PRÉCIS

Navies exist to preserve the maritime interests of the State. Navies are therefore instruments of statecraft designed for a purpose — ‘A tool is anything whatsoever which is used by an intelligent being for realising its object. The idea of a desired end is inseparable from a tool.’ However in our craving to determine the shape of the naval instrument there arises a yearn for ‘bigger, brighter and more gigabytes’ to the detriment of the ‘desired end’. It was Corbett that postulated that the object of naval instrument is to control sea communications. He argued that ‘the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control.’ ‘Battleships alone cannot exercise control; specialisation has rendered them unfit, and too costly ever to be numerous enough. Numbers are needed for this exercise…’ On Numbers ‘depends our exercise of control: on the battle-fleet depends the security of control’. ‘Bigger/brighter’ may bring strategic security, even strategic ‘cover’, but numbers exercise governance control.

SUBMISSION

According to the United Nations Global Environmental Facility, the three greatest threats to the coastal State’s maritime well-being are ocean pollution from land-based sources, overexploitation and unregulated fishing of the living marine resources, and the physical alteration or destruction of marine habitats caused primarily by the spreading of human population. Add to this the expansion of shipping and the advances in hydrocarbon and mineral exploration, climate change, uncontrolled migration and the rise of marine activity based pollution, then our appreciation of coastal ecosystems stress is heightened, as is our understanding of the importance of the oceans to the health of the adjacent State.

This intensification of both users and uses of the oceans, which initially arose with the technological revolutions of the early 20th Century, have created new perceptions as to what the national interests of coastal States are, and an awareness of their importance to the national well-being.

2 Sir Julian Corbett 1907, as quoted in ‘The Late Sir Julian Corbett’ Naval Review, Volume XI, Number 1, February 1923, 18.
3 ‘The Late Sir Julian Corbett’ Naval Review, Volume XI, Number 1, February 1923, 18.
4 ibid., 19.
In the words of Alfred Thayer Mahan: ‘The necessity of a navy, ... springs, therefore from the existence of peaceful shipping, and disappears with it.’ But the experiences of the 20th Century have suggested otherwise; that navies, as the State’s instrument in maritime enforcement, exist not only to fight battles and protect shipping but to protect their State’s maritime well-being. Navies exist in order to use the sea to further their national interests; to guarantee the safe passage of trade and people, the exploitation of resources, to further their nation’s wealth and security, and for the projection of influence to ensure an external environment conducive to the creation of that national wealth and security.

This is summarised by Admiral Don Pilling as: Our naval service is no longer predominately an insurance policy for war, but an essential and complex tool for shaping the environment, reacting to crisis, preserving the peace, and building partnerships and coalitions that enhance stability and peace on a global level.

Ken Booth best exemplifies the wider function of the span of naval operations with this adaptation of his triad of naval roles:

- the projection of power by exercising control over the oceans in times of peace and conflict—the combat or military role;
- the projection of national influence either through a passive presence, regional engagement or coercion—the diplomatic or foreign policy role; and
- the protection of national sovereignty and ocean resource governance—the constabulary or policing role.

It is appropriate the naval combat role is listed first, for the essence of navies will always be their military character; actual or latent violence is their currency. It is a navy’s ability to threaten and use force that gives meaning to its other roles—latent violence derives the navy’s diplomatic strength and law enforcement credibility. ‘However remote war might sometimes seem, it is from their fighting ability that warships have their ultimate significance. By their latent potentiality in peace they can affect the management of politics amongst nations....’ But it should also be appreciated that the threat or use of armed force is only the dramatic tip of the iceberg of coercive diplomacy. Most applications are less sensational and often more effective. Nevertheless ‘when a surface ship is about there is little doubt that it is there. It may assuage or alarm, be emollient or abrasive, but it will be noticed.’

A navy is the only service that can carry, and concentrate, the national image of sovereignty to other States. Its diplomatic potential is therefore reflective in the message that wants to be conveyed—reassurance, goodwill, engagement, coercion, political support, or power demonstration. There have been many occasions where warships and auxiliaries have come to the aid of foreign States in times of disaster or emergency. Maritime diplomacy thus ‘spans a continuum from routine diplomatic persuasion to near uninhibited military action. ...[although] the objective of ‘Maritime Diplomacy’ is to exploit power rather than to expend ammunition. ...Its impact, thanks to the precedent set by centuries of use, is heavily

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6 Alfred Thayer Mahan The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, Sampson Low Marston, London, 1890, 22-3.
9 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, London, 1977, 16.
10 ibid., 24.
psychological, despite a military presence.'\textsuperscript{13} It comes back to the image that needs to be conveyed; power demonstration or regional engagement.

Likewise, the third leg of the triad, the naval constabulary role, is also enshrined in the traditional employment contexts of naval doctrine: ‘...the idea of constabulary operations is particularly valuable because it emphasises the historically close — and continuing — relationship between maritime forces and domestic and international law enforcement.’\textsuperscript{14} Doctrinally, constabulary tasks are those obtaining their legitimacy from a legal domestic mandate or an internationally agreed order.\textsuperscript{15} Sir James Cable suggests that the distinction between ‘constabulary’ and ‘combat’ applies to situations when the infliction of damage becomes an end in itself.\textsuperscript{16} A better distinction is the sliding ‘degree of force employed’ pictorial derived from the ideas advanced by Ken Booth and further developed by Eric Grove; \textit{The Span of Maritime Operations}.\textsuperscript{17}

Also, and of probably as much importance from a ‘Western’ perception, is the modern public opinion and political expectation of a navy and its roles. First and foremost, there is the expectation to defend sovereign ‘territory from any credible attack … to control the air and sea approaches …’ But within the scope of a multi-dimensional national security strategy, this expectation extends to providing adequate protection against drug smugglers, unauthorised immigration, and any potential threat or criminal activity — a maritime perimeter protector force (apprehending illegal fishing vessels, prevent disease entering through illegal landings, search and rescue, marine legislation enforcement, navigation aids maintenance, vessel traffic services, hydrography and oceanography.) The requirements of national sovereignty enforcement, maritime border protection, and ocean resource governance.

The above contemporary ideas all have a historical legacy. Strategic theory for ‘Western’ maritime development was largely a phenomenon sourced in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century. The motivations of these early theorists are the continuing subject of scholarly debate, although what is certain is that they were influenced by the land-oriented works on the study of war by Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)\textsuperscript{18} and Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869).\textsuperscript{19} Nevertheless their collective efforts produced a systematic approach to explaining and understanding the workings of maritime strategy. The most important early actors in this process were the British historian Sir John Knox Laughton (1830-1915)\textsuperscript{20} and the naval officer and analyst Vice Admiral Philip Colomb (1831-1899).\textsuperscript{21} Their work was considerably extended by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) of the United States Navy whose seminal book \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783} published in 1890, appeared to ‘reveal immutable rules’ concerning the role of navies in international affairs that ‘could be neglected

\textsuperscript{13} Harold Kearsley, \textit{Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century}, 73.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine}, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, 55.

\textsuperscript{15} The significant difference between military and constabulary activities is that the latter depends upon legitimacy deriving from a legal mandate, while the former, whatever the degree of force implied, threatened or exercised, is defined primarily by the national interest. \textit{Semaphore, Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre – Australia}, ‘The Roles and Tasks of Maritime Forces’.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Australian Maritime Doctrine}, 55.


only at a nation’s peril.’ Written to stimulate American interest in a larger fleet, ‘this widely-read and oft-quoted book became the bible of navalists everywhere,’ particularly in Britain, where its author was feted and revered.

Mahan’s thesis was principally based on the precept that the sea was a ‘great highway’ over which men ‘may pass in all directions’ primarily to trade, as it was this capacity to trade that was the source of national wealth. The dual use and control of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link and naval power far more than army strength has been the decisive factor in ‘the control over distant regions.’

From Mahan came the maritime implications of monopolistic mercantilism and the concurrent need for colonies; that ‘sea power’ held the key to national power. Nations needed huge merchant fleets and a strong Navy to protect them. Without both, maritime trade would diminish and colonial empires would crumble. At the time it was as an ‘evangelist of sea power’ rather than as a ‘pure’ naval historian that he was regarded; journalists, admirals and statesmen hung upon his predictions and accepted his teachings as a virtually complete doctrine of power-politics. It was also blatantly and unashamedly the imperialist’s message.

Within a few years of publication, Mahan’s book had been translated into Russian, French, Italian, Spanish, Japanese and German. Kaiser Wilhelm II confessed, ‘I am now not just reading it, but devouring Captain Mahan’s book. It is on board all my ships.’ Such was its influence; it quickly gained European pre-eminence. In France: If we wish to become a great commercial democracy, which will necessitate a great development of our mercantile marine and important progress in our Colonial Empire, we must possess a fleet of such strength that no other power can dominate to our detriment the European waters on which our harbours are situated, or the oceans where our merchant ships circulate.

However, nowhere did Mahan meet with such immediate and overwhelming success as in England, his writings being such a timely analysis of the causes that had made Britain great. His volumes were reviewed eulogistically in newspapers and periodicals, one in the Edinburgh Review in October 1890 extending to 33 pages. ‘Mahan became practically the naval Mohammed of England. There was hardly a professional paper or discussion at the Royal United Service Institution which did not quote from Mahan’s writings.’ When he visited England in 1894 he dined with the Queen and the Prime Minister, was awarded honorary degrees by Oxford and Cambridge, and entertained as guest of honour by the Royal Navy Club; the first foreigner to receive this honour. In retrospect, Lord Sydenham of Combe recalls that Mahan’s book ‘powerfully reinforced our propaganda at this period. For the first

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26 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, 24.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 183.
33 ibid.
time we had a philosophy of sea power built upon history from the days of the Punic Wars. By asserting that battle fleets had determined control of the sea during the age of sail, Mahan provided the stimulus for battleship construction during the advent of the 'mechanisation' revolution in technology which led to the prominence of the rationalist's 'material' school of maritime strategic thought, and the global strategic struggle that was then developing. That he ignored the specific advances in modern technology (submarine, torpedo etc...), the larger strategic questions of trade protection, amphibious operations, economic power, international law and the whole arena of limited warfare and colonial pacification, were lost in the romance for the 'firm maintenance of sea power and the haughty determination to make it felt.'

If Mahan erred on the side of material absolutism, then Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) provided a more refined and intellectually argued version of naval historical analysis, although his major 1911 thesis on the principles of maritime strategy was published too late to affect the imperial rivalries leading up to the Great War. Corbett identified that the 'function of the fleet, the object for which it was always employed, has been threefold; firstly, to support or obstruct diplomatic effort; secondly, to protect or destroy commerce; and thirdly, to further or hinder military operations ashore.' The command of the sea, he argued, is a means to an end: and this has been constantly lost sight of in naval policy.

We forget what happened in the old wars; we blind ourselves by looking only on the dramatic moments of naval history; we come unconsciously to assume that the defeat of the enemy's fleet solves all problems, and that we are always free and able to apply this apparently simple solution. Thus, until quite recent years, naval thought had tended to confine itself to the perfection of the weapon and to neglect the art of using it. Or, in other words, it had come to feel its sole concern was fighting, and had forgotten the art of making war.

Like his contemporaries, Corbett was unconvinced about the potential effectiveness of new technologies (torpedo boats and crude submarines) and thus he also minimised the difficulties of protecting trade. Trade defence was to hold the terminals in strength 'by means

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35 Material School of Maritime Strategic Thought—The material school relies on the assumption that the dominant military hardware or weapon—the material strength—at a given time creates such an overwhelming superiority that it alone generally satisfies the nation’s defence needs. This line of thinking is usually concerned primarily with waging or deterring total war between the superpowers. In the industrial and scientific environment since the early 19th century, such technological determinism has tended to dominate strategic thinking. Source: Maritime Strategy Reader, Australian Command and Staff College, Weston Creek Campus, Canberra.
36 Prime Minister William Gladstone (Great Britain) as cited in David Howarth, The Dreadnoughts, 25.
37 'Sir Julian Corbett, naval historian and strategist, who evolved sophisticated ideas about the strategic roles of navies which were not properly understood within the United Kingdom. Corbett’s views about the use of navies to influence the war on land focused on combined operations and the protection of trade at the expense of wishful thinking for a decisive action between opposing battle fleets.’ Source: James Goldrick, The Battleship Fleet: The Test of War, 1895-1919” John Richard Hill (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy.
38 Historical School of Maritime Strategic Thought—The historical school of maritime strategic thought rejects the determinism of the material school by examining the past conduct of competing nations in order to understand all historical forces at work and thus the various alternative approaches to strategic problems. Along with the problems of waging or deterring total wars, historical strategists are also concerned with limited war and with the diplomatic and legal aspects and alternatives to conflict. Source: Maritime Strategy Reader, Australian Command and Staff College, Western Creek Campus, Canberra.
40 Sir Julian Corbett 1907, as quoted in ‘The Late Sir Julian Corbett’ Naval Review, Volume XI, Number 1, February 1923, 17.
41 ibid.
of a battle-squadron.' They were constituted defended areas and the trade was regarded as safe when it entered them. The intervening trade-routes were left, as a rule, undefended. Notwithstanding that point, Corbett added: 'Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there is no part of strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more liable to error.'

Nevertheless, Corbett did postulate that the object of naval warfare is to control sea communications—'Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes.' He argued that ‘the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control.’ Battleships alone cannot exercise control; specialisation has rendered them unfit, and too costly ever to be numerous enough. Numbers are needed for this exercise… On Numbers ‘depends our exercise of control: on the battle-fleet depends the security of control’. He therefore criticised the absolutism of the ‘big battleship-big battle’ determination and he spoke to the more subtle application of naval power, such as sea communications, commerce freedom, unfettered movement, amphibious operations and the whole relationship of navy/army cooperation. He recognised that ‘bigger/brighter’ may bring strategic security, even strategic ‘cover’, but numbers exercise governance control.

With Britain’s overwhelming strategic forces (the Royal Navy’s home fleets) the prospect of an unrestrained counterstroke would always deter foreign military adventurism in British affairs. The reality of strategic ‘deterrence’ achieved for Britain her command of the global common—the era of Pax Britannica. Pax Britannica extended British control across the oceans of the world to threaten European trade and European colonial territories throughout the Asian periphery.

But more significantly was Corbett’s original tract that to secure the command of the sea was a means and not an end in itself. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (1871-1946) echoed the same philosophy—the ‘ultimate aim of sea power …was control of the sea’. Command of the sea is only useful for the end it serves and that ‘control of the sea is not an end in itself. It …is a means to an end.’ In itself Command or Control of the sea is of little value, for it is only when that ‘Command’ or ‘Control’ is exploited that the strategic benefits can be realised. Moreover, attaining command of the sea in Corbett’s time was seen to require a ‘blue-water’ battle fleet which was likely to be costly in itself and not necessarily strategically rewarding even if the enemy was destroyed. The need to assert themselves at sea often constrained the British in their capacity to exert power from the sea. Corbett warned that the relentless pursuit of the ultimate ‘big battleship-big battle’, although generally admirable and

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43 ibid., 265.
44 ibid., 269.
45 ibid., 90.
46 Sir Julian Corbett 1907, as quoted in ‘The Late Sir Julian Corbett’ *Naval Review*, Volume XI, Number 1, February 1923, 18.
47 ‘The Late Sir Julian Corbett’ *Naval Review*, Volume XI, Number 1, February 1923, 18.
48 ibid., 19.
49 Herbert Richmond, *Naval Review*, February 1943, 43.
effective, could be taken to excess. It could lead to a distraction from the real aim of the war. Where once again, the reward for being strong at sea was the capacity it conferred to influence events ashore.

The concepts of ‘Command of the Sea’ and ‘Control of the Sea’ were at that time regularly interposed. Today their definitions are generally more refined. ‘Command of the Sea’ is defined as the possession of such a degree of superiority that one’s own operations are unchallenged by the adversary, while the enemy is incapable of utilising the sea to any degree.\(^{54}\) As a concept within contemporary military literature ‘Command of the Sea’ has been relegated into the ‘practically unrealistic’ basket of ideas.\(^{55}\) While still theoretically achievable through the complete destruction or neutralisation of the adversary’s forces, and historically valid, it became increasingly unrealistic when naval forces were being faced by the range of 20th Century threats brought about by the technological innovations of the mine, torpedo, submarine and aircraft. ‘Furthermore, attempting to command the sea carried the risk of dissipating resources by a failure to recognise that the sea, unlike the land, was a dynamic medium and that the value of maritime operations was in relation to the use of the sea for movement and not for possession of the sea itself.\(^{56}\) However, these contentions are in themselves arguable and reflect a historical paradigm\(^{57}\) based within an era of near-continuous military contest between successive competing nation-States. Just because war has been waged overwhelmingly by nation-States, and thus for national political ends, during the last three centuries does not guarantee that this will continue to be the case forever. Should the nature of social organisation change, or should the nature of battlefields change, then so will the factors that govern war and drive our application of maritime strategic concepts.

Nevertheless the contemporary, and more acceptable, term today is ‘Sea Control’. Sea Control is defined as that condition which exists when one has freedom of action to use an area of sea for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, deny its use to an opponent.\(^{58}\) Control of the sea can be limited in place and in time and the required extent is determined by the task to be done. Sea Control today is very much a multi-dimensional concept as it encompasses: control of the air; control of the surface of the sea; control of the undersea water column; control of the littoral (if operating in that environment); and control of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Each of these multi-dimensional aspects is important in each warfare discipline, and to an increasing degree it also includes consideration of space-based assets. Sea Control is thus essential for the projection of maritime power.\(^{59}\) And the military worth of an individual ship-of-war is measured by its ability to effect Sea Control—or in other words, its military worth is measured on its warfighting capability in combat and contest.

With this ‘irrefutable’ logic, historical credentials, military necessity, and political attractiveness in understanding, the quest for Sea Control, or the requirement for a navy to have the ability to assert it, has become the corner-stone of contemporary Australian naval force structure development.

Deployed in the protection of sea lines of communications [ships-of-war] have multi-dimensional capabilities and are essentially weapons of sea control ...surface

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\(^{54}\) *Royal Australian Navy Doctrine* Number One (RAN Doctrine 1), Commonwealth of Australia, 2000.

\(^{55}\) ibid.

\(^{56}\) ibid.


\(^{58}\) *Royal Australian Navy Doctrine* No. 1.

combatants [are] essential to the central concept of sea control... The modern surface combatant therefore retains a vital, indeed fundamental, role to play in the future maritime force structure. Their mobility and endurance allows the flexibility to maintain a continuous presence in moving scenes of action. Their sensors and weapons work throughout the maritime battlespace and span operations against aircraft, ships and submarines, and against forces and assets ashore. … The surface combatant thus remains a potent and flexible capability to execute the sea control requirement... Project Sea 4000, the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD), is the project which will ensure that Australia will acquire and maintain a sea control capability into the future... The mission requirement is to provide a sea control capability for the [Australian Defence Forces]. In this way the role and mission of the AWD could perhaps better be understood in terms of a sea control combatant.  

It is not the intention of this submission to directly challenge the naval modernisation programs; only the emphasis and focus that has been used in arguing their need. There is also nothing in this dissertation that refutes the logic or the military necessity for the achievement of Sea Control in the conduct of maritime operations. Sea Control is essential for the projection of maritime power and a nation’s ability to use the sea to further its own interests. But this submission does explore the questions of what happens to these emphases and focus when Sea Control is already given under the globalised 'collective' commons of Pax Americana, when the adversary does not align itself to comparable degrees of military sophistication, or when the national requirements are 'governance' rather than 'contest' focused?  

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond asked similar questions in a different time. He was nurtured during the advent of the 'mechanisation' revolution in technology and the rationalist's 'material' school of maritime strategic thought and argued that although the absolutism of the materialist lobby may have resulted in a materially strong Royal Navy, it was nevertheless a force that had serious defects in application. 'The brain of Jupiter had indeed produced an Athene fully armed ...It was no one's business to be sure that the poor lady could ever use her spear.' Britain saw a tremendous technical creature rear itself up without it being generally realised that the monster’s brain was not commensurate with its body.' As Andrew Gordon describes the same period ‘...while the Royal Navy was undergoing its fifty year conversion from oak and canvas to steel and turbines, its once-clear, empiricist understanding of ‘product’ was pilfered from the lay-apart store by the vested interest of ‘process’...’ Richmond’s warning was relatively understated—it may be 'imprudent to bank on prescience. Wisdom [lies in the] imaginative expectation disciplined by [the] recollection of historical patterns...' It is in the recollection of historical patterns and trends that we can define our expectations to evaluate the present, to then guide our future.

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60 ibid., but my emphasis underlined.
61 For example, convoy operations to counter the German submarine threat, not realising the application of wireless communications, gun sights that needed a stable platform, blast doors and turret procedures, fleet tactics, subordinate commanders having the ability to act independently … the list goes on, as the many analysts of the Battle of Jutland would later verify. In particular I would recommend Andrew Gordon’s Rules of the Game, Jutland and British Naval Command, John Murray, London, 1996 to understand the culture that gave rise to this situation.
62 Naval Review, Number 18, 1930, 168.
64 Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game, Jutland and British Naval Command, op.cit, 576.
This is not to suggest that history always repeats itself, but that ‘history is a guide to navigation in perilous times. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.’\textsuperscript{66} History is the echo chamber in which past and present voices can mingle.\textsuperscript{67} It is within this modern echo chamber that we can now see the re-emerging domination of the Sea Power evangelist’s and materialist’s lobby in preparing for high-intensity inter-State war-fighting — the exotic jargonisms of cyberspace’s network centricity and the influence on naval force structure of the informationalist’s ‘sealed, self-reinforcing, and impervious to criticism paradigms.’\textsuperscript{68} We can also see through the re-emergence of other historical patterns; those changes in the social organisation that are challenging the traditional perspectives that are currently driving 21\textsuperscript{st} Century naval force structure ideals. Just as Harold Macmillan’s ‘Winds Of Change’ swept through Africa in the sixties, so too are similar winds sweeping across the world’s oceans today: the challenge is to first recognise them, and then to harness them.

The promised panacea of the cyber-informationist’s hi-tech prognostications\textsuperscript{69} and the materialist’s supreme weapons need to be questioned in their absolutism against the material costs of ‘interoperability’\textsuperscript{70}, the significance of a single maritime superpower, the dawning maritime interests of the nation State, and the rise of the asymmetrical threat — or more applicable, the ‘imaginative expectations disciplined by the recollection of historical patterns’. Bigger, brighter and more gigabytes may not necessarily be better …or even relevant. Today, patterns are being recycled through the polarisation of western geopolitical power at sea, the rationalisation of where weapons technology has taken us, the realisation that changing global circumstances and religious fundamentalism have changed the character of warfare, our appreciation of coastal ecosystems stress (ocean pollution, overexploitation and unregulated fishing and the physical alteration or destruction of marine habitats caused primarily by the spreading of human population) the expansion of shipping and the advances in hydrocarbon and mineral exploration (the rise of marine activity based pollution) the broader concepts and consequences of climate change, uncontrolled migration and a new comprehension of what ocean governance has meant to the nation State through the expansion of State sovereignty and sovereign rights.

This is not to suggest that constabulary tasks become the Navy’s absolute pre-eminent influence in force structure planning, but that the high-tech emphasis on the modern ship-of-war needs to be re-balanced so that the triad of roles can be seen as being complimentary in satisfying the vital maritime interests of the State. During this rebalancing, we may need to back away from ‘bigger/brighter’ to get the numbers that are necessary to effect the desired purpose of the State — the desired end must remain inseparable from a tool.

As the old Israeli proverb suggests — quality may be better than quantity, but quality is best in large numbers — ‘bigger/brighter’ may bring strategic security, even strategic ‘cover’, but numbers exercise governance control.

\textsuperscript{66} David C. McCullough at \url{http://www.wisdomquotes.com/cat_history.html}.
\textsuperscript{67} Andrew Gordon, Rules of the Game, Jutland and British Naval Command.
\textsuperscript{68} Martin van Creveld, ‘The structure of Strategic Studies’, in D. Ball and David Horner (eds), Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{69} “…the new “high ground” is not aerospace, but cyberspace.’ Executive Summary, United States Air Force’s 2025, Air University Press, Educational Services Directorate, Maxwell Air Force Base, Presented 17 June 1996. See \url{http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/monographs/E-S/e-s.htm}.
\textsuperscript{70} ‘The ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.’ Source: Australian Defence Force Publication 101, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.