

The Future of the ADF ¹

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Introduction

As decade-long operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East scale down, the ADF must pause, take stock and plan a way ahead—just as it did in the aftermath of previous conflicts, including the Second World War and at the end of the Cold War. But this time is different. Australia is more closely aligned to the US than ever before; US global hegemony is being challenged by a rising China; and the globe is edging its way back to multipolarity. For the first time since the Second World War in the Pacific, the multipolar actors are performing on the stage that is Australia's front-yard.

In creating a way ahead for the ADF for the next 15 years, it is important to acknowledge that the ADF does not exist for its own sake—it cannot design its way ahead in isolation. Three critical factors will shape the ADF's future: the environment that the ADF expects to operate in; the tasks that the Australian government expects the ADF to undertake; and the ADF capabilities needed to achieve those tasks.

This article aims to examine these critical factors, distilling the broad characteristics required of ADF capabilities over the next 15 years. It does not attempt to divine the likely operations that the ADF will need to conduct, nor does it delve into the detail of the specific force design required to conduct those operations. It argues that the ADF needs to be an intelligence-driven, balanced, mobile and culturally-smart force that can adapt, innovate and scale-down to the requirements of expeditionary operations conducted within the Indo-Pacific region.

It also asserts that the ADF needs to be designed for the defence of Australia, interoperable with the US for high-end warfighting, and integrated with other arms of government. It needs to proactively engage with the region and be willing to participate in and learn from minor operations. The force needs to be deliberately small and focused on core capabilities but technologically advanced and able to expand to meet the needs of larger conflicts given sufficient warning time. Of all these characteristics, 'flexibility' is the key to ADF success in the next 15 years.

The most fundamental lesson that we need to learn from military history is that we need to be careful learning lessons from military history. As Michael Howard acknowledges, 'events or personalities from other epochs may be illuminating, but equally they mislead... [W]hat is valid in one situation may, because of entirely altered circumstances, be quite untenable the next time'.² This warning is echoed by General David Petraeus, who cautions that 'misapplied lessons of history may be more dangerous than ignorance of the past'.³

Richards Heuer, former head of the methodology unit within the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, cautions that utilising historical analogies tends to cause policy makers to become backward looking and solve the mistakes of the previous generation.⁴ In seeking to avoid these pitfalls, this article takes note of Heuer's advice that 'the greater the number of potential analogues an analyst has at his or her disposal, the greater the likelihood of selecting an appropriate one'.⁵

Consequently, this article—while including lessons from the Second World War and the Cold War—also draws on lessons from other periods to inform the way ahead for the ADF as it prepares for the next 15 years.

The future environment

The future environment will have a significant impact on the way ahead for the ADF. The environment determines the areas in which the ADF will be required to operate, the potential adversaries that the ADF may be required to fight, and the types of operations the ADF may need to conduct. In examining the future environment, it is important to acknowledge three significant factors. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific

region is evolving. Secondly, if we want to operate successfully within the Indo-Pacific environment, we need to understand it. Thirdly, any attempt to predict the future is difficult.

The Indo-Pacific region is evolving into the new global epicentre. As current national strategic guidance stresses, ‘the most significant factor for our national security is the impact of shifts in the global balance of power’,⁶ with the rise of China and India ‘shaping the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic arc’.⁷ The projected growth in the Indo-Pacific region triggered the ‘US pivot’ or ‘rebalance to Asia’, which aims ‘to support a peaceful region where sovereign states can enjoy continued security and prosperity’.⁸

The relationship between the US and China is the most critical relationship to the future of the region.⁹ In many ways, the rise of China to compete with—and possibly ultimately replace—the US as the dominant global power is a natural evolutionary process that mirrors the transition of power that occurred between Britain and the US earlier last century. In that instance, the transition of power occurred peacefully. It is in Australia’s national interest to ensure that any future transition is just as peaceful.

The context of a new global power emerging at the end of lengthy combat operations parallels the challenge that faced the US and its allies at the end of the Second World War. US experience highlighted that the newly-formed US Air Force was probably the most proactive of the services in adapting to the post-war environment.¹⁰ General Carl Spaatz, its first Chief of Air Staff, was sceptical of the new ‘peace’ and likely effectiveness of the recently-formed UN, integrating lessons from the strategic bombing campaign against Germany to massively reorganise the US Air Force to meet his expectation of an emerging Soviet threat.

The US Air Force’s ability to proactively focus on the future rather than remain anchored in the past is reminiscent of the US Marine Corps in the inter-war period. The Marines, under threat of becoming a marginalised or even disbanded force, were proactive in seeking out a new and relevant role.¹¹ They established an amphibious doctrine for the Pacific, based on lessons learned from the failed Gallipoli campaign from the First World War, and were forthright in planning for Japan as the future enemy.¹²

As the ADF contemplates a possible period of peace, these historical examples offer clear lessons. The ADF needs to focus on learning from, but not anchor to, the expeditionary counterinsurgency operations that have concluded. The counterinsurgency experience needs to be integrated into an ADF that is repositioned for future security challenges focused on the Indo-Pacific region. This should include planning for operations against a technologically-advanced and numerically-superior potential adversary.

We need to understand the Indo-Pacific region if we are to successfully operate in it. The ADF has a predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon heritage and is at risk of being culturally ignorant when conducting operations within the Indo-Pacific arc.¹³ The Vietnam War highlighted the inability of the US to adapt to the cultural nuances of its adversary. It was only in 1968—four years after the commencement of offensive operations against Vietnam—that the US appeared to broadly acknowledge and counter the cultural nuance of the North Vietnamese strategy.¹⁴

The Vietnam experience underpins the RAND Corporation’s assertion that we need to develop a deep understanding of the governing system of an adversary.¹⁵ Australian operations in the Indo-Pacific require a similarly strong regional understanding. The Australian Government is already committed to establishing key relationships with South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, India and China, as essential components of our national strategy, providing ‘a community that is able to discuss political, economic and security issues, and act cooperatively to address them’.¹⁶

Importantly, for the ADF, these relationships also provide a framework through which an understanding of the region and its many cultures can be developed. This is as important to working with future coalition partners as it is to defeating future adversaries. The ADF needs to invest in regional engagement and it needs to understand its potential future adversaries within the Indo-Pacific arc.

The most significant factor in analysing the future environment, however, is that it is difficult to predict. Forecasting the future environment for the ADF is one of the tasks assigned to defence intelligence personnel. Yet Phillip Tetlock, for example, asserts that ‘although we often talk ourselves into believing we live in a predictable world, we delude ourselves’.¹⁷ Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel

Kahneman similarly contends that ‘everything makes sense in hindsight.... The illusion that we understand the past fosters overconfidence in our ability to predict the future’.¹⁸

Twentieth century military history seems to support the notion that prediction is difficult. After the Second World War, the US failed to predict North Korea’s surprise invasion of South Korea in 1950, and General MacArthur failed to predict the entry of China into the war.¹⁹ Great Britain failed to predict Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982, and Argentina failed to predict the British resolve and speed of response.²⁰ The US failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union and, after its collapse, failed to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—just as Iraq failed to predict the resolve and cohesion of the coalition to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty.²¹

In every war, it would seem, at least one of the belligerents fails in their prediction. The lesson to take from history is that any strategic intelligence forecast 15 years into the future should be treated with a degree of scepticism.²² Consequently, the currently-vogue theme of the ‘rise of China’ is useful in terms of ADF capability and contingency planning. But it should not become the sole focus. The ADF needs to remain flexible and adaptable—and it needs to be ready at shorter notice to successfully conduct a wider breadth of lower-intensity operations within the region.

Government expectations

The Australian Government’s expectations of the ADF will play a large part in shaping the way ahead for the next 15 years. Modern democracies are built around the Clausewitzian concept that wars, and therefore militaries, are an extension of politics. Any discussion of a future ADF must therefore take into account the likely plans and requirements of the government-of-the-day.

The first responsibility of government is to defend Australia and its interests from direct attack. While the current National Security Strategy asserts that ‘the likelihood of a conventional armed attack on our territory is remote’, it notes that ‘the consequence of such an attack could be devastating’.²³ The requirement to defend Australia through the interdiction of forces in the ‘air-sea gap’ is, therefore, as valid today as it was when the term was coined in the post-Vietnam era, which ushered in the strategy of deterrence and self-reliance.²⁴

This defence of the ‘air-sea gap’ implies a maritime strategy: mobile forces—primarily naval and air—capable of conducting operations across the breadth of the continent and its waters to the north. The primacy of the defence of Australia mission must continue to drive force structures: long-range, mobile forces must continue to provide the backbone of a balanced ADF force, adaptable to missions other than the defence of Australia. For the future ADF, this means that the role of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of the northern approaches and the use of small but highly-mobile forces in intelligence-led interdiction operations will remain key capabilities and tasks.

The Australian Government’s second expectation of the ADF is that it can protect national interests in the region and around the globe. However, the definition of ‘national interests’ increasingly includes the requirement to protect economic interests, particularly in a global environment where the number of small, market-sensitive economies that are vulnerable to economic coercion has increased.²⁵

In the increasingly globalised Indo-Pacific region, and with an increasingly export-oriented Australian economy, it is easy to envisage economic diplomacy and coercion playing a greater role over the next 15 years. For example, James Goldrick has argued that ‘the ADF may need to protect vital energy shipments ... [or as part of a coalition] provide for the wider protection of trade and essential materials in their movement by sea’.²⁶ The protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) will therefore be an important task for the ADF in the next 15 years, again requiring small, highly-mobile capabilities conducting intelligence-led operations as part of a wider maritime strategy.

The US alliance

A key implied national interest is serving Australia’s alliance with the US. While some critics of Australia’s relationship with the US believe ‘it is time we begin to cut ourselves off America’s coat-tails’,²⁷ successive governments from both sides of politics have continued to support strengthening engagement with the

US. The 2013 Defence White Paper describes the Australia-US alliance as the ‘most important defence relationship ... [which is] a pillar of Australia’s strategic and security arrangements’.²⁸ So it is unlikely that the fundamentals of Australia’s relationship with the US will change over the next 15 years, even if there is an unexpected period of relative peace.

An essential underpinning of the alliance is for the ADF to remain interoperable with the US military. To do this, the ADF must continue to invest in high technology and interoperable military equipment, as well as continuing to align with US tactics and procedures, and being proactive in seeking opportunities for engagement. Such engagement may include assisting in smaller campaigns and operations where the primary benefit to Australia is in aligning our military capability and tactics to contemporary operations, rather than necessarily achieving a specific national interest.

Operating with other arms of government

Operating well with other arms of government is a further challenge. In 2009, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton introduced the term ‘smart power’ to describe the intelligent use of the full spectrum of national power as ‘picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation’.²⁹ The need for applying both ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ has long been recognised but probably not with the level of integration that ‘smart power’ implies.

The impetus for ‘smart power’ came from the limited objective wars that followed the Second World War, with the Vietnam War an obvious example. Not only did that war have limited objectives, which required a combined approach between allies, but it also required the integration of disparate, civilian arms of government. However, according to Daniel Marston, the so-called ‘Pacification’ program in South Vietnam was initially the epitome of disunity—and that it was not until a single organisation was established to focus specifically on pacification that a coordinated and sustained effort began to take hold.³⁰

The ADF needs to learn how to harness and coordinate the energies of different arms of government. To do this, it needs to be proactive in seeking opportunities for engagement, such as leading or participating in whole-of-government exercises aimed at practising a coordinated national approach. Conducting such exercises and operations would expose a new generation, both military warfighters and civilian decision-makers, to the planning and conduct of complex operations and campaigns.

Military capabilities

Military capabilities provide the means with which the government can achieve its goals and requirements within the operational environment. It follows that any planning for the future of the ADF must examine aspects of these capabilities. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that when a new conflict arises, the ADF must adapt the force-in-being to the requirements of the conflict. Secondly, ADF capabilities will always be constrained by Australia’s limited population. Thirdly, capabilities will always be constrained by the available budget.

Given the lengthy procurement timeframes for complex military equipment, the ADF over the next 15 years will largely be utilising capabilities already in service, or capabilities that are in the process of being acquired.³¹ The need to adapt and utilise the force-in-being is well illustrated by the British experience in the Falklands in 1982, where the Royal Navy carrier force was required to sail just three days after the invasion of the Falklands, enabling Britain to regain the strategic initiative.³² The challenge for the ADF over the next 15 years is to ensure that it is adequately balanced, equipped, informed and ready to meet a range of limited-warning and limited-objective contingencies akin to the Falklands.

Lengthy procurement timeframes also impact the ability to rapidly ‘scale-up’. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of the bipolar global system of the Cold War, allied forces no longer faced a short-warning threat of a Soviet large-scale offensive.³³ This, along with the trend towards urban warfare after the Cold War, led allied forces to prepare for high-end warfighting, on the assumption that a ‘scaled-down’ strategy could be used for lower-end operations.³⁴

As technologically-advanced equipment is increasingly brought into service over the next 15 years, the challenge for the ADF will be to innovate, scale-down and adapt the use of this equipment to achieve a limited-objective mission within a likely lower-technology war.

The availability of people

ADF capabilities will always be constrained by the availability of people. As a country with a relatively small population, Australia will only ever be able to field a relatively-small armed force in conflict—particularly in comparison to a number of the military forces emerging in the Indo-Pacific arc. Limitations on size further emphasise the need to compensate through superior training and technology.

This approach has been successful in past conflicts, such as the Korean War and the first Gulf War, both of which were military if not political victories. The challenge for the ADF over the next 15 years will be to find a balance between the size of the force and equipping and training the force adequately with advanced technologies. Too large a force wastes scarce human capital during peacetime and dilutes the availability of equipment, while too small a force undermines the credibility of the ADF to deter would-be attackers.

With the drawdown in Afghanistan, there is a risk that the ADF will lose experience and expertise—and may be under pressure to reduce its overall size. While any such reduction in force size is generally resisted by military forces, it could deliver some efficiencies. A smaller force has less organisational inertia and so is more likely to be able to adapt its training and capabilities to meet an evolving operating environment. A good example was the US Marine Corp's agility in adapting to the requirements of amphibious warfare in the Pacific theatre of the Second World War, much more effectively than the significantly larger US Army.³⁵

For the contemporary ADF, a small force would minimise the capital investment in modern, ICT-dependent capabilities, which are often outdated by the time the capability is operational. Furthermore, personnel costs could be redirected towards ensuring that a smaller force receives superior equipment and training, while 'maintaining credible high-end capabilities ... to act decisively when required, and deter would-be adversaries'.³⁶ Similarly, the force size needs to be sufficiently credible to be of value to the US alliance, with bilateral talks in November 2012 reportedly suggesting that Australia 'is already at the margin of defence-spending viability'.³⁷

Any plan to reduce the size of the ADF post-Afghanistan therefore needs to be carefully considered, planned and balanced against other priorities. Any force reduction should be concentrated in areas that are relatively easy to train (such as infantry), rather than areas that are difficult or costly to train (such as a submarine force). Any plan to reduce force size also requires a corresponding plan to mobilise forces should it become necessary, including an investment in collection and analysis of indicators and warnings to ensure that emerging crises are detected with sufficient warning time to mobilise an appropriately-sized force.

The budget

Perhaps the most significant impact on capability is a constrained Australian budget. The 2014 budget confirmed that the Government is committed to a 'properly resourced' defence force and to an increased defence budget that equates to 2 per cent of GDP.³⁸ However, the planned increase to defence expenditure must be taken in the context of the Government's broader priority to return the national budget to surplus by 2024-25, in an environment of falling revenue.³⁹

While Australian defence spending is already relatively low compared to other regional partners,⁴⁰ history suggests two trends that significantly impact defence spending. Firstly, Australian defence spending tends to fall in poor economic environments, such as the late 1930s, the late 1980s and since the 2008 global financial crisis. Secondly, 'Australia spends more on defence during time of war'.⁴¹

Given the context of a slowing economy and Afghanistan draw-down, it would be prudent to conclude that ADF spending will be constrained for the foreseeable future.⁴² From a 'grand strategic' perspective, this may not be a bad thing. The strategic advantage that wealthy, liberal-democratic, maritime-trading

nations have typically enjoyed over their adversaries has been in being able to mobilise economic capacity in times of war.⁴³ The most striking historical example of this can be found in the Second World War:

[Where Japan] vastly underestimated the productive capacity of the United States. Japan started the war numerically superior in practically every category of military equipment... But once the great US industrial machine geared up, the Japanese found themselves inferior in all the various machines of war'.⁴⁴

The Cold War further reinforced this idea but within a different paradigm. Both the US and Soviet Union were forced to adopt massive military budgets—but to finance a strategy of protracted deterrence rather than a short surge into warfare. According to Jonathon Kirshner, the Soviet Union lost the Cold War 'not because of military weakness but because ... its defense burden became onerous, it fell further behind technologically, and was unable to produce economic growth'.⁴⁵

The strategy for the ADF for the next 15 years should centre on minimising force size for the greater strategic good of the Australian economy—but only to the extent that credible core capabilities can be maintained. Such capabilities need to be maintained in order to deter would-be aggressors, make a meaningful contribution to the US alliance, respond to limited warning crises, and provide a solid baseline force from which mobilisation can be enabled if required.

Conclusion

This article has argued that the ADF needs to be careful when applying lessons from history to inform its future planning. It has selectively drawn lessons from history to highlight the characteristics required of the ADF for the next 15 years. These characteristics are shaped by the environment that the ADF can expect to operate in, the tasks the government-of-the-day expects the ADF to undertake, and the capabilities that are required to undertake these tasks.

The ADF needs to learn from but not be anchored by its experience from Afghanistan, and apply it within the context of the Indo-Pacific arc. It needs to understand and engage with future regional partners and adversaries, as well as contingency plan for a worst case scenario. The ADF must be designed for the defence of Australia and protection of SLOCs by generating mobile, long-range capabilities, enabled by ISR, to operate in the air-sea gap.

In designing its force structure for the defence of Australia and planning for high-end warfighting, the ADF needs to remain flexible, adaptable and willing to scale-down high-end warfighting capabilities to conduct broader, lower-intensity expeditionary operations within the region. The ADF must emphasise its traditional strengths of superior technology, training and interoperability to compensate for its inevitable small size—and must be willing to commit to minor operations for the learning experience rather than the fulfilment of a national interest.

Expertise must be built with other arms of government to develop a more coordinated and effective national approach to crises. With decreasing funding momentum, ADF resources are likely to come under further budgetary pressures. Minimising defence resource allocation during peace would allow the nation to focus on building economic strength, which would ultimately better enable the ADF for future contingencies.

Core capabilities need to be preserved during this process in order to maintain a credible deterrence effect, contribute to the US alliance, and provide a solid baseline from which to mobilise if required. Capabilities that are easy to raise and train could be reduced in size, which would decrease organisational inertia and increase agility. Finally, any reduction in force size would need an increased intelligence effort to assure sufficient warning time to achieve mobilisation in the event of a crisis.

Perhaps the most pertinent lesson from history for the ADF over the next 15 years is the requirement to remain flexible. A flexible ADF is central to compensating for the vagaries of prediction, and for adapting operational experience to the 'new' operating environment of the Indo-Pacific arc. Flexibility within the force will allow it to adapt to the task at hand, whether it be engaging future regional coalition partners in

peacetime, conducting scaled-down expeditionary operations across the region in limited war, or participating in high-end warfighting alongside the US.

Flexibility also facilitates working effectively within a diverse coalition, as well as with other arms of government, to achieve the optimal application of 'smart power'. Finally, flexibility affords the organisation maturity to accept any reduction in funding or force size during peacetime, with the conviction to maintain core capabilities as the basis for rapid mobilisation. As Michael Howard has asserted:

[W]hatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, they have got it wrong... What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. It is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine from being too badly wrong.⁴⁶

Flexibility is the key to the ADF being not 'too badly wrong' over the next 15 years.

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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the RAAF, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government more broadly.

NOTES

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- ¹ This is an edited version of a paper titled 'An essay on the future of the ADF' submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff Course at the Australian Command and Staff College at the Australian Defence College in 2014.
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 - ³ David Petraeus, 'Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam', *Parameters*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1987, p. 44.
 - ⁴ Richards J. Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA: Washington DC, 1999, p. 39.
 - ⁵ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, p. 40.

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- 6 Australian Government, *Strong and Secure: a strategy for Australia's national security*, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet: Canberra, 2013, p. 27.
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- 8 Australian Government, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 10.
- 9 Australian Government, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 9.
- 10 Stanley Brogden, 'Strategic Air Command – The Passing of an Era', *Aircraft and Aerospace*, Vol. 72, No. 4, May 1989, p. 17; Tony Mason, 'The Domination of Confrontation', in Tony Mason (ed.), *Air Power: a centennial appraisal*, Brassey's: London, 1994, p. 82.
- 11 Adrian Lewis, 'Amphibious Doctrine: the British and American visions', in Adrian Lewis (ed.), *Omaha Beach: a flawed victory*, University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2001, pp. 49-50.
- 12 Joseph Alexander, *Storm Landings: epic amphibious battles in the Central Pacific*, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 1997, pp. 12-4; Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory: the problem solvers who turned the tide in the Second World War*, Allen Lane: New York, 2013, p. 309.
- 13 Hugh Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Summer 1995, p. 536. According to the 2007 Defence census, 87 per cent of all ADF personnel are Australian-born, compared with only 71 per cent of the general population. Only 1 per cent of ADF personnel are from Asia, compared with 6 per cent for the broader community: Anthony Bergin, 'Ethnic push could be a distraction', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 July 2009, available at <<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/ethnic-push-could-be-a-distraction-20090715-dlkb.html>> accessed 4 June 2014.
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- 16 Australian Government, *Defence White Paper 2013*, p. 26.
- 17 Phillip Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? How Can We Know?*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2009, p. 19. Tetlock is best known for his scientific analysis of more than 80,000 predictions by experts. The results were devastating, with experts performing worse than if they had simply assigned equal probabilities to possible outcomes.
- 18 As Kahneman surmised, 'in other words, people who spend their time, and earn their living, studying a particular topic produce poorer predictions than dart-throwing monkeys who would have distributed their choices evenly over the options': Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, Penguin: London, 2011, pp. 218-9.
- 19 Malcom J. Muir, 'A Failed Blockade: Air and Sea Power in Korea, 1950-1953', in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine (eds.), *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies 1805-2005*, Routledge: Abingdon, 2006, p. 144.
- 20 Mark Adkin, *Goose Green: a battle is fought to be won*, Leo Cooper: London, 1992, p. 35.
- 21 Mike Smith and Matthew Uttley, 'Military Power in a Multipolar World', in Andrew Dorman *et al* (eds.), *The Changing Face of Military Power: joint warfare in the expeditionary era*, Palgrave: New York, 2002, p. 4; John Andreas Olsen (ed.), *A History of Air Warfare*, Potomac Books: Washington DC, 2010, p. 183.
- 22 This has broadly been the case since the 1987 White Paper, which acknowledged that 'Australia's strategic circumstances were relatively benign': Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force', p. 533; Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, p. 17.
- 23 Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, p. 17.
- 24 Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force', p. 532.
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- 30 Daniel Marston, 'Vietnam War: military culture', lecture presented at the Australian Command and Staff College, Canberra, ACT, 22 May 2014.
- 31 Analysis of the 2012-13 Major Projects Report indicates that it takes an average of more than 11 years to procure a major capability and bring it into service within the ADF. This is based on an average project timeframe for the top 30 projects by value: Australia National Audit Office, *2012-13 Major Projects Report - Defence Materiel Organisation*, Report No. 12, Auditor-General's Office: Canberra, 2013-14, pp. 72 and 128.
- 32 Adkin, *Goose Green*, p. 35.
- 33 Mike Smith and Matthew Uttley, 'Military Power in a Multipolar World', in Dorman *et al*, *The Changing Face of Military Power*, p. 6.
- 34 Smith and Uttley, 'Military Power in a Multipolar World', p. 8.
- 35 Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory*, p. 312.
- 36 Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, p. 17.
- 37 Peter Jennings, 'The US Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: an Australian erspective', *Asia Policy*, No. 15, January 2013, p. 43.
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- 42 Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force,' p. 533.
- 43 Kirshner, 'Political economy in security studies after the cold war', p. 76.
- 44 Herman Wolk, 'Sixty-Five Years on: plans and strategy to defeat Japan in World War II', *Air Power History*, Vol. 57, No. 3, p. 6.
- 45 Kirshner, 'Political economy in security studies after the cold war', p. 75.
- 46 Michael Howard, 'Military Science in the Age of Peace', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 119, March 1974, p. 7.