EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE last two defence white papers, 2009 +2013 resulted in much academic debate, proposals that required very long lead times and an absence of money to pay for the proposals.

The geo-political landscape has changed so dramatically since the last white paper; Australia will have to make decisions about its security right now, not in 2016. These decisions cannot be governed by themes that might be fashionable at any given time [China] or driven by platform lead times.

Australia’s strategic and defence position cannot be so brittle, that, when we lose the full utilization of our patrol boats and submarines we have no serious back plans.

Our intelligence apparatus can’t be so blind as not known that possibly hundreds of Australians want to become jihadis. This submission will illustrate that a whole new defence and intelligence organic organisation is needed and a doctrine of ‘strategic enclaves’ to enhance Australia position in the region.

This submission will show that although we have an army, navy and air force, this structure will have to change to the Australian Army that has air and naval arms. It will also only have one uniformed leader and dispense with the department secretary.
GENERAL

‘WATCH AND LEARN’

Before the Australian government goes out and spends billions on equipment, the Government should first examine events in the past to maximise the effectiveness of the Military and enhance our strategic position.

After the 9/11 attack on the United States, an inquiry* was held into the cause for the attack and to find any shortcomings in the way the government processes before and after the attack.

Out of that enquiry, the Department of Homeland Security was formed to act as a conduit for any intelligence that could act on in a more coordinated way. Of course there has been plenty of about the effectiveness of this agency, especially the skill levels of those at the bottom of the food chain. But, the bottom line is that America has not been attacked on its own soil since.

During this time, Australia has spent billions of dollars beefing up its own intelligence and military apparatus and is communicating well with its opposites abroad. Has this been effective? I’d have to say after Bali it has. But to stay safe and to improve we should look at some examples of events in the past that can guide Australia along the right path so as to eliminate errors that lead to conflict.

*The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

MALAYSIA AND THE SULU REBELLION OF 2013

On the 11th of February 2013 there was a rebellion in the state of Sabah by Filipino Sulus. The attack was carried out by the Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu around the Lahad Datu district. The Malaysian military responded firstly by negotiation, but when that failed, the Malaysians destroyed their enemy with airstrikes, mortars and small arms. Several Malaysian police and scores of Sulu’s were killed.

Blame for the initial intelligence failure of the pending attack remains a matter of conjecture, although only one special branch member was convicted of withholding information.

What should we learn from this debacle? More than support your local sheriff I hope!

- The Malaysian government was not trusted by the locals, including the Sulus
- If there were any local grievances known to the authorities, they weren’t taken seriously
- The Malaysian military has no control over its borders, considering the free passage of millions of illegals into Malaysia.
• The Malaysian government had no knowledge of the movement of large sums of money needed to support the rebellion.
• Malaysia has had to expel at least twenty thousand Filipinos, as Kuala Lumpur could not trust them let alone infiltrate that community.
• No other regional intelligence agency knew of the preparations for the rebellion.

Australia should learn from this that we must be connected to the smaller local communities via their business, language and customs so we can trust in the region as a whole, not just the capital cities.

THAILAND

• How many months was Australian intelligence aware of the manoeuvrings of the Thai Military to mount a coup?
• How was the coup financed?
• What is likelihood of southern Thailand breaking away from Bangkok, or, becoming a Mindanao type territory?
• Was the centralization of decision making of the police and other agencies in Bangkok a few years ago, a catalyst for the increase in insurgent killings in the south?

Australia needs to know who we can trust. It requires verifiable intelligence on events and players in any subject country or region so there are no surprises. Otherwise this region will continue being a thoroughfare for illicit weapons, drugs, cash that are furnished by gangs and terrorists.

If Australia doesn’t maintain a more intimate commercial and security interest with countries around the Pacific, have a stated list of ‘strategic interests’ will only be mere words.

The direction Australia needs take is to move resources outside capital city embassies into the regions. This would create a new perspective for our representatives. It would bring them into constant contact with provincial leaders and allow Australia to become proactive in local communities.

Remember “All politics is local”. 
AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

UNITED STATES

Top of Australia’s strategic interests is our relationship with the United States. A lot of talk fills the media about America’s decline. I would call it a pause. If we want to be totally honest, the most alarming decline has been Europe. Europe has turned its back on anything resembling drama outside its borders and its economy is fractured.

Australia will have a friend in the United States for a long, long time. But we are now taking more of the burden in that relationship. With the rise of China, terror caliphates and porous borders throughout S E Asia, we have no choice.

The United States Budget sequestration has been a big motivator for us to fulfil the role of a regional stabilising force. Those who say Australia is only America’s deputy sheriff don’t understand the Australian psyche of doing things its own way.

We rely today on the United States for most of our military equipment and that won’t change. Two big strategic gains for them are increased access to our bases and the building of at least two Canberra class LHD [landing helicopter dock] ships. If a third is built for the F35B, as would seem logical, that sends a pretty big security message to friend and foe alike. The message being, that we want stability in the region and anything can be dealt with.

Of course, the United States is a counter balance to China. The United States knows China seems unable to form stable partnerships, but when they do, the real contest will begin.

CHINA

Australia’s relationship with China is overwhelmingly economic. And that will continue for the foreseeable future. The spectre of poor consumer demand will play on trader’s minds in this inflation sensitive economy.

China will invest in Australia as long as the rate of return from their business remains above inflation. Once again corruption amongst the elite has proven to be a problem. The Tiananmen Square massacre had its genesis in corruption. But, when corruption is mixed in with a power struggle, that the new leader Xi Jinping goes into hiding for a month, because he was afraid of being killed by some of former Central Committee member Zhou Yongkang’s goons, that only demonstrates to the outside world XI temporary control of his country’s affairs.
China’s military build-up is real, but some its industrial shortcomings are there for all to see. China claims to have a number of stealth fighter projects in the works, but, the planes themselves look to have design flaws externally that would negate stealth [engines]. Also, the Chinese have no respectable engine designs, so must rely on Russia. Besides, any nation that can’t produce its own passenger airliner would struggle to build and design stealth aircraft.

Its army hasn’t fought a war since Korea. How reliable would they be? How would deal with everyone’s enemy Islamic State? The best part of the Chinese military lies in its navy especially with news of it planning to build 10 aircraft carriers. Within the navy the best component would be its submarines. Again if China can’t trustworthy relationships with its neighbours, any influence could be fleeting. But projects like stealing a defenceless country’s islands alarms everyone, despite any technical issues about projecting its power.

**INDIA**

India’s physical location makes it a critical member of a partnership we need to foster reliance and interdict the enemies of freedom and increase economic activity. Too often outsiders, especially from the Middle East, have found easy prey in the disenfranchised at the bottom end of society to infect them with their hatred and to finance rebellion. Not building economic relationships within India at all levels opens the door to the radicalisation of member countries. The military cost just multiplies.

Nevertheless Australia must be realistic, just the sheer numbers of people in the region mean we must position ourselves to help our friend India and they help us. To this end Australia must gain access to **Andaman Island** or as near as is permissible. China wants to have control of the arc of seaways from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. China sees this rare opportunity to reassert a historical destiny and not allowed to be encircled.

India is also a nuclear power that has a formidable deterrence value. India’s government services are at times archaic. So reform with Australia’s help, will increase trade and services between us.

With the rise of Islamic State and its ambitions to put pressure on India, we owe it to ourselves to help if we can.

**JAPAN**

This biggest strategic plus for Australia in 2014 has been the speed of the upgrading of our relationship with democratic Japan. There are very few countries in the world with the complete industrial base of Japan. After all the dramas with the Collins class submarines and its contactors, a chance to produce one of the best submarines in the world is an opportunity not to pass up. At the
end of the day our submariner's lives are on the line. A deterrent like the Sorry class vessel will complement the LHD (with F 35B) for many years.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

The biggest problem in South East Asia is its porous borders. As indicated above, the ripple effect of the lack of border security can cost lives, and cost billions to repair the situation. There is no substitute for a coordinated approach. Piracy, people smuggling and terrorism can be kept in check only if the intelligence on the ground is efficient and is not diluted by too many filters in government bureaucracies.

Vietnam is becoming more important to Australia as it battles pressure from China. Vietnam has a right to feel under siege considering it supply of water could be confiscated in its north.

IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Other than a chronic need for oil and gas, and access through the Suez Canal, most Australians would think the Middle East only represents trouble. Our strategic interest rests with supporting the only democracy Israel, and check the advance of terror states like Syria, Iran and now Islamic State. Israel has a very sophisticated IT industry that supports many defence platforms so it is our interest to foster cooperation and mutual trust.

The only other state that planners seem interested in is Iraq, only because of our involvement fighting Saddam Hussein and rebuilding a state that would support the interests of the West. In recent weeks the plight of refugees being ethnic cleansed from northern Iraq has come to light. Realistically, though our options are limited until such time we establish a presence on the ground. Until we occupy territory on the ground and eliminate the enemy of the Christians, Yazidis and Kurds, nominal air drops will be the only thing we can do.

CONCLUSION

Strategic interests around the region mean we have to a first class physical military to back it up and intelligence to back it up. Having embassies anchored in capital cities with random visits won't wash in countries with mainly rural societies.

Our strategic interest is a country as a whole not just the elite.
DOCTRINE OF
THE STRATEGIC ENCLAVE

By
Paul Jeffery

AUGUST 2014
DOCTRINE OF THE STRATEGIC ENCLAVE

Australia must have an effective engagement in our region to protect ourselves and our friends' strategic and economic interests. From time to time we may venture beyond our neighbourhood, so as to diminish an enemy's ability in the future to bring conflict to our home [Afghanistan and Iraq]. This doctrine is all about deterrence.

Building a strategic presence requires a lot of time and effort. And money. Talkfests, bland communiques and cocktail parties at embassies have their place, but, on the ground, new programs will determine the respect we receive in the world. The first part of this proposal for ‘the doctrine ‘lays out requirements in a peaceful uncontested area, while the second part turns our attention to the example of Iraq. If the strategic enclaves are established as I have indicated, then the peaceful co-existence engendered will forestall conflict and division, so we will have to deal with less Iraq type situations.

What are the objectives of the strategic enclave on a day to day basis, and, what do need to do to support them?

- Profile the region and build a database.
- Collate information on business, government, education, religious, community and social activities.
- Educate staff on the history, notable events and personalities in the region.
- Learn local languages and dialects.
- Gather intelligence on groups and individuals so to hook into the loop.
- Establish military, police and judicial contacts to improve security cooperation.
- Geological and weather survey.

SUPPORT

- Employ specialists in business, IT, intelligence, logistics, defence and communications.
- Build a large compound with three security levels, 3 retail and business, 2 intelligence and defence, 1 leadership [+armoury]
- Utilize a geographically elevated area for a compound with blast walls, earthquake proof foundations, independent internal power and water supply, shield IT from eavesdropping.
- Proximity to all weather reinforced airstrip to take all types of jet aircraft helicopter and heavy lift helicopters.
- Store of disaster relief supplies. 4x4 vehicles, car fleet and bushmaster type vehicles.
LIASON

The facility will conduct regular meetings and network with all levels of the society, especially provincial, religious and village leaders. And to build up fast and complementary communications.

Work with local authorities to secure border areas and road, rail, sea and air.

ENCLAVE LOCATIONS

Indonesia
Surabaya, Medan and Makassar

Vietnam
Da Nang

India
Andaman Island

Philippines
Cebu City

Thailand
Pak Kret

PNG
Lae

Nauru
City
ISLAMIC STATE [IS]

STRATEGIC ENCLAVE OPTIONS

I am assuming the American leadership doesn’t want a situation in the world where the smaller nations will feel they are expendable. Once IS finds out that the Americans haven’t the willpower and guts to drive it [IS] out of Iraq or anywhere else they will be harder to remove.

The insertion of a strategic enclave in a war zone or a contested area has the objectives of regaining lost territory and giving hope to the dispossessed. Right now IS is partly retreating to the urban areas of the Iraq it so as not to be exposed to American airstrikes. IS assumes it won’t be challenged or attacked shielded behind the human shield of a residential area. But IS survives from the fear of the subjects it controls and the ones it wants to control. That’s why the Iraqi army ran away.

The Americans can establish their strategic enclaves adjacent to a captured town, after IS has retreated into the town and it has been surrounded. Because IS survives by fear, and the implementation of that task is labour intensive. The checkpoints and other scattered units beyond the towns are its only perimeter defence. After eliminating those and surrounding the town, the Americans should establish its enclave beyond the range of IS long range weapons.

The new enclave/s will have its own independent water and power supplies. It should have several reinforced perimeter walls and prefabricated buildings. The enclave can now be populated by returning refugees. Over time the enclaves will become more critical and substantial than the original town. Internal security will be critical; as these safe havens cannot be infiltrated by present or past IS combatants or their followers.

These events are bound to draw some IS initially out of their captured town. The IS won’t allow this situation to become a permanent feature of urban renewal around Iraq so will have to attack the enclaves. The Americans can then destroy IS.
FORCE STRUCTURE AND PLATFORMS

AUSTRALIA needs reliable platforms with force projection like never before. Why? The United States budget sequestration over the medium term can cripple many programs. Slow new production midstream can only increase unit costs. Mothballing older weapon systems will undoubtedly put pressure on Australia to finally generate the capacity to be considered a serious middle power in the region. At the moment we are just a spectator.

Australia must exclude defence contractors that have repeated time and cost overruns, faults, weapon system software glitches and repairs outside designated maintenance schedule. Australia is lucky it is not involved in a conflict where the whole country is mobilised. Having patrol boats and submarines out of action is a situation we cannot tolerate any longer.

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'TAKE ME TO YOUR LEADER'

The ADF is top heavy with management. With all the cost overruns and scandals costing taxpayers billions.

The top end must be modified. Australia has a small defence force, with only tens of thousands in uniform, not hundreds of thousands. We should have one boss not two. So the Secretary goes. A uniformed officer will be in charge of one army that has a naval and air component. It is beyond me why a defence force so small should have so much bureaucracy.