

# A man with a plan — a study of Albert Wedemeyer and the Victory Plan of 1941

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An officer who has not studied war as an applied science, and who is ignorant of modern military history, is of little use beyond the rank of Captain.

Field Marshal Garnet Joseph Wolseley<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

The Victory Plan of 1941 was the blueprint for the general mobilisation of the US Army and the operational concept by which the US would prosecute the Second World War. This plan predicted capabilities, units and the future organisation of an army that did not yet exist, defined combat missions for a war not yet declared, and determined the expansion requirements for industries that were still committed to peacetime manufacturing. It achieved all this with remarkable accuracy.

The architect of the plan was a single major—a member of the US Army's War Planning Department named Albert C. Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer's ability to develop grand strategic ideals and articulate them in a plan was the product of intellect, experience and professional military education. Wedemeyer used his more than 20 years' experience, education and studies to peer into an indistinct future and develop a strategy which would see the US achieve victory against the Axis powers.<sup>2</sup>

The aim of this article is to examine the development of the Victory Plan of 1941. In this example of strategic planning, the plan itself and the man who developed it are undoubtedly linked and must both be examined in order to develop a fulsome perspective on its significance.

## The development of Wedemeyer as a strategic thinker

Albert Coady Wedemeyer had seemingly reached the end of his undistinguished career when he reported for duty to the War Plans Division in the late spring of 1941. His only career distinction had been a negative one: as a junior officer, he had been court-martialled for drinking. He had spent 20 years as a junior officer and had only recently been promoted major. He had never commanded above a rifle company.

As unremarkable as his career might have appeared at that time, Wedemeyer possessed an extraordinary grasp of grand strategy and a clear perception of how to apply it. With limited practical experience, he developed his expertise through professional and military education and enormous personal drive, largely in the period between the First and Second World Wars. In Wedemeyer's case, many years of routine military service masked steady intellectual growth.

Wedemeyer grew up in the US, spending most of his childhood in Nebraska. His Jesuit schooling developed his ethical and moral foundations and reinforced the need to accept personal responsibility. His father was a voracious reader and encouraged his son to form the habit of 'kaleidoscopic' reading, which would be followed by the Socratic practice of serious discourse based on the material being read.<sup>3</sup>

Wedemeyer graduated from the US Military Academy in 1918 and undertook several instructional postings and aide-de-camp positions, seeing service in China, The Philippines and the US. In 1936, Wedemeyer was assigned as a student to the German Army's *Kriegsakademie*, where he observed the 1938 armoured manoeuvre exercises, immersed himself in German military studies, and even had the opportunity to meet and talk with General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff.

The *Kriegsakademie* curriculum focused heavily on the strategic factors of war. It emphasised the relationship between what are now commonly referred to as the elements of national power, with a deep

acknowledgement that war is an instrument of national strategy.<sup>4</sup> The *Kriegsakademie* also stressed the relationships that exist between technology and manoeuvre, the importance of military history and the practical application of this history through staff rides.

Wedemeyer spent some time attached to a German anti-tank unit and even exercised command of a *Panzerabwehrkompanie* (anti-tank battalion). He also had the rare opportunity to study and employ German manoeuvre doctrine, which left him deeply impressed. Wedemeyer was struck by the depth of professional knowledge among the officer corps throughout the German Army, particularly their knowledge of the French Army. Furthermore, he later became friends with General Ludwig Beck, and was a regular dinner guest when the two would engage in discussion of the strategic issues of the day.<sup>5</sup>

On his return to the US in 1938, Wedemeyer wrote a report on his experiences to the Army Chief of Staff, who in turn distributed it to other senior staff. The report attracted the attention of the Chief of the War Plans Division, Brigadier General George C. Marshall.<sup>6</sup> Marshall immediately summoned Wedemeyer, who informed the general of Germany's determination to avoid a repetition of the stalemate of the First World War, the German plan to increase tempo in battle through the use of armoured and mobile forces, their 'avoid at all cost' approach to trench warfare, and the use of armoured forces and tactical aviation to facilitate deep-turning envelopment manoeuvres directed at objectives far beyond the battle area. Despite initially refusing an offer from Marshall to move into the War Plans Division, Wedemeyer was eventually assigned there in May 1941 as a member of the Plans Group.

Personal experience, a classical education, professional schooling and influential personal relationships all contributed to Wedemeyer's ability to serve the Army as a strategist. His time in Asia had given him a grasp of warfare in the Far East, much as his experiences in Germany informed his strategic views on the West. He came to regard the Army as a complex system, understanding its missions, operations, and the functioning of its headquarters and staff. He was also one of the few American officers who understood the battle doctrine of a nation that would soon become the chief enemy of the US.

Wedemeyer's professional reading was probably the most profound factor in the development of his strategic studies. He started with Clausewitz as a foundation for military strategy. He insisted on Sun Tzu as a way to understand the elemental aspects of war. He also saw the immense value of studying *Instructions for Generals* by Frederick the Great.<sup>7</sup> Ardent du Picq, Colmar Von der Goltz and Sir Halford J. Mackinder were also enormously influential. To Wedemeyer, these texts reinforced the notion of war as a political phenomenon, wherein:

[S]trategy, properly conceived, thus seemed to require a transcendence of narrow military perspectives that the term traditionally implied. Strategy required a systematic consideration and use of all of the so-called instruments of policy — political, economic, psychological, *et cetera*, as well as the military in the pursuit of national objectives. Indeed the non-military factors deserve unequivocal priority over the military, the latter to be employed only as last resort.<sup>8</sup>

As important as all these things were in the development of the mind of Albert Wedemeyer, they were still nonetheless secondary influences. His personal character, his value of knowledge for its own sake, his naturally enquiring mind and his reading habits were all a product of his upbringing, education and professional officer mentoring.

All the men inside George Marshall's War Plans Division were bright, intelligent and dedicated professionals, none of whom stood out from the other. In Wedemeyer's case, however, chance and opportunity would present him with a very difficult task. His intellect, education, experience and the support of men such as Marshall made him perfectly suited to draft the strategic estimate that would become the baseline for national mobilisation and prosecution of a global, total war.

## The requirement for a Victory Plan

The Army used to have all the time in the world, and no money; now we've got all the money and no time.

General George C. Marshall, January 1942<sup>9</sup>

When Wedemeyer reported for duty in the War Plans Division in 1941, the US was in the midst of a serious political debate between those who sought to avoid joining another European war and regarded America as a regional power, and those (led by President Roosevelt) who saw the US as a global superpower which had an obligation to commit to a war against Germany and deny that country the hegemonic status it so desperately sought. For a planner such as Wedemeyer, it was politically dangerous to speak too definitively about military preparations for a war against Germany.

Lacking specific guidance, Wedemeyer was left to surmise how American national policy might look once the nation committed to war. During this time, Americans were still extremely wary of large standing armies, and Congress had even gone so far as to establish a *Neutrality Act* that remained in force until as late as 1937, declaring that the US had 'no national interests beyond the Americas'.<sup>10</sup>

In 1940, two significant events gave Wedemeyer the clarity he needed. The first was the appointment of Henry Stimson as the Secretary for War in June 1940.<sup>11</sup> Stimson was a passionate anti-fascist and was convinced that the US could be attacked at any time. He believed that the US had a moral responsibility to provide arms to France and Britain, and rapidly build an army and navy in order to secure the western hemisphere.

The second event was the invasion of France. With the fall of France, the political leadership of the US now saw war with Germany as unavoidable.<sup>12</sup> Despite the development of the various operational concepts known as the Rainbow Plans in 1938, there was no overarching plan to generate the military forces needed to execute such plans.<sup>13</sup> In the preceding inter-war years, the state of the Army had deteriorated to such an extent that the then Chief of Staff of the Army declared that 'the United States has voluntarily made itself even weaker than the Versailles Treaty had made Germany. Our nation is militarily impotent'.<sup>14</sup>

Marshall sought a 'clear-cut strategic estimate of our situation' on which to base a mobilisation plan.<sup>15</sup> He knew that industrial production was dependent on efficiency: a thousand rifles could be produced in the same time as a hundred if industry was given specific requirements early enough.<sup>16</sup> What was needed was a strategic plan that would determine the production requirements, their priorities and their production scales in sufficient detail to allow the rapid expansion of the American Army and ongoing support to the US allies through Lend-Lease, without negatively impacting on the broader economy.<sup>17</sup>

This guidance was thus given to the War Plans Division. The only problem that remained was to find the right planner who had the skills to perform the task in a very short period of time. Eventually, the task fell to Albert Wedemeyer.

## The strategic estimate

It would be difficult to exaggerate Wedemeyer's impact as a strategic planner during 1941.

D. Clayton James<sup>18</sup>

Wedemeyer's task was to calculate the nation's total production requirements for the defeat of the 'potential enemies' of the US. He would be given only 90 days to complete this extraordinary task. He would be given his own office, his own secretary (unprecedented for a field grade officer) and unfettered access to General Marshall as well as his ongoing trust. This included the opportunity to undertake a 'morning walk' (from Marshall's front door to his car). As Wedemeyer later recounted:

General Marshall stopped and looked at me. He said 'Wedemeyer [he never called me Al], don't ever fail to give me the benefit of your thinking and your experience. You will be doing a disservice if you did otherwise'. If he had asked me to jump into Niagara Falls after that I would have done so for him. I felt that here is a man—a great man—giving me that latitude and being so fair about it.<sup>19</sup>

Although Wedemeyer had all the military support he could hope for, he was nonetheless constrained by the sensitivities of his work. National cultural reservations about the appropriateness of professional military officers planning industrial and societal mobilisation meant that there could be no leak to the media. Despite his ability to consult widely, Wedemeyer often had to conduct his enquiries in such a manner as to conceal their real purpose.

His first step was to outline and define the nature of the problem that he sought to solve. In order to calculate the nation's ultimate production requirements for war, Wedemeyer would have to determine the size and role of the military forces that America would field in battle. The size and function of these forces were directly related to their missions and therefore Wedemeyer would also need to estimate the type of missions that these forces would be likely to conduct in order to ensure they would be properly equipped. This would require the development of a military strategy. This, in turn, led to a series of questions, the answers to which would form the basis of his estimate:

What is the national objective of the US?

What military strategy will be devised to accomplish that national objective?

What military forces must be raised in order to execute the strategy?

How will those military forces be constituted, equipped and trained?

Wedemeyer realised that there was little strategic guidance beyond the sweeping aims of the Monroe Doctrine.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, he concluded that almost all government planning was short-term and *ad hoc*. He therefore had to draft his own interpretation of the US' national objective. He eventually concluded that it was 'to eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and, in the process, to be an ally of Great Britain; further, to deny the Japanese undisputed control of the Western Pacific'.<sup>21</sup> He put this to Marshall, who concurred with his assessment.

With an agreed national objective, Wedemeyer could then outline the military strategy necessary to accomplish it. Despite the existence of the Rainbow War Plans, these were insufficient as a military strategy because they failed to properly account for the true nature and scale of the German threat—her size, her military forces and her ambitions. Wedemeyer drew on his own experiences as well as those of a recently-returned US Defense Attaché to calculate the true capability of the German Army.

In addition, Wedemeyer had to explain in military terms why Germany presented the greatest threat to the US when Japan, Italy and the Vichy French were also hostile to her sovereignty and interests. Wedemeyer also (correctly) foresaw that Germany would likely invade the Soviet Union. It was in American interests, therefore, to extend the Lend-Lease program to the Soviets to allow them to resist and attrite the German Army committed to that theatre.

In defining his military strategy, Wedemeyer concluded that the US would need to build a powerful navy and merchant fleet; integrate strategic bombing and 'air warfare' into all operational concepts; achieve 'physical proximity' through the securing of advanced bases; and weaken the German Army by forcing it to over-extend. This would set the conditions for Germany's eventual destruction in Europe by the combined allied armies.

Once Wedemeyer had a sense of the military strategy, he was then able to describe the size and composition of the forces required to achieve his strategy. This would, in turn, define the scale of industrial mobilisation required to generate the capability. Wedemeyer would need to identify the number of operational theatres, the lines of supply, and the amount of raw materiel and manpower needed to sustain the war over many years. Also of critical concern was an understanding of the manpower 'tipping point' which, if exceeded, would remove too many men from American society for it to continue to function.

Wedemeyer also understood that a maximum effort would ensure that the war would and could be won in the shortest time possible. He was now able to move his planning to a more prescriptive process: to define the number and types of Army divisions needed to defeat Germany, as well as the war materiel required to support them. His military strategy also became an important force generation tool for the Department of the Navy, which was acting in parallel in attempting to build a navy and expand the Marine Corps.

## **Planning and assessment**

Following the development of his military strategy, Wedemeyer estimated that there were approximately 8.5 million men available for military service in the Army. Due to his critical time constraints, Wedemeyer

could not wait for Army General Staff decisions on organisation and force structure. He needed to understand the divisional structures likely to be employed because these formations alone informed the types and quantity of materiel needed to build the total force. At stake was the fundamental issue of how many Army divisions would be required.

The need to calculate Army divisions was based Wedemeyer's very simple maxim that 'military operations must be planned with the enemy's capabilities in mind'.<sup>22</sup> Using the fighting potential of a German division as a unit of measure, Wedemeyer reasoned that the Axis could build a total force of 350 divisions in the summer of 1941. He anticipated that, by July 1943, this number could grow to over 500 divisions. It was expected that up to 90 of these could be mechanised or armoured divisions. He concluded that the US Army could have to face up to 12 million Axis soldiers in the European theatre alone, amounting to as many as 500 divisions.

Based on the need to build a numerical superiority of 2 to 1 (as per American doctrine), the allied powers would have to field up to 900 divisions—a force totalling around 25 million men. While Wedemeyer understood that Germany would be materially weakened by the maritime and air blockades enforced throughout Europe, he expected that America's European allies (excluding the Soviet Union) would not be capable of providing more than 1 million men at the very most.

It would, therefore, be up to the US alone to find the manpower necessary to build the force required to defeat Germany. Noting that he only had 8.5 million men as a basis on which to build the Army (of which 2.1 million men were already earmarked for service in the Army Aviation Corps), Wedemeyer realised that he had to generate a force which was capable of overcoming German numerical superiority.<sup>23</sup>

Wedemeyer passionately believed that offensive action lay at the heart of victory in war. He considered the Army in desperate need of radical restructure. Like his German counterparts at the *Kriegsakademie*, Wedemeyer was an avid believer in the work of J.F.C. Fuller, who emphasised speed and shock action through the use of armoured forces as essential ingredients. Wedemeyer had thus to prepare the Army for a 'war of movement' in which the early decisions sought in battle would ultimately determine the outcome of campaigns and operations.<sup>24</sup>

These beliefs highlighted the need to build American divisions that were predominantly mechanised, with the armoured division to be used as the primary offensive tool. In addition, all divisions must also possess the ability to integrate tactical aviation, joint fires, and rolling logistics as intelligent force design focused specifically on reducing the demands on manpower. Wedemeyer regarded mobility as a vital force multiplier, with mechanised and armoured divisions the units of real offensive utility that the US would need to generate in order to defeat the Axis without achieving numerical superiority.

Despite his focus on defeating Germany in Europe, Wedemeyer was also required to remain within the extant planning framework of the Rainbow Plans. This meant that he had to build an army capable of defeating the Axis and of contributing to hemispheric defence as per the Monroe Doctrine, while also retaining sufficient capability to deter a Japanese threat in the Western Pacific.

Small Army garrison units were thus allocated to Atlantic outposts, with Wedemeyer estimating that 32,144 personnel would be required for this role.<sup>25</sup> Wedemeyer's service in The Philippines convinced him that the Western Pacific island chain was indefensible against a Japanese attack, and that the Army should instead concentrate its efforts on denying key Pacific ports to the Japanese for as long as possible. A 56,000-strong garrison force was also to be established in the Hawaiian islands.

With close to 200,000 troops committed to the Rainbow Plan missions outside Europe, and with 2.1 million men taken into service with the Army Aviation Corps, 6 million men were left for operations against the German Army in Europe.<sup>26</sup> Wedemeyer planned to use part of this force to secure the necessary advanced bases in the northern Atlantic and European theatres, specifically in northern England, Scotland and Iceland, with a total of 105,000 men.

He further divided the Army by estimating that 3.9 million men would be needed to form combat arms, and 1.8 million men would form the Army's service troops. Wedemeyer could therefore build an army for service in Europe that constituted some 215 divisions, based around five field armies.<sup>27</sup> Each field army

would be constructed around a core of nine 'triangular' infantry divisions. The key offensive tool in each army lay in its armoured and mechanised divisions. The approximate force structure was:

US 1st/3rd/4th Army	2nd/5th Army (Strategic Reserve)
Army HQ + Service Troops 3 x Corps HQ + Corps Troops 2 x Armoured Corps HQ 9 x Triangular Infantry Div 4 x Armoured Div 4 x Motorised Inf Div 2 x Mountain Div 2 x Airborne Div 8 x separate Tank Bn 10 x Tank destroyer Bn 10 x Anti-tank Bn 5 x Parachute Inf Bn 2 x Heavy Artillery Regts 9 x Mdm and Light Artillery Bn 12 x Aircraft Warning Regt 20 x Anti-Aircraft Regt 10 x mobile Anti-Aircraft Bn	2 x Army HQ + Service Troops 10 x Corps HQ + Corps Troops 14 x Armoured Corps HQ 27 x Triangular Infantry Div 53 x Armoured Div 51 x Mechanised Inf Div 4 x Motorised Inf Div 6 x Mountain Div 3 x Airborne Div 86 x separate Tank Bn 290 x Tank Destroyer Bn 262 x Anti-tank Bn 22 x Parachute Inf Bn 2 x Heavy Artillery Regts 9 x Mdm and Light Artillery Bn 29 x Aircraft Warning Regt 129 x Anti-Aircraft Regt 133 x mobile Anti-Aircraft Bn

**Figure 1. Wedemeyer's proposed force structure**

Each army was given a 'European' mission as well as a global contingency mission. Some 61 divisions were armoured, 61 were mechanised, 54 were infantry, 4 were cavalry, 10 were mountain, and 7 were airborne. The remaining divisions were allotted to hemispheric defence and other global tasks as defined by the Rainbow Plans.<sup>28</sup> The final manpower commitment was 8,795,658 men (2.05 million for Army aviation, 3.745 million for total active units, with 3 million men to be held as civilians in strategic reserve).<sup>29</sup> All Services concurred with the plan, which was later endorsed by General Marshall and, eventually, the President himself.

### The success of the Victory Plan

Wedemeyer's plan for victory was critical for the US in the Second World War for a number of reasons. First, it complemented the extant Rainbow Plans, primarily because the estimate was based on the need to achieve the operational concept laid out in these plans. This consistency in thinking would become vital through the early phases of the war because of the military industrial base's need for certainty and surety in planning. This would allow the US to meet full mobilisation of its industrial capacity sooner than if there had not been a clear estimate of resource requirements in the early phases of expansion. The plan was never static, however, with alterations made immediately after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

In the end, the actual number of divisions raised by the US in 1943 was a mere 90.<sup>30</sup> The main cause of this shortfall was the division 'slice' which meant that there were far more men per division than anticipated. Wedemeyer had originally envisaged a strength of 30,000 men per division. The actual figure was between 40,000 and 60,000 men.<sup>31</sup> The cause of this rapid increase in manpower was the increasing role of logistics and administration required in order to field a modern fighting division.

There were also many lessons that the US had learnt by 1945 that Wedemeyer could not have anticipated in 1941. These included the impact of Lend-Lease on American production priorities, which saw the US Army compete with Britain, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, Brazil, China, Norway and the (Free)

Italian forces for equipment and materiel. The Soviet successes on the western front also reduced the scale of American divisions required for Europe now that the Soviet Union had begun to fully mobilise.

Despite the fact that his estimate for the number of divisions was incorrect, Wedemeyer's manpower prediction was remarkably accurate. By 1945, the US had committed 8.1 million men to the war, just short of the 8.7 million that he had estimated some four years earlier.<sup>32</sup> With an understanding of its manpower constraints in 1941, the Army had been able to operate within its resources and fight the war accordingly.

Wedemeyer also correctly identified the need to build a strong and effective navy capable of supporting land operations. He was an advocate of joint planning and understood that mobilisation could not be achieved by a single Service in isolation. In addition, Wedemeyer was aware of the need to protect the American industrial base from manpower shortages and thus sought only to take sufficient manpower to achieve victory. Of equal concern for him was the need to maintain a critical mass of men in the national economy.

Wedemeyer saw his nation's military strength not as a battle or a campaign but rather as a series of units and capabilities lined up on the edge of the battle. He saw mobilisation, industrialisation and military operations as a single contiguous effort. This was especially important in attempting to overcome the manpower superiority of the Germans. He understood the need to compensate for the German manpower advantage by increasing the manufacture of aircraft, mechanised and armoured vehicles and communications, all of which lie at the heart of modern warfare. One of Wedemeyer's great achievements was his grasp of modern warfare—he built an army capable of fighting effectively in the current conflict, as opposed to the last one.

## Conclusion

The Victory Plan was a 14-page mobilisation plan designed to build an army capable of winning a world war without impacting on the nation's economic capacity to wage war for an indeterminable period. It was intended to take the US beyond the Monroe Doctrine and allow it to secure its interests outside the western hemisphere and across the world at large. It sought to defeat Germany through force of arms, and would ultimately establish the US as a global economic and military power in the years after the war.

This plan could not have been written with such remarkable accuracy and insight without the experience and professional education of its author, Albert Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer had spent his service life focusing on developing his professional military knowledge. He learned for the sake of learning, and was encouraged to do so by a series of senior officers who intuitively understood the value of knowledge and how it could be applied to military affairs.

Wedemeyer also knew that attention had to be given to the non-military aspects of national power if the US was to achieve ultimate victory in war. His longstanding preoccupation with strategic thought and his extensive knowledge of military history and economics gave him a profound insight into what was required to realise the ambitions of US war plans, and the importance of military technology as a means to achieve decisive combat weight in battle.

Wedemeyer's ability to grasp elements of strategy, policy, politics and practical military theory in the context of the need to wage total war against a global threat meant that he could generate a plan capable of surviving the hostile political climate of the day. Despite there being no army capable of meeting the plan's objectives, Wedemeyer nonetheless drafted a roadmap which enabled the US to build such an army with the least disruption to the remainder of the economy and society, so critical to the period during and after the war.

And he did all this in less than 90 days.

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## Notes

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- 1 Charles Edward Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: writing the victory plan of 1941*, Center of Military History, US Army: Washington DC, 1992, p. 5.
- 2 There has been some revisionist perspectives from US scholars in the last 10 years questioning the true value of Wedemeyer's contribution. Dr Gordon Rudd, a respected academic based at US Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting in Quantico, Virginia has provided the author with sufficient context on this debate and still assesses that Wedemeyer's contribution was significant. He surmises that there is insufficient academic evidence at this time that seriously calls into question Wedemeyer's role in supporting General Marshall's development of the Victory Plan. For more information, see John McLaughlin, *Albert Wedemeyer, America's Unsung Strategist in World War II*, Casemate Publishing: Philadelphia, 2012.
- 3 McLaughlin, *Albert Wedemeyer, America's Unsung Strategist in World War II*, p. 6.
- 4 Elements of national power, as defined by the US State Department, are diplomacy, information, military and economy.
- 5 Albert Coady Wedemeyer, 'Anti-Tank Defense', *Field Artillery Journal*, May 1941, pp. 258-72.
- 6 Forrest C. Pogue, *George Marshall: ordeal and hope*, Viking Press: New York, 1966, p. 141.
- 7 See, for example, Frederick the Great (translated by Thomas R. Phillips), *Instructions for his Generals*, Dover: New York, 2012.
- 8 Keith Eiler, 'The man who planned victory: an interview with Albert C Wedemeyer', *American Heritage*, Vol. 34, No. 6, 1983, p. 38.
- 9 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 35.
- 10 See Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: a study in American military history*, Harper: New York, 1962.
- 11 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 40.
- 12 Henry Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, Harper Publishing: New York, 1948, p. 366.
- 13 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilisation in the United States Army 1775-1945*, Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 20-212, Washington, June 1955, pp. 560-61.
- 14 Peyton C. Marsh, *The Nation at War*, Doubleday: Garden City, 1932, p. 341.
- 15 Pogue, *George Marshall*, p. 140.
- 16 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 52.
- 17 This would include munitions requirements and most major war materiel systems.
- 18 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 55.
- 19 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 56.
- 20 The Monroe Doctrine was a US policy introduced on 2 December 1823. It stated that further efforts by European nations to colonise land or interfere with states in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression, requiring US intervention.
- 21 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 63.



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- 22 Adrian Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey*, Jonathan Cape: London, 1950, p. 259.
- 23 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 92.
- 24 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 63.
- 25 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 93.
- 26 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 95.
- 27 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 98.
- 28 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 100.
- 29 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 115.
- 30 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 106.
- 31 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*.
- 32 Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, p. 100.