could the aircrew rely on others to perform these tasks, such as a joint terminal air controller or the coalition commander who authorised the Air Tasking Order (ATO)?

At the strategic level, the concern was whether any of those functions could be performed by coalition partners and, if a target was lawful, were there any unique national interest considerations that would have to be considered. If a target was attacked at the request of US forces on the ground, which country's ROE would apply? The legal 'left and right of arc' in these scenarios became an important consideration. Looking back with the benefit of seven-plus years of intense operations, it is apparent that prior to 2002 even the importance of asking the question was not generally, let alone universally, well understood.

The issue of legal responsibility for elements of targeting decisions was resolved in early 2003 in a number of ways. First, a 'law of armed conflict' six-step targeting process was developed [this process has subsequently been incorporated into ADF doctrine]. This six-step process identified the key legal steps in the targeting process. From there, it was a simpler matter to determine who could perform one or more of the steps in a targeting scenario, which steps could be performed by a coalition partner and which steps were uniquely national responsibilities.

The second way the issue was resolved was through the legal contribution to the draft CDF 'Targeting Directive'. Prior to 2003, the usual documents issued by CDF to control operations were the ROE. Given the very real potential for aerial strike operations and naval gunfire support, the strategic level planning staff determined that a targeting directive would also be required for operations against Iraq. Although a routine element of UK operations, the concept of a targeting directive was not in ADF doctrine at the time.

However, as work on the six-step targeting process advanced, the two activities became mutually reinforcing. With ADF legal and intelligence officers involved in the work-up of the US targeting policies and procedures, it became more apparent what types of issues and authorities would need to be addressed in the Australian targeting directive. As the targeting directive started to take shape, it became clearer what matters need not be addressed (that is, what assumptions could be made) in the six-step targeting process.

Once developed, the six-step targeting process needed to be adopted and explained. At the strategic level, it was incorporated into the targeting directive. At the tactical level, the 81 Wing legal officer and senior aircrew at the Wing and squadrons had been closely engaged throughout the development of the six-step process. Therefore, incorporation into mission planning and execution was intuitive and straightforward—as it should be.

The legal officers at the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) worked together with the intelligence officers and senior aircrew to develop a 'knee-pad' card that brought together the multiple requirements from the targeting directive, ROE and special instructions, weapon-effects data and guidance on how to estimate distances on the ground based on altitude and field-of-view in one of the F/A-18's cockpit displays. The work in the operational chain of

command to realise strategic ends through tactical means is a perfect example of centralised control and decentralised execution.

The specific role of the military lawyers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels

The ROE and the CDF Targeting Directive were developed concurrently with the work above. Importantly, in late 2002, Australian and UK military lawyers participated in two US ROE development meetings. This provided a unique and invaluable opportunity for the ADF to understand US ROE thinking, influence US ROE development and inform development of Australian ROE. Building on this unique insight into US and UK ROE thinking, legal support at the strategic level was instrumental in continuing to explore the likely legal basis and policy limits for upcoming operations and, therefore, the potential scope of the ROE.

Significantly at this stage, legal staff from the Wing up to Strategic Operations Division were all involved in proposing and reviewing draft ROE. Looking ahead, what this meant in due course was that all legal staff had a thorough understanding of how the final ROE authorisation came to be. This proved immensely helpful when briefing or interpreting the ROE during operations.

Strategic-level military lawyers had the important duty of explaining military operational concepts to the civilian legal staff at the Attorney General's Department (AGD) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), as well as officials from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Most importantly, the military lawyers at the strategic level were tasked with achieving the requisite degree of consensus on a government-wide basis with respect to the interpretation and application of Australia's principal legal obligations relevant to targeting—particularly under Additional Protocol I. That is, it was important that the ADF's approach to targeting, from a legal perspective, was understood and endorsed by the civilian government's principle legal advisers on international law matters within the AGD and DFAT.

Essentially, for the military lawyer at the strategic level, these processes became an ongoing sequence of briefing and rebriefing of commanders, senior military staff and officials, as well as civilian lawyers, all with the goal of identifying relevant issues, such as the proper nature and scope of the term 'military objective', and then settling an Australian view of the law. The military lawyers at the strategic level were required to begin the process of 'operationalising' the results of such deliberations for subsequent issue by CDF downwards through the chain of command. One aim of this process was to ensure that deployed commanders and their forces, not only had the benefit of clear guidance on the applicable law but that the responsibility for discerning the law on difficult issues was properly borne by the strategic level (rather than by default, left with operational and tactical level commanders and their lawyers to determine in time constrained circumstances).

The military lawyer at the operational level had multiple roles. The most important of these roles was as key legal adviser to the Australian National Commander on matters relating to that commander's responsibility to ensure that Australian views on the application of the laws of armed conflict were taken into account by the other coalition partners, particularly in the area of targeting. With 24-hour access to on-the-spot legal and intelligence support and a seat at the daily Combined Targeting Coordination Board, various levels of targeting authority were delegated to the Australian National Commander who held the national 'red card'.

In what was a critical example of where timely legal advice ensured Australia's national interests were protected, the Australian National Commander, relying on the advice of his military lawyer, played the 'red card' to opt out of a number of US-approved targets. Moreover, consistent with the role of the operational level as the link, if not filter, between the strategic and tactical levels, the deployed lawyer with the Australian National Commander was ideally positioned in the role of gatekeeper. That is, the military lawyer at the operational level coordinated all in-theatre legal queries from the air, maritime and special operations task groups and either addressed those issues directly or coordinated a response from the strategic level. Importantly, this ensured that all deployed legal elements had one point of contact for all in-theatre legal requests and that all deployed legal officers were receiving the same legal advice.

The tactical level ADF military lawyer also had a difficult task. It is a perennial challenge for command that the strategic level accepts certain risks in order to achieve strategic ends, risks that are felt at the tactical level. This acceptance of risk is inherent in the ROE, particularly any restrictions in the ROE. Legal staff must work closely and sensitively with tactical commanders to explain and implement ROE among those who execute the missions in the face of the enemy.

As the date for likely combat operations approached, the type of legal support required by commanders expanded. At the strategic level, there was a need to explain the legal issues associated with the types of decisions that would be required—for example, strike approval for sensitive targets and determinations whether to proceed with an attack where the expected collateral damage exceeded pre-determined thresholds. At the operational level in the CAOC, significant time was spent reviewing target folders.

During operations, the deliberate targeting process involves each target being reviewed by a team comprising an intelligence officer, an imagery analyst and a legal officer prior to a commander determining the operational priority and legal validity of the proposed target. As targets were likely to be proposed by coalition partners, a major effort was undertaken to review as many target folders as possible prior to the commencement of operations. While the target folders would be reviewed again prior to inclusion on an ATO, this initial review allowed the subsequent process to be significantly quicker and thereby not cause a delay in the ATO cycle.

At the tactical level, a major effort was now underway to accustom the mission planners and aircrew to the 'likely' ROE. One of the truisms of operations is that final approval of ROE will occur well after the tactical operators have the opportunity to train with the ROE. This meant delivering briefs, developing scenarios and reviewing special instructions based on 'best-guess' ROE. Again, the fact that the Wing legal officer was intimately involved in the ongoing development of the ROE greatly assisted in work-up training, mission rehearsal etc.

The lawyers at the tactical level were also in position to assist with what might be termed 'post-mission' governance. That is, ensuring that there would be appropriate measures in place to deal with any missions that could raise legal issues. Such measures would need to be able to inform the command chain, while at the same time preserve the rights of individual members. The presence of deployed legal officers meant that when questions of lawfulness, including targeting activities, were raised in the media during the course of the operation, the actual legal position could be explained to the ADF members most readily affected.

Once operations commenced, the tactical legal officer anticipated legal issues that might arise on a particular mission, refreshed aircrew on the relevant ROE and their application in the circumstances, and provided updated legal briefings in light of the evolving tactical situation. For the legal staff at the operational level, deliberate target validation continued but being prepared to support the time-sensitive targeting process took on a high importance. As it turned out, the first bomb dropped during the campaign (the first since the Vietnam conflict) was a result of the time-sensitive targeting process. The strategic level legal officers increasingly focused on ensuring that further strategic guidance was provided on legal issues that emerged during the course of operations and, where necessary, changes to existing guidance and direction were made to ensure that relevance was maintained.

As an operation is not static, neither are the ROE. At one stage, the tactical and operational level planners and commanders identified a need to expand a particular target set. From the tactical level providing data, the operational level translating this into a ROE request, the forward national headquarters endorsing the request after considering national interests and interoperability issues, to the strategic legal level identifying the required intelligence input and type of intelligence product that was required, to issue of an ROE amendment took about 24 hours.

In addition, the need to provide legal support to senior military commanders prior to press releases and media conferences took on a higher-than-usual prominence. Explaining Australia's position concisely on lawful targets, legally and operationally permitted collateral damage, and weapons like anti-personnel land-mines and cluster munitions, without breaching operational security, requires legal support. Also, measures were taken to ensure that ADF personnel serving/embedded with coalition forces were aware of any differences between their legal obligations and those of their host nation's forces.

Importantly, it should be kept in mind what legal officers did not do. In a newspaper article discussing Australia's involvement in the 2003 Iraq conflict, it was noted that Australia had 'sent about six military lawyers to the Gulf to advise troops and F/A-18 Hornet pilots on what they can attack'. This was followed two paragraphs later by the comment: 'Legal advisers had to decide if the military advantage gained by a strike justified the civilian loss of life'. That is incorrect. The lawyers assisted the commander with advice but most certainly did not have responsibility for making what is a command decision.

Finally, critical to the process of providing legal support to commanders in Iraq was teamwork. This was not only teamwork between the lawyers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels but also with other specialisations, with the air component and wider Defence organisation. For instance, the application of the laws of armed conflict to the targeting process regularly required military lawyers to identify the relevant characteristics of the potential target (for instance, why is it considered a military objective?). Consequently, at all levels, military lawyers relied on the high levels of cooperation and professional skills of the intelligence officers, who quickly grasped the mutually supporting roles that each would play during operations.

Conclusion

By having legal support at all levels, the operation against Iraq in 2003 provides a good case study in how active management of legal aspects can produce favourable results for commanders. Rather than reacting to legal problems, commanders—if not the wider civilian government—were in a position to influence the situation to enable maximum flexibility to execute operations. While only one aspect of command, ‘lawful authority’ is integral to the exercise of command, the preparation for and conduct of Operations BASTILLE and FALCONER demonstrates—perhaps better than any other recent operations—that effective command relies heavily on the lawful authority to conduct military activities being clear, manifest and understood all the way from the pilot sitting in the cockpit over enemy territory through to CDF when advising Government and issuing orders.

Air Commodore Paul Cronan, AM joined the RAAF in 1985 and has held a variety of legal officer postings at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, as well as an exchange with the US Air Force’s Judge Advocate General’s Department in the Pentagon. He deployed to the Middle East as the Chief Legal Officer, Australian National Headquarters – MEAO (2002-03); and Chief, International Law/Deputy Staff Judge Advocate – HQ MNF-I (2006). He has a Bachelor of Laws and a Masters in International Law. In 2008-09, he contributed as a Government expert to the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2010).

Group Captain Chris Hanna joined the RAAF in 1990 and has served in a number of legal officer postings with an operations law focus, including at Strategic Operations Division within Australian Defence Headquarters, Headquarters Air Command and on exchange with the US Air Force in the Pentagon. He has participated in operational deployments to Kuwait and Iraq. He is currently the Director Legal at Headquarters Joint Operations Command. He holds a Masters of International Law and a Masters of Arts (Strategic Studies).

Wing Commander Duncan Blake first served as an Army Reserve infantry officer from 1993 to 1995. He then transferred to the permanent RAAF and has been posted as a Legal Officer to 82 Wing, 322 Combat Support Wing and 81 Wing. He also served as a military prosecutor before completing Australian Command and Staff Course in 2007. He is now Deputy Director of Operations and International Law in Canberra, although he is currently out-posted to McGill University, Montreal, to study Space Law. He has served twice in the Middle East: first in 2003 in the Air Combat Wing and then in 2009 in Headquarters Joint Task Force 633.

Wing Commander Ian Henderson joined the RAAF in 1990 and has served in a variety of legal officer postings at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, including as the Director Military Law Centre and Deputy Director Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law. He served in the Combined Air Operations Centre in 2003 and is currently on loan as a Law of Armed Conflict, International and Maritime Law advisor at US Central Command. He has a Bachelor of Science, Bachelor of Laws, Master of Laws and a Doctor of Philosophy. Publications include ‘The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol I (2009)’.

Wing Commander Pat Keane joined the RAAF in 1995 as an intelligence officer and served at the Air Intelligence Centre. After transferring to legal specialisation, he served with 92 Wing, 41 Wing and as a military prosecutor. He has served on exchange with Headquarters US Air Force in Operations and International Law Division. He is currently posted as Staff Officer Legal at Air Force Headquarters and has had active service in Iraq, Afghanistan and at the Combined Air Operations Centre in Operation FALCONER.

‘Squeezing the jellyfish’ – reflections on command

Brigadier Roger Noble, DSC, CSC, Australian Army

Somebody smart once said to me ‘command is like a jellyfish; the harder you squeeze the more it comes out between your fingers’. I was probably a captain or lieutenant when I first heard this and had far better things to do than reflect deeply on bizarre nautical metaphors. As a battle group commander in Iraq, one giant beach *sans* jellyfish, I finally got it.

My short anecdote relates to explaining why command is actually like a jellyfish and why squeezing it hard doesn’t do you or anyone much good. In professional parlance, this equates to why—in the 24/7 email age—mission command still rules.

A jellyfish is defined as ‘any marine medusoid coelenterate ... having a gelatinous umbrella-shaped body with trailing tentacles’. Most Australians know them as a living wobbly mass of opaque blubber, typically seen washed up on beaches. Before they end their days on the beach, they swim around, live, hunt, eat and are mysterious contributors to the broader ecosystem. When you squeeze them, they leak out between your fingers and, the harder you squeeze, the more the leaking occurs.

At first glance, the contemporary battle group doesn’t much look like a jellyfish. But when you look more closely, you see that—just like the jellyfish—it is a living thing, whose workings and actions are highly complex, often opaque and are easily as equally mysterious. Some people believe that effectively dealing with such a beast is just a matter of giving orders and then more orders, and then more detailed clarification as necessary—this is the ‘squeezing hand of control’. My view is that while detailed direction is often critical, it is not the key to control or success and, like squeezing the jellyfish, it can lead to a messy and frustrating outcome for all involved. But enough of the jellyfish metaphor.

The contemporary tactical force operates in complex, uncertain and unpredictable space. Sure, everyone knows that. But do they think about what it really means? When you experience it first hand, you are continually amazed at the bizarre circumstances the real world throws at you—anything from bombs to mass graves, nuclear waste to small town angst—often all in a day.

The results achieved by any organisation are the product of multiple decisions and actions made by people confronting their operational environment—all of the people, top to bottom. Nobody controls the outcome because nobody controls all the variables and inputs, not by half. The notion that you can even predict outcomes is highly questionable and, in practice, is close to fanciful. I, therefore, think the first and critical step for the contemporary commander is to squarely face this reality and design a comprehensive organisational response to it, focused on the particular humans inside his or her organisation.

To exercise command and exert control requires a sophisticated approach to the people, the problem and the context of which clear and detailed direction is only one and, maybe not the most important, part. Detailed direction has a habit of getting dated fast. What is required is a control framework around people that provides the freedom of action, the resources and the guidance that enables them to act and seize fleeting opportunities. In my experience, this framework is built on a number of key ideas.

Understanding the specific individuals is the key and this requires constant face-to-face dialogue and interaction. As good as video conferencing is, or as effective as email can be, it just don't cut it for this mission. This requires personal risk taking. It requires the commander to accept that he or she may occasionally be caught out and that they may actually meet people below them who are better informed or who are smarter or who just don't agree. It happens—quite a bit actually.

The aim must be to develop a clear and common understanding of how individuals think and react and to share and constantly update that understanding. It is not something done once but needs to be nurtured, updated and developed. If you know how others think and respond, you are 'networked' in a way that surpasses any amount of technical gadgetry. The value of this hits home when things go bad and you find the first and most important question is always, 'who is out there'? And next, 'what would that particular individual need from me'?

The binding organisational glue must be 'intent' supported by 'trust'—not a really long and detailed set of rules. The rules-based approach works maybe as long as you have a complete and robust set of rules for all possible circumstances (and providing everyone remembers them). But it will come instantly a cropper in the face of the unanticipated situation for which no rule has yet been designed and promulgated. This happens—and more than some might think. In the end, 'why we are doing what we are doing' and 'what we are seeking to achieve' must be the light in the darkness—and it is relevant to the lowest level, where often the key decisions are actually made.

Soldiers have to be able to understand and decide when not to do what they have been told to do because they and they alone know the situation has changed and that there is now a better or different way. This takes courage, initiative and teamwork and will only be done if they have confidence that they can and are expected to think and make their own decisions. Two instances live in my mind when soldiers did not shoot people they were empowered and expected to shoot because of the situation in which they encountered those adversaries—and they were dead right in a mission critical way on both counts.

No written order or rule of engagement serial or data transmission from a tired staff officer was the decisive element in those decisions. Rather, it was the belief they had the freedom of action and personal responsibility to make a decision within boundaries. This was built on a comprehensive understanding of intent and the brains and skills to interpret that intent under pressure. It requires trust between all involved, which is only possible when people know each other well

Stemming from the importance of intent and trust is the need to define and discuss the concept of a mistake. It sounds simple but I am not certain people give it the thought it deserves. In our business, it is certainly not as simple as something that goes wrong. We know this because we do not and cannot control the environment. People can do everything right and lose.

I would contend that an 'unacceptable' mistake is when the intent is breached or not systematically considered. When intent is broken, trust is lost—this is the game breaker. When the intent is logically pursued but the results are less than stellar or outcomes are poor, then this is the time for analysis that may or may not lead to retraining and education or some other remedial action. There is great danger in thinking that when something goes bad, a mistake has been made and someone must pay. Sometimes that is very true but very often it isn't.

The last element of the framework is what you could call the physical elements of the framework. These familiar elements include battle rhythm and procedure, a functioning discipline system, a command and control-enabled communications network, formal orders, behavioural and policy rules, standard operating procedures and drills, and clear decision making authorities. There is no shortage of these things in most operational areas. The trick is to ensure they are coherent, logical and constantly reviewed.

My personal opinion is that only have as much as is needed—however much that may be. Many modern orders are thicker than personal combat armour. We need to make sure that each word and rule counts and matters. In my opinion, the coherency and precision of the physical elements of the framework are critical to success. But without trust, intent and a shared vision, the physical elements alone will not pull you through the unexpected and the unpredictable.

To return to ‘the command as jellyfish metaphor’. Command really is a bit like a jellyfish. Rather than squeeze and push it, tailor-make it a glass jar, give it water, feed it, talk to it, watch it closely and let it do its mysterious thing.

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Reflections on surface combatant command

Commander Justin Jones, RAN

In the ADF, seven 'fundamental inputs to capability' are recognised. Command at sea affirmed for me that there are six inputs to capability. There is only one 'fundamental' input to capability, other than a ship, and that is people.

I assumed command of HMAS *Newcastle* in the first months of the New Generation Navy (NGN) program, prior to its official launch in April 2009. The primary aim of NGN has been described as a 'course correction' to Navy's future direction, to ensure that Navy is better able to operate in the joint environment and is ready to resource the capabilities of the future fleet, which is now only one posting cycle away.

Notwithstanding this low key description of NGN, it is the most important organisational change that has occurred in the last two decades. NGN has tackled head-on the difficult and potentially complex challenge of cultural change. The nature of that cultural change has been underpinned by a wholesale renewal of leadership training and development in the Navy. The aspirations of NGN provided fertile ground for a new commanding officer.

The terms 'command' and 'leadership' mean different things to different people. Command is a legal principle pertaining to the authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Leadership is most often associated with the ability to inspire, motivate and stimulate others to achieve goals. Communication, empowerment and team building are core principles of leadership. Experience throughout my career has led me to believe that leadership excellence exists at all levels in a ship, from seaman to commander. That is, leadership is not rank dependent. In framing my command philosophy, I challenged all members of HMAS *Newcastle* to display leadership excellence.

Command philosophy

The command philosophy I employed was based on three tenets: professionalism, pragmatism and pastoral care. Professionalism refers to due diligence, pride and with adherence to the Navy values and signature behaviours. Professional people understand that perfection will not be achieved 100 per cent of the time but will strive to do the best that is possible. Pragmatism, simply put, means the application of common sense. This does not absolve people in any way from acting in accordance with directives, orders, regulations and accepted traditions of naval service. However, in making decisions, I expected superiors to consider carefully all contributing factors in order to determine the best outcome for individuals, the ship and the Navy. With thought, all three can be achieved. Where possible, regulations and instructions were always to be interpreted positively, rather than negatively, or in favour of an individual rather than to the detriment of an individual.

The notion of pastoral care places emphasis on the finest people management system in any industry. The Navy's 'divisional system' has its origin in the Royal Navy of the age of sail and has served Navy people well for over 100 years. Used properly, it is an outstanding tool. Used poorly, it results in yet more separation from service. I expected that at the end of every day,

divisional staff and supervisors asked themselves ‘what did I do for my people today?’ If the answer was nothing, not even a greeting, chat or provision of feedback, then I considered this to be poor leadership. With this command philosophy established, the senior leadership team in the ship set about introducing a number of initiatives.

Initiatives

An ‘expectation concord’ was established between myself and the ship’s company. The intent of the concord was to set some basic expectations of me and of the ship’s company that could be assessed on a quarterly basis. This was not designed to be construed as an ‘us and them’ policy—a ship’s company is one team. Moreover, I was required to command and lead, and all of us to perform, within the context of our place of work being a ship of war, subject to Government direction and the expectations of the Australian public.

The concord was one method among many by which we were able to measure and assess *Newcastle’s* performance as a team. In introducing an internal assessment process, I had little doubt that we would all perceive performance to be ‘red’ at times. Of more importance to me was that we reflected on our performance and that people took the time to provide constructive, thoughtful and honest feedback when called for. This we achieved by scheduling rank-based workshops following each quarterly assessment.

By separating out the rank groups, I was able to engage more closely with the ship’s company and receive candid feedback from our people on whole-of-ship issues. Following on from whole-of-ship internal assessment, I invited key officers and all chief petty officers to provide me with 360 degree feedback via a normal ‘Naval Officer’s Performance Appraisal’ report. I found the feedback to be thoughtful, constructive and particularly useful in refining my leadership style.

A senior and middle leadership group (SMLG) meeting was introduced. This fortnightly meeting comprised of myself, heads of department, operations officer, navigating officer, ship’s warrant officer, departmental regulators, petty officers’ mess representative, clinical manager, the junior sailors’ mess president and leading hands of the junior sailors’ mess decks. This rapidly became my primary internal management medium. The rules of the SMLG were ‘closed doors and Chatham House rules for speakers other than the commanding officer’. When I spoke and gave my direction at the end of the meeting, everything that I said was to be passed throughout the ship.

As alluded to above, we appointed a junior sailors’ mess president and vice president. Every other rank-based mess in the Navy has a president. Why shouldn’t junior sailors? The appointment was actually a response to some frustrating issues occurring in the junior sailors’ mess. By delegating and empowering downwards, the junior sailors realised ownership. Their ability to solve issues before they became problems was a testament to the success of the concept.

I formed a health, welfare and resilience committee drawn from a cross section of ranks and capitalising on known tertiary qualifications from among the junior sailors. The intention was to promulgate a plan to inspire people to increase their fitness, eat better food (both ship-provided and discretionary from the canteen) and to build mental resiliency.

Internal recognition was reinvigorated through the 'sailor of the quarter' and 'sailor of the year' (SOTY) awards. I elected to utilise the Commanding Officer's fund to support these awards. A suitably impressive trophy was procured and the SOTY award, named the McNaughton Cup in honour of the Ship's Lady, Mrs Margaret McNaughton, AM. She was only too happy for this to occur and was an active participant in the award, adding to the strong sense of community shared between the ship, its people, the Ship's Lady and the wider City of Newcastle community. Importantly, no officers were involved in the selection committee for these awards. Senior sailors were empowered to make the selection, the committee being chaired by the ship's warrant officer.

With these bedrock initiatives embedded, senior leadership in the ship was able to shift the ship's modus operandi to a philosophy of 'people first'. I am certain that we did not always get this right. However, as an aspiration I was keen to reverse the oft normal state of affairs where a singular focus on performance and the attainment of perfection eventually clouds the management of people, resulting in dissatisfaction and higher separation rates. There was something of an experiment in this aspiration. The hypothesis was 'get people matters right, within the bounds of the mission, and performance will follow naturally'.

Our people are our best recruiters. As an organisation, Navy has become better at recognising this and, more importantly, living it. If we're happy to allow our sailors to show people around the ship, then we should be happy for our sailors to appear on camera or in print, where the potential recruiting audience is much larger. In *Newcastle*, our strategy was to have the ship's company intimately involved in media. I invited their trust by giving some guidance, some issues or topics to steer clear of and then letting them get on with it. Passion speaks for itself and leaped across television screens and newspapers up and down the east coast of Australia throughout 2009. It may not always come across as slick, sharp and professional but it is, ultimately, the very human face of our people.

Community service and charity has an important role to play in the development of resilience and a sense of purpose in individuals. Holistically, service enhances our sense of community and nurtures team building. Individually, community service and charity work lends itself readily to the development of resilience and the recognition that there it is through others that we realise our strengths. *Newcastle* is fortunate to have a close relationship not only with its namesake city but, even more so, with its adopted charity, The Hunter Orthopaedic School. On a ship visit to Newcastle in August 2009, we didn't adopt the standard approach of a working party of some dozen or so people to visit the school. We opened up the volunteer list to anyone onboard that had a bona fide interest in assisting disadvantaged children. That day, we conveyed 85 members of the ship's company to the school. These types of activities can achieve the same level of teamwork and cohesion as a day or two conducting combat survivability training.

Performance

I have focused thus far on the soft aspects of command and leadership. What about performance and mission accomplishment? *Newcastle* did not deploy operationally throughout my command. However, our challenge throughout 2009 was to complete the trials process for the upgraded FFG project. We mopped up many of the trials not completed by the preceding three upgraded FFGs and set the scene for future operational testing and evaluation. In 2010,

Newcastle conducted a unit readiness workup and sailed on a four-month deployment to Guam, Japan, Canada and Hawaii. The deployment covered diplomacy, constabulary operations and high-end warfighting training. At RIMPAC 10, *Newcastle* successfully engaged an air target with a SM-2 missile. After months of preparation and testing, this was the first such firing for the Navy.

The performance of the ship's company was acknowledged in the 2009 Fleet Awards with the award of the Duke of Gloucester Cup for overall efficiency, Spada Shield for the surface combatant foremost in operations and the Australia Cup for marine engineering excellence. In the 2010 Fleet Awards, the ship was awarded the Wormald Shield for combat survivability. During the unit readiness workup in 2010, the ship's company achieved most of the required competencies within three weeks. A normal workup takes five weeks. Challenged by difficult circumstances arising from defects, and the nuances of a new combat system and its integrated logistics, the operations sailors were able to achieve the required warfare competencies within the five-week time frame prior to deploying. The words of Commodore Training perhaps best sum up the ship's company's performance:

Strong leadership across all levels informs a well motivated and professional ship's company, characterised by a firmly embedded learning culture. *Newcastle's* ship's company present as a strong team, proud of their ship and with a drive to succeed. I have been most impressed with the team. *Newcastle* has done extremely well to meet the twin challenges of a reduced unit readiness timeline and significant material defects and still achieve a significant number of unit readiness competencies. Much of this progress can be credited to a ship's company whose unflagging enthusiasm, commitment and determination to succeed are inspirational.

Failures

It is easy to look back on command through rose-coloured glasses. However, I have spent much time reflecting on what was done well and what was not. Did we make too much of consultation and collaboration, to the detriment of clearly defined direction? I don't believe so. However, I was aware that a few of our older, more experienced generation are so used to autocracy that being asked to comment, contribute, participate and make decisions themselves is a difficult proposition. In promoting a consultative style, did I unwittingly diminish the power of junior officers and senior sailors? Possibly, but my own experiences suggest that consultation empowers people and provides a sense of ownership in decisions. Moreover, there is a saying from Thucydides, 'of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most'. The grand plans for health, welfare and resilience never progressed as I had envisioned and that is something that I wish I had followed through with more rigour. No doubt there are other areas where we could have done better.

Conclusion

There will always be room for reflection on what was done well and what was not. A range of measures of HMAS *Newcastle*'s performance in 2009-10—internal and external, quantitative and qualitative—tend to support the hypothesis of 'get people right and performance will follow'. Our people are the fundamental input to capability. People give ships personality and character, without which they are just hulls of steel. People make memories, which become history and live on as sea stories or via traditions. People put the ability into capability. People make shipmates, who complement each other's strengths, account for each other's limitations and work together in ways that produce outstanding results. We ignore these inherently good qualities of our people at our own peril.

Commander Justin Jones, RAN is a Principal Warfare Officer with specialisations in Surface Warfare and Advanced Navigation. He holds a Master of Management Studies (Leadership) and a Master of Arts (Strategy and Policy). He is the recipient of the inaugural Admiral Viscount Horatio Nelson KB Trafalgar Bicentennial Sword of Excellence for leadership in 2006. Commander Jones commanded HMAS Newcastle from December 2008 to July 2010. He spent a short period as Navy Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney before taking up his current position as Deputy Director Navy Experimentation within Navy Strategic Command.

Operation CATALYST: the Australian medical detachment Balad – 2004-05

Group Captain (then Wing Commander) Michael Paterson, DSM, RAAF

Towards the middle of 2004, a health option was considered as part of the ADF contribution to coalition operations in Iraq. The concept was to embed a small specialist team into a Role 3 coalition health facility. After negotiation, Australia committed to this option. An Australian medical detachment (designated 633.1.10) was accordingly embedded within the 332nd Expeditionary Medical Group Hospital (EMDG), a US Air Force (USAF) theatre hospital, situated in Balad, 80 kilometres north of Baghdad in the Sunni triangle.

The base at Balad was the site of the former Iraq Air Force University and acted as a main logistics base (LSA Anaconda), as well as supporting offensive flying operations. The facility was one of four in the country at the time. There was a British facility in Basra, a facility for detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and a US Army facility in Baghdad. The Balad and Baghdad facilities were the largest, with subtle differences in surgical capability. Another key difference from a force protection perspective was that the Balad facility was substantially housed in tentage, whereas the Baghdad facility operated from an existing hard-standing hospital facility. These units operated in concert to receive casualties from across Iraq with surgical speciality, bed capacity and proximity to the battle lines being the main arbiter in casualty flow.

For the USAF, the deployment of the theatre hospital was the first for this war. The embedding of the Australian contingent was also something that had only been done once before, during the first Gulf War. In that instance, specialist medical teams were embedded within the Role 3 capability of USNS *Comfort*, a 1000-bed hospital ship, as part of ADF Operation DAMASK. The Balad deployment was a different circumstance, being the first land-based contribution to a sizeable Role 3 in combat.

As it turned out, the ADF contribution to Balad was to last three rotations from September 2004 to December 2005. The initial plan was to place one rotation and assess the ongoing commitment. Air Force was given the lead in establishing the first contingent but it is important to note that the contingents were tri-Service in composition. This is attributable to the specialist skill sets required and the heavy reliance on the Reserve for those skill sets. The tri-Service nature of the contingents was a strength and consistent with many sustained deployments involving Role 2 and above health effect.

At the time, I was the Commanding Officer of 1 Expeditionary Health Squadron. So it made sense to task someone like me with leading the initial deployment into this environment. It was a natural extension of my 'day job'. In late August 2004, I passed temporary command to my Executive Officer and 'force prepped' with a small advance party. The preliminary briefing was generic and little was said or known about Balad during the briefings we received in that forum.

One of the features of this deployment was that the detachment did not have the opportunity to 'force prep' as a collective. There were a couple of reasons for this but the most relevant was that although the deployment was of six month duration, specialist reserve members

were to rotate every three months. Otherwise, the impact on their private employment would have been too great. As it was, three months was an exceptionally generous contribution. So when the advance party left, the selection for the second group of specialists had not been confirmed. I met the majority of the rotation as they walked down the ramp on arrival in Balad at various times over the next several months. Although this was not ideal, as it turned out that wasn't an issue.

Our reception in Balad, via Kuwait and a briefing in Baghdad, was warm. As the ramp fell, I was greeted by the commander and deputy commander of the 332ND EMDG hospital and also the Australian air traffic control flight commander. The small RAAF Air Traffic Control (ATC) contingent had been operating at Balad for nearly two months. This and subsequent teams of ATC were to prove exceptional companions over the months ahead, sharing the same force protection issues and also the vagaries of being a very small cohort of Aussies on a base with 25,000 US servicemen and -women. Although the medical detachment was subsequently recognised for its work, I saw the ATC as also doing exceptional work during our time there. The warm reception that afternoon also extended to our first encounter with indirect fire onto the base, which was to become a very regular feature of life in Balad for all of us.

As the advance party arrived, the USAF was preparing to conduct a relief in place of the Role 3 hospital subsequently designated the 332nd EMDG hospital. The US Army had been operating the facility since the occupation of the base and it was time for them to be relieved. They were very obviously tired after sustained casualties over a long period of time. Their physical and mental exhaustion was ominous.

Although the Joint Task Force had done much planning around the practical aspects of lodging the detachment in Balad and with the theatre hospital, there was a deliberate intent to allow the officer-in-charge of the detachment and the commander of the hospital to settle the practical aspects of embedding the Australian personnel. My riding instructions were simple; make it meaningful without crossing any professional boundaries or creating tension with the USAF.

Accordingly, Colonel Greg Wickham and I had a meeting within the first days of arriving to settle this. The Australian contingent was, generally speaking, very experienced clinically and the collective had strong operational experience. Even though some individuals were deploying for the first time, for some it was the ninth deployment. My intent was to promote the use of the Australian clinical specialists into meaningful roles that recognised their clinical seniority and to embed as fully as possible. Colonel Wickham was courteous, astute and decisive and we emerged from the meeting with a staffing model that was to serve well over subsequent months. Colonel Wickham agreed that clinical experience and not nationality would be a key attribute in determining who should perform lead clinical leadership roles.

Such was the experience of the detachment members that several filled positions as department heads during their tour. Examples include roles as the clinical director of the intensive care unit and the senior nurse in the intensive care unit. The Australian orthopaedic and neurosurgeons also led their particular disciplines during various parts of the deployment. This was a thoroughly integrated model and really met the Australian Government's intent of providing a meaningful contribution within this coalition facility. For their part, the ADF personnel selected for these roles performed superbly, as I knew they would, justifying Greg Wickham's faith in them and me. During the many times when multiple resuscitations were

taking place and people were wearing protective masks and surgical tops, the teams were so integrated that the only way I could distinguish Aussies in the sea of frenetic activity was to look for their distinctively-patterned trousers in the crowd. Team cohesion was excellent, as were patient outcomes.

The hospital treated casualties of all types and sides; put simply, whatever came was treated initially and sorted later. Patients generally came via helicopter onto the 4-berth helipad directly beside the hospital. It was not uncommon to have several land simultaneously. Ages ranged from newborn (literally born within the facility) to the elderly and anything in between. Coalition forces, Iraqi forces, civilian population and detainees; all received the same care. The vast majority of those treated were US, coalition and Iraqi forces. Many of the US and coalition forces were stabilised and evacuated relatively rapidly, mostly to Landstuhl in Germany via C-17 aeromedical evacuation. Had this not happened, the hospital would have quickly become inundated and unable to receive more casualties. This would have further impacted smaller facilities up the line from us. The Iraqi patients stayed much longer.

During the tenure of the first and subsequent rotations of the detachment, there were regular mass casualty events. Blast, penetrating and burns injuries resulting from improvised explosive devices (IEDs)/vehicle-borne IEDs were the commonest source of injury. The trauma was usually very severe, although wounding patterns among coalition forces were modified by the use of body armour. The Iraqi forces and civilians were less fortunate and had higher mortality rates. Severe extremity trauma, usually traumatic amputation was very common with the majority of casualties suffering multiple injuries. Common also was penetrating trauma of the head and neck. Over the six months of the deployment, the hospital admitted in excess of 2300 patients, operated on over 1800 surgical cases (performing in excess of 4200 operative procedures), managed nearly 5000 emergency room visits and assisted in the evacuation of over 4000 patients to Germany.

The most memorable event was the US Marine Division assault on Fallujah in November 2004. On the 10th, the hospital received 58 (Priority 1) casualties in 16 hours. This fully mobilised the hospital and teams worked throughout the night performing 38 operations. Each of the 24 beds in the intensive care unit was occupied and each of the six operating tables in the three operating rooms was heavily utilised. There was a massive drive for blood on the base to try to keep pace with the amount of transfusions that were required. During all this, the base also received more than its usual amount of indirect fire, adding to the sense of chaos. The mass casualty event from Fallujah went on for another six days with another 200 or so severely wounded casualties requiring surgical procedures, admission to the intensive care and subsequent evacuation. From an Australian perspective, treating this volume and severity of battle trauma had not been experienced by an Australian medical team in many years and was not in the experience of the contemporary force.

For my part, my focus was very much on looking after the physical and mental wellbeing of the ADF personnel. Support was needed in differing ways on differing days. The sheer challenge and volume of the work, the highly confronting nature of the injuries we were treating and, in some cases, concern as to the threat environment were all factors that I needed to support various members of the team with on occasions. I ran weekly orders groups for the detachment and on-occurrence as the situation dictated. We also maintained our readiness training, including weekly weapons handling, which was the source of some consternation

with our hosts initially. So generally I had, in most instances, daily contact with everyone and a good sense of how everyone was travelling.

I was a well-accepted part of the hospital command team and my day, and sometimes night, job was to act as the clinical coordinator as well as the Aussie flight commander. This entailed adjusting the clinical resources of the hospital around the patient flow at the time. During mass casualty events, I had the opportunity to work clinically as well as manage patient flow. Clinically, the work at Balad was the most challenging of my 30 year plus career. I suspect most of my colleagues would also hold that view.

I also made monthly visits to the Commander in Baghdad to report in. Initially, Brigadier Hutchison was Commander Joint Task Force 633, followed by Air Commodore (later Air Vice-Marshal) Greg Evans quite early in our tour. Their support of the detachment was exceptional and each made the trip to Balad a couple of times during my time there to reinforce that support. Their headquarters was also supportive in many practical ways with a special mention to Padre Taylor who regularly appeared to minister to his 'congregation'. Getting to and from Baghdad to see the Commander was always interesting and although my time in the 'big smoke' was useful and necessary, I was always very happy to get back home to the team in Balad.

Despite the uncertainty and the very difficult situation we met daily, my detachment colleagues performed magnificently. No-one took a backward step and no-one left the side of a patient even under indirect attack. Such was the nature of our work that it was simply not practical. Our contribution in this coalition environment, as with other ADF in similar situations, was meaningful and respected by our coalition partners. We had met CDF's intent.

In March 2005, Lieutenant Colonel David Collins arrived with Medical Detachment 2 to take over and it was time to head for home. As I had taken an advance party in, I was to leave with them, effectively 'leaving' the majority of my team behind for a few weeks more. Although I had every faith in David, I had some real personal difficulty with leaving at that point. But staying wasn't an option. So the advance party bid an emotional farewell to our detachment and USAF colleagues and headed back into Kuwait and towards home. The next three weeks were very unsettled for me until, just on Easter, I received a call from the main body to say they had made it back to Australia in one piece. Medical Detachment 1 was home at last and the job was done.

Group Captain Paterson joined the RAAF in 1984. Over the past 26 years, he has served on most Air Force health units and flights, including Numbers 3, 4 and 6 RAAF hospitals, in roles spanning clinical, instructional, staff and command. He has served operationally in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, East Timor and Iraq. In January 2010, he was appointed as Officer Commanding Health Services Wing, where he commands the Air Force deployable health capability.

Command, leadership and operations

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Hocking, Australian Army

Introduction

This article is based on my personal observations and experiences as a commander, both in the barracks and on operations. It is based on command and leadership presentations that I have given to various audiences over the last few years. These face-to-face presentations are an essential part of our lessons learned framework. All commanders should actively pursue such opportunities and invest in our future leadership. It has also been my experience that telling your story (particular to more junior ranks, who have more limited opportunities) can also be a necessary cathartic experience that benefits the presenter as much as it can benefit the audience. I hope that writing this article will complement the 'lessons learned' process and be a more permanent reference for those interested into the future.

The article will focus on five topical areas that have been of interest to me as a commander. Given that leadership is a situational and personal endeavour—that is more art than science—I have deliberately kept the discussion in each topical area broad. This should also allow the reader to make their own conclusions based on their situation and personality. While many of my observations simply reinforce age-old leadership lessons, it is hoped that they all provide a basis for discussion or personal reflection and contribute to the development of the profession of arms in Australia.

Mission command

There has been much written about mission command over the years and I am confident that the majority of leaders understand the broad philosophy. Unfortunately, the mission command philosophy is far easier understood than put into practice. Mission command takes discipline and comes with a degree of discomfort at all levels. This discomfort is often not felt until the point of execution, at which time a degree of control is sacrificed in order to enable a more dynamic freedom of decision making in line with the commander's intent.

This freedom for subordinates comes with a feeling of unease for higher commanders, particularly during contact or when things are not going to plan. It is important that higher commanders learn to live with this discomfort and show the discipline to not unnecessarily interfere with their subordinates at such critical times. Failure to do so can stifle tempo, and advantage can quickly be lost as subordinate commanders satisfy the information (or control) needs of their superiors and quickly adopt the slow and cumbersome posture of constantly looking up for direction.

It is also worth noting that mission command, when exercised properly, can lead to far less predictable methods of execution as each subordinate commander achieves his higher commander's intent in his own way. Traditionally, military commanders are uncomfortable with this sort of variance and like to see things executed in a more doctrinal way. While I am certainly not denying the importance of doctrine, it is worth noting that our enemy suffers more discomfort from our lack of predictability than we do. This alone supports the need for commanders to live with the discomfort of mission command in order to assist subordinate commanders to create discomfort for their enemies.

Leading on from this, it is also worth asking ourselves the question of whether we appropriately practise mission command in barracks in order to best prepare ourselves for operations. While we are definitely improving in this area, as operational experience grows through our organisation, at times we still have a preference in barracks to micro-manage through prescriptive policy rather than descriptive intent. There are many reasons for this, including improved communications, lower tolerance for error etc but none of them outweighs the price that we might pay for this on operations. I would far prefer to pay the low price of executing mission command in barracks and avoid paying a far higher price of not being programmed for mission command on operations.

Managing risk

Perhaps one of the most challenging and personal tasks of any commander in the barracks or on operations is balancing the need to deliver training outcomes and operational effects with the need to reduce risk. Necessarily, our residual risk threshold in the barracks is lower than that on operations. An area of risk management that may require further discussion is the challenge of balancing short term risk with longer term risk. In my experience, risk analysis often focuses on analysing and managing the risks within a defined activity, operation or time period.

Relatively speaking, this time period is often short and at times can blind the commander to other downstream risks. There are many examples of this on operations, including balancing the short term risk of blast/fragmentation injuries by wearing body armour with the longer term risk of defeat due to lack of agility and human survivability. Other examples include balancing the desire to reduce the short term risk of IED (improvised explosive device) blast by travelling in armoured vehicles with the longer term risk of separating forces from the population they are required to influence. There are many other examples with similar risk equations.

To ensure downstream longer term risks are not ignored, it is important when analysing risk to always ask the question of what is the longer term risk of my actions and what is the longer term risk if I decide not to take action. Particularly (but not exclusively) for commanders on operations, this can often lead to situations where it may be warranted to accept higher residual risk for your own troops in order to reduce the risk in time for someone else's. These decisions are difficult to make and often take some deep soul searching. Of course, once the decision is made it also requires commanders to live with the consequences when the residual risks play out (as the science of probability tells us at times they will).

For a risk analysis model to be useful for an organisation that conducts operations and avoids inadvertently ignoring long term risk, it must avoid analysing events within a limited time frame, balance the rational science with the non-rational art and be anchored with a moral and ethical discussion between commanders at all levels. Any risk management model that does not do this, can inadvertently create risk over time.

Defeating ‘your enemy’ not ‘the enemy’

Necessarily during training we develop, describe and simulate ‘the enemy’. Commanders analyse ‘the enemy’ and we train to defeat ‘the enemy’. Most likely due to my own weaknesses, I often overlooked the fact that my most valuable role was to defeat ‘my enemy’ who, in the majority of cases, was a fellow human being trying to out-think me and then direct his troops to take action that would defeat my troops. This realisation I found extremely useful. It focused me on my information requirements and made me realise the importance of not only gaining the initiative during tactical fights but also gaining the decision making initiative over my fellow enemy commander during planning. This would force him to react to me and force me to adapt in order to retain this initiative. It also forced me to avoid assuming that my opponent was less intelligent than me (like ‘the enemy’ often is).

It is my view that we need to further focus our intellectual thinking and subsequent training design to regularly simulate this very personal dynamic. Two-way quick decision exercises (QDEs) are a way of doing this at unit level, whereby commanders at all levels act as opponents and conduct QDEs, taking into account all they know about each other including personality, tactical ability etc. To most effectively prepare for operations, we must ensure our junior commanders understand this dynamic early and are programmed and practised in it.

Team and coalition building

Building teams has always been a core function of command and leadership. Among other things, an effective team is more resilient to difficult situations, more efficient in its collective output and generally has high morale. This contributes to operational capability and has a significant impact on mission success, particularly when conducting operations against a tough and resilient enemy for an extended period of time. I think it is fair to say that in the military context, commanders at all levels are good at building teams.

It has been my observation that some military commanders have more difficulty building teams within a coalition environment and have particular difficulty in building teams in a multi-agency environment. The main reasons for this are related to personal and organisational ego, personal and organisational prejudices and, at times, just style and personality. Most military commanders and units are intensely proud and competitive by nature. Their competitors include other Australian Army units, other nations’ militaries and of course their enemies. This competitive nature creates personal and organisational ego that can at times create barriers to building effective teams at all levels.

This ego can often be reinforced by personal and organisational prejudices. With some self reflection, most commanders and soldiers would agree that military culture has ingrained prejudices against other nations’ militaries but most profoundly against civilian agencies and organisations. In many cases, these prejudices are reciprocated. Operational success on today’s complex battlefield requires the synchronisation of effects from a broad range of civilian, military and multinational agencies.

Ego and prejudice when combined with the frictions that come with forthright military command styles, mixing with more consultative civilian command styles, can lead to an environment where there is as much animosity focused internally as there is focused towards the enemy. Indirectly and in some cases directly, these personal and organisational induced frictions have a significant impact on mission success at all levels. It is my view that while as a military we must remain proud and competitive, we must also understand our personal and organisational weaknesses and better learn to build teams in the multinational and multi-agency environment that defines complex operations.

Rehabilitation

Perhaps one of the biggest challenges a unit faces during and on return from operations is the rehabilitation of soldiers who have suffered both physical and non-physical injuries. Like other commanders, I continue to learn lessons in this regard. While many pages could be dedicated to rehabilitation, I have chosen to list a few key lessons that may prompt further thought and discussion for commanders deploying in the future.

- Units must expect casualties. Casualties need good leadership. Units must man their rear details with the right quantity and quality of leaders before they fill their operational manning requirements. We have a moral contract to do this and it has a significant and enduring impact on the lives of many soldiers and their families if we don't.
- There are many organisations and specialists that contribute to rehabilitation. Fusing their information to ensure a comprehensive approach to a soldier's rehabilitation is difficult and requires cooperation rather than 'patch protection'. While rehabilitation coordinators can assist in this regard, it is important that the chain of command remains the central point of fusion, as it is only the chain of command that has the full picture.
- With the multitude of organisations, specialists and levels of command trying to help, soldiers can be overwhelmed with support in the days and months immediately after they are wounded. There can also be an impetus to quickly set future goals in order to give a soldier direction and purpose. This dynamic can lead to support fatigue and soldiers setting objectives they cannot achieve or, over time, do not want to achieve. It is important in most cases to give a soldier time and space, and the ability to move at a pace that allows time to adequately process their circumstances.
- Getting back on the horse and back into training is necessary in some cases. This said, it is important that the apparent short term success of getting back into training quickly does not bury issues that can cause problems later in a soldier's life when he does not have his peer support so readily available.

Conclusion

In conclusion, like all commanders, I am constantly learning from my own experiences and those of others. I hope this article provides useful food for thought for other commanders and hope that as a military, we continue to share our experiences and develop two of the most fundamental components of the profession of arms in Australia: command and leadership.

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Hocking graduated from ADFA in 1992 was awarded the Commander-in-Chief's Medal. After graduating from RMC, his early postings included 2/4 RAR (later 2 RAR), Adjutant 1/19 RNSWR, Adjutant 1 RAR (which included an operational tour of East Timor), instructor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Company Commander at 5/7 RAR (where he again served in East Timor) and Operations Officer. He attended the Australian Command and Staff College in 2005, completing a Masters of Management in Defence Studies and was awarded the Chief of Joint Operations prize.

In 2008, he deployed to Afghanistan as a planner in the International Security Assistance Force headquarters and was awarded a Commendation for Distinguished Service. He was then seconded to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet as a Defence Adviser. In late 2009, as incoming Commanding Officer of 1 RAR, he again deployed to Afghanistan to command the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force – Two. On return to Australia, he continues as Commanding Officer of 1 RAR.

ADF command and leadership: a Navy officer's perspective

Lieutenant Commander Dugald Clelland, RAN

Experience without reflection is as to bricks without mortar.

Anonymous

This article is a reflection on my leadership experiences as a boarding party officer in HMAS *Newcastle* in 2003 and operations officer in HMAS *Stuart* in 2008. On both occasions, the ships deployed in support of Operation CATALYST to the Middle East area of operations (MEAO) and worked primarily in the northern Arabian Gulf.

These experiences shaped my command and leadership philosophy, which I carried with me into minor war vessel command in 2009 and 2010. I am grateful for the fine officers and sailors with whom I served during these deployments. They taught me many of the leadership lessons I took away from the experience. I have confined my observations to areas in which I possess some direct knowledge or experience, being the boarding party and the frigate executive department (largely responsible for planning and executing operations onboard).

From these experiences, I will draw examples of an Australian approach to operations, physical courage, the importance of personal communication and relationship building, and the value of establishing and maintaining the right learning culture.

Boarding party officer – 2003

The scope of this section is limited to my employment as a boarding party officer in the northern Arabian Gulf. HMAS *Newcastle* deployed to the Middle East in mid-2003. *Newcastle*'s mission was to secure the integrity of Iraqi territorial waters, including the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. Other tasks included enforcing Iraqi customs, quarantine and immigration laws, and establishing and then maintaining maritime security to encourage the re-invigoration of maritime trade in the northern Arabian Gulf.

Newcastle fielded two 14-member boarding parties that could deploy in the ship's rigid hull inflatable boats or by fast rope insertion from the embarked Seahawk helicopter. The boarding parties were comprised of sailors from all categories, including technicians, supply and medical personnel, in addition to the small arms and boarding specialists. A lieutenant led each boarding party, with a petty officer as second-in-command.

An Australian approach

After a short period on station, it became apparent that mariners in the northern Arabian Gulf were well disposed toward the RAN boarding parties. Over several years of boarding operations, the RAN had established a reputation for being firm but fair with the various crews. We were consistently thorough but respectful in the conduct of our searches and questioning of the master and other key crew members. There were certainly tense situations yet the default was to bring a degree of dignity, respect and humanity to our dealings with mariners who were largely simply working to earn a living.

When we discovered a recalcitrant crew or a smuggler vessel and we executed a ‘non-compliant boarding’, the difficulty of the insertion and the accompanying threat level onboard increased significantly. Pleasingly, the boarding parties maintained their decorum and consistently showed a steady hand, even when dealing with volatile and violent situations. *Newcastle* completed 396 boardings in 105 days during 2003 and had no ‘case to answer’ for inappropriate use of force or cultural insensitivity. Noting our experiences, this was a testament to the professionalism and discipline of the sailors comprising the boarding parties. I believe this calm, egalitarian attitude is indicative of the Australian approach to operations and it has been my experience throughout my career.

Courage

During a routine extraction from a large bulk cargo vessel, one member of the team slipped from the vertical embarkation ladder and fell overboard. Weighed down with body armour, personal weapons and a backpack, he immediately disappeared from view below the surface. Each member of the boarding party wore a specially designed lifejacket that should have manually inflated in such circumstances. The jacket had sufficient buoyancy to float a member even when fully laden, however, in this instance, it did not inflate and the individual had still not appeared on the surface after a long few seconds wait.

Another member of the team, still fully dressed, now leapt immediately from the inflatable into the water in an attempt to locate the missing sailor. This second man did not inflate his own lifejacket—knowing that the missing sailor was submerged—and disappeared from sight. Both men returned to the surface shortly thereafter, paddling furiously and ready for recovery. The second swimmer instinctively demonstrated considerable physical courage to render assistance to his shipmate and, through his quick actions, salvaged a potentially disastrous situation.

Operations Officer – 2008

I will now discuss some experiences from my tenure as operations officer on HMAS *Stuart*. In early 2008, *Stuart* deployed to the MEAO, again in support of Operation CATALYST. The emphasis of the mission had somewhat changed since 2003. The focus was now primarily on critical maritime infrastructure protection, notably Iraq’s two oil export platforms at the head of the Gulf and the oil tankers that were shipping oil from them. These platforms were the primary means of exporting Iraqi oil and were the single greatest source of income for the recovering nation. Even minor damage from an insurgent attack—especially if it impacted the loading of the oil tankers alongside—could have seriously impacted the reconstruction effort, the environment and regional confidence in the state of maritime security.

In a frigate, the commanding officer (CO), warfare officers and numerous watch keepers throughout the ship conduct minute-by-minute operations. The operations officer is responsible for key planning functions generally beyond the next 24 hours. Additional responsibilities include training, preparedness, lesson capture and provision of tactical advice to the CO and on-watch principal warfare officers. One of the key leadership challenges of this role is leading without getting in anyone’s way as, in many respects, you are a staff officer and advisor to the key war fighters.

Personal communication

Generally, the operations officer does not routinely keep watch and there were several benefits to this arrangement. One was the ability to move freely around the various compartments on the ship, affording me the opportunity to speak with every member of the executive department on a once- or twice-daily basis and to discuss with them issues that were important to them. I observed the CO and heads of department doing the same all around the ship. Naturally, there was a great deal of talk about recent operational events in our area of interest.

Just as frequently, the sailors and junior officers wanted to discuss matters from home, plans for the next port visit or their concerns about what lay ahead for us. Were we making a difference? Were we holding our own in the eyes of our coalition partners? Would we get a mail drop in the next week? I found that as time on station wore on, more and more I looked forward to this one-on-one personal communication with my shipmates, while their desire for information about home and as our immediate operational concerns increased. I valued the opportunity, however small, to be a conduit of accurate and up-to-date information for them and to benefit from their perspective on how we were managing our long patrols.

As I departed the ship for my next posting, I had a discussion with a crew member about the deployment. The value for them in this personal communication, I was told, was the knowledge that they were receiving accurate information only one step removed from the CO and, equally, that they knew their concerns were being quickly transmitted up the chain of command. They had felt empowered and informed, which gave them confidence and strength.

Building relationships

I was required on regular occasions to visit a headquarters that managed the surface and aviation operations in the northern Arabian Gulf from one of the oil-exporting platforms. All the operations officers from the various units in the Gulf would meet the Task Group staff to review the week that had been and to look ahead. During *Stuart's* time on station, the Task Group staff were primarily either US Navy or Royal Navy personnel.

To my surprise and pleasure, I knew the Task Group operations officer, a Royal Navy officer, from a previous Five Power Defence Arrangements exercise in Singapore. We immediately remade our acquaintance and quickly and amicably resolved several issues that had been causing concern for the ship. The speed and ease with which this professional and collegiate relationship was established—and our shared experience in Singapore—paid dividends for *Stuart* and the Task Group.

I learned the vital importance of not only building relationships within my own ship but also across navies, given the continuing importance of coalition maritime operations. Noting the recent proliferation of social media tools, I imagine the importance and ease of relationship building will only increase in the future.

Establish and maintain the right culture

Finally, a feature of my experience in both deployments was the importance of establishing and maintaining the right culture. It was patently clear that the COs in *Newcastle* and *Stuart* worked tirelessly at setting the right tone throughout the ship as we all prepared for the

deployments and then reported on-station for our first patrols. A maxim I acquired from another officer during my time in command was 'do the right things and do the right things right'. That succinctly captures the philosophy in *Newcastle* in 2003 and *Stuart* in 2008. Focused professional mastery was the aim in all aspects of our core business.

The COs instilled a learning culture where mistakes were acceptable but failure to improve was not. We all worked at bettering our individual performance and then helping those around us do the same. Our collective performance improved as a result. We knew mission success depended on it. Once we had our first patrol under our belt, it became easier because we all learned as we went. We incorporated the lessons we were learning on operations and fed them back into our planning, preparation and training. It takes strong individual leadership to instil the right culture in a ship's company and I am fortunate to have observed it during two operational deployments.

Conclusion

This article is a reflection on my leadership experiences on operations as a boarding party officer in *Newcastle* in 2003 and as operations officer in *Stuart* in 2008. I have deliberately confined my observations to these experiences and have endeavoured to select from a broad variety of incidents or impressions. In summary, I have observed an Australian approach to operations characterised by a calm and egalitarian attitude. Underpinning this attitude is courage, strengthened by regular and genuine personal communication from leaders of all ranks.

We know Australian soldiers, sailors and airmen and -women are adept at building relationships and these serve us well when conducting joint operations. We must continue to encourage this. Finally, the establishment of a learning culture that rewards improvement and is free from fear of mistakes is vital to ensuring our continued success in future operations, as we cannot move forward without it. Australia is fortunate to enjoy a rich heritage of command and leadership experience in peace and war. It is vital to study and learn from this heritage. It is equally vital to learn from our own contemporary experience. The last 20 years has taught us more than we realise.

Lieutenant Commander Dugald Clelland graduated from ADFA in December 1996. Postings have included a variety of appointments in hydrographic survey ships, mine countermeasure vessels and frigates. Lieutenant Commander Clelland was the Commanding Officer of a Mine Hunter Coastal in 2009 and 2010 and is presently attending the Australian Command and Staff Course at the Australian Defence College, Weston Creek.



Operation SLIPPER (Afghanistan) – task group command reflections and recollections

Wing Commander Pete Cooper (Retd)

Wing Commander Ian Gibson, RAAF

Group Captain (then Wing Commander) Krista Thompson, RAAF

Wing Commander Nathan Christie, RAAF

Wing Commander Stuart ‘Clarry’ Briese, RAAF

Wing Commander Pete Cooper (1st commander)

As the first Commander of TG633.12, I had the task of taking the excellent preparatory work done by the advance party and moulding/bedding it down into an operational capability. As a very junior wing commander with only four months command experience, most of which was preparing for the deployment, I was probably less prepared for the problems of command in an operational environment.

All the other unit commanders offered support to me but the tempo of the preparations for the deployment left little time to consult and, once deployed, contact outside of the command and control chain was frowned on. The areas that took most of my attention were enhancing physical security and personnel issues. Wing Commander Ian Gibson covers the difficulties of the multiple command responsibilities very well later so I will not elaborate on the difficulties of those.

Enhancing physical security was necessary due to the minimal manning profile that the deployment was required to function under. While the operators were hit the hardest here, all personnel had to provide additional hours manning entry control and watch-keeper duties in the command post and this became very draining. The ‘beefed up’ security would allow the entry control point to be secured at night and relieve some of the pressure on operations.

The personnel problems were more unusual and needed to be approached with initiative and often cunning. Everyone, without exception, was highly motivated to get the job done in a very professional manner. However, the constant exposure to each other and the external pressure of rocket attacks and live ammunition often caused tension and individual personalities led to conflict. The majority of conflict could be easily solved by the middle management but often needed the Commander to ‘prove to/allow’ individuals so that they could solve their own problems. To enable the operational capability to be maintained over the entire commitment period, personnel were sourced from all 41 Wing units and mixed together only shortly before deployment. While this was essential to maintain the capability, it did lead to a certain amount of friction between personnel from differing units, both deployed and still at home.

Overall, the preparation and deployment of the first rotation was effective and the professional expertise shown by all members of the deployment was a significant contribution to the achievements of the overall capability. I was very proud of the capability and the people that worked under me to provide it. I like to think that a portion of that pride rubbed off on those people and empowered them to provide their best.

Wing Commander Ian Gibson (2nd commander)

From a commander's perspective, the greatest difference between a deployed command and a domestic command was the additional layers of command and control. At home, the command relationship is clearly defined and simple—from the unit commander to the parent wing. In the deployed location, there was national command, exercised by Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) 633 and delegated to Deputy Commander Afghanistan (DCJTF-A); operational control, exercised by US Air Force (USAF)(Central Command) through the Combined Air Operations Centre; technical control, exercised by Chief of Air Force; and administrative control (although this was a more informal arrangement with 41 Wing). The distinction between the various levels of command and control was not always clear and often the same information was reported to several agencies. Many decisions that a commanding officer would normally make 'at home', required a decision brief to be sent through DCJTF-A to CJTF for approval. This was somewhat vexing and tended (at times) to rob the task group commander of decision-making initiative.

Working for an ostensibly joint (but largely Army-centric) headquarters, nuances in training and operations required repetition to break the 'but this is how it has to be' mindset. A particular example was in the planning and conduct of personnel rotations—where the Army solution was wholesale replacement of all unit personnel, whereas the Control and Reporting Centre required smaller numbers to be moved in several groups and over a period of time to enable continuity of operations and effective in-country specific training.

I had particularly effective executive and operations officers who ensured that the operations of the task group ran smoothly, allowing me to concentrate on personnel issues ranging from rotation planning to the unique challenges faced by deployed task group personnel. These issues included additional stressors such as extended absence from family, rocket attacks, handling and carriage of weapons and live ammunition and additional duties (including entry control point guard, mess set-up and clean-up, post-attack clearing patrols and first aid teams).

Another issue was the potential for individuals to isolate themselves (with laptop computers for entertainment, whether it be music, movies or internet access), whereby some personnel could descend into a very insular environment when not on-duty. A contradiction to this, however, was the magnificent way the task group personnel melded into an effective, self-supporting and largely harmonious team. This spirit was particularly evident when celebrating Christmas in 2007 and on Anzac Day in 2008. That these events were held in a deployed location, with only the members of the task group for company and support, made them particularly poignant and truly reinforced the esprit de corps that had developed.

Group Captain (then Wing Commander) Krista Thompson (3rd commander)

My handover from Wing Commander Gibson took place during the week that included Anzac Day, so it was a particularly poignant start to my tour. I had the advantage of learning from the lessons my two predecessors experienced and was able to get on with commanding my group from the start. Each new commander went through a 'Battle Worthiness Board' audit conducted by the technical control representative, Officer Commanding 41 Wing, so the first few weeks were spent organising the paperwork for that event. Once that was successfully accomplished, the business of running the group continued in earnest. By my turn, the group was well and truly running operations smoothly, most higher command issues had been sorted and we just got on with the job.

While we had taken over the campsite previously run by Americans, we still had up to 25 American servicemen and civilians living with us who provided essential technical support. While most of the Australian staff knew me and how I operated, having previously been Commanding Officer 3 Control and Reporting Unit, it was interesting to see how the other nations in-theatre reacted to a senior female commander. One senior US Navy captain was very embarrassed when I 'called him' on a comment he had made to one of my American operators about a decision I was going to make. Not having the appropriate male appendages he had referred to was not going to stop me sorting the problem, nor was I going to ignore his comment either. Needless to say, we got on famously after the air was cleared.

That was not the first or last time I would run into issues of or with other higher authorities. I found that most wing commander equivalents from other nations did not have the same level of authority and command that I had. Luckily I had good support from my Australian peers and superiors in areas such as the Combined Air Operations Centre who assured my foreign colleagues that I did indeed have the authority to make various operational decisions regarding how my unit did its business. As my tour in Afghanistan was my third command appointment, albeit first deployed, I felt very comfortable doing what needed to be done as a Commander. I did find, however, that I was looked at strangely by many outside of my unit as if I needed to prove to them that I was competent. It was hard not to feel that it was due to my gender; there were after all very few senior females across the various nations there in Kandahar. There just aren't too many female role models out there.

As the second highest ranking Australian in Kandahar, I regularly attended many representational events, the hardest being the ramp ceremonies. While they were often a good opportunity to get some networking done, the solemnity of the occasion was sometimes overwhelming. Watching a fellow commanding officer of a Canadian group farewell so many of his people week after week was heart wrenching. One particular ceremony, very early in the morning which meant a very small turnout, for a young American marine used the line 'he was only nineteen ...'. After the dignity and grace of our Australian services for our fallen soldiers, that particular ceremony will be forever etched in my memory.

My tour saw a significant increase in indirect fire attacks, so not only did we become particularly good at command post duties but we spent considerable effort improving physical force protection measures. Commander Kandahar was particularly impressed with our efforts and saw us as the ideal example of how force protection could and should be managed in such an environment as Kandahar. I did try to impress on him that we received virtually no attacks when his staff patrolled outside the wire and engaged the locals; it was unfortunate that they could not go out there on indefinite patrol. There are still a few of us who twinge at the sound of certain explosion noises.

One fun part of my tour was the opportunity to engage with the local community, through the fathers and sons who set up the Saturday market stalls. Initially, there was hesitancy on both sides but by the end of my tour I felt we had broken some barriers following some interesting conversations over a cup of sweet tea sitting on some lovely handmade rugs. I will always wonder what will happen to some of them as they navigate their own war torn country in order to sell us the odd rug or trinket.

Wing Commander Nathan Christie (5th commander)

I must admit to being a tad nervous as I stepped off the strategic aviation aircraft in Kuwait. The stark contrast to Newcastle was a full-on assault on my senses. It was hot (although it would get hotter), it was dusty and it was the desert. I had had a couple of postings to Tindal and done a course in the Mojave Desert in the US, however, nothing really prepared me for this. The only thing that was normal was the old 'hurry up and wait' attitude that is just simply part of being in uniform. We waited in Sydney, we waited in the Maldives, we waited on the tarmac and in the waiting room (although this was only for a couple of minutes). I tried to convince myself that it was character building.

I am not sure why I was nervous and maybe that's not quite the right word. Probably more apprehensive than nervous as, despite being in the Air Force for nearly 20 years, this was my first operational deployment. 'Billabong flats' was an oxymoron—and not just for the obvious reason. There was a plethora of fast food outlets. Here we are in the desert, miles from western civilisation and we can get immediate 'access' to a quarter pounder or super supreme. We had soft serve ice cream and more deep fried food than I had ever seen in my life (and I had spent three years in Virginia with the US Navy).

Having said all that, what was outstanding was the way we were taken care of. Everyone knew that we were all here to do a job so a lot of the normal red tape was non-existent. One thing that the Americans did do really well in Kuwait was the support facilities. I was able to sit in a little cubicle and they would tape me reading a kids book to my children. I was then able to box up the DVD and the books and send them home. I did this every day I was there and it was awesome for my kids to be able to see daddy reading a book to them despite being so far away. Even though I had already taped myself reading about 10 books before I left, I was in uniform for these ones and it was great for the kids to see daddy while he was away and to get a package from me from the other side of the planet.

Turning up at a command that had been working well for 18 months was interesting. The last thing that I wanted to do was start to make changes. However, there are always things that you want done differently. This doesn't make the previous way wrong, just different. I came to the command at a time where the fighting season was ramping up yet we knew we were going to extract (I was the penultimate Commander). This meant that we needed to keep our eye on the ball (24/7 operations) and start preparing for the imminent departure from Kandahar. One thing was for sure; if we didn't start planning the extraction immediately, the final Commander and his team would be dealing with arguably the highest operational tempo of the entire deployment, an Afghan summer, transition to 'out of country battlespace control' and getting home. All this needed to be done quickly but more importantly safely.

I had the senior fighter controller run a full analysis of the business of the CRC. This may seem like 'suck eggs' type stuff, however, it was very important for us to understand the current fight and ensure that our manning and system was optimised for the task at hand. We very quickly found that we could do with a couple of tweaks around the edges. It was an outstanding piece of work by the lads and lasses with one of the key outcomes being demonstrated proof that we were undermanned.

Now I know that everyone complains of this problem; it's nothing new. I have always believed that even though you know you are going to lose a fight that doesn't mean you shouldn't have it. I had a chat to my boss who was out of country and very quickly realised that there was zero appetite for additional manning for a unit that had functioned so well for so long and was leaving in a few months. So, no surprises here, I determined that it was better to focus our energy on extraction. In the end, the review provided us with two things: it provided us with a platform to conduct some good lessons learnt once the CRC was shut down and it provided us with data and recommendations to pass onto our 'replacements'. I am not so naive as to think that our recommendations had a significant bearing on what our replacements did (as it was a massive US team). However, we were content that we had done all that was possible to help smooth the transition.

As a commander deployed, one of my key roles was to get as many mates as I possibly could in the other ISAF (international security assistance force) nations. It was easy with the US, UK and Canada. Some of the countries that we have had little to do with and who generally speak poor English were somewhat of a challenge. Despite the Australian CRC only having about six months left at Kandahar, I even found myself heading to the future infrastructure planning meetings. This gave me great insight into the future plans and gave me the opportunity to chat in the margins about our requirements for extraction. Moreover, it provided the ability for me to 'see' if all the base infrastructure was on schedule that was critical to our replacements getting up and running on time.

Wing Commander Stuart 'Clarry' Briese (6th and last commander)

In February 2008, when I was informed of my selection for promotion, my path was laid out: post to Commanding Officer 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit in Darwin in January 2009, deploy as the final Task Unit Commander, then return to Darwin to lead the unit through a period of reconstitution in 2010/11. In this regard, my experience has been quite different from the other commanders who returned to various postings, in some cases far removed from deployed air battle management operations.

I deployed without knowing when I would return, as our withdrawal was dependent on the completion of new facilities for the USAF unit that would replace us. On my arrival, these works were behind schedule. The previous Task Unit Commander, Wing Commander Nathan Christie, had developed a cease operations planning date of 1 August, on which he had based a transition philosophy and USAF training plan, while accepting the potential for us to be released earlier or required longer by the Combined Air Operations Centre.

Once the Australian Air Component Commander, Group Captain Quinn, saw the difficulties of planning to cease operations without a fixed date, he decided to canvas the Joint Force Air Component Commander for a date that was not only fixed but earlier than 1 August. The new commander of the USAF 606th Air Control Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel 'Stumpy' Dawson, reinvigorated the facilities works and the unconfirmed cease operations date crept forward until, on 20 June, the Air Component Commander informed us that the agreed date was 4 July. Joint Task Force staff also decided that rather than be replaced by an engineer from Headquarters 41 Wing, I would remain in location as the Force Extraction Team Commander. This led to a frenzy of planning which eventually resulted in the safe withdrawal of the unit.

I had been spared many of the challenges faced by the previous commanders. The force protection in place was reasonable, the standing instructions were well tested, the burden of mid-tour leave relief had disappeared when four-month rotations were introduced, and having an Air Component Commander in Headquarters JTF633 helped to align Commander JTF and Joint Force Air Component Commander's goals.

I had to do a lot of expectation management in early June as the withdrawal date moved forward before being fixed. Some unit members were quite disappointed to be leaving so soon (in some cases having only just qualified for operations). It was only through a lot of the unit's hard work that the pieces were in place to be able to withdraw so early. There were good reasons to go, one of the most compelling being to ease the burden on theatre logistics well before the Afghan elections planned for 20 August that year.

We held an official 'cease operations' ceremony on 9 July, attended by Commander JTF, the Air Component Commander and dignitaries from coalition partners. I took on a lot of media representation as I saw the occasion as one of the last opportunities to publicise the work of the CRC over the preceding two years. However, we were never as interesting to the media as the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force or the aircraft in-theatre, and once you stop operating you are largely forgotten.

To a greater extent than in Australia, the Commander is the conduit for information into and out of the unit. While responsible for the welfare of every unit member, through Commander Kandahar briefings I was also well informed of issues affecting the base, coalition casualties and the operational picture. At times it took a conscious effort to compartmentalise facts that were not in my sphere of control or influence.

As the withdrawal approached, the stress on all personnel visibly increased. For me, the climax in stress came over a 48 hour period. On 18 July, I learned of the loss of an F-15E and its crew of two, the loss of a contracted Mi-26 and its crew of six, the death of Private Ranaudo, and transit damage to our radar while it was being taken off site. On 19 July, an Mi-8 helicopter crashed near our compound with the loss of 16 lives. I attended the ramp ceremony for the Mi-26 crew. That night we had an indirect fire attack. The following morning, a Tornado crashed on takeoff—thankfully the crew ejected. Due to its live ordnance, the wreckage was left to burn and the pall of smoke on the horizon all morning was a good indicator of the mood on camp: 'another day, another crash'. I no longer had to work at convincing people it was a good time to leave Kandahar.

The return of the CRC's equipment to Australia faced numerous logistic challenges. Suffice to say equipment has a higher priority going into theatre than it does coming out. The reconstitution of 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit's personnel has also been challenging. There was a pleasing post-return to Australia baby boom but there have also been some unfortunate physical and mental health cases linked to the deployment. The unit has had to 'spiral up' in many areas, such as vehicle serviceability and driver training. At the time of writing in November 2010, the first of the refurbished CRC's cabins have arrived. Following a period of testing and collective training, the unit will be at full capability in late 2011.

Due to operating the radar, CRC equipment and 41 Wing personnel to the limits, two years on operations will require two years of reconstitution. Planners should note that as they propose future operations and estimate the costs; the full costs won't be known for years.

Wing Commander Cooper joined the Royal Navy in 1972 and undertook helicopter navigator training, before specialising as an Air Traffic Control Officer and later as a Fighter Controller. He served in operational and training positions, at sea and ashore, before retiring in 1995. He joined the RAAF in 1996 and has served as Chief Controller at 2 Control and Reporting Unit, at DSTO Salisbury and as Operations Officer and then Executive Officer 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (114MCRU). He completed the Australian Command and Staff Course in 2002. In 2007, he returned to command 114MCRU and led the deployment of the Control and Reporting Centre to Afghanistan. He was Chief Command, Control, Computers and Communications in Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Air and Space Operations Centre, prior to retiring in early 2011.

Wing Commander Gibson joined the Air Force in 1984. He has served in operational and staff appointments at 2 Control and Reporting Unit, 3 Control and Reporting Unit, 1 Joint Communications Unit, 1 Radar Surveillance Unit, Headquarters 41 Wing, Defence Materiel Organisation, Headquarters Surveillance and Response Group, and Capability Development Group. He completed RAAF Command and Staff Course in 1996. Wing Commander Gibson was Commander Task Group 633.12, the Australian Control and Reporting Centre at Kandahar, Afghanistan from October 2007 to April 2008. He is currently serving his second tour of duty in the Middle East Area of Operations.

Group Captain Thompson joined the Air Force as an air traffic controller in 1987, changing to Air Defence, now known as Air Combat Control, in 1993. She completed postings at 3 Control and Reporting Unit and Headquarters 41 Wing, before being posted as the inaugural Commanding Officer of Surveillance and Control Training Unit. She completed the first Australian Command and Staff Course at Weston Creek in 2001, with a Masters in Management of Defence Studies. Following tours at Capability Development Group in Canberra and Headquarters 41 Wing, she was posted as Commanding Officer 3 Control and Reporting Unit. From April to October 2008, she was the Commander of the Australian Control and Reporting Centre at Kandahar, Afghanistan. In 2009, she took up her current post as Director of Capability at Headquarters Air Command.

Wing Commander Christie joined the Air Force in 1990. In 1999, he was posted to the Naval Air Station Norfolk US as the RAAF exchange officer to the E2C Hawkeye AEW&C Training Squadron, followed by a posting to Seattle as a Mission Systems operator. In 2007, he was posted as Operations Officer at 2 Squadron and then Executive Officer at 42 Wing Headquarters, followed by a posting as the Officer Commanding 42 Wing. In early 2009, Wing Commander Christie was the Commander of the Australian Control and Reporting Centre, Kandahar Afghanistan. On his return to Australia, he was posted as Staff Officer to Chief of Air Force. In 2012, he will be the Australian Defence Attaché to NATO and the European Union.

Wing Commander Briese joined the Air Force in 1987. He has served in a variety of operational and instructional appointments in 41 Wing and in staff appointments in 41 Wing, Surveillance and Response Group, and Air Force Headquarters. He has completed one tour as Commanding Officer of Surveillance and Control Training Unit and one as Commander of the Australian Control and Reporting Centre at Kandahar, Afghanistan. Wing Commander Briese holds a Bachelor of Science from the University of NSW, a Master of Space Studies from the International Space University, Strasbourg, and is a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff Course. He is currently the Commanding Officer of 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit.

Reflections on Persian Gulf naval operations

Commander Mark McIntosh, RAN

During 2002 and 2003, I served as Chief of Staff to Captain (now Rear Admiral) James Goldrick, RAN and Captain (now Rear Admiral) Peter Jones, RAN in their capacity as Commander Australian Surface Task Group deployed on Persian Gulf operations. The mission, tasks and outcomes of the maritime interception operations, naval blockade and littoral operations have been well described in a number of publications. This article seeks to describe the mechanics, workings and building of the RAN's role, not only within the framework of the US Navy's (USN) 5th Fleet, but also our progressive integration into Task Force (TF) 55 for operations against Iraq and our integration into the Australian Joint Task Force, which was initially forward based in Kuwait then Qatar.

One of the lessons adopted within the Fleet headquarters structure was the selection of appropriate rank officers for task group command. This lesson stemmed from the RAN's integration into USN battle group (BG) operations over many years. There are a number of differences between the USN and RAN command structure. These arise in part due to differences in approach and nomenclature at the O6 (RAN Captain) and O7 (RAN Commodore) levels. From a command perspective, USN carrier battle group command is exercised at either one- or two-star level. The BG commander is generally supported by destroyer squadron commander (COMDESRON) and staff in the conduct of surface and subsurface warfare, while combat air group commander and air warfare commander (generally the escort air warfare cruiser captain) are O6-level officers.

The deployment of the O6-led RAN task group had an easy equivalence with the US construct. In late 2001, Captain (now Rear Admiral) Alain du Toit had established a very good rapport with Captain Mike Jackson USN, then COMDESRON 50 (serving the Commander 5th Fleet), which led to the opportunity for the RAN to command the Maritime Interception Forces (MIF) on a rotational basis. The MIF Commander was afforded the same status as the in-theatre COMDESRONS and afforded the courtesy title of Commodore.

Arriving in-theatre in February 2002, I set about organising a number of calls for Captain Goldrick. We joined the aircraft carrier USS *Stennis*, then operating south of Pakistan against Afghanistan. Aside from the call on the Admiral, the days on *Stennis* enabled us to establish a good rapport with COMDESRON 21, Captain Phil Wisecup USN. The good working relationships both with Captain Wisecup and Captain Jackson were to prove vital in the following month in understanding the strategic changes that were occurring, which led to an Australian being appointed MIF Commander on a full-time basis.

Command and control of continuous blockade operations, for an undersized staff, was to prove quite a challenge in the ensuing months. One of our national objectives was to demonstrate the merit of the LPA (landing platform amphibious) as a command platform but we were limited by the lack of access to the US classified communications network (SIPRNET). The role of the Chief of Staff was to prove fundamental in getting this previous 'US-eyes only' equipment into HMAS *Manoora*. Despite the use of SIPRNET by Australian task group staff when embarked in various US cruisers and destroyers, there were a multitude of technical and classification assurance measures that we needed to meet before the appropriate staff in the US 5th Fleet were prepared to give us the go ahead.

The strategy and tactics of the Australian-led MIF were starting to influence events regionally and within the coalition. The effectiveness of the naval blockade was leading to increasing efforts by the Iraqis to transport oil overland, while the tactics and procedures of the RAN were attracting the attention of senior USN officers, who were looking at ways for US ships to bring about the same effects in boarding capability. The field intelligence and operational activities of the MIF, and the lack of forecasting of key Iranian Coast Guard Navy (IRCGN) activities, were also forcing change in intelligence support from 5th Fleet to task group support rather than solely task force level support.

The authority and flexibility to task coalition members of the MIF always proved a balancing act between commanders' assessed status and capability of own units, national policy and national rules of engagement, sustaining the force in-theatre, and maintaining operational objectives. The task group as a whole benefited from operating under Commander 5th Fleet. The RAN assigned operational control of its ships initially to Commander 5th Fleet and later to Commander TF55. In-theatre logistic support elements, such as replenishment ships and helicopters, were shared among the force in a seamless manner. The RAN's logistic support element in Bahrain continued to integrate into broader 5th Fleet logistic groups, as well as utilising commercial support.

I left the Middle East in mid 2002 and returned in September that year. COMDESRON 50 staff had returned to Bahrain and the planning staff of the coalition had considerably enlarged, both in Bahrain and Qatar. US Central Command 'forward' had redeployed from Kuwait to Qatar and considerably strengthened in size. Also, the tactics utilised by smugglers had changed, with an emphasis on smuggling oil by dhows and smaller craft. Interest in the conduct and complexity of MIF operations by the US media was very strong (although this never really translated back to Australia) and there was a regular demand for media input.

There were also a number of key relationships to form. Brigadier (later Major General) McNairn led the Australian joint command element in Doha and both Captain (now Rear Admiral) Peter Jones and I formed a good rapport with him. I was to be a regular visitor to Doha, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi over the coming months and formed a key link in briefing Captain Jones' intent, as the Australian Naval Commander, to Brigadier McNairn, as well as appraising the relevant aspects of the broader plan for impending war against Iraq. My role in Doha was made much easier by familiar faces at Headquarters Australian Theatre, where I had served the previous two years.

Brigadier McNairn also went out of his way to ensure I attended the final planning conference in US Central Command in Tampa, Florida later that year. I think I was the most junior person in the room but it was an amazing experience. The other key command relationship I had was with Commander (now Commodore) Phil Spedding, who was serving as the RAN liaison officer to 5th Fleet in Bahrain. This relationship was vital for Captain Jones, as it was a direct feed of events and planning under the growing aegis of 5th Fleet. During my brief periods ashore in Bahrain and amongst my peers at sea, I was mixing with many Royal Navy (RN) officers, many of whom I had come across when serving in Flag Officer Sea Training Group in the UK several years earlier.

The principal reason for the importance of these relationships was not only to provide advice to Captain Jones but to articulate the situation at the head of the Persian Gulf within Iraqi waters. If there was to be a conflict, it was important that the blockade be maintained until

the commencement of war and into the early phases. The sustainment of this position within the naval coalition was to prove vital, with one of the most significant achievements of the force being the detection and prevention of sea mining by the Iraqis of the northern waters of the Gulf.

It was vital that our role was articulated and agreed at many levels, including the Fleet Commander and Chief of Navy. Brigadier McNairn's reporting line led through joint headquarters up to CDF and the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Similarly, the incoming Commander TF55, Rear Admiral Costello USN (embarked in USS *Constellation*) and Commander 5th Fleet, Vice Admiral Keating USN, needed to be fully briefed in order to provide approval as the operational control authorities.

Command and control (C2) arrangements needed to account of the growing number of naval assets, as well as maintenance of the MIF. Some of the particular challenges that Captain Jones was able to successfully address were the incorporation of Polish and Kuwaiti elements into the task group. I must admit I thought I would be stumped on the language barrier with the Kuwaiti forces. But the Kuwaiti liaison officer swung onboard with a 'Giddy mate, just got back from exchange to Australia' and all was resolved, much to the amazement of our American counterparts. The C2 arrangements were evolutionary, as there was considerable flux in the allied naval participation. Command of the MIF was to eventually translate to command of the task unit conducting inshore operations.

As the diplomatic efforts to prevent war were progressively exhausted, the detailed planning and adjustments to C2 continued apace. I transferred to Rear Admiral Costello's staff in early 2003 as the RAN liaison officer in USS *Constellation*. The duties of Commander TF55, as the surface and subsurface force commander (sea combat commander), were enormous in breadth. Admiral Costello shared many traits of successful commanders that I had served with. He knew his mission and provided clear guidance to his commanders. He provided opportunity for his commanders to think and forward solutions but, despite the velvet exterior, he exhibited the necessary flint.

In late 2002 and early 2003, there was a series of key planning meetings in *Constellation* for the surface forces, which were conducted in 'Nelsonian' style. Admiral Costello's leadership of these forums and TF55 was outstanding in an environment where the level of complexity is difficult to describe unless witnessed first-hand. It was hard not to warm to him—and he had spent several years away from Navy as a circuit judge—as he played to the 'court' of commanding officers planning in a coalition environment. He was prepared to provide the opportunity for each group to contribute, then blend the myriad of coalition forces into a safe and workable plan with a clear emphasis on preventing 'blue-on-blue' engagement.

During this phase, one of my abiding memories was that, more than ever, we were a coalition team separated by a common language. This was most evident in the discussions that raged across the table on the planning of amphibious operations between the RN and USN. It fell to the RAN members almost to translate and note that the concepts and objectives were similar, if not identical, but separated primarily by word conventions. My favourite moment was watching the excitement of Captain Michael Cochrane RN almost leaping from his seat at the prospect of taking an Iraqi ship 'a prize', as his forebears had done. So emerged a plan that accounted for the movements of nine carriers and their escorts, almost a dozen Tomahawk-firing submarines and a complex ballet of special force and amphibious group movements.

Once the opportunity ‘for a thousand flowers to bloom’ had occurred, and the plan agreed, the task force switched into the mode of unified conduct. Admiral Costello conducted the operation in a way that I imagined he would have conducted his court. He had the Machiavellian streak of ‘the Prince’, which was no better illustrated than when the need arose to destroy some remaining Iraqi naval ships harbouring on the Shatt Al Arab, close to Basra. His special forces colonel was eager for the task and was directed to complete the planning. However, Admiral Costello just as quickly ordered Commander Air Group to destroy the ships with a few JDAMs (joint direct attack ‘smart’ munitions) from returning F/A-18s, before announcing the following day that aviators had overtaken the need for the colonel’s risky riverine operation, especially with Iranians on the other side of the river. The colonel left disappointed, with the aviators no doubt accruing the blame—a good solution!

It was after the completion of the final planning meeting that I received from Admiral Costello’s operations officer the final copy of the plan for the conduct of inshore operations. Regrettably, the plan contained a number of differences from what had been agreed at the planning table. There was a curt instruction to ‘sort this out by tomorrow or you Aussies will be on the sideline’, which was probably half bluff but not to be left alone. I rewrote the operational concept documentation and submitted it without further reference to my commander, as there was neither time nor opportunity to do so. The operations proceeded as had been discussed and I guess I earned my pay as the RAN liaison officer to Commander TF55.

As the pace quickened through the execution of the early phase of the war, there was little opportunity or necessity for myself or the RAN liaison officer in Bahrain to provide direct reports through to Captain Jones but rather through my replacement as chief of staff, as we were all firmly in the execution phase. We maintained a good dialogue and flow of information between the Commander-level officers, including the RAN liaison officer with the 5th Fleet, RAN logistic support element commander, chief of staff to Captain Jones and to the National Command element in Doha. This was of great importance in maintaining perspective not only of the state of operations but how the relationships across the navies and broader coalition were progressing.

About two to three weeks after the commencement of combat operations, I travelled by helicopter to *Kanimbla* to call on Captain Jones and his expanded staff, which included a sizeable RN contingent. The helicopter was held off for a period while *Kanimbla* steamed south out of the Khawr Abd Allah with an RN frigate in ‘goal-keeper’ station—as a final Styx missile had been fired overhead towards Kuwait by the Iraqis. I had the opportunity to fly up over the Khawr Abd Allah to Umm Qasr in the next few days to talk to the RAN clearance divers working hand-in-hand with their RN and USN counterparts—several days after the US marines had passed through—watching the mine-hunting operations before returning to *Constellation* for the final weeks.

As is the way of the Middle East, there have been many subsequent chapters and, after almost ten of the previous 13 months in-theatre—mostly at sea—I was glad to return home. Colleagues such as Peter Jones, Pete Arnold, Phil Spedding and I were exhausted while others, such as Fred Ross and Chris Percival, were to pass before their time—perhaps for other reasons—but sadly nonetheless.

Commander McIntosh is a warfare and navigation specialist. In a career spanning 24 year, he has served at sea in all classes of vessels from patrol boats to aircraft carriers, including seven years in destroyers, and six years on the staff of task group commanders. Career highlights include an exchange to the Royal Navy's Operational Sea Training Group in 1994-95, Chief of Staff to Commander Australian Surface Task Group in Persian Gulf operations in 2002-03 and command of HMAS Success in 2003-04, which included deployment to sub Antarctic and assignment to US 7th Fleet. He left the Navy in 2005 but rejoined in July 2010 and has recently been appointed to the position of Master Attendant, leading Navy's National Port Services Organisation and management of the new Fleet Marines Services contract. He is a graduate of the University of NSW and Macquarie Graduate School of Management.

Operations SPITFIRE and WARDEN: East Timor airlift experiences

Wing Commander (then Flight Lieutenant) Bruce Walker, RAAF

It wasn't a surprise when we were told to get into work with our bags packed and board a Falcon 900 that was taking us to Tindal. The previous night we had been told to stay at home until called in but that was about all the information we knew. C-130 crews were regularly placed on standby to provide support for contingencies both at home and further afield, ranging from humanitarian assistance—such as flood relief and hay dropping—to service-assisted evacuations of Australian nationals, such as occurred in Cambodia in 1996.

This time was different, however, for a number of reasons. As we relaxed in the back of the VIP aircraft taking us to Tindal, personnel were discussing what may happen and how the C-130s may be involved. Everyone had been following the situation in East Timor and was aware that the election on East Timor's independence would be held shortly. They were aware of the violence that had marked the election campaign to date and knew that it could get worse. The seriousness of the situation on the ground in East Timor, the accompanying potential for violence and the fact that we were heading north in a hurry all made this quite different to other times of standby.

The joy of being the stand-by crew, with only a single flying executive, is that you are insulated from the real work that occurs in the headquarters. While we settled into the accommodation at Tindal, C-130s were en route to Tindal with additional personnel and equipment. The higher headquarters were working hard to cover the range of details needed to execute the variety of plans that may have been required. Over the next few days, additional aircraft and personnel arrived and established a small deployed headquarters, composed primarily of representatives from the hastily-established force elements who had assembled in location. This was obviously becoming a large and potentially complicated operation and needed local command and control to coordinate and execute the eventual operations.

While crews knew what their roles and responsibilities were, in hindsight, the situation in East Timor was changing quickly and this resulted in the scale and scope of potential plans also changing. Regular updates were provided to the crews, by headquarters, usually once a day. If specific information was required, individuals from crews would assist as needed to refine load plans, timings and other information. It is not meant to be a slight on the headquarters to say, however, that the bulk of the crew's information on the unfolding situation in East Timor was gathered from the media, as it was easily accessible on the television and radio. Events throughout the actual election and the days after showed the situation was very tense, if not already actually out of control. Crews kept themselves busy as needed, noting that there were standby crews for both day and night sorties. If not assisting the headquarters, many of the personnel were either at the gym or the pool, always on base and easily contactable if it was necessary to launch a mission quickly.

That time came on 6 September when aircraft and personnel were launched to evacuate UN personnel and foreign nationals as part of Operation SPITFIRE. The initial sorties were to Dili airfield, and the approach and arrival into the airfield was straightforward and non-eventful.

We taxied to the apron and offloaded the command elements (both air and ground), force protection team, evacuation handling team and medical elements.

My initial reaction was to wonder what had happened to all the media reporters we had been expecting? There was no media at all, highlighting how badly the situation had deteriorated in Dili to result in their departure. The other reaction was how quiet it was at the airfield, as it was five to six kilometres from the central part of Dili. All seemed to be going to plan, when we were urgently told by the ground commander to depart immediately. Nothing had seemed to happen but we quickly started and departed as the second C-130 taxied in. There had been an emergency medical issue which was handled by the staff on the ground. Sorties continued through the day, evacuating personnel as they arrived at the airfield.

Operation SPITFIRE continued for about a week and there were numerous challenges that the aircrew and ground evacuation parties had to face. While the initial focus had been into Dili, the most serious incident occurred at Bacau, a large airfield further east on the coast. There, while evacuating refugees, the Indonesians became very agitated when Bishop Belo was recognised trying to leave. Initially he wasn't granted approval but this was eventually forthcoming.

However, as the C-130 taxied to depart, the runway was blocked by a military truck. Negotiations defused the situation and it ended peacefully with the C-130 departing as planned. But there was considerable potential for an incident. The ground evacuation parties were often working in isolated and vulnerable locations during this period and were generally staffed by junior personnel. They did a fantastic job, ensuring the evacuations worked as smoothly as possible in difficult conditions. Likewise, aircrew remained flexible to changes in schedules and tasks. Incidents, such as the one above, required crews to work independently in assessing and resolving challenging situations in order to achieve the mission.

As negotiations with the Indonesian Government continued, the flow of evacuees increased, culminating in a peak in evacuations in mid-September when crews were transporting 150–200 refugees at a time in the C-130s. By this time, the operation was running smoothly and additional aircraft and crews had been steadily arriving at Tindal and joining the tasking. This created domestic issues, such as where to house the large number of C-130 crews, which resulted in them being allocated to vacant base married quarters. Tindal, by mid-September, was very busy, with many C-130s, helicopters, F-111s and F/A-18s operating daily. The deployment was lasting much longer than we had originally thought and there was no end in sight at that time. Training sorties were still programmed and conducted when possible to ensure that crews remained current and qualified.

In mid-September, the detachment was requested to airdrop foodstuffs to refugees located in remote locations in East Timor. The major problem was using the free drop method to deliver the food, which was mostly rice bags. Free drop was pretty much as the name describes. The rice bags were loaded on skid-boards and, as they rolled out the back of the aircraft, the netting constraining the load was cut and the bags tumbled out. While it was an approved US Air Force method, it wasn't in ADF publications and so Air Movements Training and Development Unit (AMTDU) personnel conducted the first actual drop in-country.

Two aircraft conducted the first sorties, utilising UN aircraft call-signs. Both had to transit via Dili for inspections by Indonesian personnel, prior to conducting the airdrops. The first

crew reported the Indonesians were very thorough in their inspection, to the point that they had to request that the use of the bayonets be minimised as it was causing the rice bags to collapse. The second crew reported no such difficulties. Both aircraft were C-130Es of 37 Squadron but were flown by a combination of 36 and 37 Squadron and AMTDU personnel. 36 and 37 Squadron crews had only recently been cross-trained on the C-130 E and H models. Aircraft checklists of the two types had also been rationalised and standardised, enabling both Squadrons' crews to fly the other type. This work provided a much greater level of flexibility for the operation planners in headquarters and was a major factor in the overall success of the operations.

While Operation SPITFIRE was now winding down, it had become clear that Australia would soon be leading a multinational UN peacekeeping force into East Timor in order to stabilise the country. Headquarters were deeply involved in the development of the movement tables that would be the basis of the airlift support to the operation. As the operational plans changed, the movement plans did likewise, resulting in a lot of re-planning to cover contingencies as the situation evolved.

Crews provided support as needed to the headquarters staff, given the workload they were under with the interchange of aircrew between command, flying and planning roles. Rehearsals were carried out to practise arrival drills and to ensure all the players involved knew their roles and responsibilities. Even at the last moment, the plan changed to reflect the C-130s arriving first in Dili, rather than the Blackhawks as originally rehearsed. The crews were briefed on the plans, highlighting the heavy landing weights due to the passengers and cargo carried and the need for additional fuel for operational flexibility.

The first C-130s departed from Tindal with follow-up aircraft departing from Townsville. Airspace had been a major issue for the planners, as the number of aircraft operating into and out of East Timor required dedicated inbound and outbound routes to be flown, at specific altitudes, to enable de-confliction plans to work. The original small C-130 detachment that had arrived at Tindal approximately four weeks earlier had morphed into an 'International Coalition Air Wing' as part of the UN peacekeeping force. Soon there would be military aircraft and crews from many foreign nations participating in the airlift operation, as well as some contracted civilian crews. Rigid adherence to the airspace requirements was needed to ensure that missions were conducted and completed safely. There were a couple of occasions where the system broke down but it generally worked very well.

The arrival into Dili was again non-eventful, with the local air traffic controller giving us clearance to land. The airfield was quiet with no other movements seen or heard. As we taxied in, it became very clear that the media were back and this posed the biggest risk to the safe conduct of the offload. Due the need to expedite the delivery of the passengers and cargo—and the lack of functioning ground-handling equipment—a combat offload of the pallets was to be conducted. It is difficult to conduct a combat offload when photographers are 20 metres directly in front of the aircraft taking pictures. This delayed the initial offload, although it eventually became obvious to them what we needed to do and they moved off the tarmac. By this time, the troops had spread out around the aircraft and the immediate vicinity. All was quiet, apart from the Hercules aircraft themselves, as we taxied back out and the second aircraft arrived. The flight back to Darwin was also non-eventful and we settled into the first day of the INTERFET airlift operation.

The logistics effort required to support the operation was immense, as became obvious when we saw all the pre-positioned loads at Darwin air movements section. As we are told, flexibility is the key to air power—and the air lift world is no different. Running an air lift operation of this scale takes an immense amount of planning and discipline. Loads to be carried need to be prioritised and booked in advance. Ground units need to deliver the loads at the time requested so that dangerous goods can be accepted and checked. Finally, aircraft need to be rigged appropriately so the correct loads are on-loaded as quickly as possible. No point being rigged for full seating expecting 90 troops when your load turns out to be two Landrovers that needed flat floors! Inevitably, the plans changed, due to changing priorities of cargoes, aircraft unserviceable or the late delivery of equipment. Both aircrew and ground personnel had to work together to resolve issues as they arose, which was pretty much constantly.

The nature and scale of the operation had changed significantly since we first arrived at Tindal. Now that Operation WARDEN was in place, crews began to rotate out and new crews rotated in. There were still other tasks that needed to be done. I was fortunate to be part of the operation from the beginning and to participate until the early days of WARDEN. The aircraft performed very well, testament to the maintainers who worked tirelessly throughout to keep them serviceable. The planning staff worked hard in developing and amending the plans, schedules and loads as the scale and scope of the operation changed. Theirs was a thankless but vital job, which was carried out by some of the best and most professional aircrew we had.

The evacuation handling parties, medical elements and protective security details handled some incredibly complex situations during Operation SPITFIRE with poise and humour. They really were on the ‘frontline’ during that time, having to operate on their own in a complex, changing environment. Air movements personnel were vital in getting the air bridge to East Timor flowing and there were all the support personnel from the expeditionary combat support squadrons who were given little notice they were deploying to East Timor.

Although the conduct of the operations was very successful, there were plenty of lessons to be learned. Communications are vital between all the disparate elements, and functional and effective logistic management systems are vital to maintaining an air bridge of this scale. The majority of the crews hadn’t been involved in the planning and execution of operations of this scale. It was also the first time for many that operations were conducted in a potential threat environment. The crews were appropriately briefed and equipped to handle the worst threat scenario planned but also had to understand this was not the expected threat scenario. It was clear the greatest threat to the aircraft and crew were themselves and so adherence to the basic air logistic support principles was emphasised. It was a steep learning curve in many respects that highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of individuals. Overall, however, it was a privilege to part of such a successful and important operation.

Wing Commander Bruce Walker joined the RAAF in 1981. After pilot training in 1984, he was posted to 36 Squadron to fly C-130Hs. Apart from a posting to ADFA from 1992-95, he remained at 36 Squadron until early 2003, when he was promoted and posted to 37 Squadron as the Tactical Flight Commander on C-130Js. He was posted to 285 Squadron as the C-130J Training Flight Commander and then Executive Officer in 2006. He completed the Australian Technical Staff Officers Course in 2007 and was posted to Capability Development Group as the Deputy Director-Training from 2008 until late 2010. He is currently Commanding Officer 285 Squadron at RAAF Base Richmond.

Leadership in the ADF

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Hawkins, DSM and Bar, Australian Army

Men make history and not the other way around. In periods where there is no leadership, society stands still. Progress occurs when courageous, skilful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better.

Harry S. Truman,
33rd President of the United States (from 1945-53)

Introduction

Leadership is commonly defined as the ability to influence people, often to complete tasks they would not ordinarily undertake. In contemporary business frameworks, there is a high reliance on leadership to create value opportunities and change things for the better. Indeed, the Australian Graduate School of Management—which is ranked in the world’s top 40 business schools—uses six domains of leadership to assist in management techniques. The domains are relational, personal, ethical, supportive, contextual and inspirational.

These business leadership domains could undoubtedly be employed to analyse ADF leadership. To display that business and military leadership attributes exist in parallel and primarily involve opportunities for positive change, an examination of recent ADF leadership scenarios, which include operational, training and administrative events, will be utilised alongside the six business leadership domains.

Each of the short accounts recollected below will endeavour to illustrate that ADF leadership can be just as easily demonstrated using the business domains. The narratives selected are all real-world events that have occurred in the past 12 years. They draw on deployments overseas and activities in Australia, and care has been taken to avoid having individuals’ privacy compromised.

Domain one – ‘relational leadership’

Relational leadership creates ties that feel honest, accessible and human. It is often between two people or a small group of individuals. To illustrate this domain, the East Timor crisis of 1999 will be used as the backdrop. Several small teams of Australian soldiers were embedded with East Timorese Falintil elements. These teams were deployed to provide liaison between General Cosgrove’s headquarters and Falintil’s leadership. One incident that highlights relational influence qualities of the Australian soldier was when the Falintil leadership heard of an incident in Dili and, as a consequence, were quite frustrated with INTERFET (the International Force for East Timor). They decided to march into Dili, bearing their weapons, which would have been against the agreement of the cantonments and aggravated the Dili situation further.

A warrant officer with one of these small teams was able to use the rapport he had built with the Falintil leadership and draw on his negotiation skills to defuse the situation but not without the potential for a major incident. Indeed, at one stage the Falintil elements in the

cantonment threatened the Australians. However, through repeated use of honesty and logical argument, and appealing to senior Falintil individuals' ability to look to the long term and trust the Australians, the warrant officer kept Falintil in their cantonment. He was assisted by several more junior soldiers, who provided him with communications support to General Cosgrove's headquarters. The soldiers' ability to work under extreme stress was testimony to their training at Army training schools in Australia and the near real-life exercises that had been conducted in Australia annually.

Relational leadership is often complemented by personal leadership, as they both reinforce the bonds formed between individuals. The second account also draws on an operational theatre to introduce an activity where personal leadership was displayed by Australian soldiers.

Domain two – 'personal leadership'

Personal leadership focuses on individual attributes, such as personality, actions, expertise and credibility. Furthermore, high levels of personal leadership influence others in their behaviour and can be a catalyst for behavioural change. This influence may be observed in many different facets but one of the aspects that ADF personnel typically demonstrate is behavioural integrity. In essence, sailors, soldiers and airmen and -women exhibit a match between their spoken values and their actions. ADF personnel 'walk the talk'. Leaders who act according to their words develop trust and credibility, which builds commitment in those they work with.

During a 2002 deployment to Afghanistan, many of the small teams of Australian special forces soldiers allocated to Regional Command East demonstrated personal leadership through behavioural integrity. This allowed them to influence very senior Afghan commanders to adhere to the coalition commander's campaign plan.

Teams of soldiers were allocated to Northern Alliance commanders for liaison with coalition forces. The time available for the soldiers to build trust with the Afghan commanders was limited. However, through repeated acts of selflessness and maintaining an awareness of Australian Army values, the soldiers were able to influence the Afghan commanders. The small teams positively identified, beyond any doubt, Al Qaida elements prior to engaging them; they paid villagers for items used at the local rate, so as not to adversely affect the local economy; they embraced the local customs; they respected livestock; and they also afforded Al Qaida women and children safe passage through combat engagements.

The small teams of Australian soldiers exhibited character traits that Afghan commanders, although not necessarily agreeing with, could recognise as Australian cultural norms and by reinforcing their values through their actions the soldiers built trust and credibility. Indeed, their leadership, through behavioural integrity, assisted coalition commanders to achieve their intent by leveraging the Afghan Northern Alliance's capability but within the norms of Australian values.

The use of relational and personal leadership traits, melded with the values ADF personnel have reinforced, allows for a perspective on ethical leadership. It draws on the notion of the greater good and places self interest as secondary.

Domain three – ‘ethical leadership’

Ethical leadership balances competing interests and encourages personal responsibility for advancing the greater good. On a tour of Afghanistan in 2005, many actions by Australian soldiers demonstrated that the ADF has some of the finest—and morally courageous—troops in the world. Their actions in dealing with local Afghans, whether they were supporters of the central government or Taliban sympathisers, were even-handed and very professional.

On one particular morning during the northern autumn of 2005, an Australian special forces element, having identified a senior Taliban commander’s house, was commencing an operation to apprehend the individual. A patrol was inserted the evening prior to provide overwatch and cover the advance of the main body once they were inserted the following morning. During the insertion of the main body, one of the snipers in the patrol engaged a Taliban spotter, as he was threatening the advancing Australian troops. Sometime later that morning, the patrol went to clear the area where they had observed the spotter and discovered to their surprise that he was still alive. They administered first aid and an aero-medical evacuation helicopter was requested. The Taliban member was evacuated to a coalition hospital, subsequently recovered and returned to his village after about one month.

The aspect of this incident that resonates is that the actions of the Australian soldiers that morning saved the life of an adversary and allowed the Taliban to witness the philanthropic virtues of Australian soldiers. It is barely possible to imagine the message that this incident would have left in the Taliban spotter and his fellow insurgents—‘the Australians will treat you fairly’. This may go some way towards allowing Taliban members to believe that Western influences in Afghanistan are not always harmful.

Ethical leadership captures the sense of weighting leadership decisions for the good of the group and in a way so too does supportive leadership. In this account, an operational training regime will be utilised to demonstrate the utility of ADF personnel in creating a supportive leadership endeavour.

Domain four – ‘supportive leadership’

Supportive leadership creates a sense of security, acceptance and confidence through providing resources, training and encouragement. The mentoring and training provided in Tarin Kowt by Australian soldiers is an outstanding example of supportive leadership. Furthermore, this mentoring allows for cross cultural tolerance and curtails ethnocentrism. The activities achieved under the mentoring program provide the essential foundation for the Afghan National Army to eventually conduct independent operations and is instilling a feeling of acceptance and confidence in the Kandaks (Afghan infantry battalions).

This supportive leadership is produced by the soldiers conducting the training and the notion of achieving recognition through working with experienced Australian troops. It requires both elements together—and the aggregation of the parts affords a greater sense of output than the elements separately. Training teams and the Australian soldiers involved are one of the best examples of supportive leadership available.

Supportive leadership creates a feeling of regional security and contextual leadership will be examined from the perspective of domestic security with the Sydney Olympics used as the focus.

Domain five – ‘contextual leadership’

Contextual leadership builds group identity and creates community. It clarifies and brings coherence to complex tasks. During the build-up to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, particularly in 1998, 1999 and early 2000, many ADF personnel were involved in the security for the venues and coordinating the competing agendas of the various stakeholders involved. Not least in this undertaking was the requirement to meld private commercial interests with the requirements of the NSW State Police jurisdiction, the Commonwealth Government, the Sydney Olympic Committee and then finally the often under-estimated external interests of foreign governments.

The ADF personnel involved were often junior officers and senior NCOs, drawn from areas such as clearance divers, sniffer dog handlers, aviation and special forces planners, who had to create a grouping or community with the various domestic and international stakeholders. This sense of coherence, despite the complexity of the inter-relationships, was not easily achieved but it did provide an understanding that the Australian Government was capable of assuring the Games’ security.

In the early interactions, such as desktop exercises and the preliminary counter-terrorist exercises at Sydney Airport, these junior personnel created an awareness of a cooperative spirit with stakeholders, including NSW and Commonwealth agencies and departments. The group identity produced demonstrated the high expectations and professionalism of the ADF personnel.

Additionally, as the Olympics approached, more complex activities were conducted that required increased interaction with the Sydney public. These activities required consultative meetings to discuss noise abatement measures for military helicopters and watercraft and, again, these junior personnel were the face of the ADF, the Australian Government and, very often, the security reputation of the Sydney Games. Through rapport building and developing a community or group identity with Australian and international stakeholders, the ADF personnel involved in the introductory Sydney Games security activities were able to provide coherence to a complex system of interdependent relationships.

The final domain is the inspirational leadership. However, this style of leadership often requires an individual to possess all the traits already mentioned. In this account, another operational scenario is used as the mechanism to demonstrate inspirational leadership in the ADF.

Domain six – ‘inspirational leadership’

Inspirational leaders produce high expectations, raise enthusiasm, optimism and confidence. There are many examples of inspirational leaders in the ADF, especially at the executive level. However, another aspect that is often ignored is the ability of junior sailors, soldiers and airmen and -women to influence their peers and superiors.

Reviewing the recent Victoria Cross recipients’ actions provides many opportunities to be inspired by the ADF’s more junior ranks. The optimism, confidence and enthusiasm that the two soldiers exhibited, during what must have been seminal moments in their lives, is a credit to the individuals themselves but also the training and education provided by the ADF training institutions. Both soldiers displayed extreme levels of inspirational leadership by creating a feeling of optimism despite the unfavourable situations they found themselves in. Furthermore,

neither of the soldiers was in a command position at the hazardous moment when they provided exemplary behaviour to their peers and superiors, yet they still demonstrated the highest attributes of soldiering.

Inspirational leadership does not necessarily need to be observed from the executive level to affect or influence a situation: inspiring actions demonstrated by junior ranks can be just as beneficial to an adverse situation. This concept could be afforded more exposure in the ADF and in business circles.

Conclusion

The use of the leadership attributes normally associated with business management demonstrates that military and corporate leadership characteristics are remarkably similar. By using the six leadership domains of corporate leadership—relational, personal, ethical, supportive, contextual and inspirational—and connecting them with a military event, spanning operational deployments through to training activities and courses, the closeness of business and military leadership has been demonstrated.

For the ADF, some of the domains will have a higher weighting, such as personal and ethical for operational service, whereas the domains of supportive and contextual may be more appropriate for training serials. Despite this observation, ADF leadership and business leadership are clearly comparable and create opportunities for positive change.

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Hawkins, DSM and Bar, is a Royal Australian Infantry officer who has served in a variety of regimental and staff appointments in Army and Australian Defence Headquarters. He holds a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering, a Master of Defence Studies—which he completed at Canadian Staff College—and a Master of Business Administration from the Australian Graduate School of Management. He is currently a staff officer in Special Operations Command.

Operations CATALYST and SLIPPER: the commander and air intelligence

Wing Commander Bill 'K9' Kourelakos, CSM, RAAF

In military aviation, every flight exposes the crew, the command chain and the Government to a range of risks. RAAF commanders are in the business of mitigating those risks to acceptable levels through training and the implementation of guidance and rules that foster desired behaviours under normal circumstances. But when abnormal circumstances exist, someone must identify, mitigate (if possible) and accept those risks if the mission is to proceed. Part of the process involved is ascertaining what that risk is and that is where RAAF commanders must interface with their RAAF intelligence officers.

This article provides the reader with two examples of how I managed the relationship with air intelligence officers during my tenure as Commander Task Group 633.4 (CTG 633.4) in the latter half of 2007. TG 633.4 was the Air Mobility Task Group that operated C-130s to provide air logistic support (delivering supplies and passengers) to ADF elements in the Middle East area of operations.¹ The C-130 missions flown under my command included missions to both Iraq and Afghanistan at a time when the Iraq operation (Operation CATALYST) was well-established and the Afghanistan operation (Operation SLIPPER) was still somewhat embryonic in terms of air intelligence support to C-130 operations.

The air intelligence provided during 2007 primarily consisted of reports related to missions that were flown along established air routes and to airfields that had been approved for RAAF operations. Risk mitigation strategies, partially based on this air intelligence, were in place to lower the risks associated with the environment and potential enemy action along those familiar air routes and at those airfields. I therefore inherited established procedures, an agreed air intelligence reporting structure and agreed mission risk profiles (risk levels) under which missions could be authorised by CTG 633.4. As long as we flew these 'normalised' missions to approved airfields, where the likelihood of threat didn't change, then risk management was generally in hand and I could authorise those missions without referring to a higher headquarters.

There were two general scenarios in which the intelligence reporting changed and I therefore had to consider engaging higher headquarters. Firstly, any change in our mission profile (for example, going somewhere we hadn't been before) meant that the normal air intelligence reporting cycle also had to be changed so that reports could be sourced and assessments made. Secondly, any change in threat levels—specifically either enemy behaviour or weapon capability—would lead to changing threat assessments and then possibly changes in risk management.

An example of the first scenario occurred when TG 633.4 was tasked with a mission to Basra in southern Iraq. The tasking direction came from higher headquarters less than 24 hours prior to the beginning of the mission. Basra was not an airfield that TG 633.4 frequented in 2007. But it was the home of a significant British contingent and occasionally, high-ranking ADF officers had business in Basra. These officers normally travelled by helicopter or some other means but, in this instance, there was a need to utilise TG 633.4 aircraft to move this group of officers.

Once the mission was understood, air mobility planners then had to develop a plan and a risk assessment. To do so, they needed two critical intelligence summaries. Firstly, they needed to assess the threats that could affect our aircrew while they conducted the approach and departure phases of their mission. In Basra, the enemy weapon capability ranged from small arms fire (bullets), to rockets and shoulder-launched missiles. The planners also needed to know what threats there might be once the aircraft was on the ground, such as rockets and mortars fired from outside the airfield. Cargo aircraft are vulnerable to attack on the ground because their arrival can't generally be disguised from the enemy and they are a tempting target because of their relatively high value.

Thus the C-130 air mobility planners had a requirement for air intelligence to provide an air threat report and a ground threat report. These air intelligence reports are detailed in nature because they analyse the likelihood of attacks across the 24-hour cycle and also across the week and seasons. Additionally, these reports are based on analysis of intent, capability and evidence, such as historical attacks (for example, by 2007, there were many years worth of historical data for attacks in the vicinity of Basra) but the reports must also project into the future based on the intelligence officer's awareness of factors that might influence the enemy in the future. Armed with this information, the air intelligence officer is then able to develop possible 'enemy courses of action'. Preparation of such reports is time consuming and labour intensive. RAAF commanders must be careful not to squander intelligence resources on frivolous 'what-if' reporting.

In the case of Basra, there were no air intelligence reports available in the Australian intelligence system. Fortunately, TG 633.4 air intelligence officers were collocated with US and UK intelligence officers in the Combined Air Operations Centre and they were able to piece together the two reports (at the expense of other reporting they were required to maintain and by putting in some very long hours).

The C-130 planners then took these reports and analysed the risk associated with the predicted threat—that is, how likely was it that the identified threat would actually occur? Of particular importance to the Basra mission was the selection of the landing time and how long the crew might have to stay on the ground (and therefore give the enemy time to set up for an attack). The mission required an arrival into Basra close to the predicted enemy attack timeframe and there was the possibility of having to remain on the ground waiting for the passengers if they were running late.

Prior to this mission, I had been keeping my eye on US intelligence reports about attacks at Basra because our aircraft routinely flew over Basra and I therefore had to consider its availability as an emergency landing site. Based on those US reports, I was well aware that in mid-2007, Basra was being attacked with indirect fire (rockets) on an almost daily basis. Thus I wasn't surprised when the air intelligence advice was that the enemy's most likely and most dangerous course of action was going to be to continue the daily indirect fire rocket attacks and that there was a good chance of an attack while our C-130 was on the ground. The intelligence assessment was that the longer our aircraft remained on the ground, the more likely it was that an attack would occur because it would afford the enemy time to prepare and because the target would be tempting. Based on this assessment, the C-130 planners devised a plan whereby they would avoid spending too much time on the ground and they presented me with a risk assessment that nevertheless was rated as a 'high risk' mission.

At the point of having received the risk assessment and mission plan, I had to analyse the planning (including the intelligence reports). My first step was to query the intelligence officer on two critical aspects: the basis for assuming that the likelihood of attacks would increase with time and the basis for assuming that our aircraft could actually be targeted. On pressing the air intelligence officers on these points, it became apparent that the indirect fire attacks occasionally hit the ramp area but that accuracy was not a strong point for the enemy. Conflicting information included the fact that British aircraft had been damaged by enemy fire. Finally, through robust discussion, it was assessed that the arrival of an Australian C-130 would not lead to an increase in the likelihood of an attack as coalition aircraft were arriving regularly, some aircraft were even based in Basra on a daily basis and intelligence reporting did not infer that the enemy would specifically target Australian aircraft.

The original plan was for the crew to land and then depart almost immediately if the passengers weren't ready to go. But, based on the assessments noted above, I had the risk assessment adjusted and the mitigation planning amended to allow the crew to remain on the ground longer than they originally planned. The mission was still assessed as being 'high risk' and I referred the risk assessment to my operational command and technical control chains for review with a recommendation to proceed with the mission. The mission was completed and uneventful (Basra was indeed attacked again that day but not while our aircraft was on the ground and the attack missed the ramp area).

One of the key lessons to take away from this mission is that RAAF commanders shouldn't be looking at air mobility operations from a strictly national context. That is, the Australian flight to Basra was simply one of many and therefore not something the enemy would detect as being abnormal or requiring an extra effort on their part. In a large scale operation, unless there is reason to suspect that the enemy can identify aircraft as being Australian and that the enemy might have a reason to target Australian aircraft more so than others, commanders should consider the totality of the air campaign when assessing risk to their particular mission.

The same broad operational mindset came to play in my second example. Late one evening, prior to a mission planned for the next day to Tarin Kowt, I was advised that intelligence officers had become aware of a potential enemy attack that might affect our mission the next day. The intelligence assessment stated that the enemy threat level had increased at Tarin Kowt, and that the 'most dangerous' course of action had now become 'the most likely' course of action, endangering the Australian mission. I was therefore faced with the situation where I needed to make a risk assessment and determine if the risk was actually any greater than the residual risk already being realised. The intelligence officer was concerned about this to the point where he recommended that I consider cancelling the next day's mission.

While it would have been easy to accept this advice on face value, it was my role to consider this intelligence in the wider scheme of our operation. I made two assessments that led me to disagree with my air planning staff's recommendation to cancel the mission. Firstly, the intelligence assessment assumed that by having our aircraft in the vicinity of Tarin Kowt, it would be the subject of an enemy's attack. But there was no intelligence reporting to suggest that there was any intent specifically to target an Australian aircraft. I therefore felt the intelligence assumption was incorrect as Tarin Kowt had approximately 20 aircraft movements per day and our mission would represent only five per cent of the total missions. Secondly, on reading the existing air planning staff risk assessment, it was evident that this likelihood of attack had already been considered and this level of risk already accepted.

What this highlighted to me was that although the air intelligence community was across a mountain of detail with respect to the intelligence situation (including the principles of operational risk assessment), they were not completely familiar with the operational considerations on which I (and the chain of command) was accepting risk. Having said that, I would not change anything that happened that evening. The duty intelligence officer recognised what appeared to be a change in the normal activity of the enemy and he dutifully reported that to the relevant commander. I appreciated his concern and the consequent air staff advice to cancel the mission seemed to make a lot of sense at first glance. But my operational considerations and risk management perspectives led me to a different conclusion.

The RAAF commander is paid to apply a broad base of knowledge and to consider the wider mission and basis upon which to accept or reject risk. In the operational context, intelligence information is often critical to decision making. Therefore air intelligence officers must sit alongside operational planners as valued advisors on the RAAF commander's air staff. It is the RAAF commander who must critically analyse the input from his advisors but not strictly on the basis of a narrow focus such as technical or intelligence information. Although most RAAF commanders have a good understanding of what drives their operational planners, that isn't necessarily the case when it comes to managing air intelligence officers. Thus, understanding air intelligence and the basis of recommendations made by intelligence officers is a critical skill that needs to be imparted to our RAAF commanders.

Wing Commander Bill Kourelakos joined the RAAF in 1997 after serving 11 years in the Canadian Forces. He has completed four tours as a C-130 navigator and participated in approximately 20 different named operations around the globe. He has held a variety of postings within Air Lift Group and had operational commands as Commander Task Group 633.4 (for which he was awarded a Commendation for Distinguished Service) and Air Component Commander Operation PADANG ASSIST. He is currently Commanding Officer, Air Movements Training and Development Unit.

1. C-130s were reassigned to CTU 633.2.X in 2009.

Review essay

Diggers and Greeks: the Australian campaigns in Greece and Crete

Maria Hill
University of NSW Press: Sydney, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-7422-3014-6

Reviewed by Robert S. Bolia,
Office of Naval Research Global, Tokyo, Japan



I remember the first time I visited a bookshop in Australia. It was on Acland Street in St Kilda and I was killing time one morning before a flight from Melbourne to Sydney. I had only been in the country a few days and I went into the store and informed the young lady working behind the counter that I was interested in reading some Australian authors. We had a brief discussion and I suddenly I found myself with a large stack of books by the likes of George Johnston and Peter Goldsworthy, and even a first novel by a bloke who worked at the bookshop.

I recognised that I would probably have to buy an additional piece of luggage for this purchase but set them on the counter anyway and proceeded to the back of the store where the non-fiction was kept. I was pleasantly surprised to find there a relatively large section on military history. It was mostly full of the works of popular American and British historians I had seen many times at bookshops in the US but there was also this massive tome—twice as large as any of the other volumes—that stood out: Les Carlyon's *Gallipoli*.

As an American, nearly everything I knew about Gallipoli was gleaned from the 1981 Peter Weir film. Although relatively well read in military history, I knew little of the First World War and was intrigued by the idea of the ANZACs finding themselves halfway around the world fighting a war against Turkey. I devoured the book, which is still in my mind one of the most readable accounts of a military campaign and was eager to learn more. Fortunately, the scene on Acland Street repeated itself in nearly every city and town I visited in Australia over the next decade and I began to accumulate a small library of Australian military history.

Eventually, it dawned on me that all of the books were about Gallipoli or Fromelles, Pozières or Passchendaele. Why, I wondered, was there nothing on World War 2? I knew that the Great War was seen as a baptism of fire for a newly-independent Australia and for that reason it continued to capture the attention of the nation's readers. Nevertheless, it could hardly be argued that the Second World War was not at least as important to the nation's history. To be honest, I did not know much about Australia's battles against the Axis but I knew at least that they had fought in North Africa and the Middle East, in the Battle of Britain and in Singapore. I also knew that the Japanese had bombed Darwin. Yet these topics did not figure prominently in the military history section of Australian bookshops.

In recent years, this has begun to change. I was delighted to step into a bookshop in Sydney in the winter of 2006 and discover a book on the battles around Kokoda. I had read many accounts of battles fought by US Navy and Marine Corps units in the Pacific but had never even *heard* of Kokoda. More recently, I read accounts of the Aussies at Tobruk and, in so doing, came across references to the operations in Greece and Crete, about which I had read nothing at all—and found myself wanting to learn more. But the disastrous campaigns were not something Australian historians typically wrote about and so I moved on to other things.

Nevertheless, it was always in the back of my mind and so I was delighted when asked to review Maria Hill's *Diggers and Greeks: the Australian campaigns in Greece and Crete*. The author, a Greek-Australian whose relatives were in Greece during the war, and a former high-school teacher who realised how little her students were learning about the battles in Greece and Crete, set out to answer some of the questions that had intrigued me about these Mediterranean struggles. Why, for example, had the Greek operation been virtually forgotten by history, not only in Australia, a nation with one of the largest populations of Greek immigrants in the world but also in Greece itself?

The answer, she found, was complicated. At one level, the campaigns in North Africa and Greece suffered the same fate as so many of Australia's battles—they dwelt in the shadow of Gallipoli and Kokoda. This is not entirely surprising. Gallipoli, after all, is viewed as a defining moment in the nation's history and Kokoda, although small in scale, represented the first Allied defeat of a Japanese Army that had conquered half of China and all of Southeast Asia, and was a turning point in the Pacific War.

Yet the hypothesis that the Anzac legend has rendered campaigns other than Gallipoli and Kokoda uninteresting is not sufficient, as Hill points out, to explain the dearth of literature on the battles in Greece, Malaya and Bougainville. It is tied up with the perception of Australia's lack of military leadership at the strategic and operational level—the Second World War yielded no Monash to be remembered by future generations of Australians—and by the nation's lack of voice in the direction of the war. These combined to involve Australian forces in a series of ignominious defeats that ordinary Aussies viewed as the result of poor decision making by the British high command, whose reckless willingness to employ Dominion troops in what some regarded as a product of Churchill's personal adventurism left a bad taste in the mouth of many Australians.

The point that is often raised is that, as a mere sideshow, the campaign was of no strategic importance and as such not worth writing about. Hill disputes this, pointing out that although the campaign had little if any effect on the defeat of Germany, it had a massive impact on Australia's military strategy. Not only did it lead to the removal of Wavell, it contributed directly to the fall of the Menzies government and to Australia's public announcement that henceforth she would look to America rather than Britain as her primary ally in defending Australia.

The Greek reluctance to write about the war is perhaps less surprising. Although Greek soldiers had performed well against the Italian invaders, they were no match for the Wehrmacht, even with the help of the Commonwealth troops. The speedy retreat was not something most Greeks wanted to dwell on, nor was the subsequent occupation. Moreover, the war left the Greek economy in shambles, leading to large-scale emigration. Those who remained wanted to forget about the war.

One might expect that Hill's purpose in writing the book is to tell the story of the battles in Greece and Crete as a means of telling a story—in which her countrymen and her ancestors played leading roles—that has largely been forgotten (as she points out, Australia does not even have a campaign medal for Greece and Crete). Yet this is not in fact her avowed purpose. Instead, she sets out to describe the campaign in terms of the relations it engendered between the diggers and their Greek allies.

She at times seems surprised that there is no literature on the interactions between Australian soldiers and the ordinary Greek citizens they encountered during their short sojourn there, although she also recognises that military historians tend to write about battles and campaigns rather than human relationships. Nevertheless, she argues that it is not enough to view war through the lenses of strategy and tactics. Human relationships matter and should be considered. That this has not been done for the Greek campaign Hill establishes by a survey of the relevant historiography. She leaves the reader with no doubts as to the novelty of her approach.

Yet there are a several problems with it. The first is that she fails to convince the reader that it is even an interesting topic or that it is particularly relevant to military history (from the title of the book, one expects a military history of the campaigns). Her rationale is based on the fact that no-one has considered the matter before but that in itself is insufficient. Maybe no-one has taken it up because it really isn't that interesting. She needs to convince the reader that an analysis of the relationships between the diggers and the Greek people will make a contribution to our understanding of the campaign or have implications for future campaigns.

Barring that, it actually needs to *be* interesting. If an understanding of the human side of Greek-Australian wartime interaction teaches us nothing about war, it may still tell a good story. Unfortunately, in this case it doesn't. Most of the anecdotes are rather dry and very little attempt is made at tying them together into a coherent whole. One is left with the impression that the Greeks and the Aussies liked each other and that this persisted after the war. But this may be said of Aussies and Yanks, Yanks and Brits, etc. It is not by any means a novel conclusion.

Part of the problem is the scope of the work does not match the product. The subject matter would probably fit nicely into a journal article or perhaps a chapter in a history of the campaign. But there is certainly not enough to fill a volume the size of *Diggers and Greeks*. There is another problem. Although Hill sets out to write a book about the relationships between Greeks and Australians, she spends more time talking about the campaign and the events that preceded it than she does about the interpersonal dealings in which she expresses so much interest.

The highlight of the book is Hill's analysis of the British decision to get involved in Greece and its implications for Australian politics and military strategy. She is highly critical of the cavalier attitude of British leadership to the use of ANZAC troops, of the machinations that led to the operation and of Allied intelligence and counter-intelligence failures (Germany was not at war with Greece when Allied troops arrived, so the German embassy was still sending reports of troop movements to Berlin). She is equally critical of Blamey's prevarication in failing to promptly inform Canberra of his views on the likely success of the Greek operation and of Australia's failure to assert her right to a say in the decision process. But she appreciates the complexity of the issue and presents a relatively unbiased view of events and offers an insightful analysis.

She also provides a decent analysis of the plans for the operation, highlighting lessons that today's military forces continue to have to re-learn. For example, the Australians did not play a significant role in planning the operation they were tasked to execute, nor were they provided with all of the intelligence available to the British. The Australians did not have enough interpreters, which led to major communication problems with their Greek allies. Nor did they have an adequate understanding of the Greek troops, their level of training or their organisation. Finally, the pre-war economic relationship between Greece and Germany led to German spies operating freely throughout the Greek countryside. All of these have as much relevance to allied operations in the modern Middle East as they do for the history of the Second World War.

Although adept at recounting the events leading up to the decision to land in Greece, Hill falls short when it comes to describing engagements at the tactical and operational level. The writing here is of uneven quality, and largely wound uncomfortably around threads of what was meant to be her focus—the personal relationships between diggers and Greeks. In many cases, it seems as though she is uncertain about what to include. At times she includes too little, at times too much. Most glaring is the total lack of reporting of the campaign from the German perspective. This would be acceptable in a work that was really more about interpersonal relations among allies. But the fact that *Diggers and Greeks* actually spends so much time on the campaign itself without reference to German decision making leaves the impression of a lack of balance.


Although I was excited to read an account of the Australian campaigns in Greece and Crete, I found *Diggers and Greeks* ultimately unsatisfying. It was neither a proper history of the operations nor a focused account of the relationships formed between Australian soldiers and their Greek allies but rather a less than coherent mingling of the two that left me feeling as though I didn't know much more about the campaign itself than I had before reading the book. On the other hand, I'm not sorry I read it, since the analysis of the Australian political context before and after the battles was for me both novel and insightful. Moreover, it gives me hope that there may yet appear histories of Australia's other forgotten campaigns of the Second World War.

Book reviews

Crumps and Camouflets: Australian tunnelling companies on the Western Front

Damien Finlayson
Big Sky Publishing: Newport (NSW), 2010
ISBN: 978-0-9806-5826-2

Reviewed by John Donovan



Many readers will be familiar with the exploits of Australia's 'tunnel rats' in Vietnam, members of the Royal Australian Engineers who explored tunnel complexes found by the 1st Australian Task Force. Fifty years earlier, another band of Australian engineers fought their underground war on the Western Front. Damien Finlayson tells the story of that earlier band. One of his relatives, 2nd Lieutenant Robert Finlayson, was killed in 1917 while serving with the 1st Australian Tunnelling Company.

Finlayson starts with a discussion of the place of mining in the First World War, the raising of the Australian Mining Corps in 1915, and its disbandment and separation into three tunnelling companies in 1916. He then recounts the exploits of those companies and the Australian Electrical and Mechanical Mining and Boring Company, nicknamed the Alphabet Company. Some readers might be familiar with part of the story, told in the recent film *Beneath Hill 60*.

Unlike the tunnel rats of Vietnam, the Western Front tunnellers did not usually explore enemy tunnels (though Finlayson records some daring exploits in German tunnels). Rather, they excavated tunnels, often for offensive mines but also for defensive purposes.

Offensive mining on the Western Front is mentioned in the Australian official histories. But these do not give a feel for the extent of these operations, well beyond the Messines Ridge area, which Finlayson covers in detail. Also, the official histories do not say much about defensive mining operations or the employment of tunnelling companies to construct tunnels (to give protected access to forward trenches) and general purpose dugouts for accommodation, headquarters or medical facilities.

Finlayson's account covers the Messines Ridge mines, mostly constructed by Canadian and British tunnellers, some of which were defended by Australians until the attack commenced. Those who visit the Western Front might be aware that not all of the Messines Ridge mines were detonated at the time. In 1955, lightning detonated a mine in the area and Finlayson records that five remain below Belgian soil, packed with around 70,000 kilograms of high explosive.

Finlayson also covers the actions of Australian tunnellers on the Belgian coast, an area little mentioned in Australian accounts of the First World War. The personal level is covered as well. Some kind of prize for devotion to duty should surely go to the digger on listening watch in a defensive tunnel, who was trapped by the explosion of a German defensive mine, but continued to maintain his watch logbook while waiting for rescue!

In the last months of the war, and after it ended, the tunnellers mainly cleared German mines and booby traps. While engaged in these tasks in December 1918, a small group of armed Australian tunnellers took the opportunity to march in formation across the unguarded German border, then discreetly withdrew before attracting the attention of higher authority.

There are some minor production issues. Some maps are printed at far too small a scale. The automatic spellchecker apparently confused a mine entrance—an adit—with an audit. In an apparent Freudian slip, Lieutenant General Haking, under whose command the 5th Australian Division fought at Fromelles, is occasionally rendered as 'Hacking'. Otherwise the production standard is excellent.

An interesting side issue is that in 1942, Lieutenant General Morshead chose a new colour patch for the 9th Australian Division, shaped as a 'T' to commemorate the division's service in Tobruk. Morshead served on the Western Front. Did he realise that the tunnelling companies had used this shape and that the colour patch of the 9th Division engineers was a squat version of the Mining Corps patch, with the grey background of the 2nd AIF?

***Fire in the Sky:
the Australian Flying Corps in the First World War***

Michael Molkenntin
Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-7423-7072-9

Reviewed by Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd)



The Australian Flying Corps (AFC) of World War 1 has a remarkable history, yet few have ever heard of Australia's aerial contribution to the Great War. Well known are the campaigns of Gallipoli and the Western Front because of the plethora of books, TV documentaries, movies, and commemorative and memorial services. The land campaigns are taught at school and celebrated every Anzac Day. There are also battlegrounds to visit and graves to lay a poppy beside. While many Australians served with the British aerial services, nearly 4000 served under the AFC. For these Australian airmen, there is no battleground, no field of graves and only one memorial in the country—hidden at the back of the old parade ground at Point Cook. The Australian War Memorial's 'Over the Front' exhibition has only recently begun to redress the previous lack of recognition.

At the behest of a far-sighted Defence Minister, Senator Sir George Pearce, Australia raised a flying service in 1912 and, by the start of the war, was already training pilots at Point Cook in Victoria. Australia was therefore well placed to contribute to this new form of warfare, if only in personnel. Although we did not send aircraft or materiel, by 1918 Australia had mobilised a half-flight and four operational and four training squadrons for overseas, as well as maintaining a significant flying school at home. The half-flight of 1915 went to Mesopotamia, 1 Squadron was sent to Egypt and Palestine, and 2, 3 and 4 Squadrons went to the Western Front. The overseas training squadrons and an AFC administrative organisation were established in England. By late 1919, members of the AFC had returned home and the Corps disbanded.

However, by 1920, Australia's military staff decided the air medium was the new frontier, so plans were laid to establish the RAAF—but that is another story.

It was therefore most pleasing to see this new history of the AFC authored by Michael Molkentin, a 27-year old school teacher from Wollongong, who had taken more than a passing interest in the men and their flying machines. Not since the release of Frank Cutlack's Volume VIII of the official history in 1923 has any serious study been compiled nor, until now, has any single volume attempted to present a modern interpretation of the AFC's war in the air.

Fire in the Sky is well researched and written in a comfortable, flowing style that presents the narrative in lay terms, allowing the reader easily to follow the story. The narrative is presented chronologically, with the first half of the book covering the air war over the Middle East and the second half the Western Front (curiously in almost the same percentages as in Cutlack's). While these two theatres were quite different, the ingenuity of the Australians and the character of the airmen appeared ubiquitous and often set them apart.

As an aside, I thought it quite amusing that while Molkentin states in his prologue that previous books 'tend to fixate on a few celebrity fighter pilots and their aeroplanes' and that he has 'avoided that approach', he spends quite a few pages discussing celebrity fighter pilots and their aeroplanes! Most pleasing, however, is his extensive coverage of work of the air mechanics, fitters and riggers who kept the aircraft flying. Theirs was an unglamorous and thankless task that has not been covered in any detail previously. The 404 pages span the subject admirably as the work makes extensive use of official records, previously published sources and eye-witness accounts left to us in letters and diaries held in the War Memorial. The book also includes endnotes, a guide for further research, an extensive bibliography and an index.

Unfortunately, the book only tells part of the story. There is no mention of the AFC detachment that accompanied the military expedition to New Guinea to capture the German garrison in 1914 (although to be fair the aircraft they took was not used), nor any mention of the considerable AFC establishment set up in England between 1917 and the war's end. Here, there was a wing headquarters, an aircraft repair section, a training depot, a hospital and two major training airfields, one at Minchinhampton and the other at Leighterton. Although not as exciting as strafing the trenches or aerial combat, this work was vitally important to replace airmen losses and maintain a steady flow of trained fitters and mechanics to the front. I believe that deserves even a passing mention.

The book is also let down by the cheap, newsprint type of paper the publishers have used and the 16 pages of selected photographs stuck between the centre pages. I for one would have been happy to part with more cash for better quality paper and photos inserted beside the appropriate text rather than a disparate collection stuffed in the centre.

Despite this, *Fire in the Sky* is well written and an easy read. Congratulations to Michael Molkentin for tackling this long neglected subject. Highly recommended for those interested in Australia's contribution to the first air war and for whom their battlefield was in the sky.

Bad Characters: sex, crime, mutiny, murder and the Australian Imperial Force

Peter Stanley
Murdoch Books: Millers Point (NSW), 2011
ISBN: 978-1-7419-6480-6

Reviewed by Lex McAulay



'Warts and all' is a fitting description of Peter Stanley's book on the darker side of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) between 1914 and 1919. In a force of 400,000, it was certain that a number would be less than honest patriots and also that the existing systems of communications and personal identification would allow undesirables to enter the ranks. From the beginnings, the AIF contained a number of criminals, crooks and confidence tricksters, some of whom managed to avoid front-line service for all or most of their time in uniform, some for years.

It was also inevitable that a volunteer force from the former colonies would include many men who had no patience for the class structure of British society and this feeling was exacerbated by British ineptness in military matters.

The unimaginable conditions of service, both on Gallipoli and the Western Front, resulted in many men trying every means to avoid front-line service, extending to desertion if legal means were not available. The front of the book has a photo of a group of smiling diggers—all deserters—who sent it to the provost marshal at Le Havre as a postcard souvenir. The now well-known Australian reluctance to salute is mentioned, with the angst generated in senior ranks, along with theft not being regarded a crime by the diggers when it was committed against other units, preferably British. More references are made to self-inflicted wounds, and venereal disease has as much attention in the text as military discipline.

While British and Australian commanders believed that the lack of a death penalty encouraged wrongdoers, and requested it be introduced for certain acts, the Australian government refused to do so. Stanley indicates that this was not a consequence of the trial and execution of Morant and Hancock but had been a constant in colonial government legislation as it related to volunteer military forces before Federation.

Stanley's decision to research and present this book came from his opinion that family researchers concentrating on the battlefield successes of the AIF would otherwise have an incomplete understanding of the true nature of the Australians who served between 1914 and 1919. However, as personal records of service contain medical records and disciplinary actions, descendants of those men should be in no doubt of the facts of their service—and unit war diaries contain details of courts martial.

Perhaps with access to official files, some family mythology will be demolished in some cases (the reviewer knows of several). But human nature being what it is, and as society today has different attitudes to some personal failings, revelation that an ancestor's war service was not entirely perfect probably will have little effect.

Stanley very kindly credits some long-time scoundrels and malingerers with so much pride in their AIF service that they continually requested replacements for lost medals and the 'Returned from Active Service' badge. But a more cynical view would be that these men were scoundrels before and during their service and that after the war some would have used the medals and badge to continue as petty criminals and confidence tricksters.

An interesting book and no doubt anyone who has served in our armed forces has met similar characters to those described here.

War

Sebastian Junger
Hachette: New York, 2010
ISBN: 978-0-4465-5624-8

Reviewed by Dr Richard B. Connell, UNSW @ ADFA



War is both a narrative about the infantry and a thoughtful commentary about armed conflict and some of its derivatives. Much of the narrative focuses on what infantrymen do, the hardships under which they live and their self satisfaction and pride at being at 'the tip of the spear'. In discussing these, Junger provides general perspectives about the meaning of war and combat and, at a micro level, analyses how soldiers react to fighting and how they are motivated. His views were honed during five trips to Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, when he was embedded primarily with a platoon of the 173rd Infantry (Airborne) Brigade. His ethnographic experiences were supplemented by desk research.

Many of his interpretations elaborate conventional wisdom held by infantrymen themselves. Other interpretations provide new and occasionally controversial perspectives to practitioners and lay readers alike. For example, he distinguishes between 'war' and 'battle' by asserting that war overarches battle and is not to be liked, except perhaps by generals, who may view it clinically as a chess game. War, he maintains, is too amorphous for the infantryman to contemplate. Combat, however, 'is the smaller game that young men "fall in love with"'. [It is] insanely exciting ... [and] provides a sense of purpose and a means of self-testing and [after combat] men worry that they'll never be satisfied with a "normal" life'.

Apart from these perspectives, that help function as context, the author delves into how infantry soldiers experience and react to combat and what motivates them. His main analysis and conclusions are distilled into three main themes—fear, killing and love—each of which forms a section in the book. These themes are core to the combat experience itself and contribute to some of the ironies of engaging in it.

As an example, he notes that combat results in extreme physiological responses. The sound of incoming fire causes men to crouch, clench their fists and display outward responses that are universal. Internally, there is another set of responses that includes stimulating pulse and blood pressure to near heart attack levels. Collectively, these responses often result in

tunnel vision, freezing, a decline in rationale thought, the unusual but occasional out-of-body experience and other psychological and physiological impairments to optimal reactions to the threat. That is, the natural responses of body and mind reduce the ability of individuals to cope with the combat environment, despite the fact that this is obviously dysfunctional in preserving the species.

In discussing what prompts infantrymen to participate in combat, Junger states that it stimulates the physiological adrenalin rushes and dopamine releases that fuel and reward the experience. However, he asserts that the core motivation is the desire to protect the group (rather than kill the enemy). Indeed, Junger contends that 'there is a profound and mysterious gratification to the reciprocal agreement to protect another person with your life, and combat is virtually the only situation in which that happens regularly'. He also asserts that 'defence of the tribe is an insanely compelling idea ... so compelling—so addictive, in fact—that eventually it becomes the rationale for why the group exists in the first place'.

This theme cascades through his explanation of one important aspect of successfully conducting close quarters battle. To make his point, he contrasts the reaction of an American squad to that of a Taliban unit, both of which were trapped in L-shaped ambushes. The 173rd elements immediately engaged in a spontaneous but highly disciplined counterattack. In doing so, individual members of the squad were put in harm's way but the group extricated itself more or less unscathed. The Taliban squad, on the other hand, returned fire as an uncoordinated set of individuals, each of whom was apparently concerned primarily with self protection. Twenty Taliban were killed in the ambush.

Junger further explains his illustration by using the metaphor of protective choreography, in this case, the classical fire and manoeuvre tactic: 'You fire and I'll advance. I'll fire and you advance'. He maintains that the choreography, used by 173rd elements, was so powerful that it overcame the enormous tactical deficits of being surprised and outnumbered. More importantly, he asserts that it was driven by decisions that were based on what was good for the group and not the individual: 'If everyone does that most of the group survives. If no-one does, most of the group dies'.

Junger states the objective of his book in terms of why he volunteered to be an embedded reporter in a geographic area, the Korengal Valley, that was arguably the most combat intensive in Afghanistan: 'To see what it's like to serve in a platoon of combat infantry'. He communicates his experiences exceptionally well through a carefully-crafted mosaic of observations and interviews with platoon members and interpretations of these. What distinguishes *War* from other books of its genre is the way Junger has laced his interpretations of events with explanatory theory from psycho-social, neurological and other scientific research.

One limitation, however, rests in the way some of his assertions are presented as universal and independent of context. For example, he gives the impression that the motive for fighting—group protection—supersedes culture, ideology and a host of other factors. While there are historical examples of where this appears to have been true—Long Tan and the Alamo among them—there are other well-known cases where multiple motives were at play. And protection of the group may not have been predominant among them. Why, for example, did so many Japanese, subscribing to the Bushido code, lay down their lives for the emperor? Why did North American civilians volunteer to join the 18th Brigade's Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil War? What drove the Crusaders? And what about Al Qaeda?


Another related limitation is his tendency to isolate and simplify causal factors and influences. For example, he asserts that group-protecting decision-based choreography is the sole reason why the American squad performed so well when it was ambushed. However, might not this explanation have benefited from at least a passing mention of such influences as training and muscle memory?

While the reader may recognise some of the limitations of the author's interpretations and assertions, Junger does provide thought-provoking perspectives on and insights into a number of phenomena that have long been studied and pondered by members of the armed forces, military philosophers and behavioural scientists. And, as one would expect from a *New York Times* best-selling author (*The Perfect Storm*), the book is highly readable. It should be of interest to scholars and practitioners alike, as well as the broader lay audience at which it is targeted and who will no doubt make *War* Junger's second international best seller.

Gallipoli: a short history

Michael McKernan
Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-7423-7028-6

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles



What more could possibly be written about Gallipoli? For nearly a century, it seems that historians from Charles Bean to Les Carlyon have delved into every detail of the campaign and have critically examined each and every decision and action taken. Is there anything new to be explored? Michael McKernan believes that there is if the story is written for today's reader who knows things that earlier writers, such as Charles Bean, could not. Today's readers can put Gallipoli in a new perspective with their knowledge of similar events, such as the great World War 2 invasions in Europe and the Pacific, and even at Inchon in Korea.

McKernan has written, for the most part, a tidy and well-articulated general history of the Gallipoli campaign. By drawing on his familiarity of the battlefield as it is today, the author effectively evokes images of what it was like in 1915. While mention is made of the landings at Cape Helles and Suvla Bay, the emphasis is on Anzac. The book opens with an excellent 11-page timeline of events and concludes with a very informative appendix explaining the origins of most of the names so familiar to us. Included in the book are some 32 well-reproduced photos taken around Gallipoli, some of which are familiar, some perhaps not. Two line maps are included but they omit any indication of the topography of the peninsula. This is a pity as the ground shaped the campaign. As well, some place names that are prominent in the narrative do not appear on the map and this is always annoying.

In a style similar to that employed by Antony Beevor, the author attempts to bring events alive through the recollections of selected participants. Unfortunately, it does not always work. Unlike Beevor, who searches out an appropriate account of an event and may not mention that

source again, McKernan attempts to follow the path of a small group as the campaign unfolds. Inevitably, events occurred which did not involve members of the group, resulting in our hearing from them as distant observers at best. It is only when they were active participants that their stories become relevant and contribute to bringing the events alive. Otherwise, their accounts of events seen or heard from afar tend to be mundane.

At several places in the book, the author is critical of the actions taken by individual British officers. He then characterises them by means of their upper class manner of speech and uses this as a form of ridicule. It may be one thing to deplore their actions but to demean the perpetrators in this manner is unnecessary and makes for uncomfortable reading.

In the introduction, the author admits that this is an opinionated work and that his opinions will annoy or surprise some readers. I can only agree with him on that! While not necessarily disputing the veracity of his observations, I did find his use of assertions not supported by balanced argument to be irksome. To be fair, the author makes it clear that this is not a work intended for the serious military historian. However, I feel that such sweeping observations, when placed before an audience of general readers, can only cause misunderstanding or bias or perpetuate myth.

There is another dimension to this book, apart from that of a short history, and it is a result of the author's attempt to have us view the grief that the war inflicted on families back home in Australia. Writers at the time could not have foreseen the long term effects that Gallipoli—and the subsequent campaigns in the Middle East and France—would have on Australia. Sociologists hypothesise that by 1918 a gloom had settled on Australia and that this was reflected in the country's stunted social development and even in its architecture.

A foretaste of this is provided when the author describes how clergymen were given the task of taking casualty telegrams to next of kin and the fear and anguish that their very presence in the neighbourhood generated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that similar reactions were to be found in married quarter areas during the Vietnam era. Chapter 6, titled 'If only I could see your grave', brings this home hard and is a most poignant and moving account.

McKernan has produced a work that will provide a good introduction to many of the events surrounding the Gallipoli campaign. It also provides an insight to the time when the people at home started to realise that there was a terrible price to be paid for the heroic deeds of the AIF. The author's digressions into unsubstantiated assertion and occasional ridicule have, in my opinion, marred what could have been a very good general history of the campaign. That said, I also feel that there is still much to be found that will be of value to his target audience. Chapter 6 alone should make the purchase worthwhile.

A History of Air Warfare

John Andreas Olsen (ed.)
Potomac Books: Washington DC, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-5979-7440-0

Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert,
Air Power Development Centre



Air power enthusiasts have at times acted like evangelist Christians who believe that Jesus will save everyone, if only everyone could 'see the light'. Many members of the ADF can get distracted by the technical details in some books written by air power's 'true-believers' and in the process find it difficult to see how the strengths and weaknesses of air power apply in their own particular situation. However, we can no longer leave the application of air power to the relatively small group of professionals within the RAAF and allied air forces, because the air dimension now impacts all aspects of the profession of arms, whatever the character of warfare or the level of conflict.

A History of Air Warfare explains how and why this is so in a manner that is clear, concise and readable. Whether you are a soldier, sailor or airman, this book is not just an introduction to air warfare; it provides the width, depth and context necessary to expand your horizons. Air power, whether provided by Navy, Army or Air Force elements, is a key enabler of ADF joint operations and without doubt it will remain so, in one form or another, for many years to come.

John A. Olsen, who is dean of the Norwegian Defence University College, has assembled a 'who's who' of military experts and convinced them to write papers on the effectiveness, utility and applicability of air power in campaigns from World War I to the 2006 Lebanese War. Many of the earlier experiences of air warfare identified the fundamentals of air warfare that underpin our understanding of air power today. For instance, the chapter by Alan Stephens shows that many of the basic principles of modern airlift were observed during the 1950-53 Korean War. Although the two world wars and the major conflicts of the early and mid 20th century are covered, the greater part of the book deals with conflicts since the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Some have argued that the post-Cold War period has seen the maturation of air power, as technology has caught up with the classical theories of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. Operation DESERT STORM, which led to the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, is described as the 'first time in history [that] air power was allowed to dominate a large-scale military campaign, and it proved itself beyond all expectations'. However, the use of air power during the NATO interventions in the 1993-95 Bosnian War and in the 1999 Kosovo conflict was much more complex and less decisive than anticipated.

In the latter case, Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO's widespread use of networked systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites, all-weather navigation and precision-guided weapons was countered by Serbian asymmetric tactics, including 'dispersal, deception, concealment, camouflage, mobility in small numbers, and placing military targets among civilians'. Much of this would sound very familiar to those who have first-hand experience in conflicts over the last ten years.

Just over one month after the 9/11 terror attacks, the US military and its alliance partners conducted Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Benjamin Lambeth explains how it was waged primarily as an air campaign conducted in conjunction with special operations forces and friendly Afghan fighters. It did not take long for this to be described as a 'new way of warfare for the United States'. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the US-led campaign in the 2003 Iraq War, followed with air power once again playing a decisive role. But this time, in the absence of a significant Iraqi air threat, the air campaign essentially came down to interdiction and close air support.

According to Williamson Murray, the author of the chapter on Iraq, strategic bombing had little effect on the regime's willingness to continue the conflict but caused considerable damage to Iraq's civilian and bureaucratic infrastructure. The limitations of a modern nation's ability to use air power against a terrorist or guerrilla organisation were demonstrated during the 2006 Lebanon War, although some might suggest that some limitations are more apparent than real if they are the result of inadequate doctrine.

The final three chapters of *A History of Air Warfare* are not chronologically based but rather deal with themes over the life of military aviation, covering almost 100 years. James Corum provides an interesting overview of air power in 'small wars'. Perhaps not too surprisingly, he concludes that the primary role of air power in irregular warfare is to support police and military forces in the judicious application of force with civil-economic actions that address the underlying causes of the conflict.

Martin van Creveld offers a chapter which sets out the reasons why he believes air power is becoming increasingly obsolete. He suggests that it is because modern conflicts involve unconventional warfare where the usefulness of air power is limited at best, that the number of combat aircraft in the world's most important air forces is on an unstoppable decline. In his opinion, the remaining elements of air power—missiles, unmanned devices and helicopters—will be reabsorbed into the ground and naval forces. The following chapter by Richard Hallion, titled 'Air and Space Power: Climbing and Accelerating', offers a more traditional view of air power. He explains why he thinks 'it is premature to bury the manned military airplane, air forces or air power'.

Overall the book contains an extremely useful collection of papers that form a valuable resource on modern warfare. Together they should generate much thought and debate within the ADF. And once again this book provides confirmation that the lessons of military history are enduring, although the technology and tactics do change. *A History of Air Warfare* is a 'must read' for everyone in the ADF who wants to understand how warfare is, and will be, conducted in the 21st century.

***A Tactical Ethic:
moral conduct in the insurgent battlespace***

Dick Couch
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-5911-4137-2

Reviewed by Dr Ian Wing



This book offers much to professional military readers. It has been written by a well-informed author with excellent access to sources. It draws on up-to-date research and observations. And its length and readable style mean that it can be read in a few hours.

Dick Couch is a widely-published author of books on the training and campaigns of US special forces. He served as a Navy SEAL during the Vietnam War, where he commanded one of the only successful missions to recover prisoners of war. His previous book, *The Sheriff of Ramadi* (2008), described SEAL operations in Anbar province, Iraq.

Couch wrote this book while teaching leadership and ethics at the US Naval Academy. His teaching used the two questions of ‘what is right’ and ‘how do we choose’. Drawing from this start point, the aim of this book is to explore the ethics and morality of US soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Couch refers to the recent TV series ‘Generation Kill’ as ‘a window into the culture and virtue of our young warriors’. While he finds their trash-talk alarming—and sees them as being very different from his own generation in Vietnam—he is very impressed by their proficiency in battle. But Couch is concerned that tightly-bonded small unit cultures may cause some soldiers to be influenced by those who wilfully engage in unlawful or immoral conduct on the battlefield. Others may be unwilling to report bad behaviour for fear of negative repercussions for their unit or themselves.

Couch reminds the reader that all deaths on the battlefield have consequences: ‘Even if cloaked in the moral authority of national service, the taking of human life is serious business. It is to be done judiciously and within proscribed limits’. In counter-insurgency operations, wrong conduct on the battlefield may lose the war. At pains not to sound soft on this topic, Couch states that he is not an ‘ivory tower’ theorist: ‘If the guy is shooting at you, he has forfeited his right to life and has earned himself a bullet. Past that, there will be restrictions and these restrictions will be situational’.

The book opens with an analysis of aspects of the history of warfare and the nature of the American warrior culture. This analysis follows the tenets of the honour codes of the US Marine Corps (USMC) and US Army. It then describes the types of men born from 1980 onwards—and known as ‘Generation Y’—who are drawn from modern society to serve in the infantry and special forces. Couch argues that an effective tactical ethos should still be grounded in classroom discussions. These discussions must present complex and realistic scenarios that force trainees to make difficult choices, such as choosing between one’s loyalty to the team and one’s duty to a greater code of honour.


Later chapters cover more advanced approaches to ethical training, emphasising two main examples. The first is the SEAL course in 'Close Quarters Defense' (CQD), which covers martial arts and combat scenarios (reminiscent of those used in ADF courses in military self defence). The second is the continuous reinforcement of value-based conduct in the warrior ethos of the USMC. The book concludes with Couch's checklist of ten 'Battlefield Rules of Ethics'. These aim to guide junior leaders in how to reduce wrong conduct on the battlefield.

Five appendices provide General Petraeus' guidance on values, the core values of the US Armed Forces, the service creeds of the US Armed Forces, the ethics section of the US Army Counter-Insurgency Manual and an overview of training integrity for CQD. While the book is primarily oriented towards an American audience, Australian military readers are likely to find plenty of material that applies to our own experiences. The book is not intended to provide a definitive study on battlefield ethics. It does offer useful and timely perspectives on how to train soldiers to do the right thing in battle. *A Tactical Ethic* is highly recommended for military professionals and others with an interest in ethics and special forces.

***We Are Soldiers: our heroes, their stories,
real life on the front line***

Danny Danziger
Sphere: London, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-8474-4397-7

Reviewed by Jim Truscott



Danny Danziger has done a sterling job of compiling a collection of personal stories about front-line actions. The British Army has been involved in many theatres of war, from the Falklands to current-day operations in Afghanistan. I simply raced through all 34 stories. They were raw, great and easy to read.

I first looked at the book with reticence, thinking that this approach had been used many times before and, what's more, these stories were all about the Poms! Well I was wrong. Each and every one of them could have been about an Australian, for the warfighting culture is identical. Each story was extremely personable and very individual. Soldiers and officers were accorded equal priority.

The way that the stories are grouped is unique. They start with accounts of combat service support. One account stands out as being the female medic awarded a Military Cross. Combat support arms are included next and they provide a fascinating cross-section of experiences. Combat arms are described last and most comprehensively, with experiences from rifleman through to brigadier, from those who have never seen an enemy on the battlefield through to abundant death on both sides.

I have no hesitation in recommending this book. It will be enjoyed by those in uniform and the public at large. It will be of particular benefit to combat commanders who have not yet experienced combat. As a staff cadet, I always remember Major Jim Connolly, our infantry instructor at Duntroon in 1977, describing the assault during a tactics lecture with continuous machine-gun fire in the background for 40 minutes. It is that sort of book.

***From STORM to FREEDOM:
America's long war with Iraq***

John R. Ballard
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-5911-4018-4

Reviewed by Dr Dominic Katter



War is an irrational act but the decision to make war should be the most rational of any made by a national leader.

Ballard, p. 241.

From *STORM to FREEDOM* is a comprehensive analysis of America's interactions and engagements with Iraq from 1990 to 2010. Author John Ballard approaches the topic with a distinctive analysis, considering both Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as two elements of a single conflict. The conflict is considered from both political and military points of view, with details of the conflict, as well as the circumstances leading to it.

Dr John Ballard is a retired US Marine officer, having served in combat in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with the 4th Civil Affairs Group. At the time of writing this monograph, he was the Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs and Professor of Strategic Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Washington. Previously, he was the Foundation Professor of Defence Studies at Massey University, New Zealand and a Professor of Strategic Studies at the US National War College.

The book manages to appropriately reflect the author's experience as a combat veteran, while also providing a depth of analysis commensurate with his academic background. The text provides an accurate, honest account of the actions and motivations of both coalition and Iraqi forces. The final chapter is devoted to detailing the strategic and policy lessons learnt by the US as a result of the conflict, including a particular emphasis on the strategic mindset required for effective modern warfare.

He states in conclusion that:

... [of all the] potential benefits that may be accrued from the war (foremost among them being democracy in the Middle East, the end of an oppressive regime, and perhaps a more mature American approach to war-making), none could be clearer or perhaps more beneficial over the long term than the need to better understand the culture and perceptions of other nations, particularly those in the Middle East.

The work is generally neither critical nor congratulatory. The author does not hesitate in stating that Saddam Hussein 'stood in violation of some sixteen UN Security Council resolutions' and this 'was sufficient grounds to renew hostilities that had been appropriately authorized and near universally accepted in 1991'. However, he goes on to add (characteristically of the rest of the work) that:

... [although] sufficient, such grounds still may not have been appropriate as a rationale for war. For the US to remain a respected global power, its leaders need to ensure that war as an instrument of national policy is only employed when it is both necessary and, in the long-term interests of the nation, a just cause.


The work is easy to read, with detailed referencing in endnote form. The book includes relevant maps, as well as a centre section of photographs of key leaders. Frequent headings and a logical outline of content make the text uncomplicated and easy to follow. In summary, this book is a valuable contribution to the conflict in Iraq. It is relevant to soldiers, political analysts and academics alike. Readers with an appreciation for military conflicts will enjoy this new perspective on the history of conflict in Iraq.

On-line book reviews

To Salamaua

Phillip Bradley
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2010
ISBN: 978-0-5217-6390-5

Reviewed by John Donovan



Many Australians will be familiar with Damien Parer's film sequence showing a wounded digger being helped across a creek near Salamaua. However, because Australian television stations often use that sequence, or photos taken from it, to illustrate stories about the Kokoda campaign, they might not be aware where and when the event occurred. Phillip Bradley has followed his book on the *The Battle for Wau* with this account of the 1943 Salamaua campaign, covering the correct context for that film sequence.

The humanity of Major General Stan Savige, commanding the forces advancing on Salamaua, stands out in the book, exemplified by his threat to 'snarler' one unit commander if he 'waste[d] one man's life unnecessarily'. His chief staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Wilton, ably supported Savige. The heroism of Corporal Leslie Allen, who rescued many wounded men under fire, and the persistence of the American Lieutenant Wendell Messec, whose platoon followed a Japanese raiding party for five days before catching and ambushing it, exemplify the courage and perseverance of the soldiers involved in the campaign.

There has been recent discussion in Australian military historiography of the mythology of Australians as 'natural soldiers'. This book records the emphasis military leaders of the time placed on training, suggesting that they were not taken in by such 'pub yarn' mythology. Where training was inadequate and experienced leaders were few, as initially in the 58th/59th Battalion, poor results were almost inevitable. However, Bradley highlights that even well-trained units, such as the 2/3rd Independent Company in its first action at Wau, could have a difficult introduction to jungle warfare. As he did in his earlier book, Bradley describes the important support provided to the Army, particularly by the native carriers and the air forces with supply dropping, without which the campaign could not have succeeded.

Savige's efforts were hampered by Lieutenant General Edmund Herring's concealment from him, until well into the campaign, that the intention was to draw Japanese forces away from Lae, not to capture Salamaua quickly. If Herring did not feel that he could trust Savige with this information, he should have selected another commander who could be fully informed of the constraints on his actions. Even late in the campaign, Herring left ambiguities in his instructions. Other difficulties were caused by the confusing command arrangements established with the US forces landed at Nassau Bay later in the campaign. These matters were also covered in Gavin Keating's recent biography of Savige, *The Right Man for the Right Job*. Savige and Wilton

were replaced just as Salamaua was about to fall, in an echo of Major General ‘Tubby’ Allen’s replacement the previous year, just as Kokoda was about to fall.


Bradley has written a fine tribute to the men who fought in what must surely have been the longest diversionary campaign in Australia’s military history. It is, however, unfortunate that the publication quality falls below standard in places. The printing on some maps is faint almost to the point of unreadability and some places mentioned in the text are not marked on the relevant map. Some of the recent photos (presumably from colour originals) lost much of their contrast in the printing process, obscuring the detail.

With John Coates’ book on operations between Finschhafen and Sio (*Bravery Above Blunder*) and Bradley’s earlier works on Wau and the Ramu Valley campaign (*On Shaggy Ridge*), a modern account of the Australian Army’s part in the 1943 New Guinea campaign is almost complete. Only the capture of Lae remains to be covered. Perhaps Bradley will write this next?

Militant Islamist Ideology: understanding the global threat

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-5911-4001-6

Reviewed by Dr Noel Sproles



Militant Islamist Ideology discusses how extreme Islamists have developed their singular view of Islam into an ideology based on a selective interpretation of the Koran. It discusses Islamism as the political dimension of Islam, with its objective of establishing Islamic rule under sharia law. It is posited that it is the ideology of the more extreme Islamists, rather than the violence of their methods, which poses a threat to those not sharing their views. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush expressed similar views in 2006 following the London bombings the previous year. Along the way, a brief history of Islam is provided, as are pen pictures of significant militant leaders, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri.

Commander Aboul-Enein is a serving US Navy officer and has written this book specifically for a US audience. Discussion is concentrated on the Middle East, with little reference to Islamism in other parts of the world. A distinction is drawn early in the book between Islam as a religion and Islam as a political movement, which the author groups as being either Islamist or militant Islamist. While the author’s choice of nomenclature is awkward, similar distinctions are common elsewhere in the literature. Ayaan Hirsi Ali even adds a third dimension of ‘social Islam’ or the interaction between the genders. At a time when many seek to portray Islam in simplistic terms, as being either the work of the devil or a religion of peace and tolerance, these are useful reference points.

An insight is provided into the way Islam is internally divided into factions and how this makes a seemingly disparate range of interpretations of the Koran inevitable. The author’s attempts at refuting militant Islamist ideology, with its very narrow and literal interpretation of the

Koran, are extensive. It is here that the book promises to make a definite contribution. Several chapters are devoted to this and they could well be of use to those familiar enough with the Koran to fully appreciate their import.

The author states that *Militant Islamist Ideology* is based on his lectures and this is evident when reading the book. Most chapters tend to stand alone, possibly reflecting their genesis in separate lectures, each with a topic loosely related to the theme of the book. As a consequence, the book drifts through the subject matter rather than maintaining a clear objective. The result is a lack of free flow or logical development of the discussion from one chapter to another. For example, while it is explained in the early chapters that militant Islamists are Salafi Jihadists, it is not until Chapter 12, halfway through the book, that a detailed explanation of Salafism is given. The unfortunate result is a book that has to be read several times in order to grasp the author's message.

To add insult to injury, the book also contains an inordinate number of typographic errors. Some of these are serious, such as the omission of part of a sentence. Another annoyance is the listing of terms in the glossary at the back of the book, the logic of which is almost beyond understanding. I have to say that I have never read a book with such an untidy and confusing layout, and with such poor proof-reading. It is a pity as I believe that the author has something to say and to contribute to the body of knowledge concerning Islamist extremism. With his obvious understanding of the subject, he would have done better to have started with a clean slate instead of attempting to cobble together a set of his lectures.

Militant Islamist Ideology is not for the general reader, despite its stated intention as being one 'for all ranks of the US armed forces'. Much of the information and views can be found elsewhere in more detail and in more manageable formats. On the other hand, the specialist or scholar may well find much of value in the discussion of how militant Islamism manipulates the Koran in support of its objectives.

***The Men Who Came Out of the Ground:
a gripping account of Australia's first commando
campaign – Timor 1942***

Paul Cleary
Hachette: Sydney, 2010
ISBN: 978-0-7336-2318-9

Reviewed by Stewart Selwood



The Men Who Came Out of the Ground is an account of 2/2 Independent Company and its initiation into guerilla warfare in Portuguese Timor during World War 2. It is not meant to be the definitive account of the campaign. Rather, it is written to inform and create discussion about the events that took place and to provide some background into our modern-day relations with East Timor.

The account of the first commando campaign carried out by an Australian force trained especially for this role is more than a simple reconstruction of events. It is also a critique of

the strategy that saw the AIF's 8th Division deployed widely throughout the Pacific region. Cleary argues this strategy contributed to the surrender of almost the entire force of 22,000 Australians, a third of whom would not make it back to Australia after being incarcerated in Japanese prison camps.

Cleary's main focus, however, is on the actions of 2/2 Independent Company and its campaign against the Japanese in Portuguese Timor. It is an account of World War 2 combat that has largely been overlooked in favour of better-known events, such as operations on the Kokoda Track, which have typically been the focus of much of Australia's contribution to the Pacific War.


Initially, the concept of guerilla warfare must have seemed relatively simple to the Australian commandos. There was little in the way of tactical doctrine and the objective of disrupting the enemy was very broad in nature. What the men of 2/2 Independent Company were to learn was that this style of warfare is one of the hardest and most fatiguing forms of combat. The account highlights how the men were constantly under threat of Japanese attack, as well as often being at the mercy of the local population—some of who would understandably have seen the Australian presence as exacerbating Japanese military actions against the locals.

Indeed, the assistance provided by the Timorese people is a key element of the account. Unlike in the Boer War and some other wars of the modern era, the Australian commandos could not rely on hiding themselves among the civilian population. They were, therefore, reliant on the goodwill of the Timorese people to shelter and provide them with vital food supplies and transport. Cleary argues that the Timorese were never properly acknowledged or rewarded by subsequent Australian governments, despite suffering appallingly at the hands of the Japanese because of their support for the Australian force.

Cleary relates how the Australian commandos, often working in small parties without officers, pushed their bodies to the limit and needed to utilise all their personal skills in bush craft and ingenuity to survive. But he also mentions their faults and indiscretions, to reinforce that they were ordinary men in an extraordinarily difficult and hazardous environment. His account reads extremely easily, complemented by interviews and personal accounts. It makes an interesting and important contribution to Australia's military history, describing a campaign that has been little reported and is little known by most Australians today.

***The Soldier:
a history of courage, sacrifice and brotherhood***

Darren Moore
Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 2009
ISBN: 978-1848-31079-7



Reviewed by Ian M. Johnstone

Darren Moore is a graduate of ADFA and the Royal Military College, Duntroon, who served in the Australian Army for 17 years. His book is a large, impressively expansive and highly-fascinating collection of stories and statistics about being a soldier. It is encyclopedic in detail, widely and deeply researched, and written in a simple reporting style that is very easy to read. He mostly lets the words of soldiers speak for themselves, which they do so directly.

Each of the ten chapters is an essay on a particular topic, from 'Who serves', about conscription, to 'Is there a need for war?' It is more than a themed anthology with commentary. The assiduously gathered items of information are woven into 'an in-depth analysis of the politics, human emotions and psychology behind soldiering'. It has 19 pages of bibliography and 43 pages of source notes. Facts and figures come primarily from Britain but also include narrative accounts of warfare from ancient Greece and Rome, the United States, France, Germany, Israel, Japan and, of course, Australia.

On courage he quotes Lord Moran, Churchill's doctor:

Courage is will-power, whereof no man has an unlimited stock; and when in war it is used up, he is finished.

He includes the poignant letter that William Malone, commanding the Wellington Battalion from New Zealand at Gallipoli, wrote to his wife in 1915, which concluded with the words, 'I have only done what every man was bound to do in our country's need'. Three days after writing this letter, Malone was killed by friendly gunfire when an artillery shell fell short and burst above his trench.

On every page there is some intriguing fact or figure. For example:


- Each day in 1918, an average of 18,000 British and Dominion troops were in hospital in France because of a sexually-transmitted disease, which was equivalent to 17 battalions of men out of the front line. And their average time in hospital was 4-5 weeks.
- In World War 1, the *British Army Act of 1914* included 'being asleep at his post' as one of 27 offences punishable by death. At the time, no other 'allied' country had such an ultimately severe penalty.

There are, of course, some notable inclusions and omissions. For example, Moore relates well the story of 'Breaker' Morant being executed in the Boer War. He also refers to the 'Battle of Mogadishu', in 1993, when an American Black Hawk helicopter was shot down. This is of special interest to me as my son served with the UN force in Somalia from May to November 1994.

There are also references to Japanese prisoners-of-war in Burma, where my father was forced to help build the railway. However, in the index, for example, Monash is mentioned but not Morshead or Blamey. Nor are there any references in the index to literature or poetry. Nevertheless, *The Soldier* is an interesting and informative read, not only for serving soldiers but also for any general reader with an interest in better understanding how soldiers 'willingly bear the true burden of war on behalf of the rest of society'.

***Digitising Command and Control:
a human factors and ergonomics analysis of
mission planning and battlespace management***

Neville A. Stanton, Daniel P. Jenkins, Paul M. Salmon, Guy H. Walker,
Kirsten M. A. Revell & Laura A. Rafferty
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2009
ISBN: 978-0-7546-7759-8



Reviewed by Dr Patrick Hew, DSTO

In their preface, the authors state two goals for this book. The first is to argue for involvement by human factors and ergonomics (HF/E) professionals in the design and development of digital mission planning and battlespace management (MP/BM) systems. The second is to propose a set of techniques for HF/E practitioners to use in studying such systems.

It is not a textbook; rather, the book is a collated set of analyses applied to a real-world MP/BM system. In reviewing it, we ask: What were the insights that were reached about the MP/BM system? Did they arise from skilled personnel applying the techniques as described? Or did they arise from keen observation, irrespective of the techniques?

Working through the book's techniques, we have:

- *Constraint analysis.* The HF/E practitioner generates an 'abstraction hierarchy' of the possible links from high-level functional purposes to low-level system (technological) components via intermediate functions. The MP/BM users are then surveyed for their opinions on the system's support for the intermediate functions. The insight was to link the introduction of certain technologies to users' perceptions on the system's utility.
- *Hierarchical task analysis for human error analysis.* The HF/E practitioner decomposes the high-level user goals into low-level tasks and counts the errors made by users in performing these tasks. For the MP/BM system, the high-level goals were from the British Army's 'Seven Questions' planning process and the low-level tasks were at the granularity of mouse clicks and keyboard entries. The insight was to classify and quantify the problems in the user interface and tools.
- *Distributed situation awareness.* The HF/E practitioner analyses the accumulation and flow of information among people and artefacts in the system. The process centres on the development of propositional networks to depict the information within the flows. The first insight was to highlight the dominant information needs for different staff, as part of the overall system. The second insight was to show aspects of information within the MP/BM system that were inaccurate or untimely, when compared to ground truth.

- *Social network analysis.* The HF/E practitioner models the MP/BM users as being agents on a network and analyses their interactions. The book proposes metrics for mapping a social network into the NATO SAS-050 Approach Space (which describes command and control structures as being centralised or decentralised, in axes of distribution of information, patterns of interaction and allocation of decision rights). The insight is to characterise the interaction between MP/BM users as it actually occurs over time, compared to what is intended.
- *Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) analysis.* The Engineering Equipment & Materials User Association (EEMUA) has provided a checklist for designing and evaluating supervisory control and data acquisition systems. The HF/E practitioner can examine the MP/BM system for compliance with this checklist. The insight is on the user interface to the MP/BM system, such as graphics and navigation to information.
- *Usability questionnaire.* The HF/E practitioner constructs a questionnaire to survey user opinions of the MP/BM system. The authors cite a particular checklist from earlier research on human-computer interaction. The insight is on where the users think that the MP/BM system needs improvement.
- *Environmental survey.* The HF/E practitioner conducts spot measurements of the physical environment containing the MP/BM system and operators. These are compared with 'ideal' conditions as recommended in British Standard EN ISO 111064-6:2005. The insight is about the potential for stressing the users of the MP/BM system from inattention to physical aspects, including lighting, temperature, acoustics and vibration. The authors note that the British standard was developed for civilian work environments but can still provide insight into the military context.

In total, we have three techniques (constraint analysis, human error analysis and usability questionnaire) that are about helping users to articulate the problems that they experience, in the context of how the MP/BM system needs to be fixed. We have two techniques (SCADA analysis and environment survey) that compare the MP/BM system against a human factors standard from an industry body. Finally, we have two techniques (distributed situation awareness and social network analysis) that measure the MP/BM system under human factors models proposed by the authors.

The book derives from research that supported the development and acquisition of a real-world MP/BM system. This should strengthen the book's findings, even as we allow for results being sanitised. However, it also shows its origins as a collection of individual papers, notably in the way it cites the literature. The book makes multiple citations to the same literature, apparently to establish that the book's techniques are novel vis-a-vis the existing body of knowledge. The continual justification of novelty is entwined into the text and distracts from the book's stated aims.

The techniques appear to be applicable to an MP/BM system that is in current service (to inform an upgrade) or a high-quality prototype in a representative environment (user testing). The authors would like to be involved in the conceptualisation, design and development stages, however, their case is not strong. The book's techniques do not appear to yield 'design' in the sense understood by an engineer: that is, being able to predict behaviour through modelling and analysing the system, prior to building any hardware (even a prototype).

Moreover, most of the techniques appear to apply to the micro-level of a user's interactions with the MP/BM system (via a user interface) and not the workings of the system itself. The exceptions are the distributed situation awareness and social network analysis techniques, which centre on the macro-level interactions of multiple users and mediating artefacts. There is no apparent limit to the size of the system that can be studied, given sufficient samples over time and system components (by manual observation or message logs). That said, while the authors make some pertinent and fascinating observations about their MP/BM system's macro-level behaviour, it is unclear that the observations arose from the techniques as presented.

For the ADF, the book may well be of frustrating potential, as it faces the acquisition and introduction of MP/BM systems including Vigilare, AFATDS and Dominator. The book might be applied to each of these systems now and would no doubt identify a host of HF/E issues. These could be logged by their project offices, funded through the capability investment processes and eventually addressed by their respective vendors.

The more pressing need (and opportunity) is in the integration of these systems for cooperative mission planning and battle management of the ADF as a joint and networked force. The book might help to characterise the component systems. However, it appears that something more is needed if we are to conceptualise the options for a system-of-systems and predict their performance and capacity.

The book thus invites careful contemplation by HF/E practitioners working on ADF command support issues, and project managers looking at their options for analysis and experimentation. It will be a useful addition to libraries in military systems engineering and human factors.

AirLandBattle21: transformational concepts for integrating 21st century air and ground forces

Ellwood P. Hinman IV, Thomas E. Jahn and James G. Jinnette
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2009
ISBN: 978-0-7546-7634-8

Reviewed by Dr Andrew Au, DSTO



The US Army's 'AirLand Battle' doctrine was the conceptual framework developed during the late 1970s and 1980s to stop massive Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat on a European battlefield. The original vision defined the close coordination between the Army and Air Force for integrating air and land operations to produce an integrated attack plan. Aggressively manoeuvring land forces were to be used in counter-offensive attacks while air forces stopped the movement of rear-echelon forces toward the front line. The joint doctrine of AirLand Battle assumed the Army to be the primary means for defeating the enemy army, with the Air Force viewed as providing support to land forces. The traditional battlefield was redefined with a series of geographic and linear references to improve coordination between the Army and Air Force.

This book argues that this conceptual framework has failed to keep pace with the advent of airpower capabilities. Lacking is an updated joint doctrine that can fully exploit the promising ideas from modern warfighting technology. The authors study the interaction between US Army ground forces and US Air Force airpower in the context of medium- to large-scale conventional war. 'AirLandBattle21' is presented as a coherent conceptual framework to integrate interdependent air and ground forces in the changed strategic environment of the 21st century.

The authors advocate taking jointness beyond merely 'deconfliction' of military actions in time, space and purpose for the prevention of fratricide. While each Service contributes its unique capabilities in its own environment, their operational and tactical interdependence across service boundaries is critical to overall joint force effectiveness with current resource limitations. Recognising the importance of interdependence of the Services, this book endeavours to develop practical ways and transformational concepts allowing air and ground forces to operate as a whole in a joint campaign.

An assumption is the formation of the US Army's 'modular combat brigades' during major combat operations, based on the brigade combat team (BCT) as the basic deployable unit of manoeuvre. The emerging concept for BCT operational manoeuvre is a nonlinear battlefield with autonomous BCTs conducting distributed operations in a non-contiguous and geographically-separated fashion. This BCT construct is increasingly dependent on airpower to accomplish the mission, making airpower truly an integral part of BCTs in the future battlespace.

Comparable to the tactically-focused Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), AirLandBattle21 aims to unite the expeditionary Army and the expeditionary Air Force into a single fighting force for a specific purpose in the battlespace. A core competency of MAGTF is an organic, combined arms capability such that their ground combat, air combat and combat service support capabilities are directed by a single commander. Since Marine ground units are inextricably tied to and dependent on indigenous Marine air for success, the MAGTF is capable of acting at short notice and without immediate support from Army and Air Force warfighting forces. Likewise, the authors argue that the Army and the Air Force could be welded into a single fighting team at the operational level of war to ensure survival and success in the 21st century.

The AirLandBattle doctrine acknowledged that air forces are very important to provide firepower in the form of close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). A fire support coordination line (FSCL) needs to be established to denote coordination requirements for fire by all force and supporting elements against surface targets. Attacks against surface targets short of the FSCL must be conducted under the positive control or procedure clearance of the associated surface force commander, while commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must coordinate with all affected commanders in order to harmonise joint objectives and avoid fratricide.

During the late 1980s and 1990s, the 'kill box' concept was developed by the US Air Force as a three-dimensional fire support coordinating measure to facilitate the integration of joint weapons fire. Each square of a grid reference system superimposed on a map of an area of operation carries its own level of permission or restriction on the use of air-to-surface or surface-to-surface weapons. The authors agree that the 'kill box' concept is a pragmatic fire control measure, albeit without a formal doctrine or the associated operational concepts fully compatible with the nonlinear battlespace in the 21st century.

Recognising the artificial limitations placed on the FSCL and the mission gap between CAS and AI, the authors propose to fill the airpower mission void by the incorporation of battlespace air operations (BAO) and use of battlespace coordination area (BCA) for fire support coordination. AirLandBattle21 defines BAO as a new 'counter-land' mission conducted in a supported role against an enemy land force with the intent to destroy or neutralise them. The BAO concept is intended to fill a doctrinal gap between the traditional AI and CAS missions in situations when friendly forces are absent, eliminating the requirements for detailed integration inherent in the CAS mission. The combination of CAS at the tactical level, BAO at the operational level and strategic attacks on military targets will establish a continuum of airpower missions.

Inspired by the success of the current doctrinal joint special operations area (JSOA) for non-linear special operations, the authors propose the use of BCA in conjunction with the nonlinear nature of future BCT distributed operations. Given the fact that the JSOA doctrine is mature and has been used to great effect in many military operations, the book concludes that the concepts of BAO and BCA will greatly facilitate efforts to achieve coordination between the Army and the Air Force to maximise destructive effects against enemy fielded forces.

The book also introduces the concept of air as a manoeuvre force to strengthen the dynamic supported/supporting relationship between interdependent air and ground forces, allowing them to shift roles interchangeably so as to seize opportunities or resist threats. While ground manoeuvre units can be used to manipulate enemy fielded forces into vulnerable air engagement zones, they may launch an offensive operation at the appropriate time to decimate the beleaguered enemy force.

AirLandBattle21 offers a spectrum of control in the air for efficient use of limited air assets to sustain the modular BCT construct. Recognising resource limitations for counter-air operations, the authors argue that the highest levels of air superiority and air supremacy are less likely in the non-contiguous nature of the 21st century battlespace. Rather, airpower applied appropriately can compensate for risk on the ground as air and ground forces become increasingly interdependent.

Like air control, air mobility and lift is a fundamental enabler of surface manoeuvre. This book explores the critical role of tactical airlift to enable the BCT distributed operations. Without new technology, such as the joint cargo aircraft and joint precision aerial delivery system, serious BCT demands on tactical airlift will remain unfulfilled.

In my opinion, the transformational concepts discussed are relevant to the ADF. Current budgetary and resource constraints have left the ADF little choice but to become leaner and likely to have increasingly-dispersed force elements in a complex battlespace. As highlighted in this book, integrating air and ground forces can produce dramatic effects when employed as joint operations. AirLandBattle21 is a new paradigm of air land integration. The ADF land and air doctrine must be sufficiently flexible to respond appropriately to the scale of modern conflicts, allowing for a dynamic supported/supporting relationship as land and air forces shift roles during future air land battles. Understanding the interdependence between land and air forces is the key to the three-dimensional vision necessary for success in future warfare.