



[REDACTED]

INQUIRY REPORT
Headquarters Joint Operations Command

CJOPS

INQUIRY OFFICERS REPORT INTO AN AFGHAN CHILD SUSTAINING A GUNSHOT WOUND, IN URUZGAN PROVINCE, ON 1 MAY 2012

References:

A. Chief of Joint Operations Instrument of Appointment (including Terms of Reference) dated 25 May 2012.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

E. DI(G) OPS 48-1 Tactical Payment Scheme

G. CDF - OP SLIPPER Rules of Engagement

Appointment and Terms of Reference

1. I, [REDACTED] Colonel [REDACTED] DSM having been duly appointed by [REDACTED] Lieutenant General Ashley Power AO, CSC, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), to inquire into the circumstances and facts surrounding an Afghan child sustaining a gunshot wound in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, on 1 May 2012 in accordance with Reference A herein submit my report.

Inquiry Officer Team

2. The Inquiry Team consisted of me as the Inquiry Officer and [REDACTED] Major [REDACTED] as the Assistant Inquiry Officer.

Introduction

3. On 1 May 2012, as part of a Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) [REDACTED] mission in Uruzgan Province, a [REDACTED] Afghan male, [REDACTED] was shot by [REDACTED] (SOTG), resulting in wounds [REDACTED] The

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

boy was evacuated to International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) medical facilities and released from ISAF medical care on 5 May 2012. The boy was paid a tactical (compensation) payment of [REDACTED] on 5 Jun 2012 by SOTG [REDACTED] staff. The SOTG Quick Assessment of the Incident is at [REDACTED]

4. Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) 633 forwarded a Decision Brief to CJOPS on 6 May recommending that CJOPS 'undertake an Inquiry Officer Inquiry into the incident'. The Decision Brief is at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), Lieutenant General David Hurley AC, DSC initially informed the Minister for Defence about the incident on 2 May 2012 and again on 13 May 2012, [REDACTED] noting that:

- a. [REDACTED] determined that the SOTG soldier operated within the approved ROE, and
- b. an Inquiry Officer Inquiry into the incident is to occur due to the sensitivity of civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incidents.

5. On 25 May 2012 CJOPS directed an Inquiry into the circumstances and facts surrounding the incident.

Methodology and Approach

6. The majority of the Inquiry was conducted through the conduct of interviews and collection of reports from SOTG (Australian and Afghan) elements located in Multi National Base - Tarin Kowt (MNB-TK). Further correlation of evidence was gained through interviews and the collection of records in Kandahar (ISAF Role 3 Medical Facility) and at Headquarters (HQ) JTF 633 in the United Arab Emirates.

Synopsis of Incident

7. My synopsis is based on a compilation of information drawn from interviews and reports from a variety of sources. Where appropriate, I have highlighted key areas of inconsistency between ISAF and Afghan civilian versions of events and subsequently dealt with these inconsistencies throughout the Terms of Reference consideration or within my recommendations.

8. On 1 May 2012, an element of the SOTG [REDACTED] conducted a [REDACTED] mission [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was known to regularly conduct insurgent activity in [REDACTED] within the Tarin Kowt District, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan. [REDACTED] is a mid level insurgent commander based in [REDACTED]. The SOTG element involved in the incident [REDACTED] consisted of a combined Afghan and Australian force of [REDACTED] personnel. The Afghan personnel were members of the [REDACTED] and the Australian element consisting of personnel from [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

9. On [REDACTED] 2012 [REDACTED] was attending a large insurgent shura [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approached the shura [REDACTED] and immediately commenced [REDACTED]

10. As part of this [REDACTED] operation, [REDACTED] was commanding the [REDACTED] position, consisting of a force of [REDACTED]. At approximately [REDACTED] hours, Sergeant [REDACTED] observed two Afghan adult males (AMs) approach his [REDACTED] position from the [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] assessed that the two AMs were attempting to escape the [REDACTED]. At a distance of 50-100 metres, the two males were challenged verbally, in Pashtu, by Sergeant [REDACTED] and his [REDACTED]. On hearing the verbal challenge (a direction to halt), the two AMs changed direction and attempted to move away from the blocking position towards the [REDACTED]. The AMs were heading towards a rock wall on elevated ground. Sergeant [REDACTED] assessed that the rock wall, on elevated ground, provided a position of tactical advantage to the AMs, if they were to reach it. [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED] a 13 year old Afghan male child who was the vicinity of Sergeant [REDACTED] states that he was drawing water from a well when [REDACTED] commenced its insertion. He was aware of the arrival of Australian forces and states he was calm and that it was routine to have 'foreign' forces in the area. [REDACTED] states that the two AMs challenged by Sergeant [REDACTED] were known to him and had been sleeping in the field, in a 'Mana' (a wooden shelter) when [REDACTED] inserted. [REDACTED] states that the two AMs were walking from the field to their residence at the time of the verbal challenge. [REDACTED] states the two AMs momentarily paused at his location, during this time he told the two men to be careful and to sit down as there were coalition forces in the area conducting a 'raid' however, the two males continued to move.

12. Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both describe that the AMs were within 50-100 metres from their location and within 20 metres of the rock wall, moving with urgency, in a crouched [REDACTED] fashion, through dense vegetation. Both Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continued to verbally direct the two AMs to halt. These verbal challenges were ignored by the AMs who continued to move toward the wall, glancing over their shoulders at Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Sergeant [REDACTED] was unsure if the AM's were armed, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sergeant [REDACTED] then engaged the AMs with a single shot, which missed the AMs but caused them to increase their speed.

13. [REDACTED] states that on hearing the single shot, the two AMs continued to move and he followed them in order to convince them to stop. At this stage he says he was within one metre of the two AMs.

14. When the AMs continued to move after the initial shot, Sergeant [REDACTED] then engaged the lead AM and at that time observed a third person fall, in the close proximity of the lead AM. This third person had not been previously noticed. [REDACTED] was also raising his weapon to engage the AMs, convinced they were insurgents moving to a position of tactical advantage (because Sergeant [REDACTED] fired first, he didn't fire).

15. Following the second engagement, the two AMs halted and waited in the vicinity of the fallen person. Sergeant [REDACTED] states that it is common for AMs being pursued by ISAF forces to stop when they realise continued attempts to evade are likely to lead to their injury or death. Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] approached the scene and identified the fallen person as an Afghan boy (later confirmed to be [REDACTED] with a [REDACTED]). Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then secured the immediate area and commenced first aid on the boy, including the restraint of the two AMs who remained at the incident scene. Care of the casualty was then continued by [REDACTED] and then [REDACTED] while Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] coordinated the casualty evacuation (by helicopter) and maintained control of the ongoing tactical situation.

16. A limited search was conducted of the immediate area and no weapons were found. The two Afghan males were questioned, both knew the boy's name and one of the Afghan males claimed to be the boy's brother in law. [REDACTED] states that after he was wounded one of the AMs picked him up and moved him into a shaded area prior to the arrival of the Australians. Sergeant [REDACTED] states that the two men had inconsistent stories about why they were in the area, what they were doing, and why they didn't stop when challenged. Ultimately the two AMs were released, it was assessed that the lack of evidence directly linked to them was highly unlikely to draw a conviction. The broader operation resulted in the detainment of [REDACTED] personnel, including [REDACTED].

17. [REDACTED] was evacuated to the Role 2 Medical Facility at Multi-National Base Tarin Kowt (MNBTK) arriving at [REDACTED] hours [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The discovery of these items was not reported by the Role 2 Medical Facility staff (to anyone) until interviewed by the Inquiry Team (6 June 2012). The Medical Staff handed the items to the child's father on 1 May 2012. The Afghan boy (with his father) was transferred to the [REDACTED].

ISAF Role 3 Medical Facility at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) later that day [REDACTED]

18. Following the evacuation of [REDACTED] and the conclusion of the mission, a simple Shura was conducted with approximately [REDACTED] members of the local [REDACTED] population, including village elders. The shooting of the boy was discussed with the village elders, no anger was expressed, [REDACTED] stated that they were too shocked to comment at that stage, and just wanted to know what was occurring. [REDACTED] also stated that at the end of the Shura [REDACTED] had a heated argument, which he believed to be over the shooting. [REDACTED] the senior Australian who led the Shura, has no recollection of any dispute or altercation at the Shura site, nor does [REDACTED] who was also present. During the Shura the child's father was identified, who indicated he would like to be with his son at the ISAF medical facility. The father was then moved by helicopter to MNB-TK. The father remained with the boy throughout his subsequent transition to KAF. The boy was released from the Role 3 Medical Facility at KAF on 5 May 2012 and moved to Mirawais Hospital in Kandahar City (known colloquially as the 'Chinese Hospital' by the local population) for further treatment. [REDACTED] was released from Mirawais Hospital on approximately 1 June 2012 and taken back to [REDACTED]

19. [REDACTED] was subsequently located and questioned as part of this Inquiry on 5 June 12, through the assistance of the Uruzgan Provincial Governor. At the conclusion of the Inquiry Interview, SOTG [REDACTED] personnel paid a tactical (compensation) payment of [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] in accordance with [REDACTED]. Additionally, a similar compensation payment was made by the Provincial Governor (exact amount unknown, though he noted publicly that his payment was more than the Australian's paid - [REDACTED])

Evidence as to the Events Surrounding the Incident

20. Evidence was gathered from a number of sources. There were seventeen (17) witnesses interviewed during this Inquiry and the transcriptions of those interviews in chronological order can be found at Appendices 1-17 of [REDACTED]. The witness list can be grouped as evidence provided by:

- a. Afghan [REDACTED] and Australian soldiers at the scene,
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. The operations staff and hierarchy of JTF633,
- d. The operations staff and hierarchy of SOTG [REDACTED] and
- e. The Role 2 and Role 3 Medical Facility staff.

[REDACTED]

21. Documentary Evidence. Documentary evidence gathered during this Inquiry includes:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. Australian National Reporting, and
- d. ISAF Operational Summaries and Incident Reports.

22. SOTG [REDACTED] was particularly helpful and proactive in supporting the Inquiry. All of the SOTG [REDACTED] witnesses were highly experienced and trained soldiers and conducted themselves in a very professional and laconic manner. I found no evidence of collusion nor any attempt to reconstruct their version of events to compliment other versions provided their colleagues. Variations in individuals recollection of events are to be expected given vagaries of individual memory, different perspectives from which observations were made, the high tempo and intensity of operations being simultaneously undertaken by the majority of witnesses, and the general chaotic nature of the incident within an environment of close combat.

The Incident Site

23. The Inquiry Team did not visit the incident site. This is not regarded as an impediment to the outcomes of this Inquiry. Detailed imagery and supporting descriptions of the area has provided the Inquiry Team with sufficient terrain information from which to orient my understanding and base my findings and recommendations. [REDACTED]

The Role 3 Medical Facility, Kandahar Airfield

24. The Inquiry Team visited the ISAF Role 3 Medical Facility and gained copies of [REDACTED] records. Unfortunately, the medical staff who were involved in the treatment of the boy could not be made available for interview. Regardless, based on evidence during interview, both [REDACTED] and his father were highly complimentary of the treatment and broader care received at the Role 3 Facility. As previously indicated, the Casualty notes from the Role 3 Medical Facility are at [REDACTED]

Environmental Conditions

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25. **Terrain.** Imagery of the incident site [REDACTED] and related witness interviews, particularly Sergeant [REDACTED] indicate that [REDACTED] was shot in a poppy field, with poppies growing densely to the waist height of a man. The field was also densely populated with trees which were casting shadows at the time of the engagement. There was a minor slope in the ground, upwards from Sergeant [REDACTED] location toward the location where the two AMs and [REDACTED] were located at the time of the engagement.

26. **Weather.** The weather conditions at the time of the incident were fine with no inclement conditions or haze prevailing (Descriptions from within [REDACTED])

27. **Visibility.** The thick poppy growth and large number of trees reduced visibility to between typical adult waist and head level. Foliage and shadows degraded clarity of view across the field [REDACTED]

The Terms of Reference

28. The Terms of Reference directed that evidence be obtained on the following:
- a. The circumstances of the incident;
 - b. The post incident response from the immediate aftermath of the incident through to reporting, personnel management and review of procedures;
 - c. The wider post incident response, including reporting, personnel management and any review of procedures;
 - d. Whether any person has, or is likely to have, any claim for compensation including for a discretionary tactical payment;
 - e. Whether or not the circumstances of the incident, or its aftermath, indicate that there were deficiencies or weaknesses in the performance of any partnered force element and/or system deficiencies or weaknesses in the performance of Australian or Afghan security forces;
 - f. With respect to the significant aspects of the ADF's performance during this incident, what went well and, in particular, reflects positively on the ADF and/or ADF personnel involved (individually or collectively) and/or could be used as a model for future operations; and
 - g. any ancillary matters touching upon the Terms of Reference.

Findings. Terms of Reference A: The Circumstances of the Incident

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

29. **General Circumstances.** [REDACTED] a thirteen year old Afghan male child, was shot by Sergeant [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hours on 1 May 2012. The incident occurred in the vicinity of [REDACTED] Tarin Kowt District, Uruzgan Province (exact location [REDACTED]). The unit conducting the mission was [REDACTED] (partnered with Afghan [REDACTED] forces) from SOTG [REDACTED]. The mission of [REDACTED] at the time of the incident was to [REDACTED].

30. **Force Dispositions and Command and Control.** [REDACTED] states that on 1 May 2012 [REDACTED] consisted of [REDACTED] personnel, including [REDACTED] Australians and [REDACTED] Afghans. The command and control relationship between the Australians and Afghans is outlined at [REDACTED] and states that Afghan [REDACTED] forces involved in the incident were subject to Australian command and control at the time of the incident.

31. **Nature and Cause of Injuries.** The only person injured at the incident scene was [REDACTED] who suffered a gunshot wound from a [REDACTED] at a range of 50-100 metres. [REDACTED]

32. **Planning, Preparation and Ability to Identify Hostile Force.** It is clear from the witness statements [REDACTED] and the orders for the mission that the Australians had a highly refined understanding of the physical and human terrain within which they were operating within on 1 May 2012. The mission brief [REDACTED] is comprehensive and compliments a much deeper tactical and environmental awareness that members of SOTG develop during their deployment, pre deployment preparation and previous deployments. It should be noted that most of the SOTG [REDACTED] personnel involved in this incident had conducted hundreds of similar missions on multiple deployments to Uruzgan Province. Sergeant [REDACTED] is currently on his [REDACTED] deployment to Afghanistan, and few, if any, Australians would have a better understanding of the Uruzgan tactical environment – his knowledge and experience is widely respected across the SOTG. The actions of the two AMs verbally challenged by both Sergeant [REDACTED] and his [REDACTED] colleague were consistent with a known and recognised insurgent behaviour. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All SOTG personnel interviewed had numerous experiences in being confronted by Afghan males behaving in this manner and subsequently engaged by them with small arms fire. [REDACTED] version of events; that he was gathering water at the well and that the AMs were walking back from 'sleeping in the field' lacks credibility. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and that there was no well nor water carrying device in the area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

33. **Application of Rules Of Engagement (ROE).** The relevant ROE to this incident is the [REDACTED]. In particular, the evidence gathered during the course of interviews including [REDACTED] made reference to 'insurgent hostilities'.

According to witness evidence the means and methods used by SOTG to identify any hostile person/s elements is based on a case by case assessment of known insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On the facts gathered during this Inquiry, I assess this incident involving the shooting of the [REDACTED] was not a case of self defence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] That is, the threat of violence faced by [REDACTED] was not imminent given the individuals were attempting to evade him without open display of weapons.

34. It is my assessment, however, that the decision by [REDACTED] to engage the two AMs was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

35. On the facts gathered during this Inquiry, in particular evidence from the interview with [REDACTED] personnel at the incident site, (particularly [REDACTED]) I assess it was not possible to capture the two individuals given the distance between the Partnered Force and the two AMs. In addition, based on the evidence, the decision to engage the two individuals was reasonable and necessary given Sergeant [REDACTED] tactical circumstances. Notwithstanding, Sergeant [REDACTED] state they did give repeated and direct verbal warnings (in Pashtu) prior to the engagement for the two individuals "to stop" which were ignored. From there, the two individuals continued to move tactically away from Sergeant [REDACTED]. I assess it was open on the facts for Sergeant [REDACTED] to form a reasonable belief based on his considerable experience and understanding of the tactical environment that the two individuals were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The evidence further supports the fact that at no stage prior to or during the attack did Sergeant [REDACTED] identify [REDACTED] was in the immediate vicinity of the two AMs.

Findings. Terms of Reference B: The post incident response from the immediate aftermath of the incident through to reporting, personnel management and review of procedures.

36. **Incident Site.** The immediate post incident response was well handled, with those present [REDACTED] stating that treatment of [REDACTED] was the local mission priority until he was evacuated to the Role 2 Medical Facility at MNB-TK. On arrival at the incident site, Sergeant [REDACTED] reported the civilian casualty as a Category A casualty (Category A is a classification of 'urgent' priority with the patient required to be evacuated to a Role 2 or 3 Medical Facility within 60 minutes) and conducted immediate first aid on the boy. Sergeant [REDACTED] was quickly joined and supported by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is a trained Patrol Medic and remained with [REDACTED] until responsibility for his care and treatment was assumed by the Role 2 Medical Facility at MNB-TK. [REDACTED] details that [REDACTED] arrived at the Role 2 Medical Facility at [REDACTED] hours, 49 minutes after he was shot.

37. At the conclusion of the mission [REDACTED] convened a Shura with the [REDACTED] elders. During this Shura the shooting of [REDACTED] was addressed and his last known condition and evacuation to MNB-TK explained. At this time, [REDACTED] father was identified and he was subsequently moved to the Role 2 Medical Facility to be with his son.

38. **Role 2 Medical Facility, MNB-TK.** [REDACTED] was treated at the Role 2 Medical Facility by [REDACTED] Trauma Surgeon, United States Navy [REDACTED]

39. [REDACTED] at the Role 2 Facility and was immediately treated for wounds [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No damage was identified beyond the gunshot wound.

40. [REDACTED] assessed that better injury imaging facilities were available at the Role 3 Medical Facility at KAF, in addition to access to [REDACTED] was transferred, via C130 aircraft, to the KAF Role 3 Medical Facility at approximately [REDACTED] hours on 1 May 2012. The boy's father moved with him to KAF.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

41. Throughout the interview with [REDACTED] it was clear that [REDACTED] was cognisant of Afghan religious and cultural sensitivities and treated the boy and his father with appropriate respect. [REDACTED] and his father expressed gratitude and praise for how the boy was treated by ISAF medical staff throughout his treatment [REDACTED]

Role 3 Medical Facility, Kandahar Airfield.

42. [REDACTED] was treated at the KAF Role 3 Medical Facility between 1 -5 May 2012 [REDACTED] before being transferred to Mirawais Hospital (civilian hospital) in Kandahar City. The boy's progress was routinely monitored by SOTG while he was in ISAF medical care, however awareness of his progress was lost from 5 May 2012, when he was transferred to civilian facilities. It was anticipated that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would monitor progress and relocate the boy from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt, however there is no evidence of the being monitored. Following the arrival of the Inquiry Team, at the request of SOTG, the Uruzgan Provincial Governor located the boy and had him transported to the Governor's residence for interview and tactical (compensation) payment on 5 June 12.

Findings. Terms of [REDACTED] The wider post incident response, including reporting, personnel management and any review of procedures.

43. **Reporting.** Relevant reports, in chronological order, pertaining to Terms of [REDACTED] are:

a. [REDACTED] May 12;

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

b. [Redacted] May 12;

[Redacted]

c. [Redacted] May 12;

[Redacted]

d. [Redacted] May 12;

[Redacted]

e. [Redacted] May 12 - [Redacted]

f. [Redacted] May 12 - [Redacted]

g. [Redacted] Jun 12 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

h. [REDACTED] Jun 12;

44. The above reports are within reporting requirements for both Australian National Directives [REDACTED] and the ISAF policies [REDACTED] for CIVCAS reporting. The reports are consistent with the established circumstances surrounding the shooting of [REDACTED]. Early SOTG reports of the incident indicated the injury to [REDACTED] was the result of a ricocheted round [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that it was initially assessed that the round was most likely to be a ricochet off one of the many 'fruit trees' [REDACTED] in the field. However later reporting no longer referred to a ricochet, as CO SOTG later believed that the ricochet assessment could not be justified [REDACTED]. The close proximity of [REDACTED] to the two AMs being engaged by Sergeant [REDACTED] and the nature of the wound, indicate that it was unlikely to be a ricochet that wounded [REDACTED].

45. There is no reporting or tracking of the casualty from the time of release from ISAF medical care (5 May 12) until he is interviewed by the Inquiry Team and paid a tactical (compensation) payment by SOTG staff on 5 Jun 12. [REDACTED] was admitted to Miriwais Hospital for the majority of this period.

Personnel Management

46. As indicated by CO SOTG at [REDACTED] all personnel involved in the incident have had access to administrative, emotional and religious support services. No shortfalls in personnel support services have been identified as a part of this inquiry.

Tactical Payment

47. There is no evidence that the next of kin of the child has ever been advised of any eligibility and rights with regard to claims for compensation from Australian forces. Regardless, [REDACTED] I assess [REDACTED] was eligible for his discretionary payment of [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] Jun 12, as he had suffered an injury because of an incident that occurred in the course of an ADF operational activity [REDACTED]. Notwithstanding that the Role 2 Medical Facility staff [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] that basis I assess he remains eligible for payment and no further action is required.

Findings. Terms of Reference E: Deficiencies and Weaknesses

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

48. No deficiencies or weaknesses were identified in the understanding and application of:

- a. ROE;
- b. compensation and tactical payments;
- c. medical, cultural or religious treatment of the civilian casualty;
- d. command and control relationships and arrangements;
- e. professional competencies and personnel performances; or
- f. welfare and administrative support to personnel involved in the incident.

49. [REDACTED] states that [REDACTED] however no process for routine reporting/monitoring is specified. There is a lack of ADF/ISAF situational awareness of the medical condition and location of [REDACTED] from the time he is released from the Role 3 Medical Facility at KAF on [REDACTED] May 2012 until he was interviewed by the Inquiry Team at the Provincial Governors Residence on 5 June 2012. It is reasonable to expect ADF/ISAF forces to have been aware of [REDACTED] medical condition and location from [REDACTED] May 12 to 5 Jun 12 [REDACTED]. This was not the case.

50. During the Inquiry Interview of 6 Jun 12, [REDACTED] Trauma Surgeon, United States Navy [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

51. There were no deficiencies identified in Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) actions with regard to this incident.

Findings. Terms of Reference F: With Respect to the significant aspects of the ADF's performance during this incident, what went well and, in particular, reflect positively on the ADF personnel involved (individually or collectively) and/or could be used as a model for future operations.

52. Upon identification of a child civilian casualty the local priority for [REDACTED] shifted temporarily. The immediate post incident response was well handled. Three SOTG [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

personnel conducted first aid on [REDACTED] and a coordinated response between [REDACTED] and SOTG Headquarters staff quickly diverted a helicopter to conduct the aero-medical evacuation. [REDACTED] arrived at the Role 2 Medical Facility at [REDACTED] hours, 49 minutes after he was shot.

53. At the completion of the successful mission, [REDACTED] personnel identified [REDACTED] father and rapidly coordinated his movement by helicopter to the Role 2 Medical Facility at MNBTK to be with his son.

Findings. Terms of Reference G: Any ancillary matters touching upon these Terms of Reference.

54. No ancillary matters were identified in the course of this Inquiry which require consideration under this Terms of Reference.

Findings Summary

55. The Inquiry findings are summarised in matrix form at [REDACTED]

Recommendations

56. The Inquiry recommendations are outlined in the table below.

Serial	Inquiry Officer Recommendations	Decision	Remarks
6.a.(1)	CDF [REDACTED] Rules of Engagement [REDACTED] remains appropriate and suitable for ADF elements deployed to OP SLIPPER.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:
6.a.(2)	No risk mitigation, reduction or prevention measure is required as a result of this incident.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:
6.a.(3)	1. ADF processes for civilian casualty tracking be reviewed in order to ensure that casualties are routinely monitored over prolonged periods until the issue is formally closed.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:
	[REDACTED]	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:

[REDACTED]

6.b.	With the exception of the ADF monitoring of the civilian casualty once released from ISAF medical facilities [REDACTED] no weaknesses in the system of casualty control or its application were identified.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:
6.c.	No changes to extant ADF, ISAF and ANSF Command and Control arrangements are required as a result of this incident.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:
6.d.	No further investigation or action is required to be taken against any individual.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:
6.e.	No other operational issues are required to be addressed.	AGREED/ NOT AGREED	COMMENT:

[REDACTED]
Colonel [REDACTED]
Inquiry Officer

~~24~~ May 2013

Annexes:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Appendices to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]