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Editor

Irene M. Coombes

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Front Cover

A 20 CU FA-18 Hornet rolling out of formation with a 76 Squadron Hawk 127.

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CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS



This edition represents a strong operational focus—as to be expected from the Journal of the Australian Profession of Arms.

Dr Chris Flaherty makes a second appearance in as many issues with an article entitled “International and Australian Pre-emption Theory”. His last offering looked very much at the operational level of war when he wrote on multidimensional manoeuvre and testing and proving theories. This time he focuses on the national strategic level and looks at pre-emption. The point that he makes is a critically important one for those involved in the employment of military force, both inside the ADO and in other government departments. Flaherty reminds us that pre-emption is not a new doctrine—if you accept that it is a modification of the strategic concept of pre-emptive strike, that Flaherty calls a “typical National Security concept”. We know that pre-emptive strike is (as Flaherty says) “noted” in Australian Defence doctrine. Given the controversy in the US, UK and Australia, as well as at the UN, concerned with strategic actions that are called “pre-emptive”, I suspect that it is not always possible to consider this important issue outside of partisan views.

Pat Byrne writes on another “strategic” but operations focused subject—“Towards a New Business Planning Paradigm”. In this case, the term strategy is used in the sense of decision making, but not necessarily at what we might call the military strategic level. It is an interesting article in that it uses the terms and environment of business to discuss a planning process—a decision making process. I encourage anyone who grew up with the traditional appreciation process to read Pat Byrne’s article. In comment, I would say that Army at least detected the faults with the appreciation process that Pat speaks of in his article, in about 1984 based on work out of the US on intuitive decision making. Army then modified its decision making process to bring some dynamism to it (“fight the battle”) but did nothing further for many more years. Finally, the joint environment adopted the intuitive decision making process (known as the Joint Military Appreciation Process: JMAP) but outside the Army, it is still in its infancy. The Australian Command and Staff College stresses the JMAP. The significant difference between the JMAP and the old appreciation process is that the emphasis is taken off the factors and deduction, and put on making an informed intuitive decision, then rigorously testing that decision. It is my view that the JMAP (based on the US tactical decision making process), correctly taught, well understood, frequently used and sensibly applied, is an excellent decision making process for very complex environments. My philosophy is that the JMAP is the only tool that we have that creates a “Joint command culture” and I am seeing that in the Australian Command and Staff College. I also believe that it should be used at the strategic level in Defence and not just at the operational and tactical levels. Many of the complaints that Pat has about the old appreciation process and many of the processes he advocates, interestingly, now exist in the JMAP. I acknowledge that many find the process surrounding the JMAP to be off-putting. I say to students that it is only by going through the torturous process that you can make quick, informed intuitive decisions. I hope many of you are prepared to comment within these pages because there is nothing more fundamental to the profession of arms than decision making.

Currency, practicality and experience scream out from Chris Field's article on his observations and insights from his time as a liaison officer during *Iraqi Freedom*. His article is indeed an acronym rich environment but then again, so was the war. I was struck yet again by the emphasis that the US put on the use of military history (implied only in this article) in preparing its advanced planners. The Australian Defence College is moving back into history in a big way starting this year (ADFA was always there with history but we allowed the Australian Command and Staff College and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies to busy themselves with other subjects) but it will still take many years to get back to where we should be. The period Chris writes about, and that he was privileged to be a part of, was some of the most sophisticated and complex decision making, orchestration and synchronisation that modern society can ever experience. There is no excuse for Australian military planners not reaching such a universal standard through education, training and experience. The only thing that will stop us will be our own lack of imagination and inertia. The Australian Defence College must of course play a key role in developing an Australian version of what Chris is describing in his article—it is now doing that. The introduction of a three month block of Higher Command and Staff Studies in the Defence and Strategic Studies Course focusing on campaigning, complemented by an even more rigorous focus on the Joint Battle at the Staff College, is a good start to developing such a capability in the minds of our future leaders.

Paul Rosenzweig would understand the place of history in Professional Military Education having been awarded the Centenary Medal for "long and outstanding research on Australia's military history". Paul writes on a part of the East Timor operation about which I admit to being totally ignorant. He raised and commanded the Pre-Poll Voting Team-East Timor (PVT-EM), an ADF deployment on behalf of the Australian Electoral Commission to collect pre-poll votes of ADF troops deployed in East Timor. Australia has an extraordinary history of the maintenance of this fundamental democratic activity during operations, particularly during the World Wars. Paul's article brings that experience up to date.

I want to draw your attention to the letters page. Both published letters in this edition address an article by Lieutenant Colonel Field on "Employment of Australian Helicopters in Vietnam".

The first, from Brigadier J.R. Salmon (Retd), a very well known gunner, takes issue with certain of Lieutenant Colonel Field's judgements, but in doing so, reminds us how turbulent, in a strategic sense, the 1960s were. He also, by implication, reminds us that Army Aviation has come a long way in the last few years, and is moving to a central position in the combined arms team. I wait with interest the development of the FGA capability as part of the (joint?) combined arms team that CAF spoke about at Chief of Army's conference in 2003.

The second letter is from Brigadier Robert Atkinson (Emeritus Consultant in Military Surgery) who makes a point on the importance of dedicated airframes for casualty evacuation. The issue of competition for available aircraft will always be an issue. An update on where the ADF stands on Combat Search and Rescue, as well as aeromedical evacuation, would be valuable.

In conclusion, I wish to thank all who replied to the survey on the *Journal* that accompanied the last issue. We received several hundred replies which is very high for this type of survey. We are currently analysing the comments and I intend taking them to the Board of Management, who represent some of the stakeholders of the Journal of the Australian Profession of Arms. Once I obtain the views of the members of the Board of Management, I will approach the CDF and the Chiefs with suggestions about how we can develop the *Journal* in the immediate future.

I invite anyone who has suggestions about the development of the *ADFJ* to send them to: publications@defence.adc.edu.au – The Editor, Australian Defence Force Journal, Russell Offices, Canberra ACT 2600. Tel (02) 6265 1193 Fax (02) 6265 6972.

A.J. MOLAN, AO
Major General
Commander Australian Defence College
Chairman Australian Defence Force Journal



Letters to the Editor

Employment of Australian Helicopters in Vietnam

Dear Editor,

I was most interested in Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field's article "Employment of Australian Helicopters in Vietnam" etc. It contained much of which I was unaware; especially I found it enlightening about the RAAF's attitude at the senior levels to the Army's need for air mobility. But the Army's requirement did not come "out of the blue" although clearly it failed to persuade the RAAF of this essential requirement.

As background I need to say I was BC 103 Field Battery RAA in Malaya in 1961-62 when 28 Commonwealth Brigade was commanded by Brigadier F.G.Hassett. I visited South Vietnam in late 1962 and like a number of others, spent about 10 days on operations with an ARVN Division. Subsequently we briefed an assembly of brigade officers at Terendak—my presentation concentrated on the operation of "Eagle Flights" i.e. ARVN infantry companies which were airborne in US Boeing CH21 twin rotor Shawnee "Flying Banana" helicopters with US advisers awaiting Vietcong movement, (as well as the excessive and indiscriminate use of firepower).

I was Staff Officer Grade 1 (Tactical Doctrine) at Army Headquarters 1963-65 during which I wrote two CGS Exercises for Lieutenant General John Wilton the Chief of the General Staff, his then deputy being Major General Frank Hassett. Subsequently I visited Vietnam, including some days at Nui Dat in August 1968; I was Chief of Staff, HQ AFV in 1971.

But back to Malaya in 1961. Thinking soldiers in those days were anxious to develop a doctrine that would counter successfully Mao Tse Tung's "Revolutionary War" concepts as practised by the Viet Minh, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap and culminating in the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Brigadier Hassett formed a study group to develop concepts and tactics. Numerous exercises at unit and brigade level, including 2RAR,

were based on air mobility fully utilising the limited RAF resources of Whirlwind and Belvedere helicopters, Single and Twin Pioneer, Bristol Freighter and Blackburn Beverley fixed wing aircraft. 103 Field Battery defied gravity and compiled load tables to move its stripped-down 105mm L5 pack howitzers by Whirlwinds despite their appalling lift capacity; and they worked. The need was to achieve off-road mobility on the potential battlefield.

Likewise in the 1963 and 1965 CGS Exercises as well as the 1964 Quartermaster Generals' exercise the need for air mobility was the principal theme. A few RAAF officers, wing commander and upwards, attended each of these. The 1963 and 1964 exercises were set on the Kontum-Pleiku plateau of South Vietnam with entry through Qui-nhon. The 1965 exercise was based on a hypothetical Commonwealth Division in a SEATO Plan 4 setting in North-East Thailand. It required a fighting withdrawal from the Mekong River to Ubon utilising an air mobile concept which required the theoretical support of an enormous numbers of USA helicopters. By then most senior Army officers were familiar with what the USA Army was trying to achieve with its experimental air mobile division although realistic about Australia's very limited resources.

As Lieutenant Colonel Field correctly points out in his Note 13, Exercise "Sky High" employed helicopters to the limited extent they were available. Why they should be "chaotic" escapes me as they were utilised successfully in Malaya in 1961-62 and subsequently by 3RAR in Sarawak during "confrontasi" in 1963-64. By 1965 there should have been a leavening of the Army at all levels familiar with helicopter employment on a limited scale.

Lieutenant Colonel Field's article certainly enlightened me on RAAF-Army friction at senior levels over the employment of helicopters in Vietnam—a subject with which I was unfamiliar, despite my time in Vietnam. While I largely agree with his conclusions,

I cannot support a statement which suggests that CGS Wilton or DCGS Hassett were “myopic and tribally focused service leaders”. Both were acutely aware of the world around them, the venue in which they might be told to deploy soldiers, the type of conflict in which they could be engaged and the air mobile concepts that their likely ally would employ. Yet why they, or the Army, failed to convince their sister Service and the Government of the need to employ RAAF helicopters in such roles and a requirement for even more helicopters I have nothing to offer.

J.R. Salmon, Brigadier (Retd)

Employment of Australian Helicopters in Vietnam

Dear Editor,

I read with interest the timely article above. My experience was with combat casualty evacuation (Dust-off) and we had a dedicated UH-1 Iroquois to that end.

There was an enormously clear message to the fighting force that if you were injured you could be evacuated to a hospital very quickly, with subsequent saving of life and limb. The medical statistics of the time reflect that. In many ways this was a landmark in medical evacuation generally, and the civilian sector in Australia took many years to catch up.

Nowadays the civilian sector leads in dedicated aeromedical evacuation.

Although in low level operations it may be satisfactory to configure an aircraft for a medical mission, it must not be forgotten that when the threat increases and combat casualties occur, dedicated aeromedical casualty evacuation will have significant implications for the Force, morale and political will.

Robert Atkinson,
Brigadier, RFD
Emeritus Consultant in Military Surgery
Council of the Royal Australian
College of Surgeons

An Australian Defence Force Liaison Officer's Observations and Insights from Operation *Iraqi Freedom*

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field

*The aim of this article is to detail ten Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Observations and Insights¹ in order to **enhance** US/Coalition future warfighting capabilities; **encourage** the embedding of ADF Planners/Lead Planners in US warfighting headquarters; and, **support** the continued success of the ANZUS Treaty.²*

The ten OIF Observation and Insights are the opinion of one ADF Officer, and should not be considered as absolute solutions to warfighting at the operational level. Instead, the author aims to stimulate ADF debate regarding the complexity of campaigning, while offering some insights into techniques relevant for operational planners.

Observation and Insight 1 – Battlespace & Command and Control (C2)

Defining the battlespace and C2, in the opinion of the author, is the essence of planning at the operational level of war.³ The other five operational functions: movement/manoeuvre; fires; logistics; intelligence; and force protection, rely on the effective establishment of the battlespace and C2 in order to set the conditions for their employment.⁴ For example a force cannot move/manoeuvre, direct fires, focus logistics, tailor intelligence, or plan force protection without a clearly defined battlespace; and, if a force does not understand who is working for whom, the five other operational functions will lack authoritative direction, and therefore any operational execution will be somewhat unsynchronised leading to a slowing of operational tempo.

Battlespace and C2, as fundamental elements of the operational level of war, can also be extremely difficult to define. Frequent challenges to the establishment of appropriate battlespace for Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) during OIF included:

- a. Operations in the vicinity of international boundaries.
- b. Poor coordination/liaison between Components, especially CFLCC and the Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC).
- c. Poor coordination between CFLCC and

CFLCC's major subordinate commands, especially as CFLCC prepared to attack out of Kuwait into Iraq.⁵ One issue affecting the battlespace was that on D Day (19 March 03), CFLCC commanded two corps level HQ (V Corps and I MEF), but CFLCC ground combat power was only three divisions (3rd Infantry Division OPCON to V Corps; and 1st Marine Division, 1st UK Division OPCON to I MEF). These Divisions, arguably, only required one corps level HQ for effective C2. With two corps level HQ, CFLCC needed to provide commensurate corps battlespace, which was difficult in the restricted terrain and limited LOCs, that CFLCC faced when attacking out of Kuwait.

- d. A lack of staff awareness regarding the *phasing* of OIF.⁶

Obstacles to the establishment of effective C2 included:

- a. Staff misunderstanding of OIF's most frequently used C2 terms of Operational Control, Tactical Control, Supporting, and Supported.⁷
- b. A resistance by CFSOCC elements to being allocated TACON to CFLCC in zone.
- c. CFLCC's burgeoning span of control that included two corps level headquarters, in addition to more than 10 direct command brigade-sized units.⁸

The bottom line for Planners is that the battlespace and C2 must be precisely defined, to include seemingly minute details, at the very beginning of any planning process in order to provide commanders and staff with a firm foundation for any campaign plan. During, and before, OIF Major General James Thurman, the CFLCC C3 (Operations), was constantly demanding that planners and staff be precise when defining CFLCC battlespace and C2. Thurman was quick to point out to planners that poor battlespace and C2 arrangements at the US Army National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, frequently resulted in “*fratricide*” amongst US Army Brigades. Major General Thurman, was not going to let the hard lessons of the NTC be forgotten during OIF.⁹

Observation and Insight 2 – The Planning Process

The C5-Plans Operational Planning Group (OPG) and the C35-Future Operations Operational Planning Team (OPT) were the centres of gravity for planning within CFLCC for OIF. Within the OPG/OPT the Lead Planner’s role was to guide, direct, cajole, encourage, focus and, at times, force the OPG/OPT to drive forward with planning. A Lead Planner needed to establish a vision, and then harness the energies of the OPG/OPT in order to achieve that vision.

Within CFLCC the C5-Plans OPG was populated with Planners who had, in many cases, experience gained during Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) in Afghanistan. These Planners represented their staff sections by function, including: personnel; intelligence; operations (fires, aviation, NBC, information operations, air-defence, military police); logistics; communications; engineering; finance; and civil military operations. The C5-Plans OPG was an ideal forum for dealing with complex long-term problems and issues, and offering dynamic solutions to Commander CFLCC. The OPG’s excellent corporate knowledge meant that it was rare for a member of the OPG not to know the answer to an issue, or at least know how to find the answer.

The C35-Future Operations OPT in contrast was only established in February 2003, and was populated with less experienced officers, some at the rank of captain. The OPT represented all staff sections, but had the mission of providing

quick solutions to problems within the Corps Commander’s decision cycle of 96 hours, and beyond.¹⁰ The OPT was adapted to deal with, mainly, *directed* courses of action that required less detailed analysis but were dependent on a short suspense in order to satisfy the requirements of Commander CFLCC.

During OIF, in both the OPG and OPT, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), or variations thereof, was employed by Planners.¹¹ The deliberate decision-making process was vital, as a problem solving and decision support tool, and Commander CFLCC expected the MDMP to be employed. Depending on the problem to be solved, and the time available, variations of the MDMP could, and would be employed. However, despite variations employed, the key to success with the MDMP was for the Lead Planner to prepare, prepare, prepare. The OPG/OPT would assist the Lead Planner, but generally the responsibility for the plan defaulted to the Lead Planner as the problem solving “belly-button”.

A Lead Planner needed to set the objectives for a planning session prior to the session commencing, and could usually expect that after about two hours the OPG/OPT would be exhausted, or at least require a substantial break. Prior to working on a problem, the more preparatory research that a Lead Planner could conduct, the more likely that the OPG/OPT session would be a success. For example, it was always useful to gather all germane US Central Command (CENTCOM) and Commander CFLCC specified tasks, prior to a planning session in order to stimulate the minds within the OPG/OPT to develop implied tasks relating to the problem and mission being discussed. The intelligence, aviation, and engineering planners could also be employed to assist planning by accessing and presenting information that helped to set the scene for the OPG/OPT with regards to the enemy, topographic, or imagery products.

Observation and Insight 3 – Branch and Decision Point Planning

Branch planning, the contingency options built into the basic plan, can be a laborious process. During the preparation for OIF, CFLCC branch planning always seemed to be allocated space on the planning calendar at *some time in the future*. Therefore, within CFLCC, branch

planning became synonymous with Decision Point planning. On D Day, Commander CFLCC had seven decision points to support the CFLCC Base Plan. Each decision point included a graphical representation of the decision to be made, which was overlaid on a map, and was supported by *measurable* conditions relating to the six-operational functions before a key operational decision could/should be made. In addition, Commander CFLCC's Critical Information Requirements were nested with each decision point in order to enable current operations battle-staff to track the progress of CFLCC towards a critical decision.¹²

The C35 Future Operations OPT developed Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) for each of the seven decision points, which were staffed throughout CFLCC, and then placed in a "warm-status" pending the requirement for a particular decision. This system of pre-prepared FRAGOs served to give CFLCC's major subordinate commands the opportunity to provide direct input into CFLCC orders well before the orders were issued as a formal document. In addition, the process of converting the decision point from a graphical and text representation into a FRAGO, required a concentrated intellectual effort by the OPT in defining tasks for major subordinate commands that were *measurable* and *appropriate* for the operational level of war. However, one danger in writing FRAGOs at the Army/operational level, is that Planners may frequently try to detail too many tactical tasks to major subordinate commands.

CFLCC Planners aimed to write FRAGOs that synchronised the six-operational functions, and that concentrated on those operational functions that an Army level commander could influence. For example, once the land campaign commenced there was little that Commander CFLCC could do to influence operational movement/manoeuvre, especially south of Baghdad as V Corps and I MEF attacked in zone toward designated objectives. However, Commander CFLCC could significantly influence operational intelligence, for example, by reassigning his operational intelligence collection assets to support a decision point; or, through the redirection of CFLCC operational fires, both lethal and non-lethal, Commander

CFLCC could shape the battlespace in order to support his operational decision point.¹³

The key observation is that in a dynamic planning environment there may not be time to fully develop Branch Plans, and therefore an option for Planners is to develop decision points to support a commander's operational vision. This method worked effectively for CFLCC during OIF, when the seven campaign decision points were frequently a focus for Planners to think about land operations as a campaign, and not merely a tactical fight.¹⁴

Observation and Insight 4 – Crash or Crash Through ~ Providing the Operational View

A Planner must be prepared to take the unfashionable/unpopular position, in order to provide an organisation with an operational view, even in the face of fierce opposition from peers and superiors. Planning is not a neat and tidy process. In situations limited by time, resources, battlespace, options, or commander's guidance a Planner will feel the full weight of responsibility to produce results. Add the Planner's responsibility to produce results with the requirement for a Planner to think and plan operationally, and an inevitable friction will occur.

OIF tended to draw most commanders and Planners into the current fight, out to a maximum of 96 hours. This tendency is natural for several reasons:

- a. After planning, wargaming, and rehearsing a plan for an extended period of time, commanders and Planners are interested to see how the plan unfolds.
- b. Robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets mandate that *everybody*, from the President of the United States (or Prime Minister of Australia) to at least battalion command level, have excellent situational awareness throughout the battlespace. The downside of excellent situational awareness is that *everybody*, from the President of the United States to at least battalion command level, can monitor and, if they choose, interfere with the tactical fight.

- c. If commanders and Planners are confident that they have written a great campaign plan, there tends to be commensurate resistance throughout an organisation to Planners who offer a differing perspective.

In the opinion of the author, it is the moral responsibility of Planners to constantly challenge, challenge, challenge fixed views within an organisation; in order to present an operational view of a developing campaign. This approach will probably lead to friction among the staff in a headquarters, but it should also lead to change and, potentially, improved warfighting solutions for a warfighting force. The CFLCC war plan for OIF was excellent, but it was not perfect especially for Phase IV (Post Hostilities) operations. From the perspective of the author, some Planners were too quick to accept “the Plan” as sacrosanct, and were reluctant to take the time to question aspects of the plan in order to think operationally.

When faced with this paradigm, the operational Planner has two choices: crash or crash through. A Planner should never hesitate to present an idea that the Planner thinks is worthwhile. If that Planner’s peers or leaders reject the idea, and the Planner still thinks that the idea is worthwhile: *the Planner should develop the idea regardless of the direction the Planner has received*. If the Planner is wrong he will crash; if he is right he will crash through. The author’s experience on, at least, three occasions during OIF proved this thesis.

There are certain results that any Planner who adopts a crash or crash through attitude to planning, can expect:

- a. A Planner will have to develop solutions to the crash or crash through idea in the Planner’s “spare” time.
- b. A Planner is most likely to gain interest from commanders and staff in the crash or crash through idea through a succinct information paper, ideally one page in length. See Observation and Insight 5– Fish or Cut-Bait for converting crash or crash through ideas straight into FRAGOs in order to gain some command interest in your crash or crash through idea.

- c. A Planner *may* recede into obscurity once the crash or crash through idea has been finally rejected.
- d. A Planner *will* recede into obscurity once the crash or crash through idea has been accepted.

Observation and Insight 5 – Fish or Cut-Bait

There is software available that will make an excellent tool to use in support of planning. Slide presentations which, combined with the Global Command and Control System (Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC)), can accurately relay complex material in a graphical form, to large bodies of people, fast and effectively.¹⁵ The steps of the MDMP were most effectively portrayed, staffed, and briefed using presentation slides during OIF. Arguably, electronic slide presentation is the life-blood of planning in the early 21st century.

Life-blood is one thing, but there comes a time when Planners must Fish or Cut-Bait, with regards converting hundreds of mega bytes of slides into a five-paragraph FRAGO.¹⁶ In the early stages of CFLCC’s OIF, this was not an easy process. CFLCC staff could build beautiful slide presentations, and they could write plans, but seemed reluctant to actually commit to writing orders.¹⁷

A Planner must be prepared to say: STOP enough slides! A Planner must be prepared to say: now is the time for the OPT to Fish or Cut-Bait and write the FRAGO. It is only when the Planner and the OPT begin to write the FRAGO, that the key synchronisation issues of battlespace deconfliction, subordinate tasking, coordinated times, and command and control become glaringly obvious to the entire headquarters staff. A five-paragraph FRAGO directs operational synchronisation, as staffs and subordinates quickly come to the realisation that they will be required to issue/receive an order, as opposed to a plan.

In addition, there may be occasions when a Planner must Fish or Cut-Bait by converting crash or crash through ideas straight into FRAGOs in order to gain some command interest in the Planner’s crash or crash through idea. This is particularly germane to issues that need General Officer attention but, due to time

constraints, formal briefings to General Officers are not possible.

During OIF, the *currency* in CFLCC was the FRAGO. The FRAGO directed all actions within the CFLCC battlespace, and was the only product post-D Day that General Officers within CFLCC had the time, or the inclination, to read, intellectualise, and action. In the opinion of the author, after D Day, CFLCC staff could have saved *hundreds of hours* of work if they had concentrated on writing orders, rather than producing presentation slides in support of OIF.

Observation and Insight 6 – Mentoring your co-workers

Planning can be characterised by drudgery; especially if a Planner has difficulty in energising the Planning Team. However, common human and military interaction can make a huge difference to the team's performance. Learning about the other Planners, about their families, their history, and their futures; listening to ideas; encouraging debate; enforcing regular and predictable work patterns for the Planning Team; and, leading through hard work all help to bond the Planning Team into a cohesive whole.

Many of the mid-ranking officers at CFLCC were not Command and Staff College graduates, and yet they were writing FRAGOs that moved every piece of the Third United States Army, and attached Joint, Interagency, and Coalition forces. Many of the mid-ranking officers at CFLCC worked with little guidance, and even less positive reinforcement for their efforts. Many of the mid-ranking officers at CFLCC only heard from their superiors when a mistake had been made, or a new task was to be completed.

Planners, who have been fortunate enough to have educational opportunities, and who have other experiences, are professionally obligated to mentor their co-workers in order to ensure that superior plans are produced in support of a commander's intent. The mid-ranking officers at CFLCC were always enthusiastic about supporting, learning, leading, and improving any planning process provided that they received appropriate support and encouragement from Lead Planners, and CFLCC leadership.

Mentoring, or simple leadership, seems to be an obvious point, but in the more than

1600-person headquarters of CFLCC during OIF it was, on many occasions, obviously forgotten. Lieutenant General McKiernan reinforced this point when he stated that Staff should "never be too busy to lead soldiers, check the small details, and correct mistakes."¹⁸

Observation and Insight 7 – Taking some down time

In the post-September 11 world, back-to-back land campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq drained the CFLCC Lead Planners, who for almost two years carried the weight of the CFLCC planning effort. By May of 2003, the Planners in CFLCC, and the other US warfighting headquarters in Iraq, were mentally exhausted and still faced the uncertainty of future deployments to the Middle East. As noted in "Observation and Insight 9: A US education is only a good start", the bottom line with US military planners is: hard work and results. Such a bottom line is excellent for a warfighting headquarters, but comes at a personal cost for Planners who constantly strive to produce the perfect plan.

Despite their numerous skills, the CFLCC Lead Planners were not adept at taking some down time in order to ensure that they remained fresh and ready for new challenges. The Planners worked long hours without break, month after month, with no end in sight. The Planners tried to factor rest periods into their schedules, but the demands upon their time, combined with a strong work ethic, meant that rest periods were not taken. The author saw Planner after Planner culminate at various times during OIF due to changing circumstances, or overwhelming workloads.

The lesson is clear, leaders must ensure that Planners are *forced* to take some down time, and take a break, in order to rest their minds and clear their heads. If not, a Planner's performance will degrade to the point where he/she is no longer adding value to the organisation. If Coalition nations are to be successful in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), nurturing planning capabilities so that they continue to be effective over the long term, is critical. Victory in the GWOT will be measured in years rather than months, and key asymmetric assets such as Lead Planners that Coalition nations possess,

vis a vis terrorist organisations, will be crucial to that victory.

Observation and Insight 8 – Access to Secure Internet Protocol Router – Network (SIPR-NET)

If any Coalition operation was tailor-made to allow relaxation of US SIPR-NET (US Secret level intranet system) usage and access; OIF was that operation. Three trusted allies, US, UK, and Australia led OIF, and in a changing world it is improbable that a similar homogenous Coalition will be assembled again. Yet despite the homogeneity of the three lead nations the US maintained strict restrictions on non-US usage of the SIPR-NET.

To cover this restriction, CENTCOM developed CENTRIX-X, a US, UK, and Australia intra-net system that, ideally, could interface with US SIPR-NET. In CFLCC C5-Plans, CENTRIX-X was an abject failure. The author attempted, as an experiment, to get *one* CFLCC C5-Planner registered as a CENTRIX-X user, so that the C5-Planner's US SIPR-NET account could interface with the author's CENTRIX-X account. Despite the CFLCC-C5 Planner's best efforts, he could not get through the restrictive administration required to become registered as a SIPR-NET/CENTRIX-X user.

The author's view is simple. Rather than attempt to set up an entirely new system, such as CENTRIX-X, in order to enable Coalition nations to fight alongside the US using a common intra-net system, the US SIPR-NET could be *modified* in order to enable Coalition nations *limited access* to US SIPR-NET. During OIF, all that the author required was email connectivity with CFLCC staff in order to participate as an *embedded* member of the HQ CFLCC. Without email connectivity it is difficult, but not impossible, to participate as an *embedded* member of warfighting headquarters.¹⁹

A modification, to the US SIPR-NET in order to enable Coalition nations *limited access* to US SIPR-NET would involve some type of *virtual fence or firewall*, combined with an access monitoring system, being placed between each Coalition US SIPR-NET access point and the US SIPR-NET as a whole. A *virtual fence or firewall* system should be technically feasible,

and could be pursued as a long-term project amongst key allies while we are at peace, as trying to establish additional access to the US SIPR-NET proved problematic during war.

Observation and Insight 9 – A US education is only a good start

A military education with the US is one way to get in the door with Planners in US warfighting headquarters, as is a thorough understanding of US joint and Service doctrine, US culture, and national characteristics.

An education as an Advanced Warfighting Program graduate may be an advantage to a Coalition Planner who may quickly identify with other US Advanced Warfighting Program graduates, who within CFLCC included 14 officers. In addition, during OIF a ready network of Advanced Warfighting Program graduates was available throughout CFLCC's major subordinate commands, and other Component Commands. In the opinion of the author, the operational planning for OIF, with few exceptions, was led by US Advanced Warfighting Program graduates, and this was certainly the case at CFLCC, V Corps, and I MEF.

However, the bottom line with US military planners is: hard work and results. Qualifications are no substitute for hard work, and within CFLCC those who would work hard, joined together and led the way to produce the results demanded by Commander CFLCC. Therefore, any Coalition officer, who is also a Command and Staff College graduate, could effectively work as a Lead Planner/Planner in any US warfighting headquarters, providing they possess a robust work ethic. Such an officer could, if necessary, learn US doctrine on the run and adapt accordingly.²⁰ The key point is that even a US military education is only of passing interest to US Planners if a Coalition officer will not/cannot work as an *embedded* Planner. If a Coalition officer is not *embedded* with the US staff, then that Coalition officer, as a Liaison Officer (LNO) who simply collects information but adds relatively little value to Coalition war planning, represents a net burden to US Planners. In a hard working and results oriented military the value of a Coalition LNO

is marginalised; in the words of Major General Thurman: “*that dog won’t hunt*”.

Observation and Insight 10 – Embed LNOs early and often

The final lesson is, therefore, axiomatic: the Coalition nation that *embeds* Planners early and often, especially with the US military, will contribute significantly to the development of Coalition plans, and ultimately to the success of any campaign. In the opinion of the author, due to the compartmentalised nature of US war planning, it is only through *embedding* that a Coalition nation can achieve an intimate understanding of any US campaign/war plan. The US military’s appreciation of hard work and results, means that “pure” LNOs, as personnel who solely serve their own nation’s interests, are of less value in the fast paced US military planning world.

If a Coalition nation can afford to “give-up” a Planner to be “embedded” with warfighting headquarters, the following benefits can be expected:

- a. The Planner will be embraced by US Planners and put to work.
- b. The Planner will work as hard as he/she chooses to work, and because the US military is so polite nothing will be said if the Planner fails to produce results. However, a non-producing Planner will be increasingly isolated until his/her very existence at the warfighting headquarters is self-defeating. This isolation is amplified if a Coalition nation only provides an LNO to warfighting headquarters. LNOs are considered by the US military to be nothing more than information gatherers.
- c. The Planner who works will be embraced as an equal by the US Planners, and will be trusted to lead planning teams, write plans, conduct liaison on behalf of the US warfighting headquarters, and brief US warfighting commanders.
- d. The Planner will gain experience that is priceless for that Planner’s nation, with regards the level of planning exposure, the tempo at which US planning is conducted, and the methods employed by the US in

- preparing for, and conducting, war.
- e. During an operation the Planner will be a point of corporate knowledge for a Coalition nation, and the Planner will be in a position to represent the Planner’s national interests, and shape the employment Coalition forces, when required.
 - f. The Planner may represent an economy of effort contribution to any US/Coalition campaign, especially if the Planner’s nation does not contribute significant forces to any anticipated, and actual, campaign.

The US military welcome *embedded* Planners, especially from close allies. The US military understands that warfighting in the 21st century requires strong Coalitions, and Coalition Planners who are *embedded* early and often with the US military contribute, in a practical manner, to coalition warfighting well before the commencement of any campaign.

Conclusion

This article has detailed an Australian Defence Force Liaison Officer’s (ADF LNO) Observation and Insights from Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) in order to **enhance** US/Coalition future warfighting capabilities; **encourage** the *embedding* of ADF LNOs/Planners/Lead Planners in US warfighting headquarters; and, **support** the continuing success of the ANZUS Treaty.

The ten Observation and Insights have been detailed not to be followed as a set of rules, but as an opportunity for debate with US and Coalition professional militaries. The Observations and Insights are one officer’s view of CFLCC planning during OIF, and the author hopes that the dialogue will continue in order to improve the ways the US and Coalition’s fight at the operational level of war.

NOTES

1. (1) Battlespace & Command and Control (C2); (2) The Planning Process; (3) Branch and Decision Point Planning; (4) Crash or Crash Through ~ Providing the Operational View; (5) Fish or Cut-Bait; (6) Mentoring your co-workers; (7) Taking some down time; (8) Access

- to Secure Internet Protocol Router - Network (SIPR-NET); (9) A US education is only a good start; and (10) Embed LNOs early and often.
2. Department of External Affairs Canberra Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS] (San Francisco, 1 September 1951) Entry into force generally: 29 April 1952 Australian Treaty Series 1952 No. 2.
 3. Battlespace and Command and Control (US DOD, 2003) see FM 1-02/MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, 2003.
 4. Six Operational Functions: Movement/Manoeuvre; Fires; C2; Logistics; Intelligence; and, Force Protection.
 5. Major subordinate commands: Particularly V US Corps (V Corps), 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), and 377th Theater Support Command (377 TSC).
 6. The Phases of OIF were: Phase I (Pre-D Day); Phase II (the Air "Campaign"); Phase III (Decisive Ground Operations); and Phase IV (Post Hostilities). Noting that Phase III and Phase IV overlapped, or more appropriately CFLCC conducted a *rolling transition to Phase IV*, the greatest challenge to CFLCC Staff was establishing measurable, and distinguishable, conditions to support the transition to Phase IV operations.
 7. Operational Control and Tactical Control (US DOD, 2003) see FM 1-02/MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, 2003. Support – Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organisation should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. (Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF, 10 July 2001).
 8. CFLCC Direct Command Units on D Day: V Corps; I Marine Expeditionary Force; 82nd Airborne Division (-); 377th Theater Support Command; 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command; 416th Engineer Command (-); 513th Military Intelligence Brigade (+); 75th Exploitation Task Force (XTF)(75th Field Artillery Brigade(-)); 335th Theater Signal Command (-); 352nd Civil Affairs Command (-); 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD)(-); 244th Aviation Brigade; and, 455th Chemical Brigade(-).
 9. Major General J.D. Thurman was the Commander, Operations Group, United States Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, (Jul 97-Jan 99); and, the Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, California, (Jul 00-Aug 02).
 10. The Corps Commander's decision cycle is generally considered to be 96 hours as that is the time an Air Tasking Order (ATO) is planned to support the warfighting commander. In a joint warfighting environment, the ATO is vital to enable the warfighting commander to shape the deep battle in order to set the conditions for decisive operations. Air Tasking Order see US JP 1-02, 14 Aug 02.
 11. The author, trained by the USMC, used the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) for problem solving during OIF.
 12. "Enable current operations battle-staff to track the progress of CFLCC towards a critical decision" – this was the final step in the pre-OIF theory of Commander CFLCC's Decision Points, and occurred during Exercise *Internal Look* (December 2002). However, during OIF CFLCC Current Operations Battle-Staff were totally consumed with monitoring the "close fight" (i.e. the next 24 hours of fighting), that all Decision Points remained with CFLCC C35-Future Operations for planning, monitoring, and direction of execution.
 13. Fires (DOD, 2003) see FM 1-02/MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, 2003. Non-lethal Fires (DOD, 2003) – Any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities. Psychological operations, special operations forces, electronic warfare (jamming), and other command and control countermeasures are all non-lethal fire options.
 14. Unfortunately, most Decision Point work was conducted on Phase III (Decisive Ground Operations), at the expense of Phase IV (Post Hostilities) Decision Points. This made transition to Phase IV operations problematic, as available Decision Points were immature, and were not supported by draft FRAGOs.
 15. For example, pre-D Day, the entire Operation *Cobra II* Plan could be briefed to any sized audience, using presentation slides, in less than 60 minutes. C2PC was developed as a US Navy system designed to connect map images with real-time satellite tracking devices in order to provide accurate battlespace situational awareness for headquarters, and subordinates. C2PC Common Operational Picture (COP) *shots* were commonly embedded in slide presentations in CFLCC.
 16. "Five-paragraph order" is US military slang for the Australian military's "SMEAC": Situation; Mission; Execution; Administration and Logistics; and, Command and Signal.
 17. Plan and Order (US DOD, 2003) see FM 1-02/MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, 2003.

18. LTGEN McKiernan to his Principal Staff, CAMP DOHA, KUWAIT, 18 May 03.
19. “difficult, but not impossible, to participate as an embedded member of a US warfighting headquarters” – the author knew two Coalition staff officers who *disembedded* themselves from US warfighting HQ during OIF, due to a lack of access to the US SIPR-NET. For the author, a lack of access to SIPR-NET meant moving information by CD or disk, between US SIPR-NET machines and the author’s stand-alone laptop. This system was inefficient, but manageable.
20. It should be noted that permanent LNOs, such as Service/ABCA LNOs and Instructors who are usually posted to the US for 24 months, also provide an excellent pool of potentially embedded officers for US warfighting headquarters.

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International and Australian Pre-emption Theory

Dr Christopher Flaherty

Following the events of 2001, pre-emption (akin to the doctrine of pre-emptive strike) became redefined in strategy thinking and international law. The notion of pre-emption, is a modification of the concept of pre-emptive strike. The doctrine has become important in the justification of US global strategy in the war on terrorism, Israeli strategy against Palestinian terrorism, and has been announced as part of the Australian Government's strategy against transnational terrorism. Pre-emptive strike is noted in Australian Defence doctrine. The notion of pre-emption is not a new doctrine rather it is a modification of the existing international law on self-defence to suit the asymmetric nature of transnational terrorism.

Pre-emption is theoretically predicated on the application of force-options against transnational terrorists. Terrorists' acts involving non-state actors, operating transnationally, attacking from other countries, and operating at a higher resource scale, utilising weapons with a greater potential to devastate countries. All present complicating factors for a country's strategy. Other complicating factors are the transnational nature of terrorist organisations, and the demonstrated ability of these to franchise.¹ Historically, thinking about terrorism has mainly focused on intrastate terrorists, for example the Oklahoma City bomber, Unabomber, or IRA. Scale wise, these examples tend to operate more in the criminal/civil realm. Transnational terrorists for instance, *al-Qaeda* and militant groups, such as *Jemaah Islamiah* operate both locally, as well as internationally seeking to attack the US and other Western countries. The scale of affect raises terrorist actors into the realm of military/strategic threat and from this point of view, pre-emption has arisen as a modified legal and strategic doctrine.

Definition of Pre-emption

Amidror's analysis of Israel's counter-strategy to Palestinian terrorism notes "Israel accepts the concept of pre-emption—that it is legitimate to strike at terror before it occurs".² Tiel's commentary on contemporary strategy argues that the US Department of Defense:

has been trying very hard to justify its new

*pre-emptive terror-war doctrine, namely that the US will attack terrorists before the terrorists attack the US. But the language of pre-emption is confusing, because of its association with the moral doctrine of pre-emptive strike.*³

Amidror identifies "pre-emption [as] something of an anomaly in the liberal world order at the dawn of the 21st century, but it has become more acceptable since 9/11".⁴ Amidror's definition of pre-emption:

*The responsibility to defend one's citizens, which for Israel combines self-defence with eliminating threats before they emerge, characterises the strategic concept.*⁵

Tiel argues the distinction between pre-emptive strike and pre-emption rests in the difference between the strategic use of self-initiated military action in the face of a real threat (such as Israeli initiation of military action against Egyptian coalition targets in the 1967 Six-Day War) and tactical action.⁶ The later identification of pre-emption as tactical has been confirmed by the US declaration of war against terrorism. Tiel explains:

Since the US is already at war with international terrorists and the regimes that support them, the use of pre-emptive strike language is morally confusing, for the US is already the defender after the aggressive attacks on 9/11. Thus, we must interpret the Department of Defense to mean not that they are employing a moral doctrine of pre-emptive strike to justify the start of

a war (since the US is already at war) but that they are employing a tactical doctrine of pre-emptive attack. In other words, the military is prosecuting the terror-war not merely by defending the US, but by actively seeking out and destroying the terrorists and their supporters all over the world.⁷

Non-neutrality Principle

Tiel commenting on the ethical justification of US policy on the war against terrorism uses the analogy of international condemnation of piracy. He clearly states that a country cannot make a unilateral claim to neutrality:

The responsibilities of nationhood include a fundamental regard for the international rule of law, and harboring pirates on the grounds of “neutrality” would only invite another power to sail into one’s harbor and destroy the pirate vessels. In just the same way, a nation wishing to avoid involvement in the terror-war may choose not to send its forces beyond its borders to seek out terrorists, but if those terrorists are within its borders, failure to act against them is an open invitation to other nations to sail in and act responsibly. Failing to act against known terrorists is complicity in their conduct; it is exactly the minimum condition on supporting terrorists that President Bush meant by the terms “safe haven”. Finally, under the rules of neutrality in a war between nations, if an enemy military unit seeks safety in a neutral country, it is disarmed (technically classified as “internment”). Terrorists never seek nor allow neutrals (or anyone else) to disarm and intern them, and thus the term “neutrality” cannot ever apply to a nation with respect to terrorist organisations. Thus, the President was correct: nations must choose whether to support the freedom of nationhood or to support those who would devastate its fundamental conditions. There is no neutral ground.⁸

Senator Robert Hill, Australia’s Minister for Defence in November 2002, in this *John Bray Memorial Oration* made a similar point:

An increasingly inter-dependent world makes this more important than ever before.

With it we are seeing the emergence of an international civil society, and an increasing recognition that with sovereignty must also come responsibility—towards one’s neighbours and one’s own people. A civilised international community will not tolerate gross abuses within states or between states. It will also not tolerate a state harbouring those who commit gross abuses against a third party.⁹

The point made by Senator Hill is that sovereignty is not a fixed absolute, but that it is politically justifiable to contradict it, if another state claims the right of pre-emption. The sovereignty question is a complex one. However, in terms of the theory behind pre-emption a state’s right to unrestrained sovereignty appears to carry the caveat that where transnational terrorists are lodged, a state is morally obliged to open its borders to other threatened states allowing them to destroy the terrorists before they can attack.

International Law

In the international law scene the legal right to take pre-emptive action is justified in terms of the *Caroline* principles. Namely to justify self-defence/pre-emptive strike a state has to show:

- Instant, overwhelming necessity;
- Leaving no choice of other means; and
- No moment for deliberation.

Article 51 of the UN Charter permits the use of self-defence “if criminal attack occurs”. The International Court of Justice however does not provide a definitive statement on the scope of the law of anticipatory self-defence under the Charter. The US position, announced in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*,¹⁰ which was promulgated in September 2002, identifies that there is an “option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our [US] national security”. Pre-emption represents a redefinition of *imminent threat*:

Legal scholars and international jurists often condition the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.¹¹

US strategy is to act pre-emptively if necessary, to “forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries”. In the Australian context the Australian Prime Minister, Mr John Howard in December of 2002, explained the reasoning underpinning his Government’s anti-terrorist strategy:

*What you’re getting [now] is non-state terrorism, which is just as devastating and potentially even more so. And all I’m saying, I think many people are saying, is that maybe the body of international law has to catch up with that new reality, and that stands to reason.*¹²

This response was predicated on the view that “any Prime Minister who had a capacity to prevent an attack against his country would be failing the most basic test of office” if he or she did not do so.¹³

In the US context, the concept of “imminent danger of attack” is adapted to the “capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”.¹⁴ The authors of the *National Security Strategy* equate imminent with invisible threats:

*We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction — weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.*¹⁵

Senator Robert Hill in November 2002,¹⁶ listed the characteristics of “today’s adversaries”—their capabilities and objectives—as:

- Non-state actors;
- Operating in the age of over-the-horizon weaponry, computer network attack and asymmetric threats;
- Where warning times are reduced virtually to zero;
- Striking almost anywhere;
- Launching in a non-conventional manner;
- Operating from a variety of bases in disparate parts of the world; and
- No telltale warning indicators, such as the mobilisation and pre-deployment of conventional forces.

Senator Hill adds that pre-emption in the international law setting is an adaptation of the existing *Caroline* principles in terms of the threat environment that exists today.¹⁷ Namely, “it is clear that, when an armed attack against a state is imminent, that state is not compelled to wait until the first blow has been struck”.¹⁸ However, importantly, the right of pre-emption even in US terms is “still couched as self-defence rather than a distinct new doctrine”.¹⁹ Senator Hill concludes this point, with the observation, that:

*Some would argue that it’s time for a new and distinct doctrine of pre-emptive action to avert a threat. A better outcome might be for the international community and the international lawyers to seek an agreement on the ambit of the right to self-defence better suited to contemporary realities. But in the meantime those responsible for governance will continue to interpret self-defence as necessary to protect their peoples and their nations’ interests.*²⁰

Australian Pre-emption Thinking in the International Law Domain

Senator Robert Hill, in some of his public statements has defined the current Australian Government’s *pre-emptive doctrine*. In an interview conducted November 2002,²¹ he related pre-emptive strike, or as he called it — “anticipatory self-defence”— to a doctrine of self-defence. Senator Hill offered these qualifications:

Yes, the UN charter permits self-defence but again it was drawn in a fairly restrictive way because it was addressing conventional conflict where there were long lead times and much greater transparency. The issue now is how you define self-defence in an environment of unconventional conflict, non-state parties, weapons of mass destruction, global terrorism. And whilst anticipatory self-defence has always been permissible, clearly this new environment requires a more liberal definition of self-defence to be meaningful. You’ve got to address the particular fact’s circumstance as it develops. Each fact’s circumstance is unique.

The point that Senator Hill is making is that, while there is no new doctrine of pre-emption, instead of pre-emptive strike, there is still a major change in emphasis. Claims of right to launch pre-emption-action, and a pre-emptive strike is clearly justifiable on the grounds of self-defence. Except in the former case—the threat is not necessarily obvious, and the actors are non-state parties. In this sense, namely a changed world, Senator Hill notes:

*It's not an easy time for policy makers when in defining self-defence you're looking at an environment, the current environment which is very different to that to which the rules were designed for. And furthermore, an environment, a strategic environment that is changing so rapidly. But ultimately in providing that definition, a state has got to be judged on how it defines it and there has to be a real threat. There has to be a real reason. It's never been in dispute that you have to wait until you're attacked before you're entitled to respond, to utilise the option of self-defence. The issue is how you define appropriate circumstances in today's very unclear, unsettled strategic environment.*²²

Senator Hill notes that the lack of certainty should not be used as an excuse for illegal international action, because there still needs to be a legal claim for the right by a state to take pre-emption-action. Further Senator Hill clarified:

*A state such as ours would always claim and seek to act within the law. After all, that is one of the things that distinguishes us from the terrorists. It's what we and our allies are fighting for. As there must be rules within the state for the orderly behaviour of citizens, so there must be rules between states.*²³

Senator Hill adds the caveat that, fundamentally pre-emption—vis—self-defence is “a just response, which however, governments make with due respect for international law”.²⁴ Comparatively, the US *National Security Strategy* states, “we will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions”.²⁵ As a further caveat on the US position, pre-emption is contained by the fact:

*The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the US or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.*²⁶

Australian Pre-emption Thinking in the Military Strategy Domain

Australian defence policy “now openly recognises that a secure Australia depends on a secure region”.²⁷ In a similar vein, Australia's *Strategic Review 1993* imported into Australian strategy a general move toward a more proactive approach to meeting security needs. The Australian Army *LWD-1 The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* identifies as general principle that the commitment to regional security finds expression—with the intention:

*to shape Australia's strategic environment by working cooperatively with regional states to prevent threats arising.*²⁸

Called *positive engagement* with regional countries, this is argued to communicate a “cautioning [to] potential adversaries against the use of force”.²⁹ In terms of National Security the authors of the *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace*, state that:

*The overall aim of [National defence] is to reduce the vulnerabilities where possible so that the country can become more resilient to unexpected crises.*³⁰

In the Australian context, the right of pre-emption is linked to transnational terrorist threats. In December of 2002, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr John Howard explained in response to a journalist's question, in respect to the notion of pre-empting a move against people in another neighbouring country planning an attack on Australia:

*I think any Australian Prime Minister would. I mean, it stands to reason that if you believed that somebody was going to launch an attack against your country, either of a conventional kind or of a terrorist kind, and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternative other than to use that capacity then of course you would have to use it.*³¹

Operational Concepts

Transnational terrorism operates conceptually between the strategic in a military sense, and international criminal in a civil sense. Strategies to deal with these also need to operate in this mixed domain. This approach has been taken in the Australian context. For instance, the Government's notion of *Layered Defence* announced in the *Australia's National Security: a Defence Update 2003* develops the concept integrating international diplomacy, legislative, financial and border controls, intelligence, policing and defence resources to defeat the terrorist threat.³²

Even though transnational terrorism operates in the mixed strategic/civil domain from a military operational concept point of view the core characteristic of winning modern asymmetric conflict would still involve *Overmatch*.³³ The Australian Army *Fundamentals* authors identify *Overmatch* as:

*applying overwhelming force against an enemy in the form of military blockade, precision bombardment and pre-emptive strikes in ways he cannot match.*³⁴

Recognition of pre-emptive strike as a means to achieve *Overmatch* emphasises the surprise aspect of strike with overwhelming force or more particularly ubiquitous force. For instance, the Royal Australian Air Force doctrine offers a qualification of pre-emptive strike in the *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power*, "strike may also take the form of a pre-emptive strike".³⁵ Australian Army doctrine, states "when used pre-emptively, or with surprise, operational manoeuvre may lead to a decision without battle".³⁶

Joint Operational Aspects to Pre-emption

Australian pre-emption operational concepts have a clear joint doctrine relationship. Engaging a mix of assets: Army, Air Force and Navy. However, an "Australia pre-emption operational concept" would also tend to mix immediate strike characteristics, as well as coercive aspects. Royal Australian Navy Doctrine offers such a qualification on pre-emption, namely the element of strategic ambiguity. For instance, Navy assets have the ability to be "ready—rapidly

prepared and deployed for a contingency".³⁷ As well, Navy assets have "immediate access to some 70 per cent of the earth's surface".³⁸ Thus, Navy assets can deploy without leaving a "footprint".³⁹ Meaning:

*warships do not create a footprint on other nations territories or in their airspace and thus do not challenge sovereignty in the way that land forces or forward deployed or over-flying air forces must do.*⁴⁰

Added to this is the nautical—operational concept of "flexibility",⁴¹ namely:

*Warships [as with submarines] can be deployed into area covertly or overtly; they can be withdrawn at will; and they can be as easily operated so as to create a deliberate impression of ambiguity as of certainty and decision.*⁴²

Conceptual Distinction between Deterrence and Pre-emption

Siqueira and Sandler identify a fundamental definitional difference between pre-emption and deterrence:

*Deterrence often represents strategic complements where decisions by targeted countries move in unison, while pre-emption represents strategic substitutes where decisions by targeted countries move in opposite directions.*⁴³

Siqueira and Sandler note that:

*in the pre-emption game, the targeted governments must decide independently whether to launch an attack against a terrorist network's camp or sponsor.*⁴⁴

The essence of Siqueira and Sandler's argument is that one country's efforts at deterrence reduces the probability of it being attacked, while this usually increases the probability that another country, with which it has a relationship could be attacked. The underlying assumption by Siqueira and Sandler is that, pre-emption differs from deterrence. This is based on game theory, emphasising the end results of either deterrence or pre-emption. Similarly, the US position, stated in the *National Security Strategy*:

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose

*avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.*⁴⁵

The Deterrence Aspects of Pre-emption

The authors of the *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace*, observe that the “capability to deter aggressors or stabilise situations enables diplomatic resolution”.⁴⁶ This is linked to *Coercive Diplomacy*,⁴⁷ which has a deterrent aspect to it.⁴⁸ It is also recognised by the authors that pre-emptive strike:

*Aimed at deterring an aggressor before major conflict erupts. While there would always be significant political and diplomatic considerations of any pre-emptive strike, confronted by irrefutable intelligence of impending hostilities, the Government may exercise a pre-emptive strike option to remove the immediate threat and demonstrate national resolve.*⁴⁹

Classically, deterrence is underpinned by the notion that a state’s strategy is conducted rationally. In game theory, rational players are deterred from attacking a country either because they have something to lose, or they can rationally conclude that changing their behaviour stops them from losing what they might lose otherwise. Harvey, argues that a key to deterrence “working” is the “credibility” with which it is held by the respective players. Underpinning deterrence is the older concept of self-defence where a state could incur a pre-emptive strike if it gave the realistic impression in a target state’s strategy that it is about to be attacked. Thus, the pre-deployment of forces that have the ability to strike with resolve has been an important part of the classical deterrence equation.

Harvey’s analysis of *denial* in deterrence thinking clearly identifies an element of pre-emption.⁵⁰ Denial employed as a basic deterrence strategy is based on articulating both an acknowledged and credible capability to defeat any threat to the physical integrity of Australia.⁵¹ A denial approach clearly underpins the Australian strategy pursued in response to the Bali Terrorist Attack. For instance, Australian, Indonesian and international reaction pooled

policing, intelligence and defence resources was partly reactive, but also constituted a type of denial, which worked to halt future terrorist attacks. As well, this action also had a pre-emption –effect in that by denying harbour and dismantling networks, potential terrorists were stopped from engaging in further actions. Similarly, the nautical – operational concept of “coercion” tends to imply a type of deterrence–denial,⁵²

*If a situation requires more direct action, maritime forces can be used to coerce a would-be adversary by demonstrating the readiness to deploy a degree of combat power which would make its aim unachievable or the consequences of achieving it not worthwhile. They are thus effective at achieving deterrence.*⁵³

Finally, a key strategic issue in the application of pre-emption–action is what is called the *decisive point*. Namely, the juncture point between when an action takes place, and the prior coercive nature of anticipated action — through the pre-deployment of forces. A means to give such “tempo” and “pause” options is through the nautical–operational concept of “deployment without footprint”:

*Maritime forces, including amphibious forces have, however, particular value in terms of such action because they are able to achieve coercive effects without necessarily violating national sovereignty.*⁵⁴

Irrationality

Deterrence is an example of symmetrical strategy. The players (for instance the Soviets and US) deploy similar weapons to counter each other. As well, each assumed the other was rational. Credibility of deterrence also depended on the perception as to whether deterrence measures work. A key methodology underpinning the application of deterrence is public negotiation between national governments. For instance, diplomatic dialogue between US and Soviet governments, and the clear public articulation of deterrence doctrines during the US and Soviet era.

Tiel identifies that current US pre-emption strategy incorporates a classical–rationalist

deterrence approach in that by elevating terrorism to “an international evil”,⁵⁵ and declaring war on states that harbour terrorists this is intended to deter states from acting as hosts for terrorists and their organisations. Problematic, of this approach is that what is known about terrorist thinking seems to suggest that the driving reasoning is not rational; or would be seen as “normatively rational” in terms of Western strategic thinking. Amidror’s analysis of some aspects of Palestinian terrorism strategy notes “they measure success not by achieving positive results for their people, but rather by the amount of suffering inflicted on their enemies”.⁵⁶ More generically, Siqueira and Sandler identify,

*Since the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, there has been a transition in the driving motivation behind transnational terrorism: that is, terrorism has become more dominated over time by religious-based, rather than left-wing, groups. There is empirical evidence that this changing motivation of terrorists has led not only to a greater carnage per incident, but also to more fanatical terrorists for whom the act itself is sufficient reward.*⁵⁷

In effect, a portion of the US deterrence strategy has been the declaration of *Total War*—a war of annihilation. The US counter-response has led to the second limb of pre-emption doctrine, namely “*destroy terrorists directly no matter where they are*”. Thus, unlike deterrence theory, pre-emption does not entail rational-Graduated Response Theory to escalating – war.

Conclusion

Pre-emption in essence combines self-defence with eliminating threats before they emerge. By way of explanation, operating at the tactical-operational level pre-emption in Australian terms is a joint doctrine with a strong maritime relationship. The redefinition of pre-emptive strike results from the start of the world war against terrorism in 2001. This signalled a more aggressive stance—more through necessity—toward halting non-state actors like al-Qaeda and militant groups, such as Jemaah Islamiah. Pre-emption is a typical National Security concept. Fundamentally, the notion sits astride military as well as civil or international

legal domains. Terrorism at the scale currently being practised by non-state actors sits uneasily in the realm of international crime, as it is much more broadly focused than intrastate terrorism. In summation, pre-emption theory announces several principles; firstly, pre-emption–action is different from pre-emptive strike, though it utilises exactly the same resources and operational concepts; namely, pre-emption relies more on cover and strike principles. Secondly, the concept is a modification of the right of self-defence translated into fighting transnational terrorists. Thirdly, the right to pre-emptive strike is not predicated on another state’s claim of sovereignty, but acts as a caveat on this. Thus, there can be no claim to the right of neutrality. Fourthly, pre-emption utilises multilateral security concepts as well as coercive–deterrence approaches. Fifthly, engaging in a war against groups that operate covertly requires a high level of intelligence capability in order to anticipate, and direct strike, as well as justify acts post-event politically.

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Designing an Emergent Capability Based Strategy –Toward a New Business Planning Paradigm?

By Pat Byrne

*Many years ago as a young cadet at military college I, along with my class mates, was educated in the art of military strategy. Learning these concepts consisted primarily of learning the “appreciation process”; a process of assessing the enemy’s capabilities, our own capabilities, the ground over which the operation was to be conducted, the timing limitations on the operation, and so on. Hours and hours, even whole days were spent on the process. It was almost as if the process was the most important lesson. We had little plastic folders (called *vui tuis*) filled with data on our own and the enemy’s forces; weapon ranges, ammunition holdings, enemy tactics, enemy unit configuration, principles of the attack; principles of defence; how many soldiers it would take to construct a figure eight barbed wire obstacle; enough data to confuse the mind and put you off the whole purpose of you enlisting in the first place (perhaps there was a message for me there).*

This same scenario was repeated over subsequent courses with the seemingly inevitable focus on the process—the appreciation. All courses emphasised performing the process; slowly at first, then faster down to having two hours to consider the problem, conduct a reconnaissance, complete the appreciation and finally, to write the plan. Moreover, it was understood (by me at least) that if you followed the process, the plan just “popped out” at the end.

This is perhaps better illustrated if one looks at one of the oft-quoted definitions of strategy provided by Colonel A.F. Lykke quoted by Clarke (see Hooker, 1993, p. 103). Lykke expresses the concept of strategy as an equation: *Strategy equals Ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).*

Put another way, this is analogous to saying that strategy is equal to the *outcomes we wish to achieve* plus the *tasks we need to perform* to achieve those outcomes and the *resources or things we use to perform those tasks* that achieve those desired outcomes.

But this isn’t quite complete in my view.

There remain unanswered questions, including:

- When do we perform those tasks? At what point do we act to achieve those ends?
- What things do we use for what tasks and when do we employ them and to what end?
- What synergies arise when we combine a number of resources to perform a number of tasks at the same time? Can we exploit these synergies or should we keep some sort of reserve in case things go bad?

These questions cannot be easily answered going through a “cookbook” planning process. Indeed, they are difficult to answer – period!

STRATEGY	+	ENDS	+	WAYS	+	MEANS
		Objectives toward which one strives		Courses of action		Instruments by which some end can be achieved
		The outcomes we wish to achieve		The task we need to perform to achieve our objectives		The things we use to perform the tasks

These were also the answers I was seeking when each time I went through the appreciation process to develop a plan.

Although I always felt that something was wrong with this process approach to strategy, I could never quite put my finger on why. It was not until I was required to read Hart's book, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (1954), that I came to realise that strategy was a significantly more cerebral concept than spending hours conducting the appreciation process. It is not to say that the processes of an appreciation are not required; rather it is to say that the concepts of strategy do not fall out of conducting the appreciation. It seemed to me to be forever a discontinuity to consider all the "factors" (ground, enemy, friendly, etc) in an appreciation then to come up with a plan of action. There was an intuitive leap from appreciation to plan that I was not taught (or perhaps could never grasp). That intuitive leap is an understanding of the true concepts of strategy. This is what Hart (1954) taught me.

Now, having read still more, I have come to realise why this situation may be so. The concept of strategy is difficult to pin down to a formula, to a checklist that can be placed into one of those ubiquitous *vui tuis*. Hence the training system concentrates on something it **can** reduce to a formula or a checklist; the appreciation and its subsequent plan.

On Corporate Strategy

What I learnt from a military perspective is what Mintzberg (1994) observes in his book, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, with

respect to corporate strategy. Mintzberg (1994, p. 139) quotes Quinn:

A good deal of the corporate planning I have observed is like a ritual rain dance; it has no effect on the weather that follows, but those who engage in it think it does. Moreover, it seems to me that much of the advice and instruction related to corporate planning is directed at improving the dancing, not the weather.

If I insert "battle" for "corporate" I find a succinct description for the phenomenon I have experienced.¹ Reading the "CMR Forum: The Honda Effect Revisited" (Mintzberg et al. 1996) encouraged me some years ago to explore this phenomenon further by investigating the concept of corporate strategy and how a compromise may be reached between those that like or need pattern and those that prefer a more intuitive approach to business strategy formulation. The compromise attempts to provide a framework to assist in that intuitive leap from conducting an appreciation of an organisation's environment to developing a plan for the organisation.

Richard Rumelt in "CMR Forum: The Honda Effect Revisited" (Mintzberg et al. 1996), identified three broad views of business strategy:

- **Designing Strategy.** This view holds that strategy is formed from the top and implemented against a grand design that attempts to predict future outcomes. The BCG study into the British motorcycle industry provides what could be considered to be a typical example of this approach.



- **Emergent Strategy.** The emergent strategy view holds that an organisation gets on with business and learns about its competitive environment as the environment evolves. Strategy is made in response to external stimulus and emerges as the organisation learns from its experience. Henry Mintzberg, in many respects, is a proponent of this view.
- **Capability Based Strategy.** This view has been championed by C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel (1989 and 1990). It embraces the concept of strategic intent and identifies how organisations compete on capabilities or competencies,² specifically their core capability. The organisation with a vision that stretches its current capabilities is the organisation of the future.

Although these three views are not entirely incompatible, there has been considerable discussion of the benefits of one view over the other. My intention is not to fuel this debate, but to illustrate a methodology for operationalising these concepts to provide managers with a framework for explaining and formulating strategy within their organisation.

It permits a designed strategy insofar as broad direction is provided from the top in the form of objectives and ongoing monitoring, yet the strategy is permitted to emerge from the bottom in response to the initiatives undertaken by junior managers and line workers attempting to meet the organisation's broad objectives. The organisation's means of achieving these objectives are its capabilities,

embodied in its people, software, hardware, facilities, information and so on. Further, to implement a designed emergent capability based strategy requires an organisational culture that encourages initiative, self-examination and risk taking.


The following discussion utilises concepts from all three of the above views and sprinkles it with liberal doses of military strategy to bring the concept together. It is an heuristic model and its ability to consistently explain past events and processes and to apply it to our company's current business planning and consultancy tasks leads me to the conclusion that it is also robust. I finish the article with a brief review of the 2003 Gulf War to illustrate that even in today's military environment the three broad views of strategy exist.

The Thesis

Another Brick In the Wall

It is my contention that a framework to assist in the intuitive leap from appreciation to plan can be established by the application of some defined business strategy concepts. Fundamental to these strategy concepts is the raising of "barriers to entry".

In economics, "barriers to entry" refers to the obstacles preventing or slowing the entry of new competitors into a market. I have taken the concept a step deeper and applied it to the individual organisation. In this context I mean for it to describe the competitive forces that drive an organisation to capture part of the available market and to attempt to retain and grow it. Accordingly, the further a firm reaches





into the marketplace, the more barriers to entry it raises, perhaps in an incremental fashion, against competitors. Strengthening its position relative to its competitors and/or protecting its current position against interlopers.

Accordingly, it manages to build a wall around its portion of the market brick by brick. Each brick might represent a particular barrier for a certain part of the market. The more bricks, the more the company has secured its future or at least its present, and made it hard for competitors to take that portion away.

Within this conceptual framework I further contend that firms can engage in three broad strategic activities to achieve their objectives:

- Strengthening core capabilities by raising constructive barriers to entry. This can be used in both an offensive and defensive sense.
- Defending core capabilities by raising protective barriers to entry. Again this can


be used in an offensive or defensive mode.

- The final strategic activity is the employment of strategic manoeuvre.

Moreover, to fully utilise these concepts they must be enmeshed in an organisational culture that nurtures forward focused people with initiative and drive.

Constructive Barriers to Entry

Constructive barriers to entry are those barriers imposed by a firm through strengthening and building a firm’s core capabilities. I consider these concepts to be constructive in nature as they directly **grow** the organisation to conquer new territory whether that is geographical, market or product. This is analogous to building “positive” bricks in the wall. Four concepts that permit these strategies to be operationalised might include:



- **Increasing the Speed of Innovation.**

The concept of increasing the speed of a product's "cycle time" from research and development to product introduction (Wheelwright, 1988, p. 44) has significant competitive advantages as it encompasses Porter's (1985) generic strategy of "product differentiation" in which he identifies a means of gaining competitive advantage by ensuring the product provides different and preferably, additional, customer value. The primary purpose is to get inside a competitor's innovation cycle so that when they have responded to your latest innovation with one of their own, you have innovated yet again. To paraphrase Wallace (1992, p. 3) its aim is to *transition through more innovations than the competitor, so that his current or impending innovations are no longer relevant.*

A similar concept has been used in military strategy theory for sometime and is known as the Boyd Cycle, after Colonel John Boyd of the USAF, or the OODA Loop (for Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) (see Lind, 1985, p. 4-6). Accelerating the cycle time for product innovation will assist a firm in increasing the durability of their core capabilities, as the end products will continually trump those of competitors. Acceleration can be achieved through creating the right environment for innovation by instituting cross-functional project teams and supplier partnering, among other initiatives.

- **Expand Use of Core Capability and Core Products.**


To extend the durability of the core capability and core products a firm can expand the end product range into areas hitherto untapped. For example a firm that produces steel buildings as end products would likely have core products, among others, of steel frame manufacture and assembly and steel sheet fabrication and assembly. Core capabilities would include welding, steel rolling and shaping, design and drawing. Accordingly, the firm could expand in a number of areas and provide other end products and services such as designing and drawing other structures and/or products (particularly in steel or metal) or manufacturing other steel or metal products such as small trailers or grain silos.

- **Expand Into New Markets.**

Expanding into new markets includes expanding into new geographical markets or even creating one that previously did not exist. It could permit a firm to increase the market size for its end products, gain new skills and knowledge from operating in different cultures and business environments and be a catalyst for the development of new core products and/or core capabilities.

- **Acquire New Capabilities.**

Acquiring new capabilities such as those embodied in new skilled staff or purchasing a firm with the necessary capabilities to ensure the geographical and core capability expansions go ahead will permit expansion further into





a firm's value system or assist in achieving other objectives.

Protective Barriers To Entry

Protective barriers to entry are those barriers designed to safeguard or protect the core capability of a firm. I consider them protective as they are primarily designed to secure the perimeter of an organisation; to hold the status quo; to entrench the current position of the organisation. They *do not* grow the firm's core capabilities *per se* but provide a base to consolidate and launch onto the offensive and something more constructive. Employing protective barriers to entry does *not* imply a defensive action as they can be used in an offensive way. But use of them could be considered a *holding* action until the opportunity to grow capabilities is considered possible, at which time a firm can be more constructive in its activities. They are not an excuse to neglect growing the organisation merely a chance to catch a breath, counter a rival's actions or even grow market share within an established market. Concepts include:

- **Rent Seeking.** Circumstances permitting, it may be possible to lobby governments at all levels to use a firm's products and/or services exclusively or at least guarantee a particular segment or share of the market. Examples could include: the issue of licenses to operate in certain markets; long term contracts for the supply of goods and services to government; a policy limiting the competitors in an industry; or lobbying

for tariff protection from competitors.

- **Cost Leadership.** Through competitive pricing coupled with other tactics such as advertising campaigns and product improvements, a firm can entrench an end product in the market. Moreover, once an end product is entrenched, switching costs (see Lieberman et al. 1988) associated with the product may prevent customers from seeking alternatives even if they offer additional utility. Microsoft versus Apple has some of these features. This strategy encompasses one of Porter's (1985) generic strategies, namely cost leadership.
- **Legal Recourse.** Legal protection through patenting ideas, processes and technologies or perhaps seeking a court injunction to prevent or force certain actions by competitors, is an accepted way of doing business in some parts of the world. However, some countries and cultures do not perceive this as a barrier, indeed they only see it as an opportunity to exploit, say the patent or copyright. The ongoing altercation between China and the USA over copyright is an example of this conflict in cultures and the ability to police the law. The solution in these situations could be to employ "strategic manoeuvre".

Strategic Manoeuvre

Strategic manoeuvre involves positioning an organisation in such a way as to gain an advantage in order to ensure the objectives of that organisation have the best chance of success.



Strategic manoeuvre is employed to place a firm in a position of strength relative to its competitors to assist it in employing constructive and/or protective barriers to entry. It is not an end in itself, but a technique to gain advantage. It is designed to put a competitor, or competitors, at such a disadvantage that the will to compete is lost; to so unhinge any likely opposition that an attrition or price war is avoided; all from outthinking and/or outplaying the opposition. A number of concepts are available:

- **Tempo.** Tempo involves moving quickly to reinforce core capabilities and erecting barriers to entry before the competition realises or can react to the intent of your actions. In this way it can invoke the advantages of the OODA Loop or decision cycle as explained earlier, but at an organisational level. Every time a competitor responds to an action in the marketplace, such as the launching of a new product or an advertising campaign, it finds that it is of minimal impact or irrelevant. Further, it finds that each time it does react, the reaction becomes increasingly irrelevant. It may require re-engineering processes to reduce the time to conduct revenue generating activities.
- **Guile and Deception.** Guile and deception are manoeuvre concepts that have often been employed in business (and should always be used in military strategy). It is used to mask the real intentions of an organisation until it is too late for competitors to react. It could be used to assist in harvesting first mover

advantages. However, it should be noted that in expressing the need for guile and deception, I in no way advocate dishonest, misleading or unconscionable conduct.

- **The Indirect Approach.** The indirect approach as articulated by Hart (1954) has three critical features; the centre of gravity of the opponent, the line of least resistance, and the line of least expectation.

The centre of gravity of an organisation is the critical element(s) that makes an organisation effective, of which the defeat, capture or otherwise render impotent will defeat that opponent in its endeavours to achieve its objectives. In the world of business the centre of gravity could be the customer's tastes, the competitor's technological base, the manufacturing processes or the tacit knowledge of key employees. The centre of gravity could include the core capability of an organisation. Capturing and/or targeting the centre of gravity of a competitor will render them impotent.

The line of least resistance is best explained in Lind's (1985) terms of "surfaces and gaps". This concept advocates the identification of the easiest routes to achieving the required objectives (gaps) and the hardest routes to achieving the same objectives (surfaces). If the objective were to defeat an opponent, then it would mean identifying the gaps that permit the easiest approach to the opponent's centre of gravity. Lind (1985) even considers the use of overt probes against the opposition to determine

where these surfaces and gaps might be. The concept has given rise to the military term of “reconnaissance pull” whereby general direction is given from above, however, the detailed route or method emerges as the results of the reconnaissance become known. In business strategy terms this could translate into: testing the market before launching a new product; finding niches away from the main players in the market; or launching multiple products and then putting your main effort behind the ones that appear to offer the best prospects.

The line of least expectation implies a degree of surprise. In business strategy terms the surprise can be in the timing, the market area targeted, the market segment targeted or even the product launched. It is the concept most likely to utilise guile and deception.

The concepts associated with the indirect approach could be utilised for risk reduction, because employed together they would assist in avoiding direct confrontation with competitors and the likely commensurate attrition style price war.

- **Schwerpunkt.** *Schwerpunkt* is a German word the concept of which translates into focusing the main effort to rapidly reinforce success. When a “gap” in the enemy’s defences is discovered then that gap is rapidly and ruthlessly exploited. A firm could use this concept by “trawling” for end products that sell by launching multiple end products and then putting their main effort behind the successful one(s). It may also find that a manufacturing process is highly successful at reducing cost; again the *schwerpunkt* is placed behind this process to maximise the return from cost leadership.

Organisational Culture

It is fine to have a framework in place that provides focus and concepts for doing battle in the marketplace. However, without the parallel development of a supporting culture at all levels, an organisation will find itself unable to fully utilise the advantages of such a scheme. A suitable supporting culture requires an ability

to identify competitive opportunities (gaps) and to respond quickly before the opportunity is lost.

Such a concept is an implicit acceptance of the emergent strategy view. To not accept this view would disregard the realities of the marketplace as a chaotic system. Chaos theory was developed to assist the science and engineering fields to better explain the unpredictable phenomena inherent in systems studied or developed by them. However, chaos theory has a wider application than those two fields, management science being one.

Business strategy, as part of the management sciences, could be said to be an attempt at working within the chaos or even taming the chaos to ensure a particular end state beneficial to the organisation for which the strategy was developed. However, the inherent problems in any attempt to work within or tame a chaotic system are manifest in the make up of a system. To micro-manage the nuances of an organisation operating within a national macro-economy, which in turn is influenced by global economic activity is difficult, primarily because it is a true chaotic system. Entropy no doubt contributed by the actions of human beings, or groups of human beings, within that system. Although it may be difficult to provide order within a chaotic system, it should not prevent a firm from ever striving to limit the adverse effects of chaos upon their enterprise and, more importantly, to take advantage of the chaos to edge closer to their objectives. It does this by a degree of design or planning which is aimed at providing a broad direction and a commonly understood strategic framework within the organisation and to incorporate an organisational culture similar to that the military call directive control, mission oriented orders or in its original German form; *auftragstaktik*.

The philosophy of *auftragstaktik* requires that all members of a military combat formation understand what are the objectives of the current activities, say a battle. For once the enemy is engaged, regardless of how good communications may be, the superior commanders will be unable to control every activity during the battle. The emphasis is on the initiative of the individual commanders and

soldiers to carry out the “commander’s intent” knowing, as they will, their immediate situation. The Germans saw this as seeing through the “fog of war” and seizing opportunities to achieve the commander’s intent when they were presented. To wait for a decision from higher would see the opportunity missed and the fog once more enveloping the battlefield.

In Australia, it is known as Directive Control and is the endorsed philosophy of command for the Australian Defence Force. It is defined as:

A philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by the superior on his intentions – that is the result required, a task, the resources and any constraints. It includes the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result. Successful directive control demands a high level of trust, understanding and communication between commanders at all levels and their subordinate commanders who must be willing to take decisive action based on their commander’s intent. Superior commanders must be willing to accept responsibility for the actions of their subordinates (ADFP 1, p. xxxiii).

From the above definition it may appear that *auftragstaktik* is analogous to management by objectives. However, it goes far deeper in that it is a culture that permeates all levels of an organisation and is not merely a tool for monitoring performance. In an attempt to pin down the philosophy to something tangible, Bashista (1994) identified four elements all of which are required to successfully build an *auftragstaktik* culture:

- Obedience by the adherence to the commander’s intent. This would be analogous to all employees having an understanding of the organisation’s strategic intent and focusing their efforts toward it.
- A proficiency in technical and tactical concepts. Analogous to managers having a good understanding of the strategic concepts and management practices required of their trade. The implication is the “learning organisation”; building on past knowledge to move forward.
- An encouragement of independent action

and the latitude for its conduct. Indeed, inaction is considered a worse crime than the wrong action. In the military environment, this concept is an imperative as an enemy will target communications links and render centralised control ineffective. Targeting communications is a situation unlikely to eventuate in business; hence this concept could be translated to offering solutions for senior managers to select rather than offering problems to be solved. Any solutions must be based on the lower management perception of the problem in the first place. Once a solution is chosen, then lower management is permitted to get on with the job.

- The maintenance of self esteem focuses on the individual having a sense of worth to the organisation; of being a contributor to the organisation’s goals. This requires upper management to relinquish control and rely on the lower levels to achieve the organisation’s goals. Further, it gives people at all levels the right to make a mistake without it endangering their job so long as that mistake was made in an attempt to achieve the strategic intent.

The culture of an organisation will have a considerable influence on its success in winning on the marketplace battlefield. It will permit the decisiveness and focus that is essential to good management practice in a competitive environment.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that an entity must first conduct its appreciation of its market using a “cookbook” of some sort. In this case it might first identify its objectives, or **Ends**, within the context of its competitive environment; determine the broad **Ways** those **Ends** can be achieved and provide broad guidelines for the allocation of resources, or the **Means**, to achieve the objectives.

The detailed **Ways** are determined by the lower management levels as they attempt to achieve the “commander’s intent”, or in the business sense, the corporation’s strategic intent; lower management *pulls* the organisation toward its strategic intent. If it appears that a

particular **Way** is likely to succeed then the *schwerpunkt*, or main effort, of the corporation is directed at this gap to ruthlessly exploit any competitive advantages.

However, the intuitive leap that permits management to decide, among other considerations, how, when and in what order and magnitude to commit resources, is the missing link to strategy. It is difficult to build into a cookbook, but nonetheless, broad frameworks can be applied. This is what I have attempted to demonstrate using my heuristic model to analyse the situation presented in “CMR Forum: The Honda Effect Revisited” (Mintzberg et al. 1996).

More recently from observing the news, commentary and analysis during the recent Gulf War and applying my model I believe I can provide a reasonably broad view of the war’s strategic development:

- The US, UK and Australian forces that fought the Iraq war were capability based forces. The process used to define, design and develop these forces was a capability based one. The *capability based strategy* was a lengthy one that had been in place for some time.
- There was undoubtedly a *grand design strategy* in the invasion. The plan would have been developed down to the last tank and the last minute.
- However, even the best laid plans suffer from the changing environment. For example the *emergent strategy* had to change the grand design to accommodate the fact that Turkey did not permit the use of their country as a launching pad for part of the invasion force. Later the plan changed again as the resistance was found to be lighter than expected—this permitted a direct rush into Baghdad itself, well in advance of the timetable anticipated.

The Gulf War demonstrated aspects of all three views of strategy. The capability based strategy is undoubtedly a long term view. The designing strategy is one that has to be developed at some stage, for without a plan it is difficult to know what capabilities might be required. However, once committed to the plan the emergent strategy takes over, as it is the only

way to accommodate the inevitable changes in the environment.

As a last word, using a broad strategic framework such as the one outlined assists business executives in making that intuitive leap from having an understanding of their competitive environment and where the corporation wants to be, to developing plans to implement a particular focus in achieving those corporate objectives. It permits the *design* of a broad strategic framework based on their current and required *capabilities*, the detail of which *emerges* in response to the competitive environment. If a corporation designed an emergent capability based strategy they would be capable of recognising and seizing commercial opportunities as they arise rather than to rely simply on good luck.

Luck is being ready for the chance

J. Frank Dobie

NOTES

1. The description has even more meaning for those who have experienced the military training regime, for if our plans were less than acceptable we would be placed in the firing line of the directing staff, a situation we referred to as “tap dancing”.
2. For the purpose of this analysis, capabilities and competencies are considered to be one and the same. I prefer the term capability as it has a compatibility with the military concept of capability that competency cannot.

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Pat Byrne spent 20 years (and 3 days!) in the Australian Army serving in a variety of locations, utilising different skills and performing a wide range of tasks. These tasks included: project management, requirement analysis, strategic capability analysis, process analysis and management, implementing management efficiencies, liaison, general management, contract development and management, human resources management, leadership, administration, and platoon commander. He has been an economics tutor and systems engineer/project management guest lecturer at undergraduate and graduate level. Pat now advises on holistic solutions to business problems for product and capability focused organisations. His recent work has included developing a whole of business approach for developing and managing capability and project information for Capability Systems in the VCDF Group and defining and articulating an holistic approach to regulation for complete Naval Regulatory System for NCSA within Navy Systems Command. Pat has a Bachelor of Arts and a Master of Technology Management. He wrote this article some years ago when researching his Phd. He subsequently updated it for publication as he has found the concepts as relevant today as they were when he first wrote it particularly in the light of the recent Gulf War when commentators regularly referred to military strategy concepts.

Federal Election Voting in East Timor: The PVT–EM Experience

“Peace-keepers and Vote-takers”

Major Paul A. Rosenzweig

In 2001, I had the unique privilege of raising and commanding the Pre-Poll Voting Team-East Timor (PVT-EM), an ADF deployment on behalf of the Australian Electoral Commission to collect pre-poll votes for the 2001 Federal Election. In summarising the outcomes of that election, the Australian Electoral Commissioner observed, “That a General Election is a watershed in Australia’s history is unarguable”.¹ Most notably for his organisation, it is also a time for intense public scrutiny, with the transparency of the system satisfying a number of objectives, not least of which is reassuring the electorate of the integrity of the democratic process. The deployment of the PVT-EM was a key aspect of maintaining that integrity.

While the ADF now has a significant degree of accumulated wisdom regarding the planning and execution of electoral activities within a peace operation,² it has not recently had to conduct an “electoral operation” to facilitate voting by its own personnel in an Australian federal election. This article provides an overview of the planning and execution of a mission to East Timor to collect pre-poll votes for the 2001 Australian Federal Election, aspects of which reflect the continuum and nature of operations described in the Joint Warfighting Framework.

Background

In general, it has always been possible for registered Australian voters in a foreign country to vote by mail in federal elections and referenda.³ It has not always been so easy for Service personnel to vote whilst deployed on operations.

The first *Commonwealth Electoral Act*, 1902 provided for postal voting by registered voters but these rights were repealed in 1910, and not restored until the passing of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act*, 1918. Special arrangements for Service personnel stationed overseas during and in the aftermath of war were established by wartime electoral acts and regulations, permitting voting at field locations. The first example of such an event was the Conscription Referendum of 1916, in which Australian troops deployed in Europe voted in polling places established by units, the whole ballot guided by Administrative Headquarters in London.⁴ Not surprisingly, the greatest return from external voting facilities has occurred during wartime: some 419,000 voters (9.4 per cent of total registered voters) voted at external locations for the 1943 general

election—Australian armed and ancillary services personnel voting under special wartime electoral provisions.⁵

More recently, deployed Australian servicemen in Vietnam could participate in the 1970 Senate election by applying for a postal ballot, to vote up to three weeks before polling day in Australia. An officer of the Commonwealth Electoral Office spent a month in Vietnam advising Service officers who had been appointed Assistant Returning Officers. Voting was not compulsory, but nonetheless voting facilities were arranged for each unit. The rules were varied somewhat for deployed troops: soldiers over the age of 21, who had lived in Australia continuously for six months, were entitled to vote even though they may not have been enrolled. Soldiers under 21, who could not vote in Australia, were eligible whilst on Special Service in Vietnam. Through these various mechanisms, all soldiers deployed in South Vietnam had the opportunity to vote.⁶

Postal voting remained the only method for Australians abroad to vote in federal elections until 1983, when a parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform reviewed the

federal electoral framework and created new options for voters. From this time, voters had the option of voting in person at an external voting location (a “pre-poll” or “declaration” vote) or returning a postal ballot.

Of interest, a pilot program by the US Department of Defense during the 2000 Presidential election allowed about 200 Service people stationed overseas, their families, and some other civilians to vote online.⁷ Electronic voting by deployed troops was a costly experiment,⁸ although it was permitted again in 2002, but by just one state. A sailor aboard USS *Monterey* wrote that the right to vote is a “concept so often undervalued at home, but so rarely even understood as a possibility in many places abroad”. He said that he did not take this right for granted, “Nor do I take for granted the can-do aggressiveness of those who make it possible for a sailor, deployed thousands of miles away, to still cast his vote in his own home town”.⁹ ADF members deployed in East Timor in 2001 might have had the same view.

Shaping

In mid 2001 it became apparent that the Prime Minister, the Honourable John Howard, would most likely call a Federal Election before the end of that year. The Australian commitment to East Timor (Operation *Warden*, then *Tanager*) had then been running for two years, and there were some 1,400 ADF personnel deployed with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) or with other elements, such as the Australian Training Support Team. The majority of deployed personnel were members of the Australian Battalion (AUSBATT) of the UNTAET Peacekeeping Force. By the likely election date, the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (which deployed as the “2nd Battalion Group”) would have only recently taken up duty as AUSBATT.

Personnel are normally only registered as overseas voters if they expect to be deployed for more than three years, so all ADF members in East Timor remained registered to vote in the electorate applicable to their normal residential address. But by the time the 2nd Battalion Group was about to deploy, candidate nominations remained open and ballot papers

were not yet available. The only options for their participation in the federal election were completion of a postal ballot in East Timor, or a pre-poll declaration vote before an authorised Pre-Poll Officer under the auspices of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), which has the mandate to conduct parliamentary elections.¹⁰

There had been more than a degree of embarrassment earlier in 2001 after more than 640 Queensland State Election postal ballots intended for ADF personnel in East Timor had been returned from the International Mail Exchange in Sydney as undeliverable to the Queensland Electoral Commission. The Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, the Honourable Bruce Scott, immediately ordered a review into the procedures for administering postal votes for ADF personnel serving outside of Australia. “It is totally unacceptable for ADF personnel deployed overseas to be denied the right to vote”, the Minister said: “our men and women serving our country overseas must be able to exercise their right to vote and I am determined that in future they will be able to do so.”¹¹

Based on this experience, the AEC determined that there was insufficient capacity for deployed members in East Timor to vote by postal ballot. And at this time, UNTAET remained a Chapter VII mission under the UN Charter, with use of force authorised, negating the ability for the AEC to deploy its own polling officials. In view of the threat level, and its recent experience with postal ballots, the AEC requested that ADF personnel be deployed to operate mobile polling booths in East Timor to collect Declaration Votes. At the strategic level, this whole-of-Government “shaping” ensured an environment that was consistent with Australian interests—the ability of all citizens to exercise their democratic right, even whilst deployed in a declared active service zone.

Commit

Once the decision to commit military forces in support of national interests was made, the task was allocated to Land Command, and HQ Logistic Support Force was tasked with providing an appropriate team. The existence of

a pool of trained and prepared members within Force Preparation Squadron-Darwin (FPS-D) meant that deployment could take place at short notice. The additional benefit was that these members would return to Darwin with a heightened situational awareness, significantly enhancing the unit's core function—delivery of pre-deployment force preparation training.

Accordingly, HQ LSF issued a Task Order to OC FPS-D to mount a team for attachment under Theatre Command to Commander Australia Theatre (COMAST). As guided by extant Joint Doctrine, at the operational level HQ AST confirmed the mission, allocated appropriate resources and provided advice on the use of these resources to best achieve the strategic ends. In addition to providing Defence members with the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to vote, the conduct of this polling was also widely seen as an important demonstration of democratic processes within a new nation which itself would soon be facing a Presidential election. For this reason the team adopted a strategy of making its activities relatively public, within force protection constraints, and explaining to locals what was occurring.

Doctrine identifies that commitment of military forces requires a clear definition of the desired outcome. This team was to be responsible for assisting the Commander Australian Contingent-East Timor (COMASC-EM) in providing electoral support for deployed forces through the deployment of Mobile Polling Booths. The proposed mission, endorsed by COMAST, was as follows: "FPS Pre-Poll Voting Team is to operate an electoral facility in EM between D-17 (24 October) and D-2 (08 November 01) in order to support COMASC-EM in providing electoral support for AS deployed forces" (where "D" represented election day in Australia).

In addition to the specified task, voting at a Pre-Poll Voting Team (PVT) facility would also be permitted by Australian Defence civilians and defence contractors, Australian UN Military Observers (UNMOs), Australian civilian police (UNCIVPOL) and any other Australian citizen. The PVT would accept completed postal ballots if submitted (where a member had previously

applied for and received ballot papers). Postal ballot applications would not be issued by the PVT however, as there would not be sufficient time for these to be processed by the AEC and returned to the member prior to election day. The PVT also had no responsibility regarding voter registration: it is a personal responsibility to be registered to vote, and non-compliance would be an issue between the individual and the AEC.¹²

Implicit in the mission and desired outcomes was not only the strategic intent of providing an opportunity to vote, but also compliance with AEC statutory provisions regarding the conduct of an electoral facility and the security of all ballot papers, used and unused.

Posturing

Initially FPS-D was directed by COMAST to deploy a four-person team to EM, and preliminary planning commenced in anticipation of the Prime Minister's announcement of an election date. A team of six was assembled (including two reserves), all of whom had previously completed Operation *Tanager* force preparation training. These personnel underwent AEC training in Darwin, as a result of which they were formally authorised by the AEC as Pre-Poll Officers.

The Governor-General issued writs for the election on Monday 8 October, and Election Day was declared as 10 November. A Mission Analysis and Concept Brief was submitted on 10 October, as a result of which COMAST approved the deployment of a six-person team. This number allowed for two mobile polling teams, of three members each, to permit adequate security and auditing of ballot papers, and in-theatre redundancy in the event of accident or injury of a team member. The PVT was now postured, with capability and intent.

Synchronisation

The AEC provided the PVT with Senate and House of Representatives Lists of Candidates (for each state), a quantity of ballot papers for every electoral division in Australia, EF012 "Declaration Vote (pre-poll)" envelopes, counterfoil folders, portable ballot boxes and padlocks, EF022 "Spoilt or Discarded Ballot Paper" envelopes and all necessary electoral



Mobile Polling Booth established at Maliana, 01 November 2001

materials and references. For legitimacy, the PVT was formally authorised by the AEC to operate an electoral facility.

Whilst deployed in EM, under Visitor status, the PVT was responsible to COMAST through the Australian National Command Element (ASNCE-EM). ASNCEEM provided all in-theatre logistic support including transport, accommodation, rationing and armed security to the PVT personnel at the voting facilities and during transit. Force protection for the PVT members was achieved by a four-man security party detached to ASNCE-EM from AUSBATT, who also maintained weapon security (so personal weapons did not have to be taken inside voting facilities) and assisted with ensuring 24-hour security of AEC ballot boxes and ballot papers. Extensive liaison with ASNCE-EM, HQ UNMO Group, UNCIVPOL and various non-government organisations ensured that the presence of the PVT was made known to Australian members throughout the region. Meanwhile, the Australian Mission in Dili would provide normal pre-poll and election day facilities for Australian citizens.¹³

This synchronisation of effects again reflected the whole-of-Government approach. Significant support and assistance was given to the PVT by J51A, HQ AST, SO2 Pers, LHQ, ASJ10, ASNCE-EM, FPS-D, AEC, Canberra and NT Divisional Returning Officer.

Deployment

The concept was to establish voting facilities throughout the AO where ADF personnel were based.¹⁴ The PVT sequentially established firm bases in each of the three key localities (Dili, Balibo and Suai), where a three-person Mobile Polling Booth (MPB) received pre-poll votes during stated time windows. Concurrently, a second three-person MPB deployed daily from this firm base to outlying areas where there were concentrations of voters. The PVT conducted this operation in five synchronised phases with a preparatory stage and a re-deployment stage, as follows:

- a. **Preparatory stage.** AEC briefings and final admin/medical/dental audits in Darwin to fulfil HQ AST and LHQ pre-deployment criteria.



Awaiting extraction by helicopter from a Mobile Polling Booth established at the “Mount Everest” retransmission site, 31 October 2001: security of the Declaration Votes was maintained at all times.

- b. **Phase 1.** Deployment of a two-person reconnaissance team in East Timor, D-21 to D-17 (20-24 October).
- c. **Phase 2.** Deployment of the PVT in Sector Central, D-16 to D-13 (25-28 October). This commencement date was determined by the availability of Senate and House of Representatives Lists of Candidates for each state, and ballot papers for each division, which was itself subject to production time immediately following the close of nominations on 18 October. One MPB was established in Dili (firm base), and another deployed to Hera and Metinaro.
- d. **Phase 3.** Deployment to AO MATILDA, Sector West, D-12 to D-7 (29 October-03 November). One MPB was established in Balibo (firm base) and then Maliana, and another deployed to Aidebelaten, Batugade, Moleana, Tonobibi, Marko and Bobonaro, as well as to “Mount Everest” for the signalers based at the retransmission site.
- e. **Phase 4.** Deployment to AO CANTERBURY, Sector West, D-8 to D-6 (02-04 November). One MPB deployed to Suai and Holbelis.
- f. **Phase 5.** Deployment in Sector Central, D-4 to D-3 (06-07 November). One MPB was established in Dili (firm base), and another deployed to Metinaro.
- g. **Re-deployment stage.** Re-deployment to Darwin on D-2 (08 November), and transfer of ballot papers to the NT Electoral Office. It was a critical consideration that all papers (completed and unused ballots) were in the hands of the AEC prior to the opening of polls on 10 November. The Divisional Returning Officer for the Northern Territory was then responsible for forwarding the ballot papers (in their sealed envelopes) to the appropriate electoral

district for tallying and recording against that district's Electoral Roll.

Each MPB was established in accordance with the statutory requirements for the conduct of a polling facility, as detailed in AEC EF151 "Pre-Poll Voting Procedures" booklet and SOP 350 (Pre-Poll Voting Requirements) produced by FPS-D. Among the key considerations were the following:

- Each MPB displayed a "Federal Election Boundaries Map" to allow members to verify their electoral districts, and held an EF054 "List of Localities and Streets" for each state for confirmation where required.
- In several cases where the member's electoral district could not accurately be determined, contact was made with the AEC by mobile phone or satellite phone to confirm details from the electoral rolls database.
- Each MPB displayed Group Voting Tickets for each state.
- Members were given the ability to mark their ballot papers in privacy.
- There was no discussion of parties, personalities, policies or any other material, which may be seen as having the potential to influence an individual's choice.
- No political material was allowed within the MPB facility other than legitimate "How to Vote" cards which may have been carried by individual members. PVT members did not issue or display "How to Vote" material and political promotional material was not displayed within the MPB facility.

The conduct of polling at each MPB was in accordance with AEC EF151 and FPS-D SOP 351 (Mobile Polling Booth Procedures). MPB staff asked members to complete and sign an EF012 Declaration Vote (pre-poll) envelope, verified and entered the electoral Division, and issued the appropriate ballot papers. The staff then removed and filed the counterfoil from the EF012, and had the member place the two ballot papers into the envelope. The member then sealed the envelope and placed it into a sealed AEC portable ballot box.

Under the prevailing philosophy of federal electoral administration, any person who claims to be an Australian registered voter may, at any

external voting location, complete a pre-poll vote for a federal election. Thus, PVT staff had no responsibility for verifying eligibility or for marking names off AEC electoral rolls but instead, for accountability and tracking purposes, maintained a comprehensive nominal roll of all personnel accounted for. The eligibility of each voter would be determined by examination of the completed voting declarations against records of registered voters by AEC officials, following the return of external voting material to Australia.

The completed Declaration Vote envelopes were stored within locked weather-proof trunks, with AEC Ballot Box Seals attached and the serial numbers recorded in the AEC Pre-Poll General Return proforma. Senate and House of Representatives ballot papers, being accountable documents, were fully acquitted at the completion of each day's polling, and then similarly secured. All items were maintained under 24-hour security, and were personally escorted to and from aircraft cargo bays by PVT staff. The inspection of the security containers by AQIS personnel prior to re-deployment was similarly supervised by PVT staff and the trunks, bearing AQIS and AEC Seals, were exempt from physical inspection by Customs officials on entering Australia.

The OIC of each MPB was required to update the AEC Pre-Poll General Return at the close of polling each day, and complete an Elector Information Report for each locality. A consolidated Pre-Poll General Return was submitted to the AEC on return to Darwin.

Outcomes

Polling was conducted over a period of ten days, at Mobile Polling Booths established in 14 localities. The team covered a total of 2,890 kilometres in three vehicles without incident. A total of 1,603 Australians in East Timor were accounted for. Of these:

- 43 personnel were found to be not enrolled.
- 16 personnel had arrived in East Timor during the PVT's deployment, and had already lodged a pre-poll vote prior to departing Australia.
- 41 personnel departed East Timor during the PVT's deployment and would be able to vote in Australia on election day.

- 7 personnel (mainly UNMOs) were scheduled to vote at the Australian Mission on election day.
- 19 personnel were on tasks or otherwise unable to attend a Mobile Polling Booth while it was in their locality, and units were advised to make arrangements for these personnel to vote at the Australian Mission on election day.

Accordingly, a total of 1,477 Declaration Votes were received: from a total of 1,427 ADF personnel, 14 Australian UNCIVPOL personnel and 36 civilians. This may not seem dramatically significant amongst the national total of 12 million votes cast,¹⁵ but the process ensured the constitutional right of eligible Australian citizens to vote. Significantly though, 926 of these votes were cast for just one Division.¹⁶

On return to Australia, the Curator of Military History and Technology at the Australian War Memorial was forwarded an AEC flag which had been signed by PVT members and Major General Ian Gordon AM (Deputy Force Commander UNTAET PKF). All reports and the SOPs which had been produced by FPS-D were lodged with HQ AST for future reference should such a deployment need to occur again.

The greatest single lesson from this experience at the tactical level was a reinforcement of the age-old maxim: success is attributable to the development of a robust yet flexible plan, thorough liaison and sound administrative and logistic support from trusted staff. At the strategic level, the PVT members had been empowered with a sound philosophy to facilitate the voting process. This new philosophy became enshrined in doctrine in early 2002 when a new ADF voting policy was promulgated in a revised Defence Instruction (General) after a review of procedures by the Directorate of Personnel Policy. Although the information in DI(G)A 52-1 generally remained valid, the most significant issue identified was that ADF responsibilities had previously not been clearly defined, and there had been a number of occasions where circumstances had denied members the opportunity to vote. The PVT experience had put that to rest.

Conclusion

In expressing his appreciation for the work undertaken by the PVT on behalf of the AEC, the Australian Electoral Commissioner reflected that the PVT had, “ensured that electors in remote and dangerous places were able to exercise their right to vote”.¹⁷ Further, the close cooperation between Defence and the AEC (at national and regional levels) ensured transparency so that the electorate could be assured of the integrity of the democratic process. The deployment of the PVT is a good example of the interaction between the various elements of national policy, supporting the most basic of democratic mechanisms, the federal election.

NOTES

1. Mr Andy Becker, Electoral Commissioner, AEC *Annual Report 2001-2002*.
2. See for example Maley, M, “Electoral Considerations In Peace Operations”. 1999 International Peacekeeping Seminar, ADF Peacekeeping Centre, 16 July 1999; Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8, *Peace Operations* (in press).
3. See A. Wall, “External Voting, the Australian Experience”. Paper for the IFE/UNDP/IDEA *Seminario Internacional Sobre el Voto en el Extranjero* (International Seminar on External Voting), Mexico City, 11-12 August 1998 [<http://www.ife.org.mx/wwwcai/semaustl.htm>].
4. C.E.W. Bean, (1942) *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18. Volume III: The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1916*. AWM Canberra, p. 892; Bean, C E W (1942) *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18. Volume IV: The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917*. AWM Canberra, p. 22. A second Conscription Referendum was similarly conducted in 1917.
5. Wall (1998), op. cit.
6. Australian War Memorial, Canberra, image FAI/70/0783/VN and associated caption.
7. <http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,34582,00.asp>.
8. <http://www.egov.vic.gov.au/International/TheAmericas/UnitedStates/EdemocracyVoting/usedemocracy.htm>: “A \$6.2m experiment to let overseas soldiers vote over the internet in the US presidential election netted just 84 ballots at a cost of over \$70,000 per voter, a research group has reported”.

9. <http://www.peworld.com/news/article/0,aid,106638,00.asp>. In November 2002, Virginia was the only state, which allowed military personnel on active duty abroad to request that their absentee ballots be sent to them via email.
10. *Commonwealth Electoral Act*, 1918; *AEC Annual Report 2001-2002*.
11. The Hon Bruce Scott MP, Media Release dated 22 February 2001 (MIN 027/01).
12. Voter registration has been compulsory for all eligible citizens resident in Australia since 1911. Since 1924, voting at federal elections and referenda has been compulsory for all registered voters.
13. http://www.southern-cross-group.org/archives/Statistics/Australian_Overseas_Voting_by_Post_10_Nov_2001.pdf.
14. The three Australian UNMOs and two Australian MCO staff deployed in the Ambino Enclave came to Dili to vote. Members in the UN Military Hospital unable to travel had their electoral details passed to PVT staff, who visited the hospital with all appropriate papers and guides to permit voting.
15. 12,098,490 votes were cast for the Senate, and 12,054,665 votes for the House of Representatives, from a total enrolment of 12,708,837. (<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/handbook/elections/index.htm>).
16. Perhaps more significantly, given the postal ballot problems in the State election earlier in 2001, this was a Queensland division.
17. M A. Becker, Australian Electoral Commissioner, letter to Secretary, Department of Defence, dated 4 December 2001.




Major Paul Rosenzweig is currently Staff Officer-Land Doctrine at the ADF Warfare Centre. He raised and commanded FPS-D in direct support of the Australian commitment to INTERFET, and later UNTAET and UNMISSET, responsible for the preparation and training of some 12,000 individuals for deployment to East Timor from November 1999 to December 2002. Prior to this, as an Army Reserve officer, he was a squadron commander in the North West Mobile Force (1998/99) and Officer Commanding, Defence Force Careers Reference Centre-Darwin (1996/97). During this time he was Executive Officer, Wildlife Management International Pty Ltd (1997-99), and Aide to the Administrator of the Northern Territory at Government House Darwin (1991-97). He has published, in a voluntary capacity, three books on history and biography, including Ever Vigilant, the regimental history of the North West Mobile Force. He was awarded the Centenary Medal in April 2003 for "long and outstanding research on Australia's military history".

Reviews

THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE FORCE and WORLD WAR II

by Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, Blue Jacket Books, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, USA. Distributed in Australia by Peribo Books, 58 Beaumont Street, Mount Kuring-Gai, NSW 2080, 272 pages, price \$52.95.

Reviewed by Vic Jeffery



Imperial Japanese submarine activities during World War II is an area of which there is seemingly not an extensive amount of detailed information available in print.

This book is based on Japanese sources and American wartime intercepts of secret Japanese radio messages. Authors American naval historian Carl Boyd and Japanese mariner Akihiko Yoshida have painstakingly recorded and evaluated a diverse array of material about Japan's underwater war at sea.

Surprisingly the Japanese submarine fleet played a rather insignificant role in the Pacific War and this book goes some way to explaining the reasons why, predominantly supporting the beleaguered Japanese Army.

Japanese submarine weapons, equipment, personnel, and shore support systems are discussed first in the context of the preparations for war and later during the war with operations from the California coast through the expanses of the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the coast of German-occupied France are analysed.

The study of the Japanese World War II submarine commences with the development of the first Japanese *Holland*-type submersible vessel, *No. 1* that was the first of five. It continues through to the 5300 ton *I-400* class that could carry three aircraft and were the largest

submarines in the world at that time. A further 28 pages are dedicated to the informative chapter, *Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy*.

A good deal of Japan's wartime submarine records was destroyed in 1945 and closer to home, some of the records of their activities around the vast Australian coastline have been seemingly destroyed, suppressed or lost in the mists of time.

It was surprising to see no reference to the 1943 torpedoing of the Australian hospital ship *Centaur* off the Queensland coast with the loss of 268 lives. The Japanese midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour in 1942 is included, along with a similar attack on Diego Saurez, Madagascar which damaged the old British battleship HMS *Ramillies* and sank the British tanker *British Loyalty*.

Some 10 Appendices are included ranging from *Imperial Japanese Navy Instructions for Submarine Warfare and the Decisive Battle* through to *Summary of Japanese Submarine Losses in World War II and the Surviving Submarines* and *Biographies of Key Members of the Imperial Japanese Navy Submarine Force*.

There is an omission in Appendix 3, *Reconnaissance Operations with Submarine-Borne Aircraft, November 1941 through November 1942*. Whilst *I-25* being off Sydney on February 2, 1942 and then off Melbourne 18 days later is included, as is *I-29* off Sydney on May 23, 1942 and *I-21* also off Sydney six days later. However, there are no mentions of the Japanese flights over Perth and Fremantle in Western Australia in 1942.

Mentions of Japanese submarine activity and attacks in Australian waters are also confined to Australia's East Coast, and completely ignore Australia's western seaboard.

These omissions certainly do not detract from this book which all in all is a good summary of the Imperial Japanese Navy submarine force in World War II. Supported by 19 photographs and 14 maps, it is recommended reading.

LINGUISTS IN UNIFORM: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE by Colin Funch. Published by the Japanese Studies Centre, Monash University, 2003, 302 pp, paperback. \$38.50 plus shipping costs. Available from the publisher at Building 54, Monash University, Victoria, 3800, Australia. (japanese.studies.centre@arts.monash.edu.au).

Reviewed by Wing Commander (Ret'd) John Steinbach.

The US Government admits relying on linguists for much of its expertise in communications intelligence, and it would be safe to assume the same applies here. The criticality of the human element in this business has, from the tragic events of 11 September 2001 been emphatically demonstrated by the dearth of Arabic linguists for the timely processing of intercepted messages. Still, in far too many histories of military intelligence coups (or failures), the role played by linguists (or the lack of them), although fundamental, has been downplayed, with code-breaking as a mathematical battle of wits or a celebration of technical wizardry, taking all the credit. This book is an exception: the history of just over 300 Australian men and women in uniform, author included, having sufficient proficiency in the Japanese language to work as military linguists during World War II. Early Christian missionaries had dubbed it *nihongo*—the devil's language, because it confounded dissemination of the Gospels in Japan. Being unlike any other language, Japanese remains one of the most difficult for Europeans to learn: a pre-WWII Canadian study reported it would then cost about \$4000 to train linguists to the necessarily high standard, and suggested that it might be worthwhile for young men to learn the language even at the expense of keeping a Japanese mistress!

On the outbreak of the Pacific War, the only linguists of sufficient competence available to the military were individuals who, in the main, had studied the language for personal interest, such as the legendary Captain Eric Nave and Wing Commander Max Wiadrowski, or acquired it as expatriates. Systematic training

although quite limited, had been underway at the Censorship Office in Collins Street Melbourne, from mid August 1940 and remained the main source of linguists until the establishment of the RAAF School of Languages at Sydney University and the Coojee Bay Hotel in 1944, with Wiadrowski as its first Commanding Officer. But there were never enough Japanese linguists anywhere; the Americans making extensive use of *nisei* servicemen, second or third generation Japanese-Americans, some of whom worked with Australians at the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), at one time located at Tighnabruach, until recently, the official residence of Commander, 1 Div in Indooroopilly, a Brisbane suburb.


Much of this book deals with the problems in the selection and training of linguists in a military context (the scrub rate was always close to 50 per cent, and there were suicides from the pressure of up to eight or more periods of instruction per day). Few outsiders have any inkling of the difficulty of learning a foreign language to the extent where it becomes possible to interrogate POWs or make sense of captured documents, by nature cryptic military correspondence. Australian military linguists also served on signal intercept duties, and after VJ, were attached to war crime tribunals gathering evidence or acting as interpreters at trials. One of the more interesting and unusual tasks was the study of aircraft and aircraft component manufacturers' markings and identification plates retrieved from downed aircraft, aircraft logs and captured aircrew which led to a detailed understanding of the Japanese aircraft industry, and provided crucial targeting intelligence to US strategic bomber forces. It was of such significance that in 1944, the entire AIRIND operation (as it was known), was moved from the AMP Insurance Building in Brisbane to the Pentagon. The training of linguists was to be one of Australia's most powerful arguments in claiming a share of post-war administration in the Pacific.

Much of what linguists do remains by nature, secretive, and the number of linguists in the ADF has always been small; with few reaching high rank—the number of one-star or higher ranked linguists at any one time could be counted on one hand—they and their work

maintains a low profile. This book offers, for the first time, an insight into their work, and it makes for fascinating reading. And there are one or two lessons about language preparedness for military planners to note.

TURN RIGHT AT INSTANBUL: A walk on the Gallipoli Peninsula by Tony Wright; Published by Allen & Unwin, 1 August 2003; 250 pp, 16 Colour Plates, Softcover, AUD\$24.95.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Craig Johnston



I received this book in the mail from the Australian Defence Force Journal. I duly set about a nightly read to meet my obligation of providing a timely book review of what on first appearances seemed like another in a long list of books seeking to discover

the mystique of Gallipoli and ANZAC. If you're not one who puts much store in fate consider my unease on the second day of becoming engrossed in this story of an ordinary Australian setting out to rediscover ANZAC Day on Gallipoli—to find that my posting to Canberra had been changed and I was going to find myself in the author's shoes the very next year. My reading passion had suddenly taken a new turn—this story had become very personal.

Tony Wright is National Affairs Editor of *The Bulletin*. Before that he was Chief Political Correspondent of the *Melbourne Age*. In that latter capacity he accompanied John Howard and Kim Beazley on their visit to Gallipoli for ANZAC Day 2000.

Unlike so many of the more recent publications about venturing to discover Gallipoli and ANZAC and why this pilgrimage is becoming something of an obsession with young Australians and New Zealanders, Tony Wright had undertaken the journey before. He had been given a copy of his great-uncle's Gallipoli diary and passed up the opportunity for another "all expenses paid" journey to the Peninsula in favour of the no frills version —

back-packing like the vast majority of pilgrims.

Wright's story reaches many a reader. A journey simply told—a description of Turkey that considers so much more than just ANZAC Day eve and the ceremonies of the day itself. Here the author brings his family's story to the heart of the reader. From his journey's beginnings in Sydney's inner suburbs to a variety of meetings with trekkers of various nationalities and Turkish guides of all shapes and degrees of competency, Wright captures the reader with a marvellous array of side ventures that distract him (and the reader) from the real quest at hand. He balances his recollections with advice for the reader on a wide range of subjects, from transport challenges to hotel options to the more important aspects of gaining full value from the experience and visiting thousands of years of civilisation at the very fingertips of the traveller.

This is not a story about ANZAC, nor is it a story about finding the answers to the legends of ANZAC. It is a journey of one man whose previous pilgrimages, and indeed even this one, have not satisfied his search for answers. This is a story that shows that at any age you may and can take your own journey and discover that it can be very much more than a simple bus trip to ANZAC Cove for one special day of the year. Wright's story is not unique, but he has undertaken to share it with many Australians—something few writers have done before him.

But no book is perfect and I found the Postscript chapter something of a let down to the remainder of the book. It is saved though, in the end, by an excellent series of tips for travellers and a valuable list of web sites for those intent on their own journey.

Whilst I do not suggest that this story could simply be applied by any young Australian or New Zealander on their own quest to search for ANZAC you could do much worse than follow Tony Wright's story, and advice. This book is so much more than another journey in search of ANZAC's Holy Grail. It is a story we would all eventually like to be following at some stage. His challenge to the reader is to find his or her own quest because it is achievable.

Wright's book will be in my pack as I head to Gallipoli.

THE OXFORD BOOK OF MILITARY ANECDOTES Edited by Max Hastings, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 513 pages.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Darren Kerr

I was extremely surprised by how much I enjoyed this book. I have always thought that compiling an anthology would have to be the easiest way to actually get a book published without working at it. Find a few good quotes, lift the odd extract, tie it together with a vague theme and you have an instant book. Nevertheless, they can make good summer books or ones into which a reader can dip while contemplating life in the small room. That is certainly the case for the reader of *The Oxford Book of Military Anecdotes* edited by Max Hastings. In fact, it deserves better than to be considered just another anthology.

The name Max Hastings should be very familiar to any student of military history. Hastings has written at least 16 books of which the best known are probably *Bomber Command*, *Overlord* and *Going to Wars*. He has also seen war first hand as a war correspondent covering conflicts in Vietnam, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Falklands. He is honest enough in his introduction to note that he did this book for commission alone, however, that should not denigrate the effort. In this collection a reader can learn much about the condition of soldiering and, in particular, those universal aspects that resonate throughout military history.

Although the collection deals largely with the American and English experience of war, it does have, as the author notes, “occasional forays among ranks of foreign armies”. The collection is arranged chronologically. Starting with an account of the fall of Jericho as recounted in the Bible, the collection moves through ancient Israel, Persia and Greece, to the wars of Cromwell, Napoleon and Robert E. Lee, before concluding with substantial excerpts covering the two world wars and modern conflicts such as Vietnam and the Falklands. There is probably something of interest to even the most casual of readers in the collection.

What comes through clearly is that the basic concerns and experiences of being a soldier, in barracks or on the battlefield, have not really changed that much throughout history. While weaponry has advanced, in general soldiering has not. Basic concerns such as staying alive, getting home and looking after mates are constant themes in this collection. One wonders if the pastimes of the soldier of 1728 —“the harmless diversions of drinking, dancing, revelling, whoring, gaming and other innocent debaucheries”—has some resonance today. Today’s soldiers should also note that dislike of a senior officer is not a modern invention, as this English soldier of 1642 would attest:

This day our soldiers generally manifest their dislike of our Lieutenant-Colonel, who is a Goddam blade, and will doubtless hatch in hell, and we all desire that either the Parliament would despoise him, or the devil fetch him away quick.

Hastings often displays a black humour in his selections, such as one titled “How to sack a divisional commander: Tewkesbury, 4 May 1471”:

Lord Wenlock not having advanced to the support of the first line, but remaining stationary, contrary to the expectations of Somerset, the latter, in a rage, rode up to him, reviled him, and beat his brains out with an axe.

Of course, there have been some changes in combat that appear to make good sense. For example, opposing armies no longer wait until the other is ready for combat as this incident between the French and English armies in 1745 shows why:

The English officers saluted the French by raising their hats. Lord Charles Hay, captain of the English guards, cried: ‘Gentlemen of the French guards, open fire.’ The Count d’Autheroche, then a lieutenant although later a captain of grenadiers, called back in a loud voice: ‘Gentlemen, we shall not be the first to fire; fire yourselves!’ The English then loosed a rolling volley.

Even with inaccurate firearms I know which side I would rather be on.

Overall, and despite its English focus, it is a collection that succeeds in its limited aim of

embracing “the soldier’s experience”. Hastings admits that he has gone for narrative quality in his selections, apparently the reason for the large number of English and American inclusions, and this enhances the book, albeit at the expense of a broader look at soldiering in the non-English speaking world. While *The Oxford Book of Military Anecdotes* is unlikely to become a staple of military researchers, it makes for a good read. And who knows, a reader may actually learn something.

THE OFFICER TRAINING UNIT SCHEYVILLE: The Scheyville Experience 1965 – 1973 by Roger Donnelly, published by University of Queensland Press. Brisbane: Price \$30

Reviewed by M.P.J. O’Brien

This is a book that fills an important gap in Australia’s military history. There have been several books on the Army’s other officer-producing establishments (the Royal Military College Duntroon and the Officer Cadet School Portsea): here is a definitive examination of the Officer Training Unit (OTU). Scheyville produced officers of a very high quality. Its raw material, predominantly selected National Servicemen, attempted a short course of high intensity. The course was staffed with excellent instructors at all levels. They applied commendable innovation in their methods of training and the ways their officer cadets were assessed. There was a very high failure rate of about 40 per cent. The product was frequently tested in battle in Vietnam, often just a few weeks after graduation. By any reasonable measure, graduates of Scheyville made every good officers indeed. Though their skills were particularly attuned to the job of being Infantry subalterns and good leaders of platoons, many

rose to high military ranks and many achieved important positions in civilian careers.

Roger Donnelly has researched this book well and organised it logically. He has placed the Officer Training Unit in its context. His book looks at the experiences of those who were trained as well as the instructors and their families. He has handled the difficult issue of treating the battle experience of graduates very well. His factual basis is strong. There are lists of graduates and directing staff, details of the unit’s raising and the cadet induction process. His opinions are also well founded. He raises several important questions that need careful consideration if we need to train military officers at short notice. What proportion of failures is acceptable? Is a system that could have been seen to attempt to break the spirit of young men before building them up again a proper approach? What is the balance between demanding training and the pressures of leading soldiers in combat? What were the adverse effects on non-graduates and should they have been avoided? There is good material here to foster these and other worthwhile debates.

The chapter on the assessment system at OTU is especially valuable. In the pre-“systems approach to training” Army, here was a successful attempt at objective assessment (with more than a few subjective elements to it) and, incidentally, a very clever early application of computers. Will this lesson be kept for future use?

This book has a good balance between the facts and the personal experiences of those associated with OTU. The well-chosen anecdotes enliven the text. It is well researched, written and edited. The chapter on OTU’s success stories is particularly interesting. All those who aspire to train leaders in the Australian Defence Force should read this book.

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