

# The ADF and Strategic Culture <sup>1</sup>

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Any state, if it is to prosper, must harmonise its strategic culture with its way of war.... A society that forgets how and why it has fought in the past and then fails to examine the way in which it might have to fight in the present and future forfeits control over its destiny.

Michael Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance* <sup>2</sup>

As the ADF prepares for the next 15 years, it seeks to avoid the struggle for mission identification that occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Cold War. Forging a way ahead requires an assessment of strategic environment and interests, capability deficiencies and requirements, and anticipated threats. It requires judgments on capability procurement, industry investment, facilities and operating expenses, and balancing current readiness with long-term investment. It demands decisions on personnel numbers and force structure. It entails consideration of the recruitment, preparation, morale, motivation and remuneration of personnel.<sup>3</sup>

Each of these factors is important in ensuring the organisation is structured and postured appropriately to meet future challenges. Yet it is strategic policy that determines the use of the ADF—how it is trained, equipped and organised—articulating strategy that deals with those areas of national policy where military factors overlap with political, economic and psychological factors.<sup>4</sup> This article argues that the first and most important step of the way ahead for the ADF is engagement in the development of sound strategy that links our way of war with national policy.

It identifies that friction between defence policy and practice has been an enduring issue in Australia, with praxis more reflective of strategic culture than policy, and advocates the development of a positive relationship between the Australian logic and grammar of war. Reviewing meta-trends in the operating environment, it questions the ADF's capacity for independent action and the continued applicability of geographic determinism to policy development. It then posits that a priority task for the ADF is developing the capacity to participate in the analysis of strategic issues and that senior leaders must assume a greater responsibility for engagement in Australian statecraft. The article concludes with a brief examination of some key considerations for inclusion in that strategy.

## The Australian way of war

There was an appreciable wave of academic analysis of war and its place in Australian policy after the Second World War and at the conclusion of the Cold War.<sup>5</sup> In the aftermath of the Second World War, a relatively stable (if antagonistic) bipolar world emerged, one in which the ADF found the cost of the peace dividend high, and saw conflicts in Indonesia, Malaya and Korea. Following the end of the Cold War, a favourable global paradigm emerged but hopes that the risk of conflict had diminished were quickly proven false, with events in Namibia, Kuwait, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans ensuring the continued utility of armed forces and the new spectrum of operations in which they would be expected to perform. As cultural norms relating to the use of force continue to evolve, these periods furnish many lessons relevant to the challenges faced today.<sup>6</sup>

War, Clausewitz tells us, has its own grammar but not its own logic.<sup>7</sup> Clausewitz did not develop this idea significantly.<sup>8</sup> It is generally accepted that the 'grammar' refers to the objective (enduring) and subjective (changeable) natures of war, with the military as the grammarian.<sup>9</sup> The 'logic' is variously correlated with policy, strategy and strategic culture.<sup>10</sup> However, for this article, it will be considered to relate to defence policy, with politicians cast as the logicians. The link between the two—strategy—must be strong to preserve consequent military activity from becoming 'pointless and devoid of sense,' for having lost touch with the political objective.<sup>11</sup> Australian defence policy has a history of dislocating one from the other, resulting in an 'extraordinary paradox ... between strategic theory and operational practice'.<sup>12</sup>

There is little consensus over what exactly constitutes a nation's way of war. For this article, the way of war will include the military strategies, operations and tactics; that is, operational practice.<sup>13</sup> This must be understood with regard to the surrounding political culture and strategic culture.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, Michael Evans sees a nation's way of warfighting as a subset of strategic culture. The grammar of war is then translation of the national values from pure theory to actionable strategy; 'the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment about how to devise the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving the political objective of the war in accordance with national values and beliefs'.<sup>15</sup>

The populist conception of the Australian way of war is based in the tales of valour and hardship of the ANZACs. The developed mythology provides an effective narrative, demonstrating core values of egalitarianism, mateship, rugged individualism and independence, selflessness and utilitarianism—the Australian way of war, built on the citizen soldier, remains free of militarism. The officer corps was never founded on elitism, the 'digger' made the hero. The cultural touchstone of ANZAC remains relevant to this day. But such experiences are contextual, and it was through continued refinement in the crucible of war that the ADF developed its character, and continues to do so, although there are few studies on the matter.

Consistent themes of volunteers fighting in expeditionary settings, in a coalition, as a junior partner relying on powerful friends to support force projection came to characterise the Australian grammar through the following century—but this is not yet the full story.<sup>16</sup> As the ADF acquires some organic force projection capability, the Australian way of war will continue to develop, taking lessons from experiences positive and negative, and maintaining guardianship of the ANZAC heritage. Despite periods of homeland defence policy, the Australian way of war has always been expeditionary.

While the character of war changes with each engagement, the Australian way of war has developed slowly and deliberately over time in parallel with Australian strategic culture. Some might characterise it more as 'a way of battle than an actual way of war',<sup>17</sup> but it has its own rules, explicit and implicit, its own moral code, and its own standards.<sup>18</sup> The Australian way of war is grounded in the strategic culture, and the strategic culture in the values of the nation. There is significant additional scope for scholarship regarding the Australian way of warfare. As the ADF looks to the future, there would be great utility in having this coalescence of Australian military heritage and values studied in detail.

In the current and future climate, domestic and political behavioural expectations are high and the ethical and honourable performance of all members is critical to the legitimacy of the institution and operations. Consciously adhered to or not, this is an important normative organisational behavioural framework. If the construct could be deconstructed to identify the precise content of this truly organic values set, identify the system's guardians, and understand the function of the associated normative framework, then these may be vulnerable to exploitation to optimise standardised behavioural and compliance outcomes. Critically, the ADF way of war is not an elite construct but a common one.

There is little more agreement over what exactly constitutes a nation's strategic culture. The idea of linkage between culture and national security policy is not modern—classical strategists including Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognized it in their seminal works.<sup>19</sup> Yet there is a vast array of opinion on how to define it, whether there is such a thing as unique national strategic culture and, if there is, then whether it is of importance in the development of strategic theory and practice.<sup>20</sup> While strategic culture 'may not have a direct independent and societal-specific effect on strategic choice'<sup>21</sup>—and, in fact, 'a wide variety of disparate societies may share a similar realpolitik strategic culture'<sup>22</sup>—there is increasing consensus that strategic culture may have an observable effect on state behaviour.

David Kilcullen offers an established model which accepts that 'strategic culture drives patterns of statecraft, which in turn drive military strategy'.<sup>23</sup> He notes that strategic culture may change slowly, that it has a special relationship with enduring circumstances and, therefore, frames issues for strategic decision makers. He also notes the normative characteristic of a nation's strategic culture—that 'even a perfect defence policy is likely to fail if it does not align with strategic culture'.<sup>24</sup> This accords with Evans' contention that 'modern strategy is first and foremost concerned with the task of upholding and preserving a nation's values'.<sup>25</sup> It is strategic culture that gives this meaning to other variables.

Strategic culture then is the 'weight of historical experiences and historically-rooted strategic preferences' that constrains the development of responses to changes in the strategic environment. These

factors can affect strategic choices in varied and unique ways.<sup>26</sup> Strategic culture ‘deals with how a nation views the place and role of military force in statecraft’.<sup>27</sup> Australia’s strategic culture is defined by expeditionary projection of force in time of need. Despite disputes about paucity of resources for Australian defence, as well as disagreements regarding the degree of force projection suitable for Australia, ‘the Australian people and their governments have been—and will continue to be—at one about the need to project military force decisively and effectively whenever and wherever it is required’.<sup>28</sup>

Australian strategic culture has been generally consistent since Federation, evolving in step with the national character. Reflecting Australian political culture, Australian strategic culture is rooted in Western liberal values and mores, including ideas about the use of force by democratic societies. Evans has identified four defining features of Australia strategic culture; the tendency to ‘fuse statecraft with strategy in order to defend values in times of war or prolonged security crisis’, the nation’s liminal geopolitical status, the application of continental philosophy to an island nation, and the persistent ‘irrelevance of Australian strategic theory to military practice’.<sup>29</sup> However, theory aside, ‘the practice of statecraft [has] showed considerable continuity’.<sup>30</sup> Evans adds one further feature, pertinent until mid-1960s, being the paradox of Asian geography and European history’.<sup>31</sup>

Others have suggested a final feature, the drive for ‘defence on the cheap’. Jeffrey Grey has noted Treasury’s persistent primacy in policy development, and the enduring ‘unwillingness of governments to think seriously about national interests in strategic as well as economic terms’.<sup>32</sup> For example, following the Second World War, the Defence Committee was instructed to determine a force structure and readiness based on budget rather than threat.<sup>33</sup> This approach has endured, and remains a planning constraint for the ADF to take into account.<sup>34</sup> From these—and the experience of British forces in the Falkland Islands (stripping museum displays for equipment prior to deployment)—the ADF must take key lessons on what is a sustainable peace dividend and what is an unacceptable capability risk.

Australia’s strategic culture is a psycho-social construct based on historical experience, national values and public opinion.<sup>35</sup> It has throughout the last century exercised a normative influence that sustained Australia’s expeditionary engagements even through several decades of espoused continental and ‘Defence of Australia’ strategies. Present informal custodians are likely to include the Chief of the Defence Force, Service Chiefs and senior staff, Secretary for Defence, and equivalent non-Defence stakeholders in the national security community.

Looking ahead, there may also be utility in the ADF electing to recognise this non-tangible asset. Strategic culture evolves slowly, if at all, and the markedly unsuccessful attempts to ‘redesign Australian strategic culture around the narrow features of an immutable geography during the last quarter of the 20th century’<sup>36</sup> demonstrate the robustness of the construct, so it is not vulnerable to significant shaping. However, it has served ADF purposes well in the past and may offer utility in the future if actively fostered. There may, for example, be scope for the development of a cross-Service and cross-agency network of stakeholders who acknowledge strategic culture as ‘an important ideational source of national pre-dispositions, and thus of national security’.<sup>37</sup>

## **Strategic dislocation**

If strategy is indeed ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’,<sup>38</sup> then in the Australian context the two opposing wills have occasionally been policy and practice. As a consequence of the friction between policy and tasking, the ADF has repeatedly been placed in positions wherein the understood rules and principles of grammar are expected to provide a substitute for an explicit logic. This can work—indeed, military commanders have arguably done so ‘whenever they found the twists and turns of logic too difficult to follow’.<sup>39</sup>

This is particularly critical in instances where policies have changed with the electoral cycle in a manner inconsistent with a procurement cycle. Critically, however, such a substitution will work only so long as ‘the grammarian and the logician are heading in the same direction’.<sup>40</sup> In particular, the post-Cold War ADF provides examples of this failing to occur and the consequences thereof.

Australia effectively pursued a policy of forward defence for most of the last 100 years. Notably, from the end of the Second World War, it was based initially on Imperial imperatives and then the Australia, New

Zealand and US Security Treaty from 1952. This lasted until the withdrawal from Vietnam, when a continental approach was adopted, to be succeeded by various iterations of a policy of 'Defence of Australia', which focused on the defence of mainland Australia.<sup>41</sup> The self-reliance concept has remained central to Australian defence policy ever since.<sup>42</sup>

In 1987, a Defence White Paper was released which provided the basis for renewed military engagement in the decade following the close of the Cold War—and which renewed old tensions between defence policy and practice.<sup>43</sup> Titled *The Defence of Australia 1987*, the explicit strategy was of 'defence-in-depth of territorial sovereignty', emphasising a doctrine of homeland protection. At the same time, it established a paradox by demonstrating the intent and capability to project force well beyond the maritime approaches through operations such as MORRIS DANCE (non-combatant evacuation operation, Fiji) and LAGOON (peacekeeping, Bougainville), and later regional and UN deployments to Namibia, Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and Bougainville, before commencing operations in Timor Leste.

The idea of what self-reliance means in terms of capability has evolved in the decades since, increasing emphasis on regional engagement and alliance relationships. However, the 2013 White Paper maintained the populist narrative, tasking Defence with deterrence and defeat of armed attacks on Australia, 'without having to rely on the combat or combat support forces of another country'.<sup>44</sup> This policy requirement requires the maintenance of 'credible high-end capabilities' to enable decisive action when required, in order to 'deter would-be adversaries and strengthen our regional influence'.<sup>45</sup>

This self-reliance rhetoric effectively dislocated the foreign policy and defence actions from the expressed defence policy and domestic political narrative. This was particularly pronounced in the ten years following the end of the Cold War. To the population, there was a strong message of continental defence. This drove decisions on investment in defence capabilities and facilities, and resulted in a markedly decreased overall ADF strength and capabilities for ground and maritime power projection as the forces were 'resourced, equipped and trained primarily for the direct continental defence of Australian territory'.<sup>46</sup>

However, external pressures shaped decisions to deploy ADF elements on a number of expeditionary tasks.<sup>47</sup> This meant that the forces could be called on to complete tasks for which they were not manned, equipped or trained. The effect of divorcing military posture from foreign policy creates 'a contradiction between available military means and the requirements for armed force that might be dictated by diplomatic obligations'.<sup>48</sup> Although by this time a role for the military in regional engagement activities had been identified, the Army in particular was not equipped or, initially, trained to undertake them.

The friction between capability and expectation was significant. Operations LAGOON and BEL ISI (Bougainville) provide clear examples of the deficiencies in force projection capability, based on policy decisions, impacting operational effectiveness.<sup>49</sup> There were a number of issues complicating force projection during these operations, including force of habit (more than a century of dependence on others for the exercise of force projection forestalled the design, development and rehearsal of critical enabling concepts), a bias towards good news reporting (dislocating senior leadership from practical issues and precluding passage of observations), and command and control issues (arising from poor strategic guidance, inadequate joint procedures and inter-Service rivalry).<sup>50</sup>

Intelligence, logistics, communications and other support systems were also inadequate. All these issues derive from the identified rift between policy and military strategy—between the logic and grammar of this conflict. And all contributed to an unacceptable outcome—increased risk for those at the tactical level.<sup>51</sup> Similar experiences were observed by the British in relation to the Suez incident in 1956.

Legitimate military forces accept that 'in the final analysis executing government policy—within a continuum of diplomatic, informational, military and economic influence—is what armed forces are for'.<sup>52</sup> *In extremis*, should a state's military force ever 'cease to be an instrument of broader, national statecraft', they immediately lose their legitimacy. Such an organisation may be as dangerous to its own people as to anyone else. Such groups tend to have a grasp of the grammar of war but very rarely its logic (which can be supplied no other way but by policy).

Where the ADF has acted in ways other than in strict accord with stated policy, it has in each instance been acting lawfully, on the order of the government, and in accord with the national strategic culture.<sup>53</sup> It

is highly worth noting, however, that ‘even an exquisite grammar cannot save a dubious logic’;<sup>54</sup> no matter how adaptable, how capable the men and women of the ADF, when defence policy is illogical to a situation or incompatible with the available equipment and manpower, it simply cannot be made to work. Henry Kissinger stated that ‘the separation of strategy and policy can only be achieved to the detriment of both. It causes military power to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over-concern with finesse’.<sup>55</sup>

The dislocation of policy from practice in Australian defence contexts appears to be more pronounced in post-war periods. During such times as the aftermath of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, politicians and polity alike were very focused on achieving a substantial peace dividend by minimising defence posture and discouraging spending on major capability platforms or infrastructure. Gray’s aphorism that ‘there is more to war than warfare’<sup>56</sup> is quite apt—wars are waged for the eventual victory.

Yet on achieving said victory, at the end of the Second World War and the Cold War, the Australian military was all but torn apart. In each instance, it was an economic, rather than strategic rationale. This neither precluded the accomplishment nor rendered such activity improper; what it does inevitably do is place greater strains and risks on the involved parties, particularly regarding equipment and preparation. However, even in the light of a confusing policy narrative, there is a marked consistency between the way of war and the strategic culture’s guiding frame. This may be seen in ADF actions in Rwanda, for example, where national values effectively guided military activity in the light of complex and confusing military policy.

Going forward, the ADF’s senior leadership must recall these lessons and these issues, and proactively engage both in the formulation of strategy and in the conduct of proactive expectation management among external stakeholders. And, in the worst case scenario, the ADF’s most senior leaders must be prepared to assume the responsibility for engaging with the policy makers to contest such an action.

## **Australia’s future operating environment**

The context in which the ADF will operate during the next 15 years will pose many challenges. It is important that Defence leaders understand the key trends shaping the future operating environment, and their likely influence, in order to design and resource response options.<sup>57</sup> However, significant caution must be exercised when attempting trend analysis. Trends being multi-faceted and interactive, it is often their second- and third-order effects that impact the future.<sup>58</sup> It is particularly important to recognise which aspects are crucial ‘rather than ephemeral or superficial’<sup>59</sup>—and to avoid misreading ‘recent and contemporary trends in warfare as signals of some momentous, radical shift’<sup>60</sup>—but rather to look to the effects on the character of contemporary warfare by political, social and strategic contexts than for changes to military science.<sup>61</sup>

It is not the intent of this article to predict the precise nature of the future battlespace. However, a number of meta-trends will affect the character of warfare in this space and must be borne in mind when considering not just the grammar but also the logic of engagements. Critically, the operating environment will be increasingly crowded,<sup>62</sup> it will be more intensely connected,<sup>63</sup> more lethal,<sup>64</sup> more collective,<sup>65</sup> and more constrained.<sup>66</sup>

Extrapolation of considerations from the meta-trends is important for discussion of the nature of future warfare.<sup>67</sup> From these trends, certain conclusions may be drawn as to their consequence on ADF operations. It appears that success will increasingly require integrated joint and coalition approaches, which draw on all elements of national power as well as regional or alliance capabilities as required. The ability to generate decision superiority will be critical. And the ability to apply ‘power overmatch’ at decisive points, whether special or temporal, will be crucial.<sup>68</sup> Caution must be exercised to ensure that the ADF does not commit to a force structure or posture designed to defeat an excessively-narrow conception of the future threat but rather maintains organisational flexibility to accommodate unexpected occurrences.<sup>69</sup>

Australian defence policy has long been framed in geographic terms. Some elements are immediately apparent, such as physical location and island construct; these largely shape announced policy. Some are less so, such as the enduring ‘paradox of geographical proximity to but cultural distance from Asia and of

geographical distance from but cultural intimacy with the Anglo-Saxon heartlands, [which] has been at the centre of Australia's modern security dilemma'.<sup>70</sup>

Looking forward, the key area of interest to Australia will be the Indo-Pacific.<sup>71</sup> This is in fact an older construct that goes back to the early 1960s, despite recent policy saturation of East Asian rhetoric.<sup>72</sup> The reinstatement of this concept serves as a lesson on how flawed 'serious-sounding prognostications about strategic futures' can be, and teaches us not to rely too heavily on such extrapolations in strategic planning.<sup>73</sup> It is important for the ADF to appreciate this evolution, even though it may be a return to the past; this provides the focal context for all policy planning.<sup>74</sup> Within this frame, the US, India and China, and regional actors, will play particular roles.

It is important to note that geography does not matter in absolute terms to Australian strategy but rather in relative terms. Australia's geography matters in terms of relative technology, population dynamics, economic capacity and national strategic intent. Perhaps the biggest role that geography continues to play is in its shaping of Australian strategic culture and the legacy of a 'consistent "forward school" pattern in Australian statecraft'.<sup>75</sup>

Of course, the ADF may be required to generate effects anywhere in the world. While a highly-developed appreciation of the proposed operating environment is important for planning, the Korean, Vietnamese, Falklands and Afghanistan wars teach us the inevitable fallacies of such predictions and highlight the importance of detecting changing patterns of economic, political and military influence. The 2013 White Paper contended that trends and developments identified in the 2009 Paper had 'begun to coalesce and give shape to an increasingly complex global order'.<sup>76</sup> A wide number of factors will influence the formulation of defence policy, including the Indo-Pacific, socio-economic development and the effects of the global financial crisis, the power and intent of China and the US, regional military modernisation, and specific regional concerns.<sup>77</sup>

## **Towards strategic harmony**

Because strategy strives to bridge the gap between political goals and military means, those ADF members engaged in its development must have a working understanding not just of their military domain but also of Australian political culture.<sup>78</sup> A country's military and political culture and the associated institutions have been termed 'mutually dependent variables' by Evans, who also suggests that the character of a legitimate military organisation is inextricably linked to dominant political views about the use of force.<sup>79</sup>

Since, as Clausewitz instructs, politics provides the framework for strategy and strategic practice, any strategy which fails to 'take note of political history, social values and ideology is unlikely to succeed'.<sup>80</sup> The British experience in the Second Gulf War, where smaller-power status denied them the influence in planning objectives and hence significantly complicated the end-state, serves as a lesson for proactive involvement; with our allies, our politicians, and all our stakeholders.

It therefore behoves all those of the leadership to build their knowledge and understanding of political culture in Australia, and to develop the skills knowledge and attributes required for a positive engagement with the Australian political culture. Australia's political culture is strongly aligned to Western values,<sup>81</sup> based on our colonial past and influenced heavily by utilitarianism, a social and conservative form of nationalism, the promotion of social cohesion, egalitarianism, and a marked degree of conformism and collectivism. Political debate 'has been firmly centred on economics and the administration of prosperity for as many citizens as possible'.<sup>82</sup> The ADF must find or create ways to increase its stake in these decision-making cycles, and build the relationships to enable success—the development of sound strategy that links our way of war with national policy.

## **Conclusion**

As the ADF reviews its planning for its structuring and posturing for the next 15 years, it must acknowledge the friction between capability and expected task performance, and engage with other stakeholders to minimise its consequence in practice. It must recognise those broader political considerations that will continue to shape defence policy, and engage in the debates surrounding defence

strategy. The friction between ADF policy and practice is an ongoing issue that has significant capacity to detract from both narrow ADF and broader national interest objectives. As stated at the outset, the ADF must strive to force durable links between its way of war and the policy through the development of strong strategy. Doing so will ensure sympathetic development of tasking responsibility with capability and capacity.

It must also be prepared to adopt non-traditional capability multipliers, including developing culture-based approaches. This can be achieved by fostering in the profession of arms a stronger factual understanding of our martial history and the realisation of a military culture in which the positive engagement in through-career development and learning is truly valued—an internal balancing between intellectual and ‘muddy boots’ style officers. Encouraging work has commenced in this area but it must be persistently developed and guarded from the ravages of the coming peace dividend. Through this means, the ADF must produce diverse and capable leaders across the ranks capable of engaging in the strategic debate in order to work proactively towards harmonisation of the policy-practice dissonance.

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## Notes

- 1 This is an edited version of a paper, titled ‘The Australian, US, and British armed forces were among those that struggled to identify their missions in the aftermath of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. Employing lessons from these periods, create a way ahead for the ADF as it prepares for the next fifteen years’, submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff College in 2014.
- 2 Michael Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's strategic culture and way of war, 1901-2005*, Land Warfare Studies Centre: Canberra, 2005, p. 106.
- 3 Considerations adapted from covering letter, Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence by Mr Paul Dibb*, Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra, 1986, pp. v-vii.
- 4 John Baylis and James Wirtz, ‘Introduction’ in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007, p. 4.
- 5 Hugh White, ‘Studying Strategy Today’, in Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (eds.), *Strategy and Security in the Asia Pacific*, Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 2006, p. 3.
- 6 White, ‘Studying Strategy Today’, pp. 3-9.
- 7 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1989, p. 605.
- 8 See Colin S. Gray, ‘Inescapable Geography’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Issue 22, Nos. 2-3, 1999, pp. 161-77; Antulio J. Echevarria, II, ‘War's Second Grammar’, Strategic Studies Institute Op-Ed, October 2009, available at <<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB946.pdf>> accessed 13 May 2015;

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- Antulio J. Echevarria, II, 'War, Politics, and RMA: the legacy of Clausewitz', *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1995-96, pp. 76-80.
- 9 Echevarria, 'War, Politics, and RMA', p. 78.
- 10 See Gray, 'Inescapable Geography'; David Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft: the challenge of aligning policy with strategic culture', *Security Challenges*, Issue 3, No. 4, 2007, pp. 45-65; Echevarria, 'War, Politics, and RMA', pp. 76-80.
- 11 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 605
- 12 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. v.
- 13 Other considerations include 'policy, strategy, operations, tactics or all of these ... [or] mainly to strategic theory or to operational practice': Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 7.
- 14 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 4.
- 15 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 11.
- 16 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, pp. 51-4.
- 17 Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward an American Way of War*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: Carlisle: March 2004, p. 1.
- 18 Such as the subjugation of all Australian servicemen and -women to the laws of war, or the commitment made by a soldier to his fellow. See John Albert Lynn, *Battle: a history of combat and culture, from ancient Greece to modern America*, Basic Books: New York, 2003, p. 366.
- 19 Jeffrey S. Lantis, 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy', *International Studies Review*, Issue 4, No. 3, 2002, p. 93.
- 20 One school of thought sees culture has a 'dynamic vessel that holds and revitalise the collective memories of people by giving emotional life to traditions'; strategic culture as a perpetuation of values and preferences. Others are more functional, for example, those who see strategic culture as 'the beliefs and assumptions that frame choices about international military behaviour, particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable'; a recognition of preferences with built-in rules to govern conduct in war. Post-modern, constructivist, metacultural, and other arguments further complicate the issue: see Lantis, 'Strategic Culture', p. 104.
- 21 Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Issue 19, No. 4, 1995, p. 34.
- 22 Lantis, 'Strategic Culture', p. 88.
- 23 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', p. 46.
- 24 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', p. 46.
- 25 Evans, *Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 3.
- 26 Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', p. 34.
- 27 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 10.
- 28 Bob Breen, *Struggling for Self-Reliance: four case studies of Australian regional force projection in the late 1980s and the 1990s*, ANU E Press: Canberra, 2008, p. 3.
- 29 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 23.
- 30 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', p. 55.
- 31 Evans, *Strategic Dissonance*, p. 25.
- 32 Quoted in Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 24.
- 33 In June 1945, the Treasury forecast an annual defence budget of £60 million before any decisions about the size or needs of the post-war forces were made. A year later, after the Defence Committee completed analysis and made their recommendations, the Prime Minister indicated that even less would be allocated, and directed 'that the chiefs should resubmit their plans on this basis': see Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press: Melbourne, 2008, p. 199.
- 34 For example, during the post-Cold War period, even Army capabilities in use overseas were stripped because they 'could not be justified for garrison operations'; Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 55.
- 35 Lantis, 'Strategic Culture', p. 97.



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36 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 4.

37 Lantis, 'Strategic Culture', p. 106.

38 Baylis and Wirtz, 'Introduction', p. 5.

39 Echevarria, 'War's Second Grammar', pp. 1-2.

40 Echevarria, 'War's Second Grammar', p. 1.

41 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987: Defence White Paper 1987*, Australian Government: Canberra, 1987.

42 Dan Fortune, 'Self Reliance: an outdated and unaffordable concept for the ADF', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Issue 193, 2014, p. 5.

43 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987*.

44 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia and its National Interests: Defence White Paper 2013*, Australian Government: Canberra, 2013, pp. 24-8.

45 Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 24.

46 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', p. 57.

47 Including deployments to the Arabian Gulf, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bougainville and East Timor.

48 Evans, *Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 85.

49 Bob Breen, *Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: a case of military action and diplomacy*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU: Canberra, 2001.

50 Breen, *Struggling for Self Reliance*, p. 158.

51 Breen, *Giving Peace a Chance*.

52 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', p. 61.

53 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft', p. 61,

54 Echevarria, 'War's Second Grammar', p. 1.

55 Quoted in Baylis and Wirtz, 'Introduction', p. 5.

56 Colin S. Gray, 'How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War?', *Parameters*, Issue 35, No. 1, 2005, p. 7.

57 Australian Army, *The Future Land Warfare Report 2013*, Australian Army: Canberra, 2013, p. 2. Analysis of these trends also allows the ADF to design and resource initiatives, including areas of personal development, material enhancement, and joint and interagency connectivity that provide the broadest range of options for government.

58 Gray, 'How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War?', p. 3.

59 Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, 'Preface,' in Ayson and Ball, *Strategy and Security in the Asia Pacific*, p. xxi.

60 Gray, 'How Has War Changed', p. 2.

61 Gray, 'How Has War Changed', p. 3.

62 Crowded land, sea, air, space, and cyber-space; population density will continue to rise and urban concentrations increase; these will require ever larger numbers of ground troops, training and technologies to deny the detection threshold: see Australian Army, *Future Land Warfare*, pp. 4-5. The Army is not structured to deal with such complexity, in an echo of the restrictions on Army during the Defence of Australia period.

63 Land, sea, air, space and cyberspace domains will be increasingly connected.

64 Combatants will continue to pursue more lethal solutions, and non-state actors will increasingly have the commensurate access; also autonomous, remote devices are likely to result in capability overmatches. Within ten years this may open up options for augmentation of soldier's robustness and resilience. Consideration must also be given to 'the degree to which soldiers can be ethically enhanced': see Australian Army, *Future Land Warfare*, pp. 8-9.

65 The operational environment will be vastly more collective, with involvement from other government agencies, and with regional or broader focus. More exposure to joint training and environments will be essential, as will enhancements of the synthetic training environment.

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- 66 Constrained finances will likely impact the ADF's ability to maintain all capabilities, possibly at the cost of corporate skills; other constraints may see increased international legal restraints, and lowered acceptance of collateral damage: see Australian Army, *Future Land Warfare*, pp. 11-2.
- 67 Australian Army, *Future Land Warfare*, p. 3.
- 68 Australian Army, *Future Land Warfare*, p. 5.
- 69 In 1956, Egyptian President Abdul Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. Three months later, the UK and France launched an assault to re-secure it but were found to be under-equipped, under-trained and inadequate to the task.
- 70 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 25.
- 71 The resurgence of the Indo-Pacific strategic construct was confirmed by its displacement in the 2013 Defence White Paper of the Asia-Pacific terminology of the 2009 Defence White Paper, and certainly eclipsed the earlier 'South East Asia and South Pacific' focus. Strategists have framed Australia's geopolitical environment in different ways, including the Pacific, the Asia-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific frame, conceiving the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as a single strategic system which encompasses Southeast Asia, is arguably the most relevant looking forward" Rory Medcalf, *Pivoting the Map: Australia's Indo-Pacific system*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU: Canberra, 2012.
- 72 When it was cast in terms of an expected ongoing British influence in the Indian Ocean, and a projected Chinese threat.
- 73 Medcalf, *Pivoting the Map*, p. 2.
- 74 Most critically, the 'most immediate is our distinct two-ocean geography and the extension of our interests this entails if we are serious about engaging our full region in this so-called Asian Century': Medcalf, *Pivoting the Map*, p. 2.
- 75 Kilcullen, 'Australian Statescraft', p. 59.
- 76 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia and its National Interests*.
- 77 Department of Defence, *Defending Australia and its National Interests*, pp. 7-16.
- 78 Ayson and Ball, 'Preface', p. xxi.
- 79 Evans, *Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 8.
- 80 Evans, *Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 8.
- 81 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster: London, 2002, p. 151.
- 82 Evans, *Tyranny of Dissonance*, pp. 12-22.